TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2019 (8) TMI 697
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....ult u/s 201(1) of the Act. 5. That the order passed u/s 201(1) and 201(1A) of the IT Act is without jurisdiction, not as per law and barred by limitation, hence requires to be cancelled. 6. The CIT(A) erred in confirming the order passed u/s 201(1) & 201(1A) even after noticing that a single order was passed for multiple assessment years which is not as per law, hence requires to be cancelled. 7. That the orders of the CIT(A) /AO are liable to be cancelled as they are passed in gross violation of judicial discipline inasmuch as even the judgment of the jurisdictional High Court in appellant's own case, which upheld the appellate orders for the earlier years involving similar facts, has been disregarded. 8. That the CIT(A) merely carried out an academic exercise of analyzing various Explanations, clauses under section 9(1)(vi) of the Act, provisions of Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements and judicial decisions without actually specifying the charge having regard to the facts and circumstances in the appellant's case. 9. That the Learned CIT(A) erred in confirming the liability against the appellant contrary to the provisions of t....
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....hese non-resident foreign entities were in the form of royalty and hence, it was held that it was the duty of assessee to deduct tax at source in accordance with the law. As there was a failure on the part of assessee to deduct tax at source, the AO had issued show cause notices by invoking the provisions of section 201(1) by treating the assessee as assessee in default in respect of tax. 3. The assessee filed a detailed reply. After considering the reply of assessee, the DDIT had passed a common order against the assessee in respect of payments made to the foreign non-resident entities. Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the DDIT, the assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(Appeals) and raised various grounds before the CIT(Appeals). 4. However, the ld. CIT(Appeals) was not convinced with the submissions made before him by the assessee and accordingly, he passed an order against the assessee. 5. As per the AO, he later noted the following two mistakes in the order passed by the DDIT:- "1. Since Assessing Officer has considered the rate of tax as per provisions of Income-tax Act, surcharge and educational cess should have been levied on the tax liability cal....
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..... The additional 1iability due to grassing up of the tax with remittances as made by the assessing officer in order under section 154 is deleted. Ground nos. 6 and 7 are allowed." 8A) In these appeals, the assessee raised these grounds also before CIT (A) that the orders passed by the AO u/s 154 are bad in law because the rectifications made by the AO are beyond the scope of section 154. This ground was also raised by the assessee before CIT (A) in 154 proceedings that interest u/s 201 (1A) is also disputed. Learned CIT (A) disposed of these appeals in the proceedings u/s 154 by way of a separate combined order dated 26.10.2016 in ITA No. 47 to 52/CIT (A)/2015 - 16. As per this order, he held that grossing up of tax by invoking the provisions of section 195A is not as per law but he held that the orders p [assed by the AO u/s 154 are not bad in law. He also held that the AO is directed to levy surcharge and cess in respect of royalty payments made to vendors who are resident of such countries with which the DTAA with India allows withholding of more than 11.33% and deleted the surcharge and cess ion respect of other payments. 9. Feeling aggrieved by the order pass....
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.... (Appeals) [hereinafter referred to as "the CIT(A)"] is against law, facts and circumstances in the case of the appellant. 2. That the orders of the learned authorities below are liable to be cancelled as they are passed in gross violation of judicial discipline in as much rate as per Income Tax are applied overlooking the rate as per DTAA. 3. That the learned CIT(A) has erred in considering the rate of tax as 15% in USA, UK, Austria and Canada and 20% for Spain whereas the rate of tax as per the relevant clause of the respective DTAA is 10%. 4. That the learned CIT(A) has erred in not considering that the order under section 154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Act) is bad in law and is thereby disputed. 5. That the learned CIT(A) has erred in not considering that the rectification u/s 154 was made on an issue that is clearly outside the scope of section 154 of the Act. 6. That the learned CIT(A) has erred in not considering that the findings, reasons given by the AO for carrying out rectification are contrary to facts emerging from records and is unsustainable and untenable in law. 7. That the learned CIT (A) has erred in fastenin....
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....ature. If it is pertaining to business the profit from which is not exempt under Section 10A and, therefore, it is to be allowed as deduction. He held the expenditure cannot be disallowed under Section. 40(a)(i). In appeal by the revenue, the Tribunal held they cannot go into the question whether the expenditure in nature as that is not what was urged before the lower authorities. Once it is held to be not representing the royalty and it is a revenue expenditure, the deduction allowed by the Appellate Authority is legal and valid and do not call for any interference." 13. The ld. DR had also drawn our attention to the order of Tribunal passed in ITA No.426, 427, 468 & 469/Bang/2006 dated 30.05.2008 wherein the Tribunal in paragraphs 18.5 & 18.6 held as under:- "18.5 We have heard both the parties. It is true that the issue under reference stands covered by the decision of the Tribunal in the case of the assessee for the asst. year 2000-01. The Tribunal while disposing off the appeal for the asst.year 2000-01, followed he earlier order for the asst.years 1998-99 and 1999-2000, which is reported in 96 TTJ 211., Thus, the issue is covered in favour of the assessee. ....
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....has been passed under section 201(1) of the Act treating it as an assessee in default in respect of payments for imported software. It was submitted by the learned Authorised Representative that the Assessing Officer did not accept the explanation put forth by the assessee and disallowed the entire depreciation claimed on the ground that there was an obligation on the part of the payers to effect deduction from out of payments made by them in favour of non-resident recipients for acquiring any software even assuming that it partakes the character of goods. It was submitted that the Assessing Officer was of the view that software is basically purchased by way of licence to use and he relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in the case of Synopsis Inc. and the decision of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of Microsoft Corporation Vs. ADIT. It was contended that the DRP agreed with the reasoning of the Assessing Officer in continuing the disallowance, even though it was submitted therein that the learned CIT(A) and the Tribunal had decided this issue in the assessee's favour in the earlier assessment years, on the ground that the Department has taken the matter ....
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....9 onwards. We, therefore, respectfully following the decision of the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal for Assessment Year 2004-05 (supra) decide this issue in favour of the assessee. Thus it is clear that the Tribunal has followed the earlier order for the Assessment Year 2004-05 which has been confirmed by the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court. Following the earlier order of this Tribunal as well as Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court, we decide this issue in favour of the assessee." 16. The ld. AR has further drawn our attention to para 170 to 172 of the order of the jurisdictional High Court in the matter of Wipro Ltd. v. DCIT for the AY 20101-02 to 2004-05 to the following effect:- "170. The said questions arose for consideration before this Court in the assessee's case in ITA No.3198/2005 which was decided on 28.2.2012 where the substantial questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Following the said Judgment, said questions of law are answered in favour of assessee and against the revenue. Substantial Question No.18: "Whether the Appellate Authorities were correct in holding that the pay....
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....he payment made by the assessee to a non-resident entity was not in the nature of royalty, there was no liability on the part of assessee to withhold tax at the time of making payment to such non-resident entity. Having so decided in favour of assessee by the competent courts and Tribunal, it was inappropriate and the authorities were in contempt for initiating action u/s. 201(1) & (1A) of the Act. 18. Per contra, the ld. Sr. Standing Counsel for the revenue had submitted that the decisions rendered by the Tribunal were issued without considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble High Court in the matter of CIT v. Synopsis International Old Ltd. 212 Taxman 454 (Kar) and in the matter of CIT v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. & Ors., 345 ITR 494 (Kar) whereby the High Court has consistently held that the payments made by the assessee for purchase of software was in the nature of royalty and hence, subject to deduction of tax and non-deduction of tax automatically invokes the rigors of section 201 for declaring the assessee as assessee in default. It was further submitted by the ld. DR that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Sun Engineering Works (P) ....
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..... 905 (C.A.), the only point argued was on the question of priority of the claimant's debt, and, on this argument being heard, the Court granted the order. No consideration was given to the question whether a garnishee order could properly be made on an account standing in the name of the liquidator. When, therefore, this very point was argued in a subsequent case before the Court of Appeal in Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith, Ltd., [1941] 1 KB 675. the Court held itself not bound by its previous decision. Sir Wilfrid Greene, M.R., said that he could not help thinking that the point now raised had been deliberately passed sub silentio by counsel in order that the point of substance might be decided." 19. Similarly, the ld. DR also relied upon the decision in the case of UOI v. Dhanwanthi Devi, 1996 (6) SCC 44 at 51 para 13 to 14 held as under:- "Before adverting to and considering whither solatium and interest would be payable under the Act, at the outset, we will dispose of the objection raised by Shri Vaidyanathan that Hari Kishan Khosla's case is not a binding precedent nor does it operate as ratio decidendi to be followed as a precedent and per s....
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....ts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law. Law cannot afford to be static and therefore, Judges are to employ an intelligent in the use of precedents. It would, therefore, be necessary to see whether Hari Kishan Khosla's case would form a binding precedent. Therein, admittedly the question that had arisen and was decided by the Bench of three Judges was whether solatium and interest are payable to an owner whose land was acquired under the provisions of the Central Act? On consideration of the facts, the relevant provisions in the Central Act and the previous precedents bearing on the topic the Court had held that solatium and interest are not a part of compensation. It is a facet of the principle in the statute. The Central Act omitted to provide for payment of solatium and interest since preceding the acquisition the property was under was under requisition during which period compensation was under requisition during which period compensation was paid to the owner. The position obta....
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....Gowda's case (supra) does not even indicate that Section 18 of the Probation Act was taken note of. In view of the specific statutory bar the view, if any, expressed without analysing the statutory provision cannot in our view be treated as a binding precedent and at the most is to be considered as having been rendered per incuriam. Looked at from any angle, the appeal is sans merit and deserves dismissal which we direct." 21. On the basis of the above, it was submitted that the principle of law expounded by the High Court in the case of Wipro (supra) [case of the assessee] was not the exposition of law as considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and was only with respect to facts before the jurisdictional High Court and therefore, will not come in the way of AO/CIT(A) for declaring the assessee as assessee in default u/s. 201(1) of the Act. 22. The ld. DR had also relied on the decision of the Tribunal rendered in the case of Intertec Software Pl. Ltd. v. ITO dated 13.10.2015 which was followed in the decision of GE India Industrial P. Ltd. in ITA No.595/Bang/2016 dated 17.11.2017, wherein at para 6, it was recorded as under:- "6. We have heard the rival submissi....
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....Ltd. vs. DCIT (Supra) rendered on 25.03.2015. As per this judgment, in Para 171, it was held that in earlier judgment dated 25.08.2010, similar question was decided in favour of the assessee and against the revenue and therefore, in those appeals also, the issue was decided in favour of the assessee. We have already seen that the decision dated 25.08.2010 is not on this aspect that it is Royalty or not and therefore, this judgment is not relevant in the present case. Accordingly, this later judgment dated 25.03.2015 is also not relevant. 7. There is no dispute that the present issue is covered against the assessee by the judgment of Hon'ble Karnataka High Court rendered in the case of CIT vs. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. (Supra) and learned AR of the assessee has merely cited these two judgments rendered in the case of WIPRO Ltd. (Supra) and no other argument was made to the effect that this issue is not covered against the assessee by this judgment of Hon'ble Karnataka High Court rendered in the case of CIT vs. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. (Supra). Since, these two judgments cited by him are not applicable as per above discussion; ITA No. 1388/Bang/2013 we respect....
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....assessee's own case for AY 2007-08 mentioned supra and the decision of the jurisdictional high court in assessee's own case for AY 2004-05 in ITA 879/2008 dt.25.03.2015 (copy placed on record - relevant para 170 page 56 of the order). From the above it is seen that on identical set of facts having regard to the law even after the insertion of Explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) with retrospective amendment from 01.06.1976 carried out in Finance Act 2012, the decision of the Hon'ble TIM' and Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in assessee's own case have been rendered in favour of the assessee on the basis of its own facts and the applicable law. The argument of the department that the issue before the Hon'ble ITAT and the Hon'ble High Court did not involve the question of TDS on Royalty is factually incorrect as evident from the discussion and the decision both by the Hon'ble ITAT and the Hon'ble High Court extracted in our written submission dt.22.11.2017. It is to be seen that it is a decision between the litigant parties which has the binding effect. The reliance placed by the department in support of the order u/s 201(1) & 201(1A) on the ....
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....is not applicable as it is a decision on the constitutional validity of section 9(1)(vii)(b) of the Act whereas the impugned case is on the issue of applicability of section 9(1)(vi) of the Act. This decision is not applicable as the subject matter is different and the law involved is different. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in CIT vs Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd - 198 ITR 297 that a decision cannot be read out of context. Hence reliance placed on the decision in GVK Industries is not correct. The reliance placed by the Ld.DR on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs Wipro Ltd 203 Taxman 621 (department paper book pages 139 to 143) is also incorrect as evident from page 142, para 6 of the order extracted as hereunder wherein the Court has clearly said that the issue does not pertain to shrink wrapped software: "6 Mere fact that in the instant case, the issue do not pertain to shrink wrapped software or off-the-shelf software and access to database maintained by M/s.Gartner is granted online, would not make any difference in the reasoning assigned by us to hold that such right to access would amount to transfer of right ....
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.................... " and in ITA 879/2008 (11.25.03.2015 in Para 171 page 56 Substantial question no.18 "171. The said substantial questions of law arose for consideration in the assessee's case itself in ITA 507/02 which was decided on 25.8.2010 where the substantial question of law was answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Accordingly, the said question of law is answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue." Since in the impugned case the substantial questions of law were framed and answered in favour of the assessee, the ruling in PCIT vs GMR Energy Limited ITA 358 to 360/2018 dt.08.01.2019 relied on by the Ld.DR is out of context and not applicable." 26. We have heard the rival contentions of the parties and perused the record. If we look into the order passed by the Tribunal in the case of the assessee for the AY 2007-08, the Tribunal in para 8.4 had decided the issue by following the decision of the coordinate Bench in favour of assessee for the earlier AYs 2001- 02 and while doing so, had not distinguished the binding decision of the High Court rendered in the case of Synopsis International Old Ltd. (supra). Similarl....
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....luding before the High Court with respect to applicability of provisions of section 9(1)(vi) of the Act or the Explanation introduced into the Act w.e.f. 1.4.2012. In our view, application of law is required to be decided by the coordinate Bench by discussing the provision of law and also of the judgment and thereafter discussing how the said provision of law and judgment are applicable or not applicable to the facts . In the absence of any discussion on the above two aspects as to the scope of provisions of the Act as well as judgment, it will be unfair to conclude that, the coordinate benches had correctly applied the law in the context of what was now argued before us by the assessee. In fact this Bench was having the occasion to consider the pith and substance of the decisions rendered by the High Court in the matter of Wipro and thereafter had come to conclusion ,which was rightly pointed out by the ld. DR, that the issue of royalty was not an issue before the High Court in the matter of Wipro. 27. Though both the parties during the course of arguments had submitted and had argued that this Tribunal will be in contempt if the Tribunal does not follow the judgment of Wipro a....
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....for the assessee is with respect to the order passed by the Officer was barred by limitation (ground No.5 & 6). In this regard, the ld. AR had submitted that the assessment year under consideration was 2007-08 and 2012-13 and law amendments were made in s. 201 and earlier limitation was not provided under the Act and subsequently by virtue of amendment, limitation was provided and therefore it was submitted that in the absence of limitation provided, the maximum period for passing the order was four years in the light of decision rendered in the matter of Mahindra & Mahindra and further it was submitted that combined order passed by authorities below as separate order was required to be passed distinctly dealing with limitation issue, the taxability and also the issue of DTAA. 31. Per contra, the ld. DR had submitted that section 201 makes no distinction between resident and non-resident payee. However, limitation was provided by the proviso only with respect to resident for initiation of proceedings u/s. 201 for declaring assessee as assessee in default and no limitation was provided by the Act for non-residents. He however relies on decision of coordinate Bench in the matter o....
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....mitation only in respect of payments made to the resident in India. In the Circular Explaining the Finance Act, it has been specifically referred that the payments made to the nonresidents, no limitation is applicable. In view of the specific provision providing Limitation only to the payments made to the resident in India and not providing any limitation to the payments made to the non - resident , no limitation can be prescribed or read into the section. 2) Without prejudice to the above contention if the contention of the assessee is to be accepted that in the absence of any limitation being provided under the Act, reasonable time limit has to be read into the section as held by various high courts in the case of NHK Japan, Bharath Hotels, the limitation provided for payments to residents has to be applied(six years ). Otherwise it amount to discrimination between the payments made to the resident and the non-resident. 3) I nsofar as the judgements relied on by the assessee, all the judgements were rendered in respect of the orders passed prior to amendment to section 201(3) of the Act and period of four years has been arrived at on the analogy of various other....
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....o the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Bharti Airtel vs. Union of India (76 taxman.com.256) and special attention was drawn to paras.11,12, 13, 14 & 17. 94. We heard rival submissions and perused material on record available. In our view, before we deal with issue of limitation, it would be relevant to reproduce the reasoning given by the Special Bench in the case of Mahindra & Mahindra (supra) which is as under: 14.2 After considering the rival submissions in the light of the material placed before us and the precedents relied upon it is obvious that sub-sections (1) and (1A) of section 201 do not prescribe any time limit for the initiation of the proceedings or the passing of the order. We find that for the most of the actions under the Act, the particular time limit has been given for the commencement and completion of the proceedings. For example time limit for issuing of notice for the purposes of making assessment is laid down in section 143(2). Similarly time for issuing notice of reassessment has been set in section 149. Section 153 deals with the time provided for the completion of assessment and reassessments. Similarly time....
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....Supreme Court in CIT v. Venkateswara Hatcheries (P.) Ltd. [1999] 237 ITR 174/103 Taxman 503. 95. In para.14.2 (supra in Mahindra and Mahindra) it has been held by the Special Bench that in sub-section (1) and (1A) of section 201, no limit for initiation of proceeding or passing of the order is prescribed. Thereafter, the Special Bench noticed the period of limitation provided for issuance of notice u/s 143(2), 149, 153, 154, 263 and thereafter it was held that certainty in taxing provision is hall-mark of any proceeding and it was noticed that "it is beyond our apprehension that how in absence of time limit provided in the section, action can be taken in indefinite period. It is impermissible to argue that no time limit be granted to revenue." 96. Thus it is clear from reading of the abovementioned paragraphs that the logic and reasoning given by the Special Bench for coming to reasonable period of 4 years was based on analysis of the provisions viz., 143, 147, 148, 149 and 153 and absence of time limit u/s 201(1) of the Act. In our view, there is a change in the position after passing of judgment by the Special Bench as the section 201 has been amended by the leg....
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....onable time and in the absence of such prescription of limitation, the power to enforce the order is vitiated by error of law. He places reliance on the decisions in State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha; Ram Chand v. Union of India and Mohd. Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim. We find no force in the contention. It is seen that the order of rejectment against the applicant has become final. Section 21 of the Mamlatdar's Court Act does not prescribe any limitation within which the order needs to be executed. In the absence of any specific limitation provided there under, necessary implication is that the general law of limitation provided in the Limitation Act (Act 2 of 1963) stands excluded. The Division Bench, therefore, has rightly held that no limitation has been prescribed and it can be executed at any time, especially when the law of limitation for the purpose of this appeal is not there. Where there is statutory rule operating in the field, the implied power of exercise of the right within reasonable limitation does not arise. The cited decisions deal with that area and bear no relevance of the facts." (Emphasis added) 74. We also find that Bombay H....
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.... par with resident. In other words, period of imitation for initiation of proceedings for resident as well as non-resident u/s 201 should be 6 years from the end of the financial year. Further the payer is required to maintain books of account and deduct TDS for both resident as well as non-resident. No Separate treatment had been envisaged under the Act, for the payer paying to a non-resident. 100. Further, the non-resident payee cannot be worse off than resident payee under the Income Tax Act and under the provisions of DTAA. Law provides non-discrimination of non- resident with resident and requires equal treatment of non-resident with resident under the provisions of DTAA. It cannot be said that a nonresident would be given special and beneficial treatment in comparison to the resident or treated unequally by providing unlimited time to initiate proceedings under section 201 of the Act. In our opinion, the Constitution of India provides equal treatment and equal protection of law within the territory of India. If the law requires initiation of proceedings within 6 years from the end of financial year for the resident, same treatment is required to be given to the non-r....
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....l as non-resident, we are of the considered view that limitation for initiation of proceedings for non-resident payee should be 6 years instead of no-limitation.as is the limitation for resident-payee. In view of the above ground No.12 in assessment year 2007-08 deserves to be dismissed and accordingly we dismiss the same." 32. On the basis of the above, it was submitted that once common question of law was raised before the lower authorities with respect to applicability of DTAA, provision of section 90 as well as limitation, common order was passed by the authority and there was no prohibition in law for passing a common order for the common question of law and there is no difference in facts in all the years. He had also drawn our attention to section 143(1) and section 201 and submitted that if comparison is drawn between the two provisions, then the law does not prohibit any passing of the common order u/s. 201. 33. In rebuttal, the ld. AR had filed the written submissions as under:- "Further it is the contention of the assessee that passing a single order for multiple assessment years is unsustainable and untenable under the circumstances. This contention is su....
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....Section 201(3) of the Act reads as under: "(3) No order shall be made under sub-section (1) deeming a person to be an assessee in default for failure to deduct the whole or any part of the tax from a person resident in India, at any time after the expiry of seven years from the end of the financial year in which payment is made or credit is given. Thus bare perusal of the above sections implies that an order u/s 201(1) can be passed only in respect of a particular previous year/assessment year. It is a well settled principle by the judiciary that each assessment year is separate, distinct and independent. The assessee places reliance on the decision of Allahabad HC in Mohd. Ayub vs ITO - 346 ITR 30 - paper book index IV - pages 411 to 413 wherein the Court has held that each assessment year is an independent unit of assessment and the provisions of the Act applied separately. The limitation for passing the order as per section 201(3) has also to be tested for each previous year separately. Thus the impugned common order passed by the AO u/s 201(1) & 201(1A) dt.15.10.2013 for multiple assessment years being AY 2007-08 to 2012-13 are had in law and requires to be va....
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.... finding that assessee has failed to pay tax directly, deductor can be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of such tax. It is relevant to notice here that Explanation to Section 191 is confined only to the amount of tax which was required to be deducted." Thus on this count also, the tax liability fastened requires to be deleted." 34. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the record. The grounds of appeal raised before the ld. CIT (A) were similar in all the assessment years under consideration before us and we are not reproducing hereinbelow the common grounds raised by the assessee in each of the assessment years for the sake of brevity. 35. From a perusal of the above, it is amply clear that assessee has raised common grounds of appeal feeling aggrieved by the order of AO, and on the issue of DTAA, the assessee had raised general ground and therefore, in our considered opinion, there is no prohibition for the AO to pass a common order for all the assessment years. In all the cases before the AO, the payee (recipient) was non-resident. It is not disputed that payment was made for purchase of software. It is also not disputed before the AO that tax was n....
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....t ion these grounds also and these are also rejected. 40. As per Ground No. 7, the dispute raised is about interest u/s 201 (1A). This is a settled position of law as per the judgment of Hon'ble apex court rendered in the case of Hindustan Coca Cola Beverage Pvt. Ltd. Vs. CIT , 293 ITR 226 that if tax is paid by the deductee, demands from deductor for tax u/s 201 (1) cannot be raised but the deductor has to pay interest u/s 201 (1A) till the date of payment taxes by the deductee. Hence, in our considered opinion, the ratio of this judgment is this that if tax was deductible by the payer, interest u/s 201 (1A) is payable by him till the payment of such tax by him or by the payee. Accordingly, we hold that there is no merit in Ground No. 7 and it is also rejected. 41. In the result, all the six appeals filled by the assessee in the proceedings u/s 154 are dismissed. 42. Now we take up six appeals filed by the revenue in the proceedings u/s 154 i.e. ITA Nos. 2335 to 2339/Bang/2016. Identical Grounds raised by the revenue in these six appeals are already reproduced above in Para 9. 43. Both sides were heard. Regarding Ground No. 1 raised by the revenue in these appeals, it ....