TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1973 (11) TMI 95
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....he was confirmed as a Subordinate Judge. On April, 2, 1962 he was promoted, again on, trial basis, to the rank of Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) which is a post in the cadre of the Orissa Superior Judicial Service (Junior Branch). As Ms work was found unsatisfactory, he was reverted to his substantive post of a Subordinate Judge on January 4, 1963. The order of reversion was challenged by him in a Writ Petition which was dismissed by a Bench of Ahmad, C.J. and Barman, J. The case is reported in I.L.R.] 1966, Cut 503. An appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed on February 6, 1967. While working as a Subordinate Judge, after reversion, he was suspended from service from 15th May, 1964 to 9th April, 1967 during the pendency of a disciplinary proceeding against ham. That proceeding ended in a light punishment of two of his increments being stopped. From the above order of punishment, the appellant filed on 10-10-1967 an appeal to the State Government. The State Government by its order dated 15-7-1970 allowed the appeal on the ground that the Public Service Commission had not been consulted by the High Court before imposing the punishment, and that the Charge-Sheet served o....
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....e for a short period by way of stop-gap arrangement, the High Court placed several restrictions on his administrative powers. 7. In the brief period that he was working as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Cuttack, the appellant showed gross indiscipline by defying a request made by the District, Judge in due course of administration. He also committed a grave judicial misdemeanour. He heard an appeal and posted it for judgment on June 22, 1971. The judgment was delivered on that date and the appeal was dismissed. The Order-Sheets of the judgment were signed by the appellant and the judgment was duly sealed. Later in the day, however, the appellant scored through his signatures both in the Order-Sheet and in the judgment and returned the record of the appeal to the District Judge for disposal by making a false statement that the judgment had not been delivered and that the parties being known to him it was not desirable that he should further hear the appeal, after taking additional evidence for which a petition had been filed. This was something quite extraordinary from a Judge of the appellant's standing. When these matters were brought to the notice of the High Cour....
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....start a disciplinary proceeding against the appellant and, pending the same, to place him under suspension in exercise of their powers under Article 235 of the Constitution. Accordingly on March 30, 1972 the appellant was placed under suspension and his headquarters were fixed at Cuttack. 12. The present contempt proceedings arise out of events which took place after the suspension order. On receiving the suspension order the appellant addressed by letter an appeal to the Governor of Orissa for cancelling the order of suspension and for posting him directly under the Government. That is Annexure 8. As the High Court was of the view that no appeal lay from an order of suspension pending disciplinary charges, it did not forward the appeal to the Governor. In fact on April 28, 1972 the Registrar of the High Court intimated the State Government that the appeal filed by the appellant to the Governor had been withheld by the High Court as no such appeal lies against the order of suspension pending disciplinary proceedings. The appellant was also intimated accordingly. 13. On April 29, 1972 charges in the disciplinary proceeding were framed by the High Court and communicated to the ....
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....preliminary objection. The Division Bench refused to deal with the preliminary objection and so on 30-8-1972 the appellant filed Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 1972 in this Court praying for cancellation of the contempt proceedings challenging therein the maintainability of the proceedings and complaining of bias and prejudice of the High Court particularly the Honourable the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice R.N. Mishra. He said he apprehended that he would not get a fair deal if the matter is disposed of by the High Court. 18. On 21-11-1972 the Supreme Court appeal was withdrawn. At the instance of the Division Bench, a Full Bench of five Judges was constituted by the Chief Justice and the case came on for hearing before the Full Bench on 4-12-1972. In the meantime the appeal memo filed by the appellant in the Supreme Court was available and since it contained matter which amounted to contempt, additional charges were framed and a show-cause notice was issued to the appellant in respect of these additional charges. A copy of the appeal memo containing the statements amounting to contempt is Annexure 20. 19. The Annexures were examined by the court with a view to consider whether th....
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.... fact that when he intimated to the High Court that he desired to join duties after his leave on March 20, 1972 he was informed by the High Court on March 23, 1972 that his re-posting after leave would be decided after the medical board reported as to his fitness to join after leave. This, according to the appellant, showed that the High Court had already taken a decision in the absence of the Chief Justice that the appellant should be re-posted. But on the return of the Chief Justice from New Delhi there was a sudden change. He clearly suggested that after the Chief Justice's return the court took the decision to suspend him and in this connection he made the following observations : This decision of the High Court, reached at before the Honourable the Chief Justice attended the High Court on the 27th March after his 10 days of absence, clearly indicates that no proceeding, much less suspension, against the appellant was under contemplation till that day, but on the other hand, the appellant's place of posting was under consideration of the High Court. Circumstances clearly disclose that after the return of the Honourable Chief Justice, the Government's order, disap....
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.... had no independent judgment of their own, and were influenced by the Chief Justice to take a view, different from what they had already taken, to give a posting order to the contemner, and that the High Court resorted to a subterfuge. He wanted protection of the Governor against the High Court which he insinuates as an engine of oppression. He characterised the High Court's order of suspension as mysterious and prayed that the Government should post him directly under it. We have no doubt that the Full Bench has correctly summarized the effect of Annexure-8, and we have nothing more to add. 25. Annexures 13 and 14 should go together. Annexure 13 is a letter by the appellant to the Registrar dated May 14, 1972 in which he told him that he had moved the Governor, Orissa with a prayer to refer his matter to the Tribunal under the provisions of the Disciplinary Proceedings Rules, 1951 and also that he would take all other alternative steps "administrative and judicial" to avoid this proceeding being dealt with by the High Court and for this purpose would have to consult some prominent Advocates of Calcutta and Delhi. Annexure-14 is a further letter dated May 22, 1972 to the ....
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....he multiple number of such charges may naturally make the petitioner, apprehensive of the result of the proceedings, if conducted by the High Court." "... the High Court even without any authority or jurisdiction in this regard and or the face of the directions of the Government in Political and Services Department communicated in the Government's Memo No. 3559-Gen., dated the 15th March 1958, have placed the petitioner under suspension." "The High Court have also taken unusual move in placing the petitioner under suspension in a 'contemplated proceeding' " "... the High Court on the administrative side, is seriously prejudiced and biased against him, and they act, as if the charges stand established, requiring extreme punishment and as such, justice may not be meted out to the petitioner by the High Court, if they conduct this departmental inquiry." "... the petitioner considers it risky to submit his explanation to the High Court." "... the High Court in the best interest of justice, should not enquire into these charges." 29. A copy of the above representation was sent to the Registrar and the following endorsement appe....
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....ut affording him an opportunity to obtain stay of the sentence from this Honourable Court, executed the sentence by administering admonition in the open court and sounding warning that, if at any time such contumacious conduct of his was noticed, a very serious view would be taken about punishment." 33. In the other contempt matter, he alleged, a Judge wanted to add a new charge. The appellant objected to the same and went in appeal to the Supreme Court. The appellant says that when the appellant filed his appeal in this Court and brought this fact to the notice of the Honourable Judges, they dropped the additional charge. In another proceeding, he says, the Honourable Judges while dropping the proceeding found out a very innocent and inconsequential mistake in the sworn counter-affidavit of the appellant and on that account ordered the filing of a criminal complaint for an offence under Section 199 of the I.P.C. In ground (1) the appellant alleged that the appellant fears bias of the Honourable High Court against him in view of the facts and circumstances stated above. 34. The Full Bench in its judgment has considered each one of the allegations in the appeal memo and shown ....
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....was applied in India. The expressions "scandalize", "lowering the authority of the court", "interference", "obstruction" and "administration of justice" have all gone into the legal currency of our sub-continent and have to be understood in the sense in which they have been so far understood by our courts with the aid of the English law, where necessary. 38. The first sub-clause generally deals with what is known as the scandalization of the court discussed by Halsbury 3rd Edition in Volume 8, page 7 at para 9 : "Scandalous attacks upon Judges are punished by attachment or committal upon the principle that they are, as against the public, not the judge, an obstruction to public justice; and a libel on a judge, in order to constitute a contempt of court, must have been calculated to cause such an obstruction.... The punishment is inflicted, not for the purpose of protecting either the court as a whole or the individual judges of the court from a repetition of the attack, but of protecting the public, and especially those who either voluntarily or by compulsion are subject to the jurisdiction of the court, from the mischief they will incur if the authority of the tribunal is under....
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....pinion in Rex. v. Almon-(1765 Wilmot's Notes of Opinions, 243 97 E.R. 94 which is the source of much of the present law on the subject, spoke of the article complained of as calculated to lower the authority of the judge." 42. It is therefore, clear that scandalization within the meaning of Sub-clause (i) must be in respect of the court or the Judge with reference to administration of justice. 43. The contention of Mr. Sen on behalf of the appellant is that in the first place, it must be remembered that the publication or acts complained of are in the course of the appellant challenging his suspension and holding of disciplinary proceedings in an appeal or representation to the Governor from the orders passed by the High Court. In Annexure-20 he was challenging the Order of the High Court before the Supreme Court. The appellant in his submission, bona fide believed that he had a right to appeal and, in pursuance of the right he thus claimed he had given expression to his grievance or had otherwise acted, not with a view to malign the court or in defiance of it, but with the sole object of obtaining the reversal of the orders passed by the High Court against him. In the se....
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....tice by the Presiding Judge. The power of appointment of clerks and ministerial officers involves administrative control by the Presiding Judge over them and though such control is described as administrative to distinguish it from the duties of a Judge sitting in the seat of justice, such control is exercised by the Judge as a Judge, in the course of judicial administration. Judicial administration is an integrated function of the Judge and cannot suffer any dissection so far as maintenance of high standards of rectitude in "judicial administration is concerned. The whole set up of a court is for the purpose of administration of justice, and the control which the judge exercises over his assistants has also the object of maintaining the purity of administration of justice. These observations apply to all courts of justice in the land whether they are regarded as superior or inferior courts of justice. 48. Courts of justice have, in accordance with their Constitutions, to perform multifarious functions for due administration of justice. Any lapse from the strict standards of rectitude in performing these functions is bound to affect administration of justice which is a term of w....
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....stice implies an authority to control them in the interest of administration of justice. This controlling function which is commonly described as an administrative function is designed with the primary object of securing administration of justice. Therefore, when the Chief Justice appoints ministerial officers and assumes disciplinary control over them, that is a function which though described as administrative is really in the course of administration of justice. Similarly Section 9 of the High Courts Act, 1861 while conferring on the High Courts several types of jurisdictions and powers says that all such jurisdiction and powers are "for and in relation to the administration of justice in the Presidency for which it is established." Section 106 of the Government of India Act, 1915 similarly shows that the several jurisdictions of the High Court and all their powers and authority are "in relation to the administration of justice including power to appoint clerks and other ministerial officers of the court." Section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935 preserves the jurisdictions of the existing High Courts and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the adm....
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....dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations, and indisposes their minds to obey them; and whenever men's allegiance to the laws is so fundamentally shaken, it is the most fatal and most dangerous obstruction of justice, and in my opinion, calls out for a more rapid and immediate redress than any other obstruction whatsover; not for the sake of the Judges, as private individuals, but because they are the channels by which the King's justice is conveyed to the people. To be impartial, and to be universally thought so, are both absolutely necessary for the giving justice that free, open, and uninterrupted current, which it has, for many ages, found all over this kingdom,..." Further explaining what he meant by the words "authority of the court", he observed "the word "authority" is frequently used to express both the right of declaring the law, which is properly called jurisdiction, and of enforcing obedience to it, in which sense it is equivalent to the word power : but by the word "authority", I do not mean that coercive power of the Judges, but the deference and respect which is paid to them and their acts, from an opinion of their justice and integrity." 53. Scanda....
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....e case is no authority to the proposition put forward by Mr. Sen. In Gobind Ram v. State of Maharashtra [1971] I S.C.C. 740 some observations of Jagannadhadas, C.J. (as he then was) in the State v. The Editors and Publishers of Eastern Times and Prajatantra AIR1952Ori318 were quoted by this Court with approval. These observations are : "A review of the cases in which a contempt committed by way of scandalization of the court has been taken notice of for punishment shows clearly that the exercise of the punitive jurisdiction is confined to cases of very grave and scurrilous attack on the court or on the Judges in their judicial capacity the ignoring of which could only result encouraging a repetition of the same with the sense of impunity which would thereby result in lowering the prestige and authority of the court." Mr. Sen has particularly emphasised the words "judicial capacity" and argued that this only refers to the Judge functioning in the seat of justice. It does not appear from the report of the Orissa case that the High Court was in any way, concerned with the alleged dichotomy between the Judge's administration functions and his adjudicatory functions. "Judicial capac....
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...." Woodroffe, J. at page 199 observed : "The Court, however, in such cases does not seek to vindicate any personal interests of the Judges, but the general administration of justice, which is a public concern." Mookerjee, J at page 231 observed : "it seems to me indisputably plain that the implication of the second article, whether taken along with or independently of the fast, is that, at the instance of persons interested in the Calcutta Improvement Trust, the Chief Justice has constituted a Special Bench to ensure a decision favourable to the Trust in the appeals against the judgment of Mr. Justice Greaves." Proceeding further he held "an imputation of this character constitutes a contempt of court." It was the function of the Chief Justice as Chief Justice of the Court to administratively form, from time to time, benches for the disposal of the business of the court. To attribute improper motives to him in the exercise of this function was held to be a contempt because that was bound to undermine the confidence of the people in the High Court and its Judges in relation to administration of justice. Similarliy, in The state of Bombay v. Mr. P. AIR1959Bom182 ." "a scurrilous attac....
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....n mind-and the case was referred to earlier in the judgment-Lord Atkin showed in the words quoted above that the criticism did not refer (i) to any judicial act, meaning thereby any adjudicatory act and (ii) to any administrative act, because the Chief Justice alone had no administrative control over the subordinate courts but only the High Court as a whole. The plain implication is that if the circular had been alleged to have been issued by the Chief Justice under the authority of the High Court, then the imputation having the effect of lowering the prestige and authority of the High Court could conceivably have been regarded as contempt. Their Lordships of the Privy Council are not known to waste their words over matters not relevant to the issue. It was absolutely necessary for their Lordships to eliminate the possibility of the alleged action of the Chief Justice being connected in any manner with any adjudicatory or administrative function of the High Court by pointing out that it did not refer to any official act in the administration of justice or, as stated in Queen v. Gray already referred to, "the act of a Judge as a Judge", in which case alone the imputation would have ....
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....contravened Articles 235 which vested control over the Subordinate Judiciary in the High Court. From these findings the State of Orissa has come in appeal and that appeal is numbered Criminal Appeal No. 77/1973. In our opinion, the principal matter before the Full Bench was in relation to the contempt committed by the appellant. The constitutional issue between the State Government and the High Court came in only by way of a side-wind. In fact it would appear from the judgment that the learned Advocate-General had requested the court not to express any opinion on these Constitutional matters, and the court also seems to have thought that the Constitutionality of the rules had no relation to the commission of the contempt. However, the court thought that the issue became relevant, especially, on the question of sentence and hence applied its mind to the Constitutionality of some of the rules. It has struck down those rules which, in the opinion of the court, contravened Article 235 in their application to the Subordinate Judiciary. We have considered whether it is necessary for us to deal with those questions here, but are inclined to think that we should express no opinion on the C....
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....isaffection or its being a bona fide plea for orderly change in the judicature and its process. On the facts, we agree that the spirit of defiance, extenuated partly by a sense of despair, is writ large in the writings of the appellant but wish to warn ourselves that his reported past violations should not prejudice a judicial appraisal of his alleged present criminal contempt. And the benefit of doubt, if any, belongs to the contemner in this jurisdiction. 64. The dilemma of the law of contempt arises because of the Constitutional need to balance two great but occasionally conflicting principles freedom of expression and fair and fearless justice remembering the brooding presence of Articles 19(1)(a), 19(2), 129 and 215 of the Constitution. 65. In a sense, the Indian approach is a little different from the English and its orientation is more akin to American jurisprudence, although there is much that is common to all the three. The pronouncement of Wilmot, C.J., posthumously published, has influenced the law of contempt in the United States and the Commonwealth countries, but it is a moot point whether we should, still be bound to the regal moorings of the law in Rex v. Alma....
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....no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. The prestige argument, from age alone, that because a claimed legal rule has lasted a certain length of time it must automatically be valid and binding at the present day, regardless of changes in basic societal conditions and expectations, is no longer very persuasive. According to the basic teachings of the Legal Realist and policy schools of law, society itself is in continuing state of flux at the present day; and the positive law, therefore, if it is to continue to be useful in the resolution of contemporary major social conflicts and social problems, must change in measure with the society. What we have, therefore, concomitantly with our conception of society in revolution is a conception of law itself, as being in a condition of flux, of movement. On this view, law is not a frozen, static body of rules but rules in a continuous process of change and adaptation and the judge, at the final appellate level anyway, is a part-determinant part-of this dynamic process of legal evolution. This approach must inform Indian law, including contempt law. 68. It is very necessary to remember the l....
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....rder. 69. The present proceedings challenge the projection of the power to punish for contempt into administrative domains of the Court and its extension to statements in remedial proceedings. One recalls the observations of the American Supreme Court : Contempt of Court is the Proteus of the Legal World, assuming an almost infinite diversity of forms. 70. Considerations such as we have silhouetted led to the enactment of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971, which makes some restrictive departures from the traditional law and implies some wholesome principles which serve as unspoken guidelines in this branch of law. Section 5 protects fair comment on the merits of cases finally decided, and Section 13 absolves from sentence all contempts which do not substantially interfere or tend substantially to interfere with the due course of justice. Statements which disparage a subordinate judicial officer presiding over a court are not contempt if made in good faith to the High Court or any other lower Court to which the offended judge is subordinate. The emphasis in Section 2(c), Section 3 and Section 13 to the interference with the course of justice or obstruction of the administr....
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....ostings, routine disciplinary action against subordinate staff, executive acts in running the establishment and ministerial business ancillary to office-keeping-these are common to all departments in the public sector and merely because they relate to the judicial wing of government cannot enjoy a higher immunity from criticism. The quintessence of the contempt power is protection of the public, not judicial personnel. Excerpts from a few Anglo-American authorities will attest our standpoint : "The object of the discipline enforced by the Court in case of contempt of Court is not to vindicate the dignity of the Court or the person of the Judge, but to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice." [Bowen, L.J. Helmore v. Smith (1887) 35 Ch. D. 449] "The law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges who may be sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate. "[Douglas, J. Craig v. Harney; 331 U.S. 367]. Judges as persons, or courts as institutions, are entitled to no greater immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions. Just because the holders....
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.... The Attorney-General struck a sound note when in the course of the arguments he summed up the law thus : "A libel upon a judge, holding him up to contempt and ridicule in his character as a judge, so as to lower him in the estimation of the public amongst whom he exercises office is a contempt of court." (emphasis supplied) 75. Lord Atkin, in the celebrated case of Debi Prasad Sharma v. The King-Emperor (1942) 70 I.A. 216, where the printer, publisher and editor of the Hindustan Times were found guilty of contempt by the Allahabad High Court for criticising the Chief Justice by falsely imputing to him a circular communication to the subordinate judiciary to raise collections for the war fund, set aside the conviction holding that the proceedings in contempt were misconceived. The learned Law Lord observed : When the comment in question in the present case is examined it is found that there is no criticism of any judicial act of the Chief Justice, or any imputation on him for anything done or omitted to be done by him in the administration of justice. It can hardly be said that there is any criticism of him in his administrative capacity, for, as far as their Lordshi....
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.... a fit subject for punitive action. (In that case, of course, the contemnor was convicted for another publication). The deep concern of the law of contempt is to inhibit sullying essays on the administration of justice in which the public have a vital interest and not to warn off or victimise criticisms, just or unjust, of judges as citizens, administrators, non-judicial authorities, etc. 78. K.L. Gauba's I.L.R. [1942] Lah. 411 case was naturally pressed into service at the Bar against the contemnor but such an extreme case of wild and vicious attacks on the Chief Justice rarely serves in the search for any abiding principle in an excited setting. That ruling reminds us that, whatever the provocation, a Judge by reason of his office, has to halt at the gates of controversy but as enlightenment spreads and public opinion ripens this judicial self-abnegation will be appreciated better and not "embolden the licentious to trample upon everything sacred in society and to overthrow those institutions which have hitherto been deemed the best guardians of civil liberty." Again, while Young, C.J., in that case rules out the tenability of truth as a valid defence against contempt acti....
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....s shackles and proceedings to contempt are wholly uncalled for. 81. The Judicial Committee in In re. S.B. Sarbadhicary (1906) 20 I.A. 14 considered the misconduct of a barrister for publishing an article where he cast reflections upon judges of the Allahabad High Court. The merits of the case apart, the Judicial Committee emphasized the judicial capacity of the judges which attracted the contempt jurisdiction. Sir Andrew Seoble observed : "There is no doubt that the article in question was a libel reflecting not only upon Richards J., but other judges of the High Court in their judicial capacity and in reference to their conduct in the discharge of their public duties." (emphasis added). "The public duty" in their "judicial capacity" was obviously in contradistinction to merely personal activities or administrative functions. It is not as if a judge doing some non-judicial public duty is protected from criticism in which case any action, by him as Dean of Law or Vice-Chancellor in a University or as Acting Governor or President or Member of the Law or Finance Commission would also be punishable as contempt. The basic public duty of a judge in his judicial capac....
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....ourt punished the late Shri C.Y. Chintamani and Shri K.D. Malaviya for publishing a criticism to the effect that comparatively undeserving lawyers were being frequently raised to the Bench. The Court held them guilty of contempt holding the criticism of the judges as a vicious reflection and a case of contempt. [see In the matter of an Advocate of Allahabad AIR1935All1 . Borderline cases draw up to the penumbra of law and cannot light up dark corners. 83. The learned Additional Solicitor General, in an endeavour to expand the meaning of "administration of justice" so to rope in criticisms of executive acts of judges, drew our attention to Articles 225, 227 and 235, and the provisions of earlier Government of India Acts (c.f. Section 224(1) 1935 Act) which vest the power to appoint the staff and do other incidental management functions, in the High Court as part of the administration of justice. Several High Court Acts clothe Chief Justices with administrative powers and Civil Courts Acts and Letters Patents charge judges with administrative duties the goal being effective administration of justice. If the appointment of clerks is part of the administration of justice, denunciati....
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....on about ? Against the appellant in his judicial capacity, for acts of judicial misconduct. The control was therefore, judicial and hence the unbridled attack on the High Court for the step was punishable as contempt. A large margin must be allowed for allegations in remedial representations but extravagance forfeits the protection of good faith. In this case reckless excess has vitiated what otherwise could have been legitimate grievance at least in one flagrant instance, the others being less clear. One of the grounds for taking disciplinary action was based on the disposal of a civil appeal by the contemnor as Additional District Judge. He heard it, delivered judgment dismissing the appeal, signed the order sheet and judgment and sealed the judgment. Later in the day, the contemnor scored off his signatures in the order sheet and judgment, and returned the record to the principal District Judge for disposal falsely stating that the judgment had not been delivered. The High Court took the view that this action was without jurisdiction and revealed utter disregard of truth and procedure deserving disciplinary action. Obviously, the impugned conduct of the contemnor was qua judge a....
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....t office-and yet no one should be able to initiate proceedings for an enquiry by a complaint to the appropriate authority by reason of a fear of being punished for contempt, and I can find no justification for this view. 89. At this stage it must be noticed that in the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ravi Shanker 1959CriLJ251 this Court ruled that aspersions of a serious nature made against a Magistrate in a transfer petition could be punishable as a contempt if made without good faith. However, in Govind Ram v. State of Maharashtra, 1972CriLJ620 this Court reviewed the decisions on the point and ruled that if in the garb of a transfer application scurrilous attacks were made on a court imputing improper motives to the Judge there may still be contempt of court, although the court referred with approval to the ruling in Swarnamayi Panigrahi v. B. Nayak AIR1959Ori89 that a latitudinarian approach was permissible in transfer applications. The core of the pronouncement is that a remedial process like a transfer application cannot be a mask to malign a judge, a certain generosity or indulgence is justified in evaluating the allegations against the judge. Eventually, Grover J., held that ....
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....hat we will never use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own dignity. That must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it to suppress those who speak against us. We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itself It is the right of every man, in Parliament or out of it, in the Press or over the broadcast, to make fair comment, even outspoken comment, on matters of public interest. Those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done in a court of justice. They can say that we are mistaken, and our decisions erroneous, whether they are subject to appeal or not. All we would ask is that those who criticise us will remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot reply to their criticisms. We cannot enter into public controversy. Still less into political controversy. We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication. Exposed as we are to the winds of criticism, nothing which is said by this person or that, nothing which is written by this person or that, nothing which is written by this pen or that, will deter us from doing what we believe is right; nor,....