TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1972 (4) TMI 106
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.... the following grounds, (a) that there was no reciprocating agreement between India and Singapore after Singapore became an independent territory in August, 1965 and that, therefore, Section 44-A Civil Procedure Code, will not apply to the decree passed by the Singapore High Court; (b) that he never submitted to the jurisdiction of i he Singapore High Court that therefore, the Singapore High Court had no jurisdiction to pronounce judgment or pass decree against him and that therefore the judgment and decree was a nullity; and (c) that the judgment had been given on default of appearance without any trial or evidence and (d) since the decree was not one passed on merits, the decree cannot be executed under Section 44, Civil Procedure Code. 4. The learned First Additional Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, while overruling the grounds of objection raised by the respondent about the maintainability of the execution petition under Section 44-A, Civil Procedure Code, accepted the other grounds of objection raised by the respondent and dismissed the Execution Petition. 5. It was not seriously disputed before us about the maintainability of the Execution Petition under Section 44-A, Civil Pr....
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....rts for the purpose of Section 44-A(1), Civil Procedure Code. The judgment and decree sought to be executed by the appellant were those of the High Court of Singapore. The Judgment is Exhibit A-17 dated 30th July, 1966. The notification S.R.O. No. 1867 dated 1st September, 1955 was in force on the date when the decree was passed, namely, 30th July, 1966. That notification was superseded by the later notification G.S.R. No. 1225 dated 17th June, 1968 when the Colony of Singapore had become a Republic. It is, therefore, clear that at the time when the decree was passed by the High Court of Singapore, Singapore was a reciprocating territory. Section 44-A(1), Civil Procedure Code, will apply to the execution of the decree passed by the High Court of Singapore for execution in the Indian Courts. 7. The next point for consideration is whether the respondent submitted to the jurisdiction of the High Court of Singapore and whether the decree passed against the respondent was by a competent Court. 8. The following facts are relevant for consideration: The respondent is one of the three partners of the firm run under the name and style of "R.M.V. Vellachi Achi" which was doing mo....
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.... Achi, the appellant, to one Manickam to carry on the above said firm in Singapore. Exhibits A-4 to A-8 are the certified copies of the memorandum of judgments in the suits instituted by the Power of Attorney Agent against the local residents for the moneys alleged to have been due by them. The appellant, therefore, contends that the respondent being one of the partners of the firm and that since the firm had filed several suits in the Courts at Singapore, the respondent must be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Singapore Courts. It is contended by the respondent that Exhibit A-3 was not executed on behalf of the partnership and that the suits covered by the judgments Exhibits A-4 to A-8 do not indicate that the respondent had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Courts at Singapore. It is also contended by him that even assuming that Exhibits A-3 to A-8 were deemed to be on behalf of and by the partnership, since the partnership was dissolved in 1962, these documents could be of no avail as the judgment Exhibit A-17 was obtained in 1966 subsequent to the dissolution of partnership. 13. It is well established that the following circumstances would give jurisdicti....
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....s shows that there was partnership business in money-lending carried on in the name of partnership of "R.M.V. Vellachi Achi", the partners being the appellant, the respondent and one Shanmugham Chettiar. Shanmugham Chettiar died before the renewal of the application and the partnership, after November, 1959, is said to have been continued with the appellant and the respondent as partners. 16. Exhibit A-3 is the power of authorisation purported to have been executed by R.M.V. Vellachi Achi in favour of Manickam on 10th March, 1951 in India to carry on the money-lending business at No. 47, Market Street, Singapore and in particular, to sue, enforce or to defend, answer and oppose all actions and other legal proceedings touching any matters concerning the money-lending business. 17. It is the case of the respondent that Exhibit A-3 was not executed by the appellant on behalf of the partnership and it was on her own behalf and that Exhibit A-3 would not be binding on them. There is some force in this contention. Though Exhibit A-3 was admittedly executed in India by the appellant, the respondent and the other partner Shanmugham Chettiar had not joined in the execution of Ex....
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....e appellant in her individual capacity against the firm respondent and two others for the recovery of moneys alleged to have been due from them. This suit was filed admittedly after the dissolution of partnership. 20. This point has been made clear by the decision of this Court in Guritswami v. Mohamad Khan Sahib (1932) 63 M.L.J. 761. The appeal in that case was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Venkatasubba Rao and Reilly, JJ. In that appeal, a question was raised as to the effect of an ex parte judgment passed by a foreign Court against an absent foreigner. The facts of that appeal are briefly these: 21. The appellants therein were subjects of the Mysore State and they filed a suit in the District Court of Bangalore against three defendants. The suit was based upon promissory note alleged to have been executed by the defendants therein and also upon a contract, which they were stated to have entered into. The third defendant in that suit who was the respondent in the appeal was a British subject and was residing at the time of the suit in the District of Coimbatore where he was served with the summons in the suit. He did not appear, and a judgment was passed by the Bangal....
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.... by the respondent without trial can be deemed to be a judgment on merits. Under Section 13 (b), Civil Procedure Code, a foreign judgment cannot be conclusive and binding on the parties where such judgment has not been given on the merits of the case. 24. What happened in this case was this: The suit against the respondent was filed in the Singapore High Court on the affidavit filed by the plaintiff's attorney for service of summons on the respondent in India where the respondent was residing. The High Court of Singapore issued notice on 2nd June, 1966, to the respondent to be served in India in lieu of service in Singapore--aide Exhibit A-10. It appears that notice was served on the respondent on 4th July, 1966. The respondent did not appear in the suit. On 29th July, 1966, the Deputy Registrar of the High Court in Singapore, issued a certificate of non-appearance of the respondent in the suit. On the same day, on hearing the solicitor for the appellant, it was ordered that the appellant was at liberty to sign final judgment against the respondent for the suit claim. On 30th July, 1966, the final judgment Was passed against the respondent decreeing the suit as prayed for. It ....
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....n judgment in a Britjsh Indian Court is where it has not been given on the merits of the case. As I understand Mr. Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar's argument, he says that it is not like the case of the defendant's defence being struck out for not answering interrogatories or being out of time or anything of the kind; for that may be held not to be a defence on the merits because ex hypothesi the position is the defendant was precluded from going into the alleged merits which he had set up and he says it is quite different where the defendant does not appear at all because that is a clear intimation by him that he admits the validity of the plaintiff's claim and that it is just as good as if the plaintiff has actually proved it by evidence. I think the decision of their Lordships of the Frivy Council impliedly excludes any such distinction and I regret to say that I cannot agree with the attempt made by two learned Judges of this Court to draw this distinction in Janoo Hassan v. Mahomed Ohuthu (1954) I.L.R. 47 Mad. 877 : 47 M.L.J. 356, and I think that the case must be regarded as no longer law. Krishnan and Curgenven, JJ., the other two Judges constituting the Full Bench ag....