TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2016 (9) TMI 1479
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....ffidavit before the Tribunal in support of his contention. 3. During the course of hearing, the learned counsel for the assessee submitted that in support of his submission, the assessee has filed affidavit before the Tribunal. The learned counsel for the assessee also submitted that when the assessee was pursuing his penalty appeal before the learned CIT(A), it came to his notice that the appeal was dismissed. Therefore, it was prayed by the learned counsel for the assessee that the order of the Tribunal may kindly be recalled. 4. On the other hand, the learned DR submitted that the ex-parte order was passed by the Tribunal on 8.5.2012 but the miscellaneous application is filed after 4 years and 78 days. Therefore, the miscellaneous application is not tenable in law. Moreover, by the Finance Act, 2016 w.e.f. 1.6.2016 the period of filing the miscellaneous application within 4 years from the date of the order has been substituted and now it is 6 months from the date of the end of the month in which the order is passed. Therefore, as per the amended section 254(2) of the Act w.e.f. 1.6.2016, the Tribunal has no power to entertain the present application. 5. We have heard th....
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....s. (2A) In every appeal, the Appellate Tribunal, where it is possible, may hear and decide such appeal within a period of four years from the end of the financial year in which such appeal is filed under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) 8[***] of section 253: Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may, after considering the merits of the application made by the assessee, pass an order of stay in any proceedings relating to an appeal filed under sub-section (1) of section 253, for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date of such order and the Appellate Tribunal shall dispose of the appeal within the said period of stay specified in that order: Provided further that where such appeal is not so disposed of within the said period of stay as specified in the order of stay, the Appellate Tribunal may, on an application made in this behalf by the assessee and on being satisfied that the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee, extend the period of stay, or pass an order of stay for a further period or periods as it thinks fit; so, however, that the aggregate of the period originally allowed and the period or p....
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.... word 'apparent' is that it must be something which appears to be expenditure-facie and incapable of argument and debate. If such a 'mistake apparent on the face of record' is brought to the notice, section 254(2) empowers the Tribunal to amend the order passed under section 254(1). Amendment of an order does not mean obliteration of the order originally passed and its substitution by a new order. What is mistake apparent on the face of the record or where does a mistake cease to be mere mistake and become mistake apparent on the face of the record is rather difficult to define precisely, scientifically and with certainty. An element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature and it must be discernible from the facts of each case by judiciously trained mind. Mere existence of a mistake or error would not per se render the order amenable for rectification, but such a mistake must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record." We respectfully following the judgment of the Hon'ble Madras High Court (supra), are of the view that the scope and ambit of application of section 254(2) of the Act is very limited. The same is restricted to rectification of the mist....
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....abated is not called for. Once the suit has abated as a matter of law, though there may not have been passed on record a specific order dismissing the suit as abated, yet the legal representatives proposing to be brought on record or any other applicant proposing to bring the legal representatives of the deceased party on record would seek the setting aside of an abatement. A prayer for bringing the legal representatives on record, if allowed, would have the effect of setting aside the abatement as the relief of setting aside abatement though not asked for in so many words is in effect being actually asked for and is necessarily implied. Too technical or pedantic an approach in such cases is not called for." 10. Another Bench of this Court in a recent judgment of Katari Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba Rao, (AIR 2009 SC 2907) again had an occasion to construe the ambit, scope and application of the expression 'sufficient cause'. The application for setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal heirs of the deceased on record was filed in that case after a considerable delay. The explanation rendered regarding the delay of 2381 days in filing the application for condo....
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....d by the Bench dealing with the case of Ganeshprasad Badrinarayan Lahoti (supra). 13. As held by this Court in the case of Mithailal Dalsangar Singh (supra), the abatement results in the denial of hearing on the merits of the case, the provision of abatement has to be construed strictly. On the other hand, the prayer for setting aside an abatement and the dismissal consequent upon an abatement, have to be construed liberally. We may state that even if the term 'sufficient cause' has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of 'reasonableness' as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right, as accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduc....
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....ed a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan, ILR 13 Mad 269. It is however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the....
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....rue and correct meaning and must be applied wherever called for. If we accept the contention of the Learned Counsel appearing for the applicant that the Court should take a very liberal approach and interpret these provisions (Order 22 Rule 9 of the CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act) in such a manner and so liberally, irrespective of the period of delay, it would amount to practically rendering all these provisions redundant and inoperative. Such approach or interpretation would hardly be permissible in law. Liberal construction of the expression 'sufficient cause' is intended to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable. There can be instances where the Court should condone the delay; equally there would be cases where the Court must exercise its discretion against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect 'sufficient cause' as understood in law. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition, 1997] The expression 'sufficient cause' implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word 'sufficient' means adequ....
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....lications for setting aside abatement, than other cases. While the court will have to keep in view that a valuable right accrues to the legal representatives of the deceased respondent when the appeal abates, it will not punish an appellant with foreclosure of the appeal, for unintended lapses. The courts tend to set aside abatement and decided the matter on merits. The courts tend to set aside abatement and decide the matter on merits, rather than terminate the appeal on the ground of abatement. (iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation. (iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a court depends on the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case. For example, courts view delays in making applications in a pending appeal more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The courts view applications relating to lawyer's lapses more leniently than applications relating to litigant's lapses. The classic example is the difference in approach of courts to applications for condonation of delay in filing an appeal and applications for condonation of de....