TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1994 (3) TMI 16
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....he petitioners on April 4, 1991, to which the petitioners objected by their statement dated April 9, 1991. But the Deputy Commissioner did not accept the objections; he set aside the assessments by the order, exhibit P-1, dated May 27, 1991, in each of these cases which were served on the petitioners on July 23, 1991, and remitted the matter to the assessing authority for fresh consideration. In the interregnum, and on April 1, 1991, the 1991 Act had been brought into force repealing the 1950 Act. The 1991 Act by its section 77 provided a remedy of revision to the Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax at the instance of an assessee, aggrieved by any order of the Deputy Commissioner passed under section 75 of the Act. In the bona fide belief that such a revision lies, the petitioners challenged the order, exhibit P-1, in revision under section 77 before the Commissioner. The Commissioner, however, took the view that the revisions were not maintainable having regard to the fact that the proceedings were commenced under section 34 of the 1950 Act. According to him, the proper course for the petitioners was to pursue their remedies under the 1950 Act, namely, to seek reference to th....
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....them which are prejudicial to the Revenue, the power of the Commissioner being wider embracing within it orders and proceedings of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner as well. The Commissioner is also vested under section 77 with the power to revise any order of the Deputy Commissioner under section 75 on an application made in that behalf by the assessee. Any order of the Commissioner passed under section 76 or 77 is subject to challenge in this court in revision under section 78 on the ground that the Commissioner had either erroneously decided or failed to decide any question of law. Thus the position under the 1991 Act is that an assessee who is aggrieved by an order of the Deputy Commissioner in suo motu revision under section 75 can challenge it in revision before the Commissioner under section 77 and then approach this court in revision under section 78 if he does not get the expected relief from the Commissioner. A Departmental remedy is thus provided to him, apart from substituting the cumbersome procedure of reference with a revision to this court, albeit on limited grounds. Section 99 of the 1991 Act is the repealing provision. It repeals the 19....
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....t." I may at once note here that the proviso to sub-section (1) deals with things or actions taken or done by the Revenue, while sub-section (2) deals with matters initiated by the assessee. I say so with reference to sub-section (2) because it speaks of any application, etc., made or preferred to any officer or authority and not made by or preferred to such officer or authority. Sub-section (2) is, therefore, intended to cover action taken by the assessee, action at the instance of the Revenue being completely covered by the proviso to sub-section (1). The effect of these provisions is as follows so far as proceedings pending as on April 1, 1991, are concerned: (a) Any right, title, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the 1950 Act is not affected. It is preserved. This is the first part of the proviso to sub-section (1). (b) Subject to the above, anything done or any action taken by the authorities functioning under the 1950 Act in exercise of the powers conferred thereunder (including any notice) is fictionally treated as done or taken under the 1991 Act. This is as per the middle part of the proviso. (It is under this that the proceedings in revision....
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....e principles. The proceedings in revision in these cases continued to be in the seisin of the Deputy Commissioner who had issued the notices under section 34. No doubt, as pointed out by the Government Pleader, the Deputy Commissioner was exercising the powers of the Commissioner under the 1950 Act, there being no statutory authority as the Deputy Commissioner under that Act. The Government Pleader's logic was that the order, exhibit P-1, must be deemed to be one passed by the Commissioner himself under section 76 in which event, it was not revisable afresh under section 77 on an application by the assessee. The argument proceeds on a fallacy and is, in fact, destructive of the order, exhibit P-1, itself. If the proceedings under section 34 could be continued only by the Commissioner as contended, necessarily the order, exhibit P-1, becomes forthwith invalid as one passed by an authority without jurisdiction, namely, the Deputy Commissioner. But none understood it that way and everybody-the assessee as well as the Deputy Commissioner-proceeded on the basis that the matter had to be dealt with by the Deputy Commissioner himself after April 1, 1991. I think this was right because th....