AI Drafter 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1962 (2) TMI 124
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....2 of the Act. Respondent No. 2, on 19-8-1959, filed a written objection to the maintainability of the aforesaid complaint on the ground that the offence having come to the knowledge of the Inspector on 27-10-1957, the complaint was barred by limitation under Section 106 of the Act. It is not disputed that formerly the Inspector had inspected the distillery on 27-10-1957, 2-2-1958 and 23-10-1958 also and had raised similar objections. The trial Court, relying on an unreported decision of Pandey, J. in Shaligram Mehta v. State of M.P., Criminal Revn. No. 274 of 1958, D/-23-6-1959 (M. P.), held that as the complaint in the instant case had not been filed within three months of 27-10-1957, the date when the breach of the section first came to the knowledge of the Inspector, it was barred by time. Accordingly he dismissed the complaint and acquitted the respondents-accused. The appeal, therefore, raises a short question whether, under the circumstances of the case, the complaint was barred by limitation under Section 106 of the Act. The relevant portion of the aforesaid section is in the following terms: "No Court shall take cognisance of any offence punishable u....
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....ce committed on July 1 came to the knowledge of the inspector on that day, when he visited the respondents' factory. I, therefore, come to the conclusion that the information was laid in time." In The Public Presecutor v. Veerabhadrappa, AIR 1953 Mad 204, Govinda Menon, J., following an earlier decision of Subba Rao, J. in criminal revn. case No. 417 of 1950 (Mad) and the aforesaid decision of the King's Bench Division, held: "In the present case, as we have already held, the offence committed is a continuing one, and when the Inspector visited the factory on the second occasion on 24th January 1951, the offence committed on that date came to his knowledge on that day, and the prosecution having been launched within three months of that date is in time," To the same effect are the decisions in State v. Bhiwandiwalla, (S) AIR 1955 Bom 161 and State v. Laxmi Narain (2) and we respectfully agree with the aforesaid decisions. Again in State v. Kunj Behari, AIR 1954 Pat 371 (FB),; which was a case under the Mines Act (1923), a similar view based on the provisions of Section 42 of the Act, which is analogous to the provisions of Section 106 of the Factories Act, was t....
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....ecause Section 92 of the Act, while providing for the continuance of a contravention after a conviction, says that a penalty at the rate of Rs. 75/- for each day on which the contravention is continued may be levied. This can he interpreted to mean that in the case of continued contraventions the law intends to give locus paenitentiae to the accused to rectify the omission till the last moment of the day, which as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act, means 'a period of twenty-four hours beginning at midnight'. It would be noted that Section 92 of the Act uses an expression, 'the contravention is continued', and from this it is sought to be argued that the contravention is not (sic)ant to be punishable de die in diem as a separate fresh offence every day, unless Section 23 of the Limitation Act or the principle underlying it were to be invoked, We shall, therefore, briefly examine the concept underlying the expression 'continuing' when used in connection with crimes. To continue' means to remain in existence, not to cease. So that, when an offence is the product of a positive act, it is complete when the act ceases; and every repetition of such an ac....
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....or intermittent) but are deemed to be committed every day giving rise to a fresh cause of action de die in diem so long as the wrongful state of affairs subsists. In the words of the Lahore High Court in Khair Mohammad v. Mst. Jannat ILR 1941-22 Lah 22 at P. 28: (AIR 1940 Lah 359 at p. 360). "in considering whether the particular act complained of constitutes a 'continuing wrong' within the meaning of Section 23, for which the cause of action arises de die in diem, it is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between an 'injury' and the 'effects of that injury'. Where the injury complained of is complete on a certain date, there is no 'continuing wrong' even though the damage caused by that injury might continue, in such a case the cause of action to the person injured arises, once and for all, at the time when the injury is inflicted, and the fact that the effects of the injury are felt by the aggrieved person on subsequent occasions intermittently or even continuously does not make the injury a 'continuing wrong' so as to give him a fresh cause of action on each such occasion. If, however, the act is such that the injury itself ....
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....re negligent in launching prosecutions or indulgent in giving time to the defaulters to remedy the defects, the defaulters acquire a charter to keep the fermenting vats unfenced for ever? Because if the contention of the accused is accepted, that would be the result and all that the accused shall have to do is to stall for time till the limitation expires and then be free from the obligations under the provisions of the Act and the Rules which are made for the safety and well-being of the factory workers. A result so startling as this could never have been in the contemplation of the Legislature and any interpretation of the section which produces such a result has, in our opinion, to be avoided. We may examine the question from another angle also. The non-prosecution of the accused for the first default could not have placed him in any better position than as if he were acquitted for that default. But What relevance the acquittal or conviction of the accused for the first offence would have so far as their liability for the contravention of the provisions of the section on 26-3-1959 is concerned? Could they have pleaded autrefois acquit or autrefois convict? We do not think the....
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....7, a person who committed a further offence was liable to a fine not exceeding GBP20 for every day on which an offence triable by the justices was committed, and therefore, as the justices were not, by virtue of Section 104 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, concerned with an offence committed on any day more than six months prior to the date of the information, they could not impose a daily penalty in respect of any such day." We are, therefore, of opinion that the limitation provided under Section 106 of the Act only prescribes a trial jurisdiction for the Magistrate trying the case, so that in respect of an offence falling in point of date within the three months period he has jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint and, for an offence outside that period, he has no such jurisdiction. The contention based on the analogy of Section 23 of the Limitation Act is equally misconceived. It cannot be disputed that that section proprio vigore does not and cannot apply as it is concerned with breaches of contracts and wrongs independent of contract, and not with offences. And, as regards the principle underlying the section, it is of universal application, because all....