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TaxTMI 
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TaxTMI 
1962 (9) TMI 93
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....and served on the petitioner but upon objection filed under section 9, the Certificate Officer by his orders dated December 20, 1956, directed the issue and service of fresh notices under section 7. Fresh notices dated December 20, 1956, were issued and served on the petitioner. Thereupon the petitioner filed under section 9 of the Act fresh petitions of objections dated January 27, 1957, and supplementary objections dated February 4, 1957. The Certificate Officer, Shri D.S.P. Mukherjee, dismissed the objections by his order dated January 8, 1958. Appeals preferred by the petitioner under section 31 were dismissed by the Commissioner, Presidency Division, by his order dated April 18, 1958, and revision petitions preferred by the petitioner under section 53 were dismissed by the Board of Revenue by its order dated April 21, 1960. The petitioner obtained the present rules on November 28, 1960. On behalf of the petitioner it is contended that Shri D.S.P. Mukherjee had no power to hear and dispose of the petition under section 9 as he was not the successor in office of Shri S.K. Banerjee before whom the petition had been filed. This contention was raised for the first time before the ....
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....artners to whose business the Act applied. I cannot accept this contention. This definition in section 2(17) of the Act did not exclude the wider definition of "person" in section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act. Where the partners of a firm are liable to be assessed jointly in the partnership name under section 14(3), the partnership firm is the assessee within the meaning of the proviso to section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, and by sections 29, 45 and 46 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, read with section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, the notice of demand of the excess profits tax could be served upon the partnership firm in the firm name and on default of payment by the firm the Excess Profits Tax Officer could forward a requisition to the Collector for realising the demand from the firm. The assessment, the notice of demand, the requisition for the certificates and the certificates in the name of the petitioner firm were, therefore, lawfully issued. On behalf of the petitioner it was contended before the Certificate Officer that a large sum of money had been paid by the petitioner on account of the tax dues. The Certificate Officer and the Co....
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.... accounting periods and (b) the income-tax on the basis of which the excess profits tax was assessed. Now the first column of the certificate mentioned the name of the certificate holder, the third column stated the name and address of the certificate debtor, the fourth column stated "Dt. NC-II Cal" by way of particulars of the demand. The first column of the several certificates also gave further particulars of the public demand respectively thus: "C.A.P. 31-3-42/E.P. Tax", "C.A.P. 31-3-43/E.P. Tax.", "C.A.P. 31-3-44/E.P. Tax" and "CAP. 31-3-46/E.P.Tax". The words "C.A.P." mean chargeable accounting period as defined in section 2(6) of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940. By section 2(1) of that Act "accounting period" means where the accounts of the business are made up for successive periods of twelve months, each of such periods and, in any other case, such period as the Excess Profits Tax Officer might determine. The certificates plainly specify that the demands are on account of excess profits tax assessed in respect of the chargeable accounting periods ending on the date therein specified. The public demands ....
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....mar Maity's case (supra), the attention of the Division Bench giving a contrary decision was not drawn to the Privy Council decision. The validity of the certificates is next attacked on the ground that they are not in the prescribed form. The wording of the certificate issued in the instant case is as follows : "I certify that the sums mentioned overleaf are due to the certificate-holder by the certificate-debtor(s) and that they are justly recoverable, the recovery by suit not being barred by law". In the case of Satish Chandra Bhowmick v. Union of India [1961] 65 CWN 324such a certificate was held to be invalid on the ground that it was not in the prescribed form. The form of the certificate prescribed at the relevant time by Form No. 1 of the Appendix to the rules in Schedule II of the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, is as follows : "I hereby certify that the above-mentioned sum of Rs........ is due to the above-named.......... from the above-named (if the certificate is signed on requisition sent under section 5, add-) I further certify that the above mentioned sum of Rs.... is justly recoverable and that its recovery by suit is not barred by law. Dated ....
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....a blank : see Haraprosad Gain v. Gopal Chandra Gain [1927] 31 CWN 299;Dhirendra Kumar Chandra v. Pramatha Nath Shah ILR [1946] 2 Cal 18, explaining and distinguishing the decision in Sudhir Chandra Chakravarty v. Sudhansu Kumar Choudhury [1940] 44 CWN 1097. A certificate cannot be pronounced to be invalid merely on the ground that it does not repeat the exact formula prescribed by the standard form. It is true that a certificate issued in a form identical with the form used in the instant case was held to be invalid in Satish Chandra Bhowmick v. Union of India [1961] 65 CWN 324but with respect we are unable to agree with that decision. In Ajit Kumar Ganguli's case (supra) another Division Bench regretted this insistence on strict adherence to the prescribed form and pointed out that substantial compliance with the prescribed form is sufficient. The matter is now set at rest by West Bengal Act XI of 1961. The certificate as also the notice under section 7 are attacked on the ground that the notices under section 7 were not signed by the Certificate Officer on the same date on which he filed the certificates and that this defect is fatal to the entire certificate proceedings. Th....
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....3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 is that the notices under section 7 must be signed by the Certificate Officer, on the date on which he files the certificates in his office and that the date borne in the notice must be the date on which the certificate is signed and filed. It is plain enough that a fresh notice issued under section 7 after the first notice is set aside cannot be signed on the date on which the certificate was filed and cannot bear that date. If the notice under section 7 is signed on the same day on which the certificate is filed, the date given at the foot of the notice does not conflict with, the statement in the body that the certificate has been filed in the office on the same date. But the notice under section 7 need not be signed on the day on which the certificate is filed. If the notice is signed on a later date, a recital in the body of the notice that the certificate has this day been filed in the office would be incorrect and the circumstances of the case therefore require that the body of the printed notice should be amended by giving the date on which the certificate was filed in the office. The absence of such amendment does not invalidate the notices issued in....
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....ese points. It may be noted that in the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the petitioner West Bengal Act XI of 1961 was challenged on the ground that it puts unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights of the petitioner but that point is not pressed in argument. The West Bengal Act XI of 1961 is a piece of legislation dealing with certificates and notices issued under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913. Now if the West Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, is a law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the State List, it will follow that West Bengal Act XI of 1961 is also a law with respect to matters within the State List and the State Legislature would be competent to enact this law and also the law will not be invalid because the assent of the President under article 254(2) of the Constitution has not been obtained. Now plainly the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, is not a law with respect to entry No. 43 of the Concurrent List; it is not a law with respect to recovery in the State of West Bengal of claims regarding public demands arising outside that State. Under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, there can be no recove....
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....ct that the assent of the President under article 254(2) of the Constitution was obtained to the passing of the amending West Bengal Acts (XV of 1955 and XV of 1957). The first two cases have been considered in the judgment in Ajit Kumar Ganguli's case (supra). I may add that the assent of the President to the West Bengal Act (XV of 1957), though not necessary, might have been obtained by way of abundant caution. It is not contended that the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, is a law with respect to any other entry in the Concurrent List or with respect to any of the specific entries Nos. 1 to 96 in the Union List. Nevertheless it is contended that the Act is not a law with respect to any of the entries in the State List and that it is a law with respect to entry No. 97 of the Union List, i.e., with respect to a matter not enumerated either in the State List or in the Concurrent List. I am unable to accept this contention. Learned Advocate-General contended that the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, is a law with respect to (a) land revenue, including assessment and collection of revenue and (b) administration of justice, constitution and organisation of revenu....
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....ing, execution, discharge or satisfaction of the certificate and the confirmation or setting aside of a sale held in execution of the certificate. By section 48 every Collector and Certificate Officer acting in discharge of his functions under the Act is deemed to be acting judicially within the meaning of the Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850, and by section 49 they have the powers of a civil court for the purposes of receiving evidence, administering oaths, and enforcing attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents. The orders passed under the Act are made subject to appeal, revision and review by sections 51, 53 and 54. Appellate powers are given to the Collector, the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue and revisional powers are given to the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue. By section 56(2) certain provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, are made applicable to all proceedings under the Act as if a certificate filed under it were a decree of a civil court. By section 57 a Certificate Officer is deemed to be a court and any proceeding before him is deemed to be a civil proceeding within the meaning of section 14 of the Indian Limitation Ac....
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....icate Officer may operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit between the parties and, if so, in what circumstances. In the case last cited, B.B. Ghose J. observed that the Certificate Officer cannot in any circumstances be considered as a court and that the procedure of this officer is contrary to all sense of justice and the rules universally followed by a court and that the procedure of an ex parte certificate and sentence followed by a trial on the challenge of the debtor is not the procedure of a court of justice. But it is well to bear in mind that the object of this peculiar procedure is to enable speedy recovery of public demands; consistently with this object the procedure of revenue courts is in many respects different from the procedure of the civil courts. I may also observe that in England the Court of Exchequer was the first tribunal to break away from the curia regis and introduced a peculiarly efficacious procedure for the recovery of the monies due to the Crown. The Court of Exchequer entertained not only purely fiscal disputes, but also many pleas between subject and subject. A revenue court, if so authorised by law, may entertain not only claim for revenue but a....
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....amount under the aforesaid section is recoverable, as if it were an arrear of land revenue. The Certificate Officer signed and filed a certificate within the meaning of the Public Demands Recovery Act on the receipt of a certificate of the Income-tax Officer within the meaning of section 46(2) of the Income-tax Act. This certificate is challenged as invalid, illegal and improper in these proceedings under article 227 of the Constitution against an order of the Board of Revenue. Applying the principles established in the case Ledgard v. Bull [1886] LR 13 IA. 134; ILR 9 All. 191and in the case Minakshi Naidu v. Subramanya Sastri [1887] LR 14 IA 160; ILR 11 Mad 26, the validity of a certificate can be challenged on one of the four grounds, namely, (1) that the Certificate Officer was not competent to sign and file the certificate concerned; (2) the certificate in question related to demands other than public demands within the meaning of section 3(6) of the West Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act; (3) that the certificate-holder was no person in law and (4) that the certificate-debtor in question was no person in law. No challenge has been made on any of the first three grounds. Th....
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...."the form set forth in the appendix shall be used with such variations as circumstances may require". The number of the certificate used is Form No. 1027. The standard form in the appendix also refers to that number. In the standard form after the tabular statement it is stated "I hereby certify that the above-mentioned sum of Rs... is due to the above-named ....from the above-named..........etc." Instead of the word "above-mentioned" in Form No. 1 of the appendix the words "mentioned overleaf" have been used and instead of giving the names of the certificate-holder and the certificate-debtor they have been described as certificate-holder and certificate-debtor. It is not difficult to see from Form No. 1 of the appendix that it provides that the entries should be in one side of a sheet of paper. The tabular statements are to be filled up in the upper part and the operative portion would come in the lower part. This requires a long sheet of paper. Instead of that, apparently for purposes of economising paper, they have used a. smaller sheet of paper. On one side of it is the tabular portion and on the other side of it is the operative portion....
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....e-debtor has come to the revenue court and taken various objections -really all objections that were open to him. Supposing this notice was bad, what the court might have done was to cancel the previous notice and issue a fresh notice after striking out the word "today" and inserting the actual date of the certificate therein. The result would have been that the same notice would have gone again, same objections would have been urged again and for no useful purpose. This error in the notice under section 7 is, in my opinion, at the most an irregularity which does not affect the validity of the certificate and which does not affect the merit of the objections taken by the judgment-debtor. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere under article 227 of the Constitution to cancel such a bad notice which has served all the purposes of a good and valid notice. I am, therefore, of opinion that neither the invalidity nor the illegality of the certificate in question has been established. The only question relating to the propriety of the notice under section 7 is a matter which does not affect the merits of the certificate or the objection and would be no ground for interfering ....
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....ut may be courts. The question is whether the Public Demands Recovery Act relates to any revenue court and whether the Certificate Officer, the Commissioner and the Board are courts within the meaning of item No. 3. Item No. 3 refers to constitution- of courts for purposes of administering justice and not to serve the purposes of a particular group of statutes but with the avowed object of creating a forum for administration of justice between man and man and man and State. The courts may be said to be the seats where judicial power of the sovereign is exercised, not with reference to any particular statute nor a particular group of allied statutes but with regard to matters in general. In our country courts have been divided into three categories: (1) civil courts, (ii) criminal courts and (iii) revenue courts, apart from the Supreme Court and the High Courts. The courts are halls of justice where justice is administered with reference either to civil matters or to criminal matters or to revenue matters in general, and not limited to serve the purpose of any particular statute. In an industrial tribunal matters relating to the Industrial Disputes Act and allied matters are decided....