TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2019 (8) TMI 257
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.... Indian Bank, Bargur Branch in which the writ petitioner has an account. As the fourth respondent is only a formal party, more in the nature of a Garnishee, there is no disputation that this writ petition can be disposed of at the admission stage with the consent of learned counsel for writ petitioner and standing counsel for Respondents 1 to 3. Therefore, main writ petition is taken up with consent of learned counsel for writ petitioner and standing counsel for respondents 1 to 3. 3. Short point on which the entire writ petition now turns is limitation. 4.An order dated 13.12.2018 bearing reference A.No.74/2017/CTA-II/CO-ST being Order-in-Appeal No.199/2018-ST made by the first respondent has been called in question. This order shall her....
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....late Authority has powers to condone the delay, but subject to a cap of one month. Therefore, one month cap expires on 21.03.2017. Under such circumstances, the appeal before the first Appellate Authority, no doubt, was filed only on 01.08.2017. To be noted, these dates are undisputed dates. Therefore, Appellate Authority rejected the appeal as time barred without going into the merits of the case. 8. In this regard, the only point that arises for consideration is, whether a statutory Appellate Authority can condone delay beyond the cap, when the statute provides for a cap. Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that whenever there is a cap qua delay condonation in a statute, an Authority or Court has no powers to condone delay beyo....
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....al within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days' time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, ....