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2018 (5) TMI 1936

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....be recalled for conducting fresh hearings before the Regular Bench in view of Rule 34(5) of the Income-tax(Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 r.w.s 254(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter called "the Act").The Ld. Counsel brought to the notice of bench that hearing in this case in ITA no. 1994/Mum/2013 for AY 2007-08 was concluded on 29.10.2015 while the order was pronounced on 01.02.2016 and hence pronouncement was beyond the period of 90 days. The Ld. Counsel for the assessee relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Shivsagar Veg. Restaurant v. ACIT [2009] 317 ITR 433 (Bom), Hon'ble Bombay High Court decision in the case of Otters Club v. DIT (E) [Writ Petition no.2889 of 2016, dated 12.01.2017], decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ACIT v. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. [2008] 305 ITR 227 (SC) and decision of Mumbai Tribunal in G. Shoe Exports v. ACIT reported in [2018] 89 taxmann.com 308 (Mumbai tribunal) to support its contentions. 3. The Ld. DR objected to the recalling of the order and prayed for dismissal of MA on the grounds that power of tribunal is very limited so far as Section 254(2) is concern. 4. We have consid....

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....mpugned judgment has also rendered it vulnerable. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant has referred to various judgments of the Apex Court as well as of this Court and various other High Courts to show that only on the ground of delay in rendering the judgment for period ranging from four months to 10 months, judgments were held to be bad in law and set aside. It has been held time and again that justice should not only be done but should appear to have been done and that justice delayed is justice denied. Justice withheld is even worse than that. The Apex Court in the case of Madhav Hayawadar Rao Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra [1978] 3 SCC 544 has an occasion to take serious note of the prejudice normally caused to the litigant due to delayed delivery or pronouncement of the judgment for the reasons which are not attributable either to the litigant or to the State or to the legal profession. 13. In R.C. Sharma v. Union of India [1976] 3 SCC 754, the Apex Court after noticing absence of the provision in the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of time frame in delivery of judgment, observed as under : "Nevertheless, we think that an unreasonable del....

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....f three months from the date case is closed for judgment 7. From the above, we find that the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in the case referred above has held that unexplained delay in pronouncement of the order renders it vulnerable. It was held that such judgments were bad in law and were to be set aside. It was expounded that justice should not only be done, but should appear to have been done and that justice delayed is justice denied. The Hon'ble High Court has also referred to Hon'ble Apex Court decision where serious note was taken of the prejudice caused to the litigant due to delay in delivery or pronouncement of the judgment for the reasons not attributable either with the litigant or to the state or to the legal profession. 8. Furthermore, we find that the ITAT Rules vide Rule 34(5) provide rules as for the delivery of judgments, which provide for a maximum period of 3 months for the pronouncement of judgement after completion of hearing. The said rule read as under: Order to be pronounced, signed and dated 34. (1) ....... (5) The pronouncement may be in any of the following manners :- (a) The Bench ma....

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....re all questions still at large. Mr. Suresh Kumar, the learned counsel who appears for all the respondents, including the Registry of the Tribunal is unable to shed any light on the same. Moreover, we are unable to comprehend the meaning of 'Administrative clearance' in the face of Rule 34 (5)(c) read with Rule 34(8) of the Tribunal Rules. It is clear that the above provisions mandate the Tribunal to pronounce its order at the very latest on or before the 90th day, after the conclusion of the hearing. In fact, this Court in Shivsagar Veg. Restaurant (supra) after referring to various decisions of the Apex Court directed the President of the Tribunal to frame guidelines to prevent delay in delivery of orders/judgments. It also directed all the revisional and appellate authorities (including Tribunal) under the Act to decide the matters heard by them within a period of three months from the date of the conclusion of the hearing. This is further compounded by the fact that the submission of the petitioner in respect of the entire issue being covered by orders of coordinate benches was according to the petitioner, lost sight of while passing the order dated 3rd February, 2016. ....