TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2016 (9) TMI 1479
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....of his contention. 3. During the course of hearing, the learned counsel for the assessee submitted that in support of his submission, the assessee has filed affidavit before the Tribunal. The learned counsel for the assessee also submitted that when the assessee was pursuing his penalty appeal before the learned CIT(A), it came to his notice that the appeal was dismissed. Therefore, it was prayed by the learned counsel for the assessee that the order of the Tribunal may kindly be recalled. 4. On the other hand, the learned DR submitted that the ex-parte order was passed by the Tribunal on 8.5.2012 but the miscellaneous application is filed after 4 years and 78 days. Therefore, the miscellaneous application is not tenable in law. Moreover, by the Finance Act, 2016 w.e.f. 1.6.2016 the period of filing the miscellaneous application within 4 years from the date of the order has been substituted and now it is 6 months from the date of the end of the month in which the order is passed. Therefore, as per the amended section 254(2) of the Act w.e.f. 1.6.2016, the Tribunal has no power to entertain the present application. 5. We have heard the rival contentions of the parties. We find th....
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.... and decide such appeal within a period of four years from the end of the financial year in which such appeal is filed under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) 8[***] of section 253: Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may, after considering the merits of the application made by the assessee, pass an order of stay in any proceedings relating to an appeal filed under sub-section (1) of section 253, for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date of such order and the Appellate Tribunal shall dispose of the appeal within the said period of stay specified in that order: Provided further that where such appeal is not so disposed of within the said period of stay as specified in the order of stay, the Appellate Tribunal may, on an application made in this behalf by the assessee and on being satisfied that the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee, extend the period of stay, or pass an order of stay for a further period or periods as it thinks fit; so, however, that the aggregate of the period originally allowed and the period or periods so extended or allowed shall not, in any case, exceed three hundred and sixty-five days and the....
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....apparent on the face of record' is brought to the notice, section 254(2) empowers the Tribunal to amend the order passed under section 254(1). Amendment of an order does not mean obliteration of the order originally passed and its substitution by a new order. What is mistake apparent on the face of the record or where does a mistake cease to be mere mistake and become mistake apparent on the face of the record is rather difficult to define precisely, scientifically and with certainty. An element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature and it must be discernible from the facts of each case by judiciously trained mind. Mere existence of a mistake or error would not per se render the order amenable for rectification, but such a mistake must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record." We respectfully following the judgment of the Hon'ble Madras High Court (supra), are of the view that the scope and ambit of application of section 254(2) of the Act is very limited. The same is restricted to rectification of the mistake apparent from record. The recalling of the entire order would mean passing a fresh order. That does not appear to be legislative intent. What th....
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....egal representatives proposing to be brought on record or any other applicant proposing to bring the legal representatives of the deceased party on record would seek the setting aside of an abatement. A prayer for bringing the legal representatives on record, if allowed, would have the effect of setting aside the abatement as the relief of setting aside abatement though not asked for in so many words is in effect being actually asked for and is necessarily implied. Too technical or pedantic an approach in such cases is not called for." 10. Another Bench of this Court in a recent judgment of Katari Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba Rao, (AIR 2009 SC 2907) again had an occasion to construe the ambit, scope and application of the expression 'sufficient cause'. The application for setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal heirs of the deceased on record was filed in that case after a considerable delay. The explanation rendered regarding the delay of 2381 days in filing the application for condonation of delay and 2601 days in bringing the legal representatives on record was not found to be satisfactory. Declining the application for condonation of delay, the Court, while di....
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....ng on the merits of the case, the provision of abatement has to be construed strictly. On the other hand, the prayer for setting aside an abatement and the dismissal consequent upon an abatement, have to be construed liberally. We may state that even if the term 'sufficient cause' has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of 'reasonableness' as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right, as accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to ....
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....ation which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan, ILR 13 Mad 269. It is however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration;..." 14. In the case of ....
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.... (Order 22 Rule 9 of the CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act) in such a manner and so liberally, irrespective of the period of delay, it would amount to practically rendering all these provisions redundant and inoperative. Such approach or interpretation would hardly be permissible in law. Liberal construction of the expression 'sufficient cause' is intended to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable. There can be instances where the Court should condone the delay; equally there would be cases where the Court must exercise its discretion against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect 'sufficient cause' as understood in law. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition, 1997] The expression 'sufficient cause' implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word 'sufficient' means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances a....
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....sure of the appeal, for unintended lapses. The courts tend to set aside abatement and decided the matter on merits. The courts tend to set aside abatement and decide the matter on merits, rather than terminate the appeal on the ground of abatement. (iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation. (iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a court depends on the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case. For example, courts view delays in making applications in a pending appeal more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The courts view applications relating to lawyer's lapses more leniently than applications relating to litigant's lapses. The classic example is the difference in approach of courts to applications for condonation of delay in filing an appeal and applications for condonation of delay in re-filing the appeal after rectification of defects. (v) Want of "diligence" or "inaction" can be attributed to an appellant only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done, courts do not expect the appellant ....