TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2019 (5) TMI 1752
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....59 (hereinafter referred to as Act 1959) claiming his Ambalam right. The Joint Commissioner of Hindu Religious & charitable endowment Board after holding an inquiry passed an order dated 21.12.2010 holding that appellant to be entitled for Ambalam Right and to receive first respect as an Ambalam in the village, Tirupathartalu, Shiv Gangi District, Tamil Nadu. 2.2 Two writ petitions were filed in the High Court challenging the order dated 31.12.2010 being W.P.M.D. No. 14382 of 2011 filed by Radha Krishnan and W.P. No.185 of 2012 filed by Madhavan. Both the writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court vide its judgment dated 10.01.2012. A W.P.M.D. No. 379 of 2012 was filed by one Laxmanan in which initially an interim order dated 12.01.2012 was passed. The third respondent P.R. Ramanathan filed an appeal No.2007 OF 2012 against the order dated 31.12.2010 passed by Joint Commissioner. The appeal filed by third respondent was under Section 69 of Act, 1959. W.P.M.D. No.3379 of 2013 was filed by P.R. Ramanathan, third respondent, seeking a direction to decide his statutory appeal filed under Section 69 of Act 1959. The High Court vide its judgment and order dated 07.03.2013 d....
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....Limitation Act is applicable only in application filed before a Court. The commissioner being not a Court, there was no applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 5. He further submits that by virtue of Section 115 of Act 1959, the only provision of the Limitation Act which has been made applicable is that the time requisite for obtaining certified copy of order or decree shall be excluded. He submits that specifically applying provisions of Section 12(2) of Limitation Act, indicates that other provisions have not been made applicable to the Act 1959. He submits that in event the limitation Act was to be applicable to the proceeding of appeal under 1959 Act, there was no occasion of Section 115 of Act 1959. Limitation Act has been applied only to the extent as mentioned in Section 115, other provisions are not applicable. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent refuting the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant submits that although Commissioner is not a Court as defined in Act 1959, but it is a court for the purposes of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Relying on Section 110, he submits that procedure provided for hearing of appeal is as nearly as may be in a....
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.... town, the Chennai City Civil Court; (ii) in relation to a math or temple situated elsewhere, the Subordinate Judge's Court having jurisdiction over the area in which the math or temple is situated, or if there is no such Court, the District Court having such jurisdiction; (iii) in relation to a specific endowment attached to a math or temple, the Court which would have jurisdiction as aforesaid in relation to the math or temple; (iv) in relation to a specific endowment attached to two or more maths or temples, any Court which would have jurisdiction as aforesaid in relation to either or any of such maths or temples;" 11. Section 8 of the Act, 1959 enumerates the authorities under the Act. Section 8 is as follows:- "Section 8.Authorities under the Act.- There shall be the following classes of authorities under this Act, namely.- (a) The Commissioner; (aa)Additional Commissioner; (b) Joint Commissioner; (c) Deputy Commissioners; and (d) Assistant Commissioners." 12. Section 9(1) provides that the Government shall appoint the Commissioner as it may think fit. Section 9(2) provides various modes....
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....Section 69 which is to the following effect: "Section 69.Appeal to the Commissioner.-(1) Any person aggrieved by any order passed by [the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be], under any of the foregoing sections of this chapter, may within sixty days from the date of the publication of the order or of the receipt thereof by him as the case may be, appeal to the Commissioner and the Commissioner may pass such order thereon as he thinks fit. (2) Any order passed by [the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be], in respect of which no appeal has been preferred within the period specified in sub-section (1) may be revised by the Commissioner suo motu and the Commissioner may call for and examine the records of the proceedings as to satisfy himself as to the regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed by 1[the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be]. Any such order passed by the Commissioner in respect of an order passed by [the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be], shall be deemed to have been pas....
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....ection 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 which appeal was dismissed holding that provisions of Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 are not applicable to nationalized Banks. After the dismissal of the said appeal the orders of Deputy Commissioner of Labour(Appeals) dated 01.09.1987 was challenged in this Court which too are rejected. It was thereafter appellant instituted a regular suit in the City Civil Court where the question came for consideration regarding applicability of Section 14 of Limitation Act. In the above case in paragraph 3 the issue was noted to the following effect: "3. In order to bring a suit within the period of limitation, the appellant claimed benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act on the ground that he had represented to the Local Board and, thereafter, filed an appeal under Section 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 and was, therefore, prosecuting "civil proceedings" in a court with due diligence. It is claimed that the entire period during which those proceedings were pending has to be excluded and if this is done, the suit will be well within limitation." 19. In the above context, ....
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.... the Judge(Revisions) are not courts, hence, Section 14 of the Limitation Act shall not be applicable. In paragraph 9 following has been laid down: "9. The above observations were quoted with approval by this Court in Jagannath Prasad case1 and it was held that a Sales Tax Officer under U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 was not a court within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure although he is required to perform certain quasi-judicial functions. The decision in Jagannath Prasad case it seems, was not brought to the notice of the High Court. In view of these pronouncements of this Court, there is no room for argument that the Appellate Authority and the Judge (Revisions) Sales tax exercising jurisdiction under the Sales Tax Act, are "courts". They are merely Administrative Tribunals and "not courts". Section 14, Limitation Act, therefore, does not, in terms apply to proceedings before such tribunals." 21. There being three-Judge Bench judgment having held that appellate authority under U.P. Sales Tax Act is not a Court, we are not persuaded to follow the judgment of two-Judge Bench in P Sarthy (supra). 22. Both the above questions being inter-connected....
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....ection 13 again refers to Court. Section 14 specifically refers to the Court. Section 14 of the Act is as follows: "Section 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. -(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of the appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a count of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court wh....
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....imitation". First Division deals with different kinds of suits. Second Division deals with appeals and Third Division deals with applications. The suits, appeals and applications which have been referred to in the Schedule obviously mean suits, appeals and applications to be filed in Court as per the provisions referred to in the Act noted above. 23. Section 29(2) provides that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation and the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 21 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Whether prescription of appeal of limitation of any suit or application in any special or local law relates to suit, application or appeal to be filed in Court or it may refer to statutory authorities and tribunals also, is the question to be answered. Different special or local laws have been enacted by Legislature ....
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.... held to have been so enlarged as to include within them applications to bodies other than courts, such as a quasi judicial tribunal, or even an executive authority. An Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court dealing with applications or references under the Act are not courts and they are in no way governed either by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure. We cannot, therefore, accept the submission made that this article will apply even to applications made to an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court............" 26. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Nityananda, M. Joshi and others. vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others, (1965) 2 SCC 199, had occasion to consider the applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act to an application filed under Section 33(c)(1) and (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Labour Court. Three-Jude bench categorically held that the scheme of the Limitation Act is that it only deals with application to Courts, and the Labour Court is not a Court within Limitation Act, 1963. Following was laid down in paragraph 3: "3. In our view Article 137 only contemplates applications to Courts. In the....
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.... the restoration applications remained pending as being prosecuted bona fide". The High Court answered the reference in affirmative which judgment was questioned before this Court. Three-Judge Bench held that the appellate authority and the Judge (Revisions) Sales-tax exercising jurisdiction under the Sales-tax Act are not courts and hence, Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not apply. Following was laid down by this Court in paragraphs 9 and 24: "9...............In view of these pronouncements of this Court, there is no room for argument that the Appellate Authority and the Judge (Revisions) Sales tax exercising jurisdiction under the Sales Tax Act, are "courts". They are merely Administrative Tribunals and "not courts". Section 14, Limitation Act, therefore, does not, in terms apply to proceedings before such tribunals........." 24. For all the reasons aforesaid, we are of the opinion that the object, the scheme and language of Section 10 of the Sales Tax Act do not permit the invocation of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, either in terms, or in principle, for excluding the time spent in prosecuting proceedings for setting aside the dismissal of appeals i....
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....etition was one contemplated by the Telegraph Act for judicial decision. The petition is an application falling within the scope of Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act." 30. In the above case since the application under the Telegraphs Act was filed before the Court, this Court held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act was applicable. It is to be noticed that in the above mentioned cases this Court held that applications contemplated under Limitation Act are applications to a Court but in the above cases the Court did not refer to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. 31. A two-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Sakuru vs. Tanaji, 1985(3) SCC 590, needs to be noticed. In the above case the question was as to whether delay in filing appeal before Court under Section 19 is condonable under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. This Court held that the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to proceedings in 'courts' and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than courts such as quasi-judicial tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on courts under the....
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....was in the following terms: 93. Limitations.-Every appeal and every application for revision under this Act shall be filed within sixty days from the date of the order against which the appeal or application is filed and the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply for the purpose of the computation of the said period. On a plain reading of the section it is absolutely clear that its effect is only to render applicable to the proceedings before the Collector, the provisions of the Limitation Act relating to "computation of the period of limitation". The provisions relating to computation of the period of limitation are contained in Sections 12 to 24 included in Part III of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5 is not a provision dealing with "computation of the period of limitation". It is only after the process of computation is completed and it is found that an appeal or application has been filed after the expiry of the prescribed period that the question of extension of the period under Section 5 can arise. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Venkaiah case1 that Section 93 o....
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....side the award on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 34 will have to be made within three months. The period can further be extended, on sufficient cause being shown, by another period of 30 days but not thereafter. It means that as far as application for setting aside the award is concerned, the period of limitation prescribed is three months which can be extended by another period of 30 days, on sufficient cause being shown to the satisfaction of the court." 36. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act as well as Section 34 of the Arbitration Act was referred to. This Court after noticing the provisions of Section 34 opined that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded. In paragraph 20 following has been laid down: "20. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act inter alia provides that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period of limitation prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period was the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by a....
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....in this case is dealing with Section 34 of the Act which confers powers on the court of the first instance to set aside an award rendered by an arbitrator on specified grounds. It is not the case of the contractor that the forums before which the Government of India undertaking had initiated proceedings for setting aside the arbitral award are not "courts". In view of these glaring distinguishing features, this Court is of the opinion that the decision rendered in CST did not decide the issue which falls for consideration of this Court and, therefore, the said decision cannot be construed to mean that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996." 38. Three-Judge Bench held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act was applicable to application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. R.V. Raveendran, J. in his concurring opinion has held that Sections 3 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act will not apply to proceedings before the tribunal, to appeals or applications before the tribunals, unless expressly provided. In paragraph 44 following was laid down: "44. It may be noticed a....
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....insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." A bare reading of this section would show that the special or local law described therein should prescribe for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule. This would necessarily mean that such special or local law would have to lay down that the suit, appeal or application to be instituted under it should be a suit, appeal or application of the nature described in the Schedule. We have already held that such suits, appeals or applications as are referred to in the Schedule are only to courts and not to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals. It is clear, therefore, that only when a suit, appeal or application of the description in the Schedule is to be filed in a court under a special or local law that the provision gets attracted. This is made even clearer by a reading of Section 29(3). Section 29(3) states: "29. Savings.-(1)-(2) * * * (3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under ....
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....or in relying on Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. In paragraph 4 of the judgment following was laid down: "4. There can be no manner of doubt that the U.P. Sales Tax Act answers to the description of a special or local law. According to sub- section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, reproduced above, for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Section 12(2), inter alia, shall apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. There is nothing in the U.P. Sales Tax Act expressly excluding the application of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act for determining the period of limitation prescribed for revision application. The conclusion would, therefore, follow that the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act of 1963 can be relied upon in computing the period of limitation prescribed for filing a revision petition under Section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act." 43. This Court held that Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act can be relied upon in computing the period of limitation prescribed for filing....
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....nt of this Court in CST, U.P. vs. M/s. Madan Lal Das & Sons having not referred to earlier judgments of equal strength, we are persuaded to follow the earlier three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in CST, U.P. vs. M/s. Parson Tools and Plants. 45. The judgment on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent is Mukri Gopalan vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, (1995) 5 SCC 5. In the above case, question for consideration was as to whether the appellate authority under Section 18 of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 has power to condone the delay in filing appeal. The issue which has been noticed in paragraph 1 is to the following effect: "1. In this appeal by special leave a short but an interesting question falls for determination. It is to the effect "whether the appellate authority constituted under Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rent Act') has power to condone the delay in the filing of appeal before it under the said section". Majority of the Kerala High Court in the case of Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma, AIR 1974 Ker 162, has taken the....
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....are found to be present. In fact, Mr Nariman, learned counsel for respondent also fairly stated that these appellate authorities would be courts and would not be persona designata............" 48. Section 29(2) was also considered. This Court further held that Section 29(2) will get attracted to appeals filed before appellate authority under Section 18 of the Rent Act. In paragraphs 11 and 15 following has been laid down: "11. It is also obvious that once the aforesaid two conditions are satisfied Section 29(2) on its own force will get attracted to appeals filed before appellate authority under Section 18 of the Rent Act. When Section 29(2) applies to appeals under Section 18 of the Rent Act, for computing the period of limitation prescribed for appeals under that Section, all the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply. Section 5 being one of them would therefore get attracted. It is also obvious that there is no express exclusion anywhere in the Rent Act taking out the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals filed before appellate authority under Section 18 of the Act. Consequently, all the legal requirements for applicabi....
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....supra), Mukri Gopalan has been referred to and has been held to be no longer good law in view of the earlier three-Judge judgments of this Court. Dealing with Mukri Gopalan's case two-Judge Bench in M.P. Steel Corporation had held following in paragraph 29 : "29. Quite apart from Mukri Gopalan case being out of step with at least five earlier binding judgments of this Court, it does not square also with the subsequent judgment in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt. A three-Judge Bench of this Court was asked to decide whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act would apply to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. After discussing the various provisions of the Arbitration Act and the Limitation Act, this Court held:............" 32. Obviously, the ratio of Mukri Gopalan does not square with the observations of the three-Judge Bench in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises. In the latter case, this Court has unequivocally held that Parson Tools is an authority for the proposition that the Limitation Act will not apply to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals. To the extent that Mukri Gopalan is in conflict with the judgment in Consolidated Engg. ....
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....s a court or not. Due to a reason that revision was filed before the High Court and there cannot be any issue as to the High Court is not a Court, thus, when revision application was filed before a Court Section 29(2) was clearly attracted applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The said judgment cannot be said to be authority for the proposition that in appeals filed before statutory authorities which are not Court, Section 5 of the Limitation act shall be attracted. Another judgement relied by the respondent is Syed Zalil Akhtar vs. Zila Sahkari Krishi Avam Gramn Vikas Bank, Mydt., (2016) 12 SCC 365. This Court in the above case was considering the power of condonation of delay in filing appeal under Section 55(2) of M.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1960. The High Court has upheld the decision of the M.P. State Cooperative Tribunal, appellant's application filed under Section 55(2) was belated and since there being no provision for condoning the delay in filing of the appeal and Section 5 of the Limitation Act was also not applicable. Two-Judge Bench has referred to Mukri Gopalan (supra). Relying on Mukri Gopalan and Anshuman Shukla, two-Judge Bench held that Section 5 of the Li....
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....1) The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act, 1963 are suits, appeals and applications which are to be filed in a Court. (2) The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act are not the suits, appeals and applications which are to be filed before a statutory authority like Commissioner under Act, 1959. (3) Operation of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is confined to the suits, appeals and applications referred to in a special or local law to be filed in Court and not before statutory authorities like Commissioner under Act, 1959. (4) However, special or local law vide statutory scheme can make applicable any provision of the Limitation Act or exclude applicability of any provision of Limitation Act which can be decided only after looking into the scheme of particular, special or local law. 55. We, thus, answer question Nos.2 and 3 in the following manner: (i) The applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is with regard to different limitations prescribed for any suit, appeal or application when to be filed in a Court. (ii) Section 29(2) cannot be pressed in service with re....
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....he appeal. 59. Section 115 deals with limitation. It only provides that in computing the period of limitation prescribed under Act, 1959 for any proceeding, suit, appeal or application for revision against any order or decree passed under this Act, the time requisite for obtaining a certified copy of such order or decree shall be excluded. 60. The provision of Section 69 of Act, 1959 also indicates that Legislature never contemplated applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in proceedings before Commissioner. Section 69(2) noted above provides that any order passed by the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may, in respect of which no appeal has been preferred within the period specified in sub-section (1) may be revised by the Commissioner suo motu and the Commissioner may call for and examine the records of the proceedings to satisfy himself as to the regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed by the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be. 61. Thus, Section 69(2) gives suo motu power to the Commissioner to call for and examine the records of the proceed....