TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2019 (10) TMI 151
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....registration or should leave the matter to be considered by Commissioner Income Tax to consider matter afresh giving rise to further litigation in the matter; (ii) Whether co-extensive Appellate jurisdiction conferred upon Income Tax Appellate Tribunal being a last court of fact can be read to confer upon it similar powers as been exercised by authorities below whose orders are considered in Appeals by Tribunal." 2. It was on an Appeal preferred by the Revenue under Section 260 (A) of Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1961'). The Appeal was preferred to challenge the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, which directed registration of the Trust under Section 12AA (1)(b) of the Act of 1961 within a period of sixty days, failing which it would deemed to have been registered. The challenge to said direction was made by the Revenue in reference to the judgment of the Division Bench in Income Tax Appeal No. 112 of 2013: Commissioner of Income Tax, Meerut vs. M/S. A.R. Trust Meerut decided on 04.09.2017 wherein it was held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal itself cannot direct for registration of a Trust, without recording satisfaction....
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....r registration is rejected by the Commissioner after recording a perverse finding then on an Appeal, it can be corrected after taking a proper view and recording satisfaction, as required under Section 12AA of the Act of 1961, to direct for registration of the Trust. If the required satisfaction is recorded by the Appellate Tribunal, then remand of the matter would be nothing but an empty formality, as the Commissioner cannot take a view different then taken by the Appellate Tribunal. The registration of the Trust needs to be granted if the Appeal is allowed by the Tribunal after recording its satisfaction, as required under Section 12AA of the Act of 1961. In view of above, the Tribunal can itself issue a direction for registration of the Trust. The Tribunal can even remand the case in given circumstance when the Commissioner has rejected the application on hyper technical grounds and interference therein is made. The matter can be remanded back to the Commissioner to record its satisfaction, as required under Section 12AA of the Act of 1961. In view of above, the adjudication of the issue before the Tribunal can be with a direction to register the Trust under Section 12AA of the ....
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....shall pass an order in writing registering the Trust or institution; (ii) shall, if he is not so satisfied, pass an order in writing refusing to register the Trust or institution, and a copy of such order shall be sent to the applicant: Provided that no order under sub-clause (ii) shall be passed unless the applicant has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (1A) All applications, pending before the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner on which no order has been passed under clause (b) of subsection (1) before the 1st day of June, 1999, shall stand transferred on that day to the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner and the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner may proceed with such applications under that sub-section from the stage at which they were on that day. (2) Every order granting or refusing registration under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be passed before the expiry of six months from the end of the month in which the application was received under clause (a) or clause (aa) or clause (ab) of sub-section (1) of section 12A. (3) Where a Trust or an institution has been granted registration unde....
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....ties of the Trust, but also about the objects of the Trust or the Institution. In view of above, the registration of the Trust requires satisfaction of the Commissioner. In case the Commissioner is satisfied with the genuineness of the activities and even the objects, he can register the Trust under Section 12AA of the Act of 1961 and in case the Commissioner is not satisfied or refuses registration, then the Appeal lies to the Tribunal to challenge such order under Section 254 of the Act, 1961. 11. In such case, the Appellate Tribunal needs to adjudicate the issue raised before it because it is the last court of facts. The exemption under Sections 11 & 12 of the Act of 1961 can be sought only after registration of the Trust, thus satisfaction of the Commissioner before registration has been given importance. In view of above, the argument of the learned counsel for the Revenue is that unless such a satisfaction, as envisaged under Section 12AA of the Act of 1961 is recorded by the Commissioner, a direction for its registration should not be given by the Tribunal. As against the aforesaid, the argument of learned counsel for the assessee is that if Tribunal is satisfied about th....
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....nd for its maintainability it requires no authority of law, Appeal requires so. As was observed in State of Kerala v. K.M. Charia Abdulla and Co. [AIR 1965 SC 1585] the distinction between right of Appeal and revision is based on differences implicit in the two expressions. An Appeal is continuation of the proceedings; in effect the entire proceedings are before the Appellate Authority and it has the power to review the evidence subject to statutory limitations prescribed. But in the case of revision, whatever powers the revisional authority may or may not have, it has no power to review the evidence, unless the statute expressly confers on it that power. It was noted by the four Judge Bench in Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury [AIR 1963 SC 698] that the distinction between an Appeal and a revision is a real one. A right of Appeal carries with it a right of rehearing on law as well as fact, unless the statute conferring the right of Appeal limits the rehearing in some way, as has been done in second Appeals arising under the Code. The power of hearing revision is generally given to a superior court so that it may satisfy itself that a particular case has been decided accor....
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....morally justifiable. Under our Constitution it is Parliament's opinion on these matters that is paramount." (emphasis supplied) In the same judgment, it is further observed: (WLR p. 157 F) "... But if this be the case it is for Parliament, not for the judiciary, to decide whether any changes should be made to the law as stated in the Acts...." (emphasis supplied)" 15. With regard to taxing statute, it has been held that the courts have to apply strict rule of interpretation. When the competent legislature mandates taxing certain person/certain objects in certain circumstances, it can not be expanded/interpreted to include those, which were not intended by the legislature. The aforesaid has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Customs (Import) Mumbai versus Dilip Kumar and Company and others reported in (2018) 9 SCC 1. The relevant paragraphs in the aforesaid judgment of Dilip Kumar and Company and others(supra) is as follows:- "21. The well-settled principle is that when the words in a statute are clear, plain and unambiguous and only one meaning can be inferred, the courts are bound to give effect t....
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.... a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse [(1997) 6 SCC 312 : AIR 1998 SC 74] .) The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner [(1846) 6 Moo PCC 1 : 4 MIA 179] courts cannot aid the legislatures' defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel [(1998) 3 ....
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....dgments make it amply clear that statutory interpretation particularly with regard to taxing statutes has to be strict and only in accordance with the unambiguous words used in the statute. The intention of the legislature in incorporating or leaving out certain words is necessarily required to be seen. 18. The words 'as it thinks fit' used in relation to the powers of the Appellate Tribunal exercisable under Section 254(1) of the Act, 1961 is of the widest amplitude. The said expression confers a very wide jurisdiction enabling the Appellate authority to take an entirely different view on the same set of facts. 19. The terminology ' as it thinks fit' in relation to the powers of the Appellate authority have been considered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Babu Lal Nagar versus Shree Synthetics Limited and others reported in 1984 (supp) SCC 128. The relevant paragraph of the judgment is as follows: "16. Section 66(1) of the Act provides that the Industrial Court omitting the portion not relevant for the present purpose, may call for and examine the record of such case and pass order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. If the Industri....
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....fere with the same even if patent jurisdictional error is not pointed out." 20. Upon a perusal of the powers of the Appellate authority as indicated in section 254(1) of the Act, 1961, it can be seen that the widest jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Appellate authority in the wisdom of the legislature. The said power has not been proscribed in any manner whatsoever. 21. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Clariant International Limited and another versus Securities and Exchange Board of India reported in (2004) 8 SCC 524 has held that once the jurisdiction of the Appellate authority is not fettered by statute, it exercises all the jurisdiction. It has also been held that the limits to jurisdiction of the Appellate authority would have been stated explicitly in the statute had that been the intention of legislature. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment in the case of Clariant International Limited (supra) are as follows;- "73. Had the intention of Parliament been to limit the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, it could say so explicitly as it has been done in terms of Section 15-Z of the Act whereby the jurisdiction of this Court to hear the Appeal is....
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....f material on record, would be an empty formality because the Commissioner in such a case can not go against the specific finding recorded by the Appellate Tribunal. 26. In view of the unfettered power of the Appellate Tribunal in terms of section 254 (1) of the Act, 1961 the Tribunal can very well record its satisfaction on the genuineness of the activities and object of the Trust and can very well direct registration of the Trust without remand of case to the Commissioner in case such satisfaction is recorded on the basis of documents and material already available on record at the stage of examination by Commissioner. 27. However it would be a different matter where the Appellate Tribunal records such satisfaction on the basis of material or documentary evidence which was not available before the Commissioner while exercising his powers under Section 12 (AA) of the Act, 1961, which is our opinion would require remand. 28. Remand to the Commissioner can also be affected in a case where the Commissioner rejects the application on a technical ground without recording its opinion on facts or genuineness of the activities and object of the Trust but the Tribunal finds ground....