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2018 (4) TMI 1665

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....d his mother Smt. Prakashwati seeking eviction of the Defendant-Corporation and for recovery of the arrears of rent. The learned Munsif refused to decree the suit for eviction. However, the Defendant-Corporation was directed to pay Rs. 1700/- towards arrears of rent for the period 1979-81. Both the Plaintiffs and the Defendant-Corporation filed appeals against the judgment of the Trial Court. The First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Defendant-Corporation and allowed the Plaintiff's appeal. Consequently, the suit was decreed in favour of the Plaintiffs and eviction was ordered. The second appeals filed by the Defendant-Corporation before the High Court challenging the judgment of the First Appellate Court were allowed. The High Court reversed the judgment of the First Appellate Court and dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the present appeals are filed. 4. In the plaint it was averred that the first Plaintiff along with his father, Sh. Ram Narain Gupta, were bhumidars of an area admeasuring 4 bighas 3 biswas in Mauza Rashidpur, Garhi Pargana, Bijnor. According to them, the land was grove land. 3 bighas 8 biswas from the said land which is adja....

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....ed the findings of the Trial Court regarding interpretation of the 1971 Act and held that it was only the leasehold interest in the land that stood vested in the Government. The First Appellate Court recorded a finding that Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act would apply to the instant case as the lease was for a fixed period between 1976-1980 and the lease stood determined automatically on 30.06.1980. The First Appellate Court decreed the suit by allowing the appeal filed by the Plaintiffs. The appeal filed by the Defendant-Corporation was dismissed. 6. The High Court allowed the appeals filed by the Defendants and dismissed the suit by holding that the land stood vested in the State Government under the 1950 Act as the lease executed by the Plaintiffs in favour of the Defendants was in violation of Section 156 of the 1950 Act. The High Court also relied upon Section 167 of the 1950 Act to hold that the Plaintiffs lost their rights over the land and as a consequence of void transfer, the land stood vested with the State Government free from all encumbrances. The High Court further observed that by virtue of Section 3 of the 1971 Act the land which was occupied for the pur....

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....ehabilitation of the mills by the Government was the reason for the statute being brought into force. Section 2(a) defines the appointed day in relation to the undertakings specified under Schedule I as July 3, 1971. M/s. Shiv Prasad Banarasi Das Sugar Mills, Bijnor is at serial No. 10 of Schedule I. Section 3 of the Act provides for vesting of every scheduled undertaking on the appointed day free from any debt, mortgage, charge or any other encumbrances. Scheduled undertaking as defined in Section 2(h) of the Act reads as follows: (h) "scheduled undertaking" means an undertaking engaged in the manufacture or production of sugar by means of vacuum pans and with the aid of mechanical power in factory specified [in any of the schedules of this Act], and comprises- XXX XXX XXX (vi) all lands (other than lands held or occupied for purposes of cultivation and grovelands) and buildings held or occupied for purposes of that factory (including buildings pertaining to any of the properties and assets hereinbefore specified, and guest houses and residences of directors, managerial personnel, staff and workmen or of any other person as lessee or licensee, and any store houses, molasses,....

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....ention of the Appellant is that the land belonging to him was leased out to the sugar mill and the vesting is only of the leasehold interest in the land and that he continues to be the title holder. We are unable to agree. A detailed examination of the provisions of the Act would make it clear that the intention was to secure all assets which were being used for the purposes of the factory. (State of U.P. v. Lakshmi Sugar & Oil Mills Ltd. (supra)). The crucial words in Section 2(h)(vi) are "held or occupied for purposes of that factory." The scope of the word 'held' arose for consideration in A.G. Varadarajulu v. State of T.N. (1998) 4 SCC 231 and this Court observed: 26. The word "hold" or "held" in the context of land has come up for consideration in several cases before this Court. In State of U.P. v. Sarjoo Devi [ (1977) 4 SCC 2] while dealing with the said word in Section 3(14) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, as follows: (SCC p. 8, paras 8 and 10) The word 'held' occurring in the above definition which is a past participle of the word 'hold' is of wide import. In the Unabridged Edition of The Random House Dictionary of th....

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.... in; to take or hold possession. Actual use, possession, and cultivation. See occupancy; occupant; occupation; possession. The words 'held' or 'occupied' carry the same meaning and there is no manner of doubt that if the land is in the lawful possession of the factory and was being used for the purposes of the factory, the said land vested in the Government as per Section 3 of the 1971 Act. Section 3 of the 1971 Act provides for the vesting of the scheduled undertaking free from all encumbrances. There is no dispute that, in the instant case, the land was held and occupied by the sugar factory for a long period of time pursuant to a lease deed executed by the Plaintiffs and was being used for the purpose of the factory. 14. The point that remains to be considered is about the reason for the insertion of the words "including any leasehold interest therein". The submission of the Appellant which found favour with the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court is that the vesting under the 1971 Act is only of the leasehold interest in the land. We disagree. We are of the opinion that all lands including those which are held pursuant to a lease vest in the State. It is....