TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2015 (1) TMI 1411
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....hese appeals are as follows: There is no dispute that Gopanpally village in Ranga Reddy district was a Jagir village. According to the writ Petitioners Survey Nos. 36 and 37 measuring Ac 280.00 guntas and Ac. 378.14 guntas of the said village were Jagir lands and Jagirdar had given Pattas to different persons who were in possession of the lands and after abolition of Jagirs the same were reflected as Pattas in Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-55 which was prepared Under Section 4(2) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Record of Rights in land Regulation, 1358F and subsequently the Pattadars had alienated the lands to the Petitioners under registered sale deeds and they are in possession of the same. It is their further case that Patta was granted to an extent of Acre 44-00 in Survey No. 36 and to an extent of acre 46-00 in Survey No. 37 and while the matter stood thus, the Petitioners on inquiry came to know that the Government has reserved and allotted a total extent of 477 acres in Survey Nos. 36 and 37 of Gopanpally village for house sites to the Government employees by Government Orders dated 10.7.1991 and 24.9.1991, without mentioning the sub-division Nos. of the survey numb....
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....hasara Pahani made by the then Patwari were detected by the Revenue Authorities and hence enquiry has been ordered Under Section 166B of Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317F and only a show cause notice has been issued. 5. The learned single Judge by common order dated 15.9.2009 set aside the impugned Government order in GOMS No. 850 dated 24.9.1991 insofar as the lands held by the writ Petitioners to the total extent of Acre 90-00 in Survey Nos. 36 and 37 are concerned and also set aside the impugned notice dated 31.12.2004 and accordingly allowed the writ petitions. Aggrieved by the same Respondents 1 and 2 namely the Government preferred appeal in writ Appeal Nos. 273 and 323 of 2010 and the Division Bench of the High Court after hearing both sides dismissed both the writ appeals by common judgment dated 8.6.2010. Challenging the same the State Government has preferred the present appeals. Respondent No. 13 in writ appeal 323 of 2010 has also preferred an independent appeal before this Court and all the three appeals are heard together. 6. Mr. Nageshwar Rao, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the Appellant State contended that the land was he....
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....e case in which the decision arose, suo motu action taken after a period of thirty years was remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration. In the decision in State of Maharashtra and Anr. v. Rattanlal (1993) 3 SCC 326 this Court while dealing with revisional power Under Section 45 of Maharashtra Agricultural Land (Ceiling and Holdings) Act, 1961 held that suo motu revisional power may not be exercised after the expiry of three years from the date of the impugned order, however, where suppression of material facts, namely, existence of the undeclared agricultural land had come to the knowledge of the higher authorities after a long lapse of time, the limitation would start running only from the date of discovery of the fraud or suppression. In the decision in State of Orissa and Ors. v. Brundaban Sharma and Anr. (1995) Supp.(3) SCC 249 this Court while dealing with the power of revision Under Section 38B of Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 held that the Board of Revenue exercised the power of revision 27 years after the date of alleged grant of patta but its authenticity and correctness was shrouded with suspicious features and, therefore, exercise of revisional power was ....
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....e Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 held as follows: 11. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time-limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. 12. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which the power of revision may be exercised would be three years Under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub-Divisional Officer Under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of the Tahsildar p....
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.... immovable property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisions of other Acts (such as the Land Ceiling Act). Hence, it appears that without stating from what date the period of limitation starts and within what period the suo motu power is to be exercised, in Sub-section (4) of Section 50B of the Act, the words "at any time" are used so that the suo motu power could be exercised within reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud depending on facts and circumstances of each case in the context of the statute and nature of rights of the parties. Use of the words "at any time" in Sub-section (4) of Section 50B of the Act cannot be rigidly read letter by letter. It must be read and construed contextually and reasonably. If one has to simply proceed on the basis of the dictionary meaning of the words "at any time", the suo motu power Under Sub-section (4) of Section 50B of the Act could be exercised even after decades and then it would lead to anomalous position leading to uncertainty and complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties, that too, over immovable propert....
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....) Board of Revenue Regulation, 1358F, the Government or any Revenue officer not lower in rank to a Collector the Settlement Commissioner of Land Records may call for the record of a case or proceedings from a subordinate department and inspect it in order to satisfy himself that the order or decision passed or the proceedings taken is regular, legal and proper and may make suitable order in that behalf; Provided that no order or decision affecting the rights of the ryot shall be modified or annulled unless the concerned parties are summoned and heard. (2) Every Revenue Officer lower in rank to a Collector or Settlement Commissioner may call for the records of a case or proceedings for a subordinate department and satisfy himself that the order or decision passed or the proceedings taken is regular, legal and proper and if, in his opinion, any order or decision or, proceedings should be modified or annulled, he shall put up the file of the case and with his opinion to the Collector or Settlement Commissioner as the case may be. Thereupon the Collector or Settlement Commissioner may pass suitable order under the provisions of Sub-section (1). (3) The original order ....
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....ue Act cannot be exercised 50 years after the making of the alleged fraudulent entries and that the High Court was justified in quashing notice dated 31st December, 2004 issued to the Respondents, I would like to add a few lines of my own. 15. The facts giving rise to the filing of the writ petitions and the writ appeals before the High Court out of which arise the present appeals have been set out at length by my esteemed Brother in the order proposed by him. Narration of the factual matrix over again would, therefore, serve no useful purpose. Suffice it to say that the dispute in these proceedings is confined to an extent of 44 acres of land situate in Survey No. 36 and 46 acres of land in Survey No. 37 of Gopanpally village of Ranga Reddy district in the state of Andhra Pradesh. The case of the Respondents (writ Petitioners before the High Court) was that the said extent of land was granted by the Jagirdar concerned on Patta to persons in actual cultivating possession. The Patta was, according to the Respondents, recognised by the Government, with the result that the names of the holders were shown in the Khasra Pahanis since the year 1954-55. 16. In terms of G.O. Ms 850 Rev. ....
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....its order dated 8th June, 2010. The Division Bench relying upon the decisions of this Court in Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil and Anr. v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale (2009) 9 SCC 352 and Special Director and Anr. v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and Anr. (2004) 3 SCC 440 held that the proposed correction of the revenue entries 50 years after the same were made was not legally permissible. The present appeals assail the correctness of that view. 18. The writ-Petitioners, as noted earlier, claim to have purchased an extent of 90 acres of land in Survey Nos. 36 and 37 from the erstwhile Pattadars recorded in the revenue records. The present dispute is, therefore, limited to that extent of land only. That being so, if the notice invoking the revisional jurisdiction Under Section 166B of A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act has been not assailed by any other effected party, we should not be understood to be interfering with the same qua such persons. Having said that the only question which the High Court has addressed and which has been elaborately dealt with by it in the impugned orders is whether revisional powers vested in the competent authority Under Section 166B of the Act aforementioned co....
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....t Galande. v. Pune Municipal Transport and Ors. (2010) 8 SCC 467 where this Court reiterated the legal position and held that the power to revise orders and proceedings cannot be exercised arbitrarily and interminably. This Court observed: The legislature in its wisdom did not fix a time-limit for exercising the revisional power nor inserted the words "at any time" in Section 34 of the 1976 Act. It does not mean that the legislature intended to leave the orders passed under the Act open to variation for an indefinite period inasmuch as it would have the effect of rendering title of the holders/allottee(s) permanently precarious and in a state of perpetual uncertainty. In case, it is assumed that the legislature has conferred an everlasting and interminable power in point of time, the title over the declared surplus land, in the hands of the State/allottee, would forever remain virtually insecure. The Court has to construe the statutory provision in a way which makes the provisions workable, advancing the purpose and object of enactment of the statute. 22. In State of H.P. and Ors. v. Rajkumar Brijender Singh and Ors. MANU/SC/0509/2004MANU/SC/0509/2004 : (2004) 10 SCC this Court ....
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....s part nullifies the order passed by him in exercise of power Under Sub-section (3) of Section 20. 23. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur and Ors. (1992) 2 SCC 598 where the Court explained the legal position as under: The rule which says that the Court may not enquire into belated and stale claim is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon its own facts. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how delay arose. The principle on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the Petitioner should come to the writ court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence. The test is not as to physical running of time. Where the circumstances justifying....