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2019 (5) TMI 1462

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....t Information Reports) has been registered by the CBI i.e. SPE/CBI/ EOW/ Chennai being R.C. No. FIR No. RC8/E/2003 CBI/EOW/ Chennai. The Charge sheet was filed on 5.7.2005 against Star Forex India Pvt. Ltd. (2) S. Rajenderan, (3) Naganathan and (4) Chockalingam for the offences under Section 120B read with 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC and substantive offence under Section 420/467/468 & 471 IPC. 3. On the basis of Charge-Sheet, material and documents from the CBI a case was registered under PMLA being ECIR No. ECIR/02/CEZO/2015 Zone Chennai dated 05.02.2015. It is not mentioned in the ECIR that what was the date of the commission of the alleged offence and when the FIR/ RC was registered by the CBI and when the Act has come into force. 4. The provisional attachment order 08/2018 was passed on 28.03.2018. The Complaint was filed on 19.04.2018 by the Joint Director, respondent No. 3 before Adjudicating Authority U/s 5 (5) of the PMLA 2002. 5. The show cause notice was issued on 2.5.2018 to the appellants u/s 8 of the Act by the Registrar/ Administrative Officer Adjudicating Authority PMLA and the same was replied. 6. The reply was filed by the appellants on 5.7.2018 before the Adj....

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.... in frustrating any proceedings relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime under this Chapter, he may, by order in writing, provisionally attach such property for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date of the order, in such manner as may be prescribed." 13. In view of the order dated 27.07.2018 passed in Writ Petition No. 7758/2018 filed by the one of the appellants herein Smt. Mallika, it is evident that the High Court has clarified that proceeding before Adjudicating Authority may continue. However, order if any is passed, shall not be implemented, meaning thereby that after passing the final order, no steps under section 8(4) for taking the actual possession be taken by the respondent. 14. In the present case in terms of Section 5 (1) of the PMLA no Provisional Attachment Order has been confirmed within 180 days as prescribed under the Act which is mandatory from the date of the issuance of the provisional attachment order i.e. 28th March, 2018 bearing No. 08/2018, as such the provisional attachment order was expired on 24.09.2018 and after the expiry of the such period the provisional attachment order is not to be confirmed and the Adjudica....

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....the further delay not beyond 60 days, it would come within the ambit and sweep of the provisions and policy of legislation. It is equivalent to section 3 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it is uncondonable and it cannot be condoned taking recourse to Article 142 of the constitution. .............................................. ................................................" In the aforesaid judgment Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the limitation can be condoned within the extended period and not thereafter. 16.1 In the matter of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission& others reported in (2010) 5 SCC 23, while dealing with Electricity Act, there lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: The relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced below: ".............................. .............................. 29. Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which is substantially similar to Section 125 of the Electricity Act came to be interpreted in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. The precise question considered in that case was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limita....

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.... the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act." (emphasis supplied) 30. In Singh Enterprises v. CCE- the Court interpreted Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 which is pari materia to Section 125 of the Electricity Act and observed: "8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short 'the Limitation Act') can be availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of communication to him....

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.... used in Sections 35, 35-B. 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days. * * * 35. It was contended before us that the words 'expressly excluded' would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law which here in this case is the Central Excise Act. The natur....

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....ceedings are intended to be abided by, subject to any power expressly conferred on the court to condone any delay. Thus the Limitation Act 1963 provides for different periods of limitation within which suits, appeals and applications may be instituted or filed or made as the case may be. It also provides for exclusion of time from the prescribed periods in certain cases, lays down bases for computing the period of limitation prescribed and expressly provides for extension of time under Section 5 in respect of certain proceedings. If the periods prescribed were not mandatory, it was not necessary to provide for exclusion or extension of time in certain circumstances nor would the method of computation of time have any meaning. 10. Section 4 (2) of the Act plainly read similarly requires a person objecting to a notification issued under sub-section (2) of Section 3 to file a petition raising such objections within 30 days of the issuance of such notification. The words are unequivocal and unqualified and there is no scope for reading in a power of Court to dispense with the time limit on the basis of any principle of interpretation of statutory provisions. In R. Rudraiah v. State o....

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....ndered redundant. We will discuss the scope and applicability of Section 29(2) in greater detail subsequently. ............................. .............................." 17. Mr. Nitish Rana, learned counsel for the respondent has not denied the fact that the Hon'ble High Court in its order dated 27.07.2018, it was clarified that the proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority shall continue. ED was the party there. Thus, once the said factual position is admitted, the Adjudicating Authority was supposed to pass the confirmation order within 180 days as prescribed in section 5(1) of the Act. If the order of the High Court was to exclude the period of litigation before the High Court, then the said period has to be excluded. But in the present case, the specific period was that the proceedings shall continue. The ED and the Adjudicating Authority was fully aware about the High Court order. 18. No doubt, that Section 5 has been amended by the amendment to Act 15 of 2003 and in Section 5 the following amendment has been made which reads as under:- "(b) In section 5:- (i) IN such -Section (1), after the second proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted, namely:- "....