TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1985 (10) TMI 282
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....ons :- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines contempt of courts ~s per section 2 of the said Act. Civil contempt is defined by section 2(b) as under : - " civil contemptmeans wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;" While 'criminal contempt' is defined in seetion,2(c) as under 'Criminal contempt' means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which - (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or (ii) prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;" Section 10 of the Act which is, relevant for our present purpose reads as under : - "Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice.,....
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.... discharging judicial functions. We may usefully refer to the separate judgments rendered by all-the said three learned Judges constituting majority. Kania, C. J. concurring with Fazl Ali and Mahajan, JJ. observed as under : - "Having considered all the provisions of the Act, it seems to me clear that the Tribunal is discharging functions very near those of a court, although it is not a court in the technical sense of the word". 6. Thereafter, the learned Chief Justice made the following observations in para 3 of the report : - "The next question is whether under Art. 136 the Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for leave to appeal against the decision of such a body. It is not disputed that the Court has power to issue writs of certiorari and prohibition in respect of the work of the Tribunal. The only question is whether there is a right of appeal also. In my opinion, the wording of Art. 136 is wide enough to give jurisdiction to the Court to entertain an application for leave to appeal". FazI Ali, J. in his judgment in para 7 of the report has made the following pertinent observations : - "Now, there can be no doubt that the industr....
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....ch are binding upon it are observed, and its powers are not exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner". Thereafter, repelling the contention on behalf of the contesting party that the adjudication of the tribunal has not at all the attributes of a judicial decision because the adjudication cannot bind the parties until it is declared to be binding by the Government under S. 15 (forerunner of present section 17A of the Act), Fazl Ali, J. adopting the ratio of the decision in the case of Rex v Electricity Commissioners; London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ex parte, (1924) 1 KB 171 which was rendered in connection with legality and propriety of issuance of a writ of mandamus and certiorari, quoted with approval the following observations in the aforesaid decision in the case of Rex (supra) : - "It is necessary, however, to deal with what I think was the main objection of the Attorney General. In this case he said the Commissioners come to no decision at all. They act merely as advisers. They recommend an order embodying a scheme to the Minister of Transport, who may confirm it with or without modifications. Similarly the Minister of Transport comes to no dec....
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....eration. The provision in the then existing section 15, which is now re-enacted in terms of two provisos to section 17A(l)wherein appropriate Government in cases where it is a party to the award has been given limited power in given contingencies on public ground to declare the award not to be enforceable on the expiry of 30 days and similar powers have been given to Central Govt. to make the award of National Tribunal unenforceable on similar ground, was considered and in that connection, it was laid down in para 12 of the report that despite such provision, in cases where the appropriate Government is not a party to the disputes, all that the Government has to do on receiving the award of the tribunal is to declare it to be binding and to state from what date and for what period it will be binding. Section 15(2) was held as mandatory and it was further observed: - "The act itself makes a distinction between cases in which the Government is a party and those in which the Government is not a party. The proviso relates to a very special type of case and as at present advised I do not wish to express any opinion as to whether an appeal lies to this court or not in such a cas....
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....procedure adopted by the Act and the Rules is modelled on the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, in view of the learned Judge, the Industrial Tribunal had all the necessary attributes of a Court of justice. It had no other function except that of adjudicating on a dispute. It was no doubt true that by reason of the nature of the dispute that they may have to adjudicate the law gives them wider powers than are possessed by ordinary courts of law but powers of such a nature did not affect the question that they are exercising judicial power. It was then: observed :- "Statutes like the Relief of Indebtedness Act, or the Encumbered Estates Act have' conferred powers on courts which are not ordinarily known to law and which affect contractual rights. That circumstance does not make them anything else but tribunals exercising judicial power of the State though in a degree different from the ordinary court and to an extent which is also different from that enjoyed by an ordinary court of law. They may rightly be described as quasi-judicial bodies because they are out of the hierarchy of the ordinary judicial system but that circumstance cannot affect the question of their being ....
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....d advocates appearing before us in support of their rival contentions. 8. We may now turn to the next decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 SC 66 : (1956 Cri U 156) on which strong reliance was placed by the learned Advocates for the petitioners as well as by the learned Advocate Mr. Gupta appearing for the contesting respondents. In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned directly with the question as to under what circumstances an authority can be considered to be a court within the meaning of S. 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 which is the forerunner of present section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 that holds the field today and which is in pari materia with section 3 in the predecessor Act. In that case, three learned Judges of the Supreme Court had to consider the question whether the Commissioner appointed under Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, can be said to be a court as contemplated by section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. Bhagwati, J. as he then was, speaking for the Supreme Court made the following observations while answering this question : - "The word 'court' is not defin....
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....empts and obstruction to their proceedings as is given to civil and criminal courts by the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was also similar in its nature and the very nature and extents of the power indicated that they were n)to courts in the ordinary sense o ' f the term. In our view, these later observations of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case do not advance the case of the respondents any further, as the clinching circumstances for deciding whether an authority is a court or not viz. power to adjudicate by way of authoritative judgment which has finality and authoritativeness being not there with the Commissioners, they can never be treated as courts within the meaning of Contempt of Courts Act and consequently for guarding them against contempts, statutory provision had to be made in the Act enabling such Commissioners to function effectively. In view of the scheme of I.D. Act as considered by the Supreme Court in Bharat Bank's case (AIR 19-50 SC 188) (supra), the basic requirements for judging whether the authority is a judicial tribunal or not have got to be held to have been satisfied so far as the tribunal functioning under I.D. Act is concerned, even applying the cl....
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....ents on the point including the judgments of the Suprenie Court in Bharat Bank's case (AIR 1950 SC 188) (supra), Brajnandan's case 1956 Cri U 156 (supra) and Virinder Kumar's case (1956 Cri U 326) (supra) and various other decisions of the Supreme Court and other courts. In the light of ratio of various decisions of the Supreme Court on the point as aforesaid, the following conclusion was reached in Jugal Kishore's case (supra) :- "A registrar exercising powers under S. 48 must be held to discharge the duties which would otherwise have fallen on the ordinary civil and revenue courts of the land. The Registrar has not merely the trappings of a court but in many respects he is given the same powers as are given to ordinary Civil Courts of the land by the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to summon and examine witnesses on oath, the power to order inspection of documents, to hear the parties after framing issues, to review his own order and even exercise the inherent jurisdiction of courts mentioned in' S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In adjudicating upon a dispute referred under S. 48 of the Act, the Registrar is to all intents and purposes, a court discharg....
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....passage in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 9, at page 342, laying down the parameter of the' word 'court. Observations in Cooper v. Wilson, (1937) 2 KB 309 at page 340 were referred to and relied upon. These observations read as under - - "It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the court should haw~, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement". Four characteristics making up a judicial decision as laid down in Brajnandan's case (1956 Cri U 156) (SC) (supra) were also extracted with approval in para 16 of the report. Mr. Gupta for the respondents as well as Mr. V. B. Patel who intervened on behalf of the respondents submitted that the ratio of the decision in Thakur Jugal Kishore's case (1967 Cri U 1380) (SC) (supra) will not apply as the scheme of Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act as considered by the 'Supreme Court is entirely different from the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act. We will co....
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....ber bench of the Supreme Court which decided Brainandan's case (supra) has taken the view on the phrase court subordinate to the High Court which runs counter to the ratio of the decision of two-member bench of that Court which decided Jugal Kishore's case (supra) and consequently, it should be held that before any court is considered to be court subordinate to the High Court, it should be ascertained whether it is subordinate to the High Court in the hierarchy of courts and if such hierarchy is absent, recourse to Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be taken for culling out subordination of such authority which may fall outside the hierarchy of ordinary courts. It is not possible to agree with this contention of the respondents for a number of obvious reasons. Firstly, the observations of three-member bench in Brainandan's case (supra) themselves clearly indicate that the Supreme Court in that case had not authoritatively pronounced upon the question whether a court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 3(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act must be a court subordinate in the hierarchy of courts. Employment of the word'prima facie'suggests that it was a tentat....
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....be decided in the light of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court. 11. We may now turn to a later decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. K. Sarkar v. Vinay Chandra, AIR 1981 SC 723: (1981 Cri U 283). Another Division Bench of two learned Judges of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case has taken the same view on the phrase courts subordinate to the High Court' as employed by section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which is in pari materia to section 3 of the earlier Act of 1952. In that case, the question arose as to. whether the Board of Revenue functioning under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was a court subordinate to the High Court as contemplated by section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, whose confempt can be taken cognizance of by the High Court. Answering the question in the affirmative, the Supreme Court speaking through R. S. Sarkaria, J. made the following pertinent observations in para 15 ot the report : - "The provision in section 10 is but a replica of section 3 of the 1952.Act. The phrase courts subordinate to it" used in section 10 is wide enough to include all courts which are judicial....
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.... civil court, the period of limitation prescribed in the schedule of the Limitation Act would not automatically be applicable to applications filed before the labour court. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court taking this view cannot in any way be, projected to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 where according to the Supreme Court decisions directly on the point, as we have seen earlier, the word 'court' has been interpreted to take in its sweep not only regular civil courts or courts in the strict sense of the term but also judicial authorities functioning under diverse statutes. Mr. Gupta then invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd. AIR 1963 SC 874. In that case, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether the award passed by the Arbitrator appointed by parties as per section 10A of the I.D. Act can be appealed against under Article 136 of the Constitution. It was held that as the Arbitrator appointed by the parties derives his power not through any statute, but only through the agreement of parties, his award was an award of arbitrator simpliciter and cou....
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....he following pertinent observations about characteristics of judicial decision: - "A judicial decision is not always the act of a judge or a tribunal invested with power to determine questions of law or fact; it must however be the act of a body or authority invested by law with authority to determine questions or disputes affecting the rights of citizens and under a duty to act judicially. A judicial decision always postulates the existence of a day laid upon the authority to act judicially. Administrative authorities are often invested with authority or power to determine questions, which affect the rights of citizens. The authority may have to invite objections to the course of action proposed by him, he may be under a duty to hear the objectors, and his decision may seriously affect the rights of citizens but unless in arriving at his decision he is required to act judicially, his decision will be, executive or administrative. Legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of citizens, does not make the determination judicial; it is the duty to act judicially which invests it with that character. What distinguishes an act judicial from administrative is th....
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....cieties Act was a court so that contempt jurisdiction could be exercised, 'Their Lordships pointed out at page 1499 that a Registrar exercising powers under Section 48 of the Act which provided the machinery for domestic adjudication of these disputes was discharging the duties which would otherwise have fallen on the ordinary civil and revenue courts of the land. The Registrar had not merely the trappings of a court but in many respects he was given, the same powers as were given to ordinary Civil Courts of the land by the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to summon and examine witnesses on oath, the power to order inspection of documents, to hear the parties after framing issues, to review his own order and even exercise the inherent jurisdiction of courts mentioned in Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In adjudicating upon a dispute referred under Section 48 of the Act, the Registrar was to all, intents and purposes a court discharging the same functions and duties in the same manner as a court of law was expected to do. The settled principles were followed where it had been field that in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essentia....
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....om the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1967 SC 1494: (1967 Cri LJ 1380) (supra) for deciding as to under what circumstances the statutory authority entrusted with the task of adjudicating a dispute between private parties can be, considered to be a court within section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. However, the reasoning of the Division Bench in para 11 of the report to the effect that subordination to the High Court as per Article 226 of the, Constitution would satisfy the test of a court,: being subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts-Act, prima facie appears to be unjustified as proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution are considered to be of original nature. However, we are not required to closely examine this aspect of the matter in view of the fact that the word 'tribunar which was deleted from Art. 227 by Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1975 by adding new clause 5 to the said Article, was restored in the Article by.Constitution (44th Amendment) Act. At the time when this court decided S. R. Paters case (1978-19 Guj LR 751) (supra), the word 'tribunal' had stood deleted from Art. 227 and ....
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.... decided cases in order to constitute the tribunal a court. In the first place, the tribunal or an authority would be a court if it is given power to give a definitive judgment or a decision which has finality and authoritativeness that would bind the party appearing before it so far as the rights litigated before it are concerned and secondly, the appointment of the tribunal or an authority as well as the source of its power must be judicial power of the State coming to it by the statute itself. The power of review and the inherent power enjoyed by a civil court cannot be regarded as sine qua non for holding any tribunal to be a court. Since the officers on special duty perform judicial functions and have been empowered to tender definitive decisions decisions which have finality and authoritativeness so as to bind the parties appearing before them qua their rights, of course subject to appeal or review or revision that has been provided under the Act and since the said officers on special duty are appointed by the State Government under notification in exercise of the powers conferred by See. 3 of the Mah. Co-op. Societies Act and they derive their authority to dispose of t....
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....s presented before the authority for adjudication and decision. (ii) The source of the power must emanate from the statute and must not be based merely on agreement between the parties. The power must statutorily flow and must continue to inhere in the authority subject to the limitation engrafted by the statute conferring such power. (iii) The manner of exercise of power must partake of essential attributes of 'Court' though minor trappings or inconsequential attributes may be absent. These essential attributes of the court would include right of the contesting parties to represent their case not necessarily orally before the tribunal, ascertainment by the authority of the disputed question of fact posed for its consideration by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence led before the authority, if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal arguments by the parties and the power of the authority to inforce attendance of witnesses, production of documents etc. to-enable the authority to March 1957 under the Act. Chapter 11 of the Act deals with authorit....
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....r has been a Judge of the High Court., The next group of relevant sections is found in chapter III which deals with reference of disputes to boards, courts or effectively decide their dispute in a judicial manner. (iv) The resultant or end product of the exercise of such power by the authority must result in a binding decision between the parties concluding the lis between the parties so far as the authority is concerned. The said decision must be definitive and must have finality and authoritativeness. The decision rendered by such authority must dispose of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law of the land to the fact so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law. 24. We will have to judge the questions posed for our consideration in the light of the aforesaid tests. For that purpose, we have to turn to the relevant statutory schemes under which the concerned authorities function. We will first turn to the scheme of the I.D. Act in connection with which rival submissions were submitted by the learned counsel for our consideration. So far as the scheme of Bombay Industrial Relations Act and the Gujar....
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....thority or if it has reached such magnitude that conciliation may not help, it has to be referred for adjudication to the labour court, tribunal or national tribunal, as the case may be. There is a clear-cut distinction between the reference for conciliation or promotion of settlement on the one hand and reference for adjudication on the other. It goes without saying that the dispute referred for settlement or for conciliation would involve exercise of convincing and prompting parties to the dispute to amicably settle the dispute. Once that stage is reached, it -is an agreement between the parties which would bring industrial peace between warring camps. It is their own agreement which will remain binding to them. No process of compulsory adjudication is involved therein. However, when a dispute is referred for adjudication to the proper authority, may be labour court, industrial tribunal or national tribunal, the canvass is spread wide open before the concerned authority to enable the authority after hearing the concerned parties to adjudicate upon their dispute. It would naturally involve element of compulsion and whether the parties agreed to it or not, the adjudication and deci....
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....ial knowledge of the matter under consideration as assessors to advise it in the proceeding before it. Sub-section (6) lays down that all conciliation officers, members of board or court and presiding officer of a labour court, tribunal or national tribunal shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code; while as per sub-section (7) thereof, they have been given full power to determine by and to whom and to what extent and subject to what conditions, if any, costs are to be paid. As per sub-section (8), every tabour court, iribunai oc national tribunal will be deemed to be civil court for the purposes of sections 345, 346 and 348 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is of coursr, true that the provisions of section I I apply riot only to labour court, in ' dustrial tribunal but also to arbitrators or board or court of inquiry. But that does not mean that trappings of court which are invested in the labour court or tribunal as per section 11 are in any way less effective. It may be that conciliation officer and board of inquiry may also have those trappings. However, because they have no power to adjudicate upon the dispute or ....
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....by a national tribunal; that it will be inexpedient on public grounds affecting national economy or social justice to give effect to the whole or any part of the award, the appropriate Government or as the case may be, the Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, declare that the award shall not become enforceable on the expiry of the said period of thirty days. (2) Where any declaration has been made in relation to an award under the proviso to sub-section (1), the appropriate Government or the Central Government may, within ninety days from the date of publication of the award under section 17, make an order rejecting or modifying the award, and shall on the first available opportunity, lay the award together with a copy of the order before the legislature of the State, if the order has been made by a State Government, or before Parliament, if the order has been made by the Central Government. (3) Where any award as rejected or modified by an order made under sub-section (2) is laid before the Legislature of a State or before Parliament, such award shall become enforceable on the expiry of fifteen days from the date on which it i....
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....ll, subject to the provisions of this section remain in operation for a period of one year from the date on which the award becomes enforceable under section 17A provided that the appropriate Government may reduce the said period and fix such period as it thinks fit. It is further provided that the appropriate Government may before the expiry of the said period, extend the period of operation by any period not exceeding one year at a time as it thinks fit, so however, that the total period of operation of any award does not exceed three years from the date on which it came into operation. Sub-section (4) of section 19 lays down that where the appropriate Government, whether of its own motion or on the application of any party bound by the award, considers that since the award was made, there has been a material change in the circumstances on which it was based, the appropriate Government may refer the award or a part of it to a labour court, if the award was that of a labour court or of a tribunal, if the award was that of a tribunal or of a national tribunal for decision whether the period of operation should not, by reason of such change be shortened and the decision of labour co....
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....ing or punishing whether by dismissal or otherwise, such protected workmen in the circumstances contemplated by the said sub-section. As per S. 33A, -a complaint may be made to the labour court or the tribunal or national tribunal or any other authority by the employee aggrieved by contravention of S. 33. Such complaint has to be made in writing in prescribed manner. Section 33B gives power to the appropriate Govt. to withdraw any proceeding under the Act pending before the concerned authority for adjudication. Section 33C deals with procedure for recovery of money due from an employer. Sub-section (2) thereof enables the workman to apply to the labour court for getting monetary - dues of the workman adjudicated against the employer and for direction regarding payment thereof. Section 34 deals with cognizance of offences by court and lays down that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under the Act or of the abetment of any such offence, save on complaint made by or under the authority of the appropriate Government. Section 36 deals with representation of parties insofar as labour court, tribunal or national tribunal are concerned and lays down by subsection (4)....
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.... decision of many cases a court must fill interstices in legislation. A legislator cannot anticipate every possible legal problem; neither can he do justice in cases after they had arisen. This inherent limitation in the legislative process makes it essential that there must be some elasticity in the judicial process. Even the ordinary courts of law apply the principles of justice, equity and good conscience in many cases; e.g. cases in tort and other cases where the law is not codified or does not in terms cover the problem under consideration. The industrial courts are to adjudicate on the disputes between employers and their workmen etc. and in the course of such adjudication they must determine the'rights' and 'wrongs' of the claims made, and in so doing they are undoubtedly free to apply the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, keeping in view the further principle that their jurisdiction is invoked not for the enforcement of mere contractual rights but for preventing labour practices regarded as unfair and fro restoring industrial peace on the basis of collective bargaining. The process does not cease to be judicial by reason of that elasticity or by reason of t....
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....erence has been properly made to an industrial tribunal, the dispute has to be duly resolved by the industrial tribunal." It must, therefore, be held that the labour being invested with judicial power of the State enabling them to resolve the disputes between the parties and settling the lis between them. 29. So far as the second test is concerned it is also satisfied. Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals obviously are constituted by the I.D. Act itself as seen from the relevant sections. Only because the appropriate Government is enabled to specify the concerned tabour court or tribunal which can resolve such dispute, it cannot be said that the constitution of these tribunals is made by the Government and not by the statute. In fact, appropriate Government acting under the statute is having power coupled with duty to specify the concerned tribunals once the industrial disputes are found existing or apprehended. In that connection, Government merely acts as a statutory delegate and nothing more. Consequently, the submissions of Mr. Gupta and Mr. V. B. Patel placing strong reliance on sections 7, 7A and 10 to the effect that tabour court and tribunal can adjudicate upon only th....
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....d, is the statute of I.D. Act and none other. Once having seen that labour courts and industrial courts are creatures of the statute and they are invested with judicial power of the State, mode of its exercise as required by the third test does not present any difficulty. The statutory scheme in terms indicates that all the relevant trappings of 'court' for deciding the lis are available on a platter with these authorities. All essential procedural provisions for the functioning of these judicial authorities are made available. In that connection, we may usefully refer at this stage to the majority decision of the Supreme Court in Bharat Bank's case (AIR 1950 SC 188) (supra) wherein it has been clearly laid down that industrial tribunals functioning under the 1. D, Act have all the necessary trappings of courts of justice, and that functions and duties of the industrial tribunals are very much like those of a body discharging judicial functions, although it is not a court in the technical sense of the word, meaning thereby, they are not courts strictosensu. This aspect is further highlighted by a later decision of the Supreme Court in the case of J. K. Iron and Steel Co. (AIR 1956 ....
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....of the employers as well as to those workmen who might subsequently become workmen and may not be workmen at the relevant time when the dispute is resolved. It is true that as per section 17 read with section 19, period of operation of the award can be modulated by appropriate Government. But that makes no difference to the aspect of finality and binding character of the award, As per section 19(6), even after expiry of the period of operation of the award, it would remain binding to the concerned parties and their successors till the award is terminated by giving notice. Consequently, finality of the award which results out of ad judicatory process is of all pervasive nature and it clings to the concerned parties even after statutory period of its operation is over. 31. It is now time to turn to S. 17A on which great store was laid by the learned counsel Mr. Gupta and Mr. V. B. Patel for the respondents. It was submitted that under certain circumstances, appropriate Government if it is a party to the dispute can either cancel or modify the award and Central Government can equally do so in case of award of national tribunal even though it may not be a party to the dispute and, t....
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....up to the date it passes its order. The award so made acquires a binding effect on the order of the Government made under S. 15. The power to make the award operative for a period not exceeding one year thereafter, which is given to the Government under S. 19(3) of the Act, is an independent power. Such extension does not in any way affect the jurisdiction or power of the Tribunal. There is no justification for reading the provisions found in Ss. 10, 15 and 19 of the Act as providing one maximum period of twelve months. The maximum period of one year mentioned in S. 19(3) starts from the date of the award and does not cover the period antecedent to the award." In the case of L. 1. C. of India v. D. J. Bahadur, AIR 1980 SC 2181, majority of the Supreme Court speaking through V. R. Krishna Iyer, J. has made the following relevant observations, in the light of the scheme of the Act about binding nature of the award : - "After expiry of the specific period contractually or statutorily fixed as the period of operation of an award or settlement, the same does not become honest but continues to be binding. Law abhors vacuum. Until a new contract or award replaces the previous ....
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.... rendered by the Labour Court and industrial tribunal. Consequently, it must be held that even the fourth test is fully satisfied in the present case. It must, therefore, be held that the labour courts and industrial tribunals functioning under the I.D. Act are Courts within the meaning of Ss. 2 and 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Before parting with this discussion, we may refer to one more aspect of the matter as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Premier Automobiles v. K. S. Wadke, AIR 1975 SC 2238. The functions discharged by Industrial Courts and Labour Courts under the Act are of peculiar nature and so far as such Courts are concerned, they have exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, Civil Court's jurisdiction is impliedly ousted qua those disputes, which can be resolved only through adjudicatory machinery of I.D. Act. Untwalia, J. speaking for the Supreme Court has made the following pertinent observations in connection with the jurisdiction of industrial tribunal and Labour Court under I.D. Act vis-a-vis jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Courts "the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to an industrial dispute may be stated thus : - ....
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.... Chandrachud, C.J. and A. P. Sen, J. was concerned with the question whether the Tribunal under the I.D. Act had power to set aside an ex parte award. It was observed :-- "A review is on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. Obviously, when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito Justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every Court or tribunal." Mr. Gupta, however, placed strong reliance on the observations found in para 7 of the report to the effect that under Clause (d) of subs. (3) of S. 11, the Tribunal or such other authorities have also the same powers as are vested in civil Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed. Although the Tribunal or other authorities specified in S. 11 are not Courts but they have the trappings of a Court and they exercise quasi-judicial functions. Mr. Gupta wanted to submit that the aforesaid observations indicate that the Supreme Court has ruled that the tribunal and other authorities are not Courts. How....
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....ting a tribunal under S. 7A of the Act has power to constitute a tribunal and also the power to define and limit the period during which that Tribunal can function. It can appoint it for a limited time or for a particular case or cases as it thinks fit and as the situation in a particular area or a particular case demands. If a person is appointed for a limited duration to act as a tribunal it does not mean that the tribunal also was constituted for a limited duration." It was submitted by Mr. Gupta that when the State has, got such power, it cannot be said that such tribunals are substitutes of ordinary Civil Courts. It is difficult to appreciate this submission of Mr. Gupta. Even if tribunals or Labour Courts are constituted for a given contingency, once they are so constituted and once the disputes are referred to them for adjudication, the awards which result as a consequence of such adjudication cannot but be said to be result of exercise of judicial process by tribunals invested with judicial power of the State. It is not as if that judicial power of the State cannot be entrusted for a given limited period. It is entrustment which matters and not duration thereof. Conseque....
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....rts Act. 37. Reliance placed by Mr. Patel as intervener for the respondents on the ratio of decision of AIR 1969 SC 724 : (1969 Cri U 1069) also cannot advance the case of the respondents. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act whereunder the Registrar's nominee was held not to be a Court under S. 195, C. P. Code. The clinching circumstance which was noted by the Supreme Court for coming to this conclusion was that under that Act, the nominee exercising his power to make award under S. 96 of the Maharashtra Act derived his authority not from the statute but from the Registrar in his individual discretion. The powers so invested were liable to be withdrawn. He was, therefore, found not to have been invested with judicial power of the State. He was merely a statutory arbitrator for arbitrating upon the dispute referred to him. We fail to appreciate how that decision can be of any relevance to the facts of the present case. As we have already observed earlier, once the reference is made by appropriate Government to the concerned Labour Court or industrial tribunal for resolution of the industrial dispute between the p....
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.... any interim, final or supplementary determination in an arbitration proceeding of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto. Industrial Court is defined in sub-s (16) to mean the Court of industrial arbitration constituted under S. 10. Sub-s. (1~) defines 'industrial dispute' to mean any dispute or difference between an employer and employee or between employers and employees or between employees and employees and which is.connected with any industrial matter. Subsection (21) defines 'Labour Court' to mean a Labour Court constituted under S. 9. Chapter 11 deals with authorities to be constituted or appointed under the Act. S. 8 thereof deals with labour officers and assistant labour officers; While S. 9 deals with constitution of Labour Courts and states that the State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Labour Courts having jurisdiction in such local areas as may be specified in such notification and shall appoint persons having the qualifications specified in sub-section (2) to preside over such Courts. S. 10 enjoins the State Government to constitute a Court of industrial arbitration. As per subsection (2) thereo....
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.... standing orders; (ii) The application and interpretation of standing orders; (iii) any change made by an employer or desired by an employee in respect of an industrial matt e*r specified in Schedule III and matters arising out of such change; (b) industrial disputes- (i) referred to it under S. 71 or 72; (ii) in respect of which it is appointed as the arbitrator by a submission; (c) whether a strike, lock-out, closure, stoppage or any change is illegal under this Act". Section 79 deals with commencement of the proceedings before the Labour Court and provides that proceedings before a Labour Court in respect of disputes falling under Clause (a) of paragraph A of sub-section (1) of S. 78 shall be commenced on an application made by any of the parties to the dispute, a special application under sub-s. (3) of S. 52 or an application by the labour officer or a representative -union and proceedings in respect of a matter falling under Clause (c) of the said paragraph A on an application made by any employer or employee directly affected or the Labour Officer or a representative union. Labour Court has also power to condone delay i....
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....g before it relating to an industrial dispute to the Industrial Court for decision. Sub-section (3) empowers the State Government to refer to Industrial Court any point of law arising in any proceedings held under the Act. Industrial Court is competent to decide such reference only in open Court and with the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Court present at the hearing of reference. S. 92. deals with procedure before Industrial Court which will be regulated by regulations consistent with the provisions of the Act and the rules made there under. Such regulations may also provide for the formation of Benches consisting of one or more of its members and the exercise by each such Bench of the jurisdiction and powers vested in it. S. 93 deals with execution of order as to cost as passed by the Industrial Court. S. 94 lays down binding character of the order, decision or award of the Industrial Court. S. 95 lays down that the order of the Industrial Court shall be final, except on review. S. 95A provides that law declared by the Full Bench of the Industrial Court shall be recognised as binding and shall be followed in all proceedings under the provisions of the Act. Chapte....
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....or wage board to decide all matters arising out of the industrial matter or dispute referred to them for decision under any of the provisions of the Act. Section 119D entitles the Labour Court, Industrial Court or wage board to pass interim orders which it may consider just and proper. 41. The aforesaid is the cross-section of the relevant provisions of the Act. A mere look at them leaves no room for doubt that the Industrial Court and Labour Court functioning under the BIR Act satisfy all the four tests for deciding whether these authorities are Courts within the contempitition of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or not.' To recapitulate, the first test is about entrustment of the judicial power of the State. The way these authorities decide the disputes between employers and employees brought before them by applications and the way these decisions are definitive and determinative in character provide sufficient pointer to the fact that they are entrusted with the judicial power of the State. So far as the second test is concerned, they are statutory authorities under the Statute in question. So far as the third test is concerned, they have all the main trappings of the regular....
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.... a board of nominees, appointed by the Registrar. Section 99 deals with procedure for settlement of disputes and power of Registrar, his nominees or board of nominees. The Registrar, his nominees or the Board of nominees, hearing a dispute under Section 98 have to hear the dispute in the manner prescribed and have power to summon and enforce attendance of witnesses including the parties interested or any of them and to compel them to give evidence and to compel the production of documents by the same means and as far as possible in the same manner as provided in the case of civil Court by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Sub-section (2) of Section 99 provides that except when a dispute involves complicated question of law or fact, no legal practitioner in his capacity as a legal practitioner or as a person holding a power of attorney shall be permitted to appear on behalf of any party at the hearing of a dispute. Section 130 empowers Registrar or his nominee or the board of nominees to issue order of attachment before award. As per Section 101, Registrar or his nominee or the Board of nominees, after giving a reasonable opportunity to the parties to the dispute to be heard, is em....
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....State, as they decide the disputes or lis between the contesting parties in a judicial manner. Secondly, they are creatures of the statute. Their establishment and their powers flow from the statute. Thirdly, they have all the trappings of the civil court while they decide these disputes originally or in appeal or revision as the case may be and lastly their decisions are final and binding and cannot be called in question in any Court. It is, therefore, apparent that the Registrar or his nominee or board of nominees while exercising their powers are discharging their duties which are otherwise discharged by ordinary civil courts. As seen above, under section 99, the Registrar or his nominee or Board of nominees is given the same powers as- are given to ordinary civil courts of the land by the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 97 specifically lays- down that the period of limitation in the case of any dispute other than those mentioned in subsection (1) which are required to be referred to the Registrar under Section 96, shall be regulated by the provisions of the Limitation Act as if the dispute were a suit and the Registrar a Civil Court. Therefore, it is obvious that the register ....
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.... of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1968 was a Court within the meaning ofSection 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act as he satisfied the main two criteria in order to constitute the tribunal a Court. In the first place the tribunal or an authority would be a court i it is given power to give a definitive judgment or a decision which has finality and authoritativeness that would bind the parties appearing before it so far as the rights litigated before it are concerned and secondly the appointment of the tribunal or an authority must be statutory and the source of its power must be judicial power of the State coming to it by the statute itself. On parity of reasoning, it must be held that on the scheme of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, the Registrar's nominee as well as the Tribunal satisfy both the aforesaid tests for being held to be judicial authorities and courts within the contemplation of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 45. Conclusion: - As a result of the aforesaid discussion, our answers to the referred questions in these Misc. Civil Applications are in the affirmative, meaning thereby that the Labour Courts under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1....