TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2017 (8) TMI 1526
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....since we are really concerned with the interpretation of the words "imprisonment for a term not less than ten years" appearing in Clause (i) of proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as amended in 1978. A few facts 3. A First Information Report No. 936 of 2016 was lodged on 27th October, 2016 in respect of allegations made under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) and the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). Although the Petitioner was not named in the First Information Report, investigations seemed to implicate him in a very large and structured conspiracy. Accordingly, on 5th November, 2016 the Petitioner was taken into custody pending further investigation. 4. Ordinarily, the maximum period of detention during the course of investigation (without a charge sheet or challan being filed) would be 60 days in terms of Clause (ii) of proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Cr.P.C.'). In the Petitioner's case, this period would come to an end on 3rd January, 2017. However according to the State, since the Petitioner had committed offences which could result in "imprisonme....
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....tion of 90 days of detention. 9. In view of the charge sheet having been filed, the modified question before us is whether the Petitioner was entitled to 'default bail' with effect from 3rd or 4th January, 2017 onwards and, in any case on 11th January, 2017 when his application for "regular bail" was rejected by the Gauhati High Court. History behind the enactment of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 10. The Code of Criminal Procedure enacted in 1898 contained Section 167 which laid down the procedure to be followed in the event the investigation into an offence is not completed within twenty-four hours. What is significant is that the legislative expectation was that the investigation would ordinarily be completed within twenty-four hours. Incidentally, this legislative expectation continues till today. Whatever be the anxiety of the Legislature in 1898, there can be no gainsaying that investigation into an offence deserves an early closure, one way or the other. Therefore, when Section 167 was enacted in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 it was premised on the conclusion of investigations within twenty-four hours or within 15 days on the outside, regardl....
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....r carefully studying several earlier Reports) and proposed to increase the time limit for completion of investigations to 60 days, acknowledging that "such an extension may result in the maximum period becoming the Rule in every case as a matter of routine: but we trust that proper supervision by the superior courts will prevent that." (Emphasis supplied by us). The view expressed by the Law Commission of India and its proposal is as follows: 14.19. Section 167 provides for remands. The total period for which an arrested person may be remanded to custody-police or judicial-is 15 days. The assumption is that the investigation must be completed within 15 days, and the final report Under Section 173 sent to court by then. In actual practice, however, this has frequently been found unworkable. Quite often, a complicated investigation cannot be completed within 15 days, and if the offence is serious, the police naturally insist that the Accused be kept in custody. A practice of doubtful legal validity has therefore grown up. The police file before a magistrate a preliminary or "incomplete" report, and the magistrate, purporting to act Under Section 344, adjourns the proceedings and re....
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....rise detention in the custody of the police. (4) Any Magistrate other than the Chief Judicial Magistrate making such order shall forward a copy of his order, with his reasons for making it, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate. 12. The recommendations of the Law Commission of India were carefully examined and then accepted. The basic considerations for acceptance, as mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons dated 7th November, 1970 for introducing the (new) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were: 3. The recommendations of the Commission were examined carefully by the Government, keeping in view among others, the following basic considerations: (i) an Accused person should get a fair trial in accordance with the accepted principles of natural justice; (ii) every effort should be made to avoid delay in investigation and trial which is harmful not only to the individuals involved but also to society; and (iii) the procedure should not be complicated and should, to the utmost extent possible, ensure fair deal to the poorer Sections of the community. The occasion has been availed of to consider and adopt where appropriate suggestions received from other quarters, based ....
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....he custody of the police. Explanation.-If any question arises whether an Accused person was produced before the Magistrate as required under paragraph (b), the production of the Accused person may be proved by his signature on the order authorising detention. (3) to (6) Not relevant for the present purposes. 14. A few years later in 1978, a need was felt to amend Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by not only extending the period for completing investigation but also relating that period to the offence. Therefore, a shift was proposed to grant an aggregate period of 90 days for completing the investigation in cases relating to offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life or "imprisonment for not less than ten years or more" and up to 60 days in any other case, as stated in the Notes on Clauses accompanying the Statement of Objects and Reasons dated 9th May, 1978 for amending the statute. What is of significance (for our purposes) is the use of the words "imprisonment for not less than ten years or more". In our opinion, the use of the words "or more" gives a clear indication that the period of 90 days was relatable to an offence punishable with a minimum im....
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....n of the Accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding,-- (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; (ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the Accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this Sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter; (b) no Magistrate shall authorise detention of the Accused in custody of the police under this Section unless the Accused is produced before him in person for the first time and subsequently every time till the Accused remains in the custody of the police, but the Magistrate may extend further detention in judicial custody on production of the Accused either in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage; (c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall a....
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....hat was the offence allegedly committed by the Petitioner? According to the State he was liable for punishment for an offence, inter alias, Under Section 13(1) of the PC Act, the offence being "punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than four years but which may extend to ten years" and fine. Therefore, the view of the State is that since the Petitioner could face imprisonment that could extend to 10 years, the date for applying for 'default bail' would commence on the expiry of 90 days. However, according to the Petitioner the date for obtaining 'default bail' would commence on the expiry of 60 days that is on or about 3rd January, 2017. (On the facts of this case, we need not quibble on the exact date). To this extent there is no dispute between the Petitioner and the State. Discussion on interpretation 19. To answer the primary question before us, we need to first decide the meaning of the expression "punishable with imprisonment for not less than ten years" occurring in Clause (i) to proviso (a) of Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Its interpretation stirred considerable debate and discussion before us. 20. Learned Coun....
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.... not less than 10 years. This decision certainly supports the contention of learned Counsel and there is also a feeling of dij` vu in the use of the words "or more" in the decision, those words having been used in the Notes on Clauses when the Code of Criminal Procedure was sought to be amended in 1978. 21. In contrast, learned Counsel for the State referred to and relied upon Bhupinder Singh v. Jarnail Singh (2006) 6 SCC 277. That case concerned an offence Under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code where the punishment provided is not less than 7 years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.3 In other words, the 'punishment range' or 'punishable range' available to a sentencing judge varied from not less than 7 years extending to life imprisonment. Keeping this in mind, it was noted that what is the adequate punishment in a given case would be decided by the court on the basis of the facts and circumstances before it. 22. The decision in Rajeev Chaudhary was distinguished by recording that the case related to an offence punishable Under Section 386 Indian Penal Code and the sentence in respect of the said offence is not less than 10 years. This Court ....
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....le and not the maximum sentence. Merely because minimum sentence is provided that does not mean that the sentence imposable is only the minimum sentence. 25. While it is true that merely because a minimum sentence is provided for in the statute it does not mean that only the minimum sentence is imposable. Equally, there is also nothing to suggest that only the maximum sentence is imposable. Either punishment can be imposed and even something in between. Where does one strike a balance? It was held that it is eventually for the court to decide what sentence should be imposed given the range available. Undoubtedly, the Legislature can bind the sentencing court by laying down the minimum sentence (not less than) and it can also lay down the maximum sentence. If the minimum is laid down, the sentencing judge has no option but to give a sentence "not less than" that sentence provided for. Therefore, the words "not less than" occurring in Clause (i) to proviso (a) of Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (and in other provisions) must be given their natural and obvious meaning which is to say, not below a minimum threshold and in the case of Section 167 of the Code of Crimina....
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....been to conclude investigations within twenty-four hours. This intention has not changed for more than a century, as the marginal notes to Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure suggest. However, the Legislature has been pragmatic enough to appreciate that it is not always possible to complete investigations into an offence within twenty-four hours. Therefore initially, in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898, a maximum period of 15 days was provided for completing the investigations. Unfortunately, this limit was being violated through the subterfuge of taking advantage of Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898. The misuse was recognized in the 41st Report of the Law Commission of India and consequently the Law Commission recommended fixing a maximum period of 60 days for completing investigations and that recommendation came to be enacted as the law in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973. Subsequently, this period was also found to be insufficient for completing investigations into more serious offences and, as mentioned above, the period for completing investigations was bifurcated into 90 days for some offences and 60 days for the remaining offences. ....
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....gence of views on the need, inter alia, to separate investigation work from law and order. Such views and opinions over a prolonged period have prompted the Legislature for more than a century to ensure expeditious conclusion of investigations so that an Accused person is not unnecessarily deprived of his or her personal liberty by remaining in prolonged custody for an offence that he or she might not even have committed. In our opinion, the entire debate before us must also be looked at from the point of view of expeditious conclusion of investigations and from the angle of personal liberty and not from a purely dictionary or textual perspective as canvassed by learned Counsel for the State. Default bail as an indefeasible right 33. It was submitted by learned Counsel for the State that the charge sheet having been filed against the Petitioner on 24th January, 2017 the indefeasible right of the Petitioner to be now released on 'default bail' gets extinguished and the Petitioner must apply for regular bail. 34. What is forgotten is that the indefeasible right for 'default bail' accrued to the Petitioner when the period of 60 days for completing the investigation ....
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....pplies for bail under this provision on expiry of the period of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and committed to custody according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The right of the Accused to be released on bail after filing of the challan, notwithstanding the default in filing it within the time allowed, is governed from the time of filing of the challan only by the provisions relating to the grant of bail applicable at that stage. 37. This Court had occasion to review the entire case law on the subject in Union of India v. Nirala Yadav (2014) 9 SCC 457. In that decision, reference was made to Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 5 SCC 453 and the conclusions arrived at in that decision. We are concerned with conclusion No. 3 which reads as follows: (3) On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the Accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the period prescribed and ....
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....by learned Counsel for the Petitioner in the High Court and it was considered but not accepted by the High Court. The High Court did not reject the submission on the ground of maintainability but on merits. Therefore it is not as if the Petitioner did not make any application for default bail-such an application was definitely made (if not in writing) then at least orally before the High Court. In our opinion, in matters of personal liberty, we cannot and should not be too technical and must lean in favour of personal liberty. Consequently, whether the Accused makes a written application for 'default bail' or an oral application for 'default bail' is of no consequence. The concerned court must deal with such an application by considering the statutory requirements namely, whether the statutory period for filing a charge sheet or challan has expired, whether the charge sheet or challan has been filed and whether the Accused is prepared to and does furnish bail. 41. We take this view keeping in mind that in matters of personal liberty and Article 21 of the Constitution, it is not always advisable to be formalistic or technical. The history of the personal liberty jur....
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....was treated as a writ petition and in Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra (1983) 2 SCC 96 a letter addressed by a journalist complaining of custodial violence against woman prisoners in Bombay was treated as a writ petition. These cases are merely illustrative of the personal liberty jurisprudence of this Court and in matters pertaining to Article 21 of the Constitution of India this Court has consistently taken the view that it is not advisable to be ritualistic and formal. However, we must make it clear that we should not be understood to suggest that procedures must always be given a go-by-that is certainly not our intention. Duty of the Courts 43. This Court and other constitutional courts have also taken the view that in the matters concerning personal liberty and penal statutes, it is the obligation of the court to inform the Accused that he or she is entitled to free legal assistance as a matter of right. In Khatri v. State of Bihar (1981) 1 SCC 627 the Judicial Magistrate did not provide legal representation to the Accused since they did not ask for it. It was held by this Court that this was unacceptable and that the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge before whom an Accus....
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....ourt as is evidenced by the decisions mentioned above, and also adverted to in Nirala Yadav. Application of the law to the Petitioner 45. On 11th January, 2017 when the High Court dismissed the application for bail filed by the Petitioner, he had an indefeasible right to the grant of 'default bail' since the statutory period of 60 days for filing a charge sheet had expired, no charge sheet or challan had been filed against him (it was filed only on 24th January, 2017) and the Petitioner had orally applied for 'default bail'. Under these circumstances, the only course open to the High Court on 11th January, 2017 was to enquire from the Petitioner whether he was prepared to furnish bail and if so then to grant him 'default bail' on reasonable conditions. Unfortunately, this was completely overlooked by the High Court. 46. It was submitted that as of today, a charge sheet having been filed against the Petitioner, he is not entitled to 'default bail' but must apply for regular bail-the 'default bail' chapter being now closed. We cannot agree for the simple reason that we are concerned with the interregnum between 4th January, 2017 and 24th Jan....
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.... violation of Section 13(1) thereof. There is absolutely no cogent reason for excluding the Petitioner from the rigours of the PC Act as amended by the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013. Conclusion 49. The Petitioner is held entitled to the grant of 'default bail' on the facts and in the circumstances of this case. The Trial Judge should release the Petitioner on 'default bail' on such terms and conditions as may be reasonable. However, we make it clear that this does not prohibit or otherwise prevent the arrest or re-arrest of the Petitioner on cogent grounds in respect of the subject charge and upon arrest or re-arrest, the Petitioner is entitled to petition for grant of regular bail which application should be considered on its own merit. We also make it clear that this will not impact on the arrest of the Petitioner in any other case. 50. We allow the petition and set aside the judgment and order of the High Court. 51. The companion petition, being S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 2176 of 2017 is rendered infructuous and is dismissed as such. 52. By way of a footnote, we may add that it is time that the reports of the Law Commission of India and the decision of this Court i....
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....ts of the APSC Examination were recovered which contained extra marks bearing the signature of the invigilator including the APSC tabulation sheet, master paper of answer scripts, draft copy of APSC answer booklets including instructions part from a particular printing press of the brother of the Appellant. The Papers were supposed to be printed at the Government Printing Press as per the APSC provisions, but they were made to be printed at the private press without any authority. Telephonic conversation records revealed that Nabakanta Patir was in contact with a candidate regarding appointment for the post of BDO also for the year 2016. Some other recoveries were also made from his office and the printing press. The Appellant was arrested on 4.11.2016 and was produced before the Judge, Special Court, Guwahati on 5.11.2016, wherein he was remanded to custody. 56. The present Appellant first preferred a regular bail application before the Special Judge which was dismissed on 20.12.2016. Thereafter, in January 2017, he filed Bail Application No. 23 of 2017 before the High Court of Guwahati Under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (for short "the Code"). It is signifi....
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....nces Under Sections 7, 13(1)(a)(b) (d) and 13(2) of the PC Act and Sections 120B, 420, 462, 468, 471, 477(A), 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) against the Appellant and other co-accused. After filing the chargesheet, the Appellant moved bail application No. 136 of 2017 before the High Court of Guwahati seeking bail on merits. This bail application also came to be rejected on 13.2.2017. These two orders of the High Court dated 11.1.2017 and 13.2.2017 are challenged before this Court in these present appeals. 59. Heard Shri Abhishek Manu Singhvi, senior counsel for the Appellant and Shri Mukul Rohtagi, senior counsel for the State of Assam. 60. The primary argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that the default of the Investigating Agency in not filing the chargesheet within sixty days entitles the Accused to be released as per the provision of Section 167(2) of the Code. It is contended that the maximum punishment for the offences for which the chargesheet has been filed against the Accused is seven years. The PC Act was amended by the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 primarily by enhancing the punishments for certain offences, to be investigated and prosec....
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....e Accused that the Amendment made to the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 by the Lokpal and Lokayukta Act, 2013 has not been enforced, has no legs to stand on. The Amendment has been enforced with effect from 16.01.2014 which has been accepted by this Court in the case of Kiran Chander Asri v. State of Haryana (supra). The challenge to the power of the parliament to amend the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 by way of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 is neither substantiated nor further pressed and is thus liable to be rejected. 63. The three main questions that arise in these appeals for our consideration are as under: I. Whether in a case regarding offence for which the punishment imposable may extend upto ten years, the Accused is entitled to bail Under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 due to default on the part of investigating agency in not filing the charge sheet within sixty days? II. Whether the Appellant is entitled to default bail Under Section 167(2) of the Code though he has not made any application (oral or written) Under Section 167(2) of the Code before the Magistrate (or Special Judge), but has instead argued orally w....
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....tion relates to any other offence. 66. The question that arises in the instant case is whether for the offence which is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, the Accused will be entitled to be released on bail for default in not filing charge sheet within sixty days from the date of remand. The learned Counsel of the Accused has relied on the case of Rajeev Chaudhary (supra) wherein a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with the permissible period of custody for an offence Under Section 386 Indian Penal Code, which is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to ten years. 67. In Rajeev Chaudhary (supra) it has been observed that only if the minimum prescribed punishment is ten years imprisonment or more, then the requirement of completing investigation may extend to ninety days. But in my opinion when Section 167(2) of Code was amended, there was no such category of offences in the Indian Penal Code where minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment was required to be imposed in 1978 without alternative prescribed sentence of imprisonment for life. For example: offences punishable Under Sections 121A, 122, 128, 131, 194, 304 (part I), 313,....
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....ence Under Section 304B Indian Penal Code was held to be ninety days. While holding so, the Court observed as under: Where minimum and maximum sentences are prescribed both are imposable depending on the facts of the cases. It is for the Court, after recording conviction, to impose appropriate sentence. It cannot, therefore, be accepted that only the minimum sentence is imposable and not the maximum sentence. Merely because minimum sentence is provided that does not mean that the sentence imposable is only the minimum sentence......... 69. The main ambiguity in the interpretation of the provision arises in the use of the words "not less than ten years" in Section 167(2)(a)(i) of the Code. The legislative drafts on the amendment of this provision do not throw much light on the expression "not less than ten years" used in the provision. But while answering the criticism to the amendment at the Rajya Sabha, the then Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs-Shri S.D. Patil, who had moved the bill in both the houses, made the following statement which may help us to know the kinds of cases that were intended to be included in the ninety days category. The statement is as und....
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....ass. His statistics shows that he had classified the cases punishable with death sentence in one group, cases punishable with life imprisonment were classified in another group and cases punishable with imprisonment of upto ten years were classified in the third group. The reference he was making to the 36 cases that fall in the category of "imprisonment of not less than ten years" in Section 167(2)(a)(i) of the Code, were in fact the offences for which the punishment was of imprisonment for a period which may extend to ten years. It can further be inferred that, when he stated "...or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years and we have 36 offences punishable with this sentence...", he referred to offences wherein ten years imprisonment was also an imposable punishment. 72. From the above analogy, I am of the opinion that the intention of the legislature was that if an offence was punishable with imprisonment upto ten years, then it falls within the provision of Section 167(2)(a)(i) of the Code, and the permissible period for investigation is ninety days. The intention of the Legislature in extending the permissible time period from sixty days to ninety days for investig....
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....prior to the time of hearing, the counsel for the Appellant has realised that the Accused was entitled for default bail Under Section 167(2) and has taken the plea in the oral arguments in the High Court that since sixty days for filing charge sheet has expired, he is entitled to bail as matter of right Under Section 167(2) of the Code. The question thus arises, whether such application on merits can be equated to be an application seeking enforcement of statutory right Under Section 167(2) of the Code and whether such practice of taking such oral arguments directly before the High Court in a pending regular bail application without having taken such grounds in the application or having approached the Magistrate (or Special Court) should be entertained. 74. The legal position regarding bail Under Section 167(2) of the Code was cemented by a Constitution Bench of this Court which has inter alia held in the case of Sanjay Dutt v. State through C.B.I., Bombay (1994) 5 SCC 410 that: ...The "'indefeasible right" of the Accused to be released on bail in accordance with Section 20 of the TADA Act read with Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in default of completion of....
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....ion 167(2) has been recognised in several cases. In the case of Mohamed Iqbal Madar Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra (1996) 1 SCC 722, this Court rejected the claim for statutory bail Under Section 167(2) of the Code on the ground that no application was made on that ground. In para 11 of the judgment the Court held as under: So far the facts of the present case are concerned, the Appellant Nos. 1 to 6 were taken into custody on 16.1.1993. The charge-sheet was submitted on 30.8.1993; obviously beyond the statutory period Under Section 20(4)(b). There is nothing on record to show that provisions of Section 20(4)(bb) were applied in respect of Appellants. They had become entitled to be released on bail under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Code read with Section 20(4)(b) of the TADA. But it is an admitted position that no application for bail on the said ground was made on behalf of the Appellants. Unless applications had been made on behalf of the Appellants, there was no question of their being released on ground of default in completion of the investigation within the statutory period. It is now settled that this right cannot be exercised after the charge-sheet has been submi....
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....e allegations against him are serious in nature and several recoveries appear to have been made from his residence and other places. The provisions of the APSC with regard to handling of the answer sheets and other procedural illegalities in dealing with the examination are alleged. A network of illegal activities is said to have been operating for huge amounts of illegal gratification. It is submitted by the state that the Investigating Officer has filed an application Under Section 173(8) of the Code seeking permission to carry out further investigation as materials have been unearthed which indicates involvement of some other Accused persons. It is further submitted that at least fourteen witnesses have deposed Under Section 164 of the Code indicating that the Appellant has demanded illegal gratification in lieu of one post or the other and also received the same. 80. In the case of Nimmagadda Prasad v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2013 (7) SCC 466 this Court, while rejecting bail in a case related to economic offences, has observed that: While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity o....
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.... have had the privilege of going through the judgments authored by my learned brothers Madan B. Lokur and Prafulla C. Pant, JJ. 85. Since the facts of the case and the legislative history of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Code') have been set out in detail in the two judgments of my learned brothers, I do not want to burden the file with unnecessary facts. The main issue is whether the Petitioner, who is charged with an offence, which is punishable with imprisonment for a period ranging from 4 to 10 years is entitled to 'default bail' or 'statutory bail' in terms of Section 167(2) of the Code on completion of 60 days or not. The Petitioner is a former Chairman of the Assam Public Service Commission. The allegation against him is that he used to take bribe from some candidates for recruiting them to the posts advertised and filled in by the Assam Public Service Commission (for short 'APSC'). A trap was laid and he was allegedly caught red-handed. Amongst other offences he is also charged of having committed an offence Under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (for short 'PC Act'). 86. The f....
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....ence in which the punishment imposable is up to 10 years, whether the Accused is entitled to grant of bail in terms of Section 167(2) of the Code if the investigating agency does not file the charge-sheet within a period of 60 days. (e) Whether an Accused can be enlarged on bail Under Section 167(2) even though he may not have made an application in writing Under Section 167(2) of the Code but has orally argued that he is entitled to grant of 'default bail'. 88. Before dealing with Section 167 of the Code, I would like to refer to Section 57, which provides that any person arrested by the police should not be detained for more than 24 hours unless an order is obtained from the magistrate Under Section 167 of the Code. The Code was originally enacted in the year 1898. We must remember that at that time, the means of communication were very primitive; the means of telecommunications barely existed. Despite that, in the Code as originally enacted, the police was expected to complete investigation within 15 days and the magistrate did not have any jurisdiction to pass an order detaining him beyond 15 days if investigation was not completed. This system worked well enough for....
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....at the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by Section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the Accused to such Magistrate. (2) The Magistrate to whom an Accused person is forwarded under this Section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the Accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the Accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that- (a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the Accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if....
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.... or imprisonment for a term not less than 10 years. 92. In my considered view, without indulging in any semantic gymnastics, the meaning of this provision is absolutely clear. It envisages three types of offences: (b) Offences which are punishable with death; (c) Offences which are punishable with imprisonment for life; (d) Offences which are punishable with a term not less than 10 years. 93. In my view the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. Out of the three categories of offences, we need to deal only with that category of offences where the punishment prescribed is not less than 10 years. If an offence is punishable with death then whatever be the minimum punishment, the period of investigation permissible would be 90 days. Similarly, if the offence is punishable with life imprisonment, even if the minimum sentence provided is less than 10 years, the period of detention before 'default bail' is available would be 90 days. 94. Keeping in view the legislative history of Section 167, it is clear that the legislature was carving out the more serious offences and giving the investigating agency another 30 days to complete the investigation before the Accus....
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.... conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. In Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd AIR 1955 SC 376, S.R. Das, J., speaking for this Court, held as follows: The cardinal Rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. 97. External aids of interpretation are to be used only when the language of the legislation is ambiguous and admits of two or more meanings. When the language is clear or the ambiguity can be resolved under the more common Rules of statutory interpretation, the court would be reluctant to look at external aids of statutory interpretation. 98. Gajendragadkar J., speaking for this Court in the case of Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan AIR 1957 SC 907 held: 6.......... the first and primary Rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. 99. These sound principles of statutory construction continue to hold the field. When the natural meaning of the words is clear and unambiguous, no external aids should be used. 100. A bare reading of Section 167 of the Code clearly indica....
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....Court held that in a case where an offence is punishable with imprisonment for 10 years or more, the Accused could be detained up to 90 days. The Court further held that the expression "not less than ten years" obviously means 10 years or more and would cover only those offences for which punishment could be imprisonment for a clear period of 10 years or more. 104. On the other hand, in Bhupinder Singh and Ors. v. Jarnail Singh and Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 277, the Court had distinguished Rajeev Chaudhary's case (supra) and held that the word "punishable" is significant and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for 10 years, whether that be the maximum punishment or minimum punishment, the Accused was not entitled to 'default bail' prior to 90 days. With due respect, I am unable to agree with the view expressed in this case. Strictly speaking, this question did not arise in Bhupinder Singh's case (supra). In that case, the Accused was charged for an offence Under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code and this offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 7 years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. Since the offence is....
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....and is not entitled to 'default bail'. If this objection had been raised at that stage, either by the Court or by the State, the Accused could have either filed a fresh application for grant of 'default bail' or could have prayed for 'default bail' by adding an additional ground in the existing application much before 24.01.2017 when the charge-sheet was filed. 107. It has also been urged on behalf of the State that since the charge-sheet has now been filed, the Petitioner is not entitled to grant of 'default bail'. Both my learned brothers have referred to the case of Sanjay Dutt v. State through C.B.I., Bombay (II), (1994) 5 SCC 410. Reference has also been made to Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 5 SCC 453. 108. It is not necessary to multiply citations because in Union of India v. Nirala Yadav, (2014) 9 SCC 457, this Court has considered the entire law on the subject and followed the law laid down in Uday Mohanlal Acharya's case (supra) as well as in Mohamed Iqbal Madar Sheikh and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 1 SCC 722, wherein this Court deprecated the practice followed by some courts of adjourning applications ....
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....he continued custody of the Accused even beyond the specified period in para (a) will not be unauthorised, and therefore, if during that period the investigation is complete and the charge-sheet is filed then the so-called indefeasible right of the Accused would stand extinguished. 6. The expression "if not already availed of" used by this Court in Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI, (1994) 5 SCC 410, must be understood to mean when the Accused files an application and is prepared to offer bail on being directed. In other words, on expiry of the period specified in para (a) of the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 167 if the Accused files an application for bail and offers also to furnish the bail on being directed, then it has to be held that the Accused has availed of his indefeasible right even though the court has not considered the said application and has not indicated the terms and conditions of bail, and the Accused has not furnished the same. 110. A reading of the aforesaid judgments leaves no manner of doubt that if an Accused files an application for grant of default bail and is willing to furnish bail then he is deemed to have exercised his right to avail of bail a....