TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1940 (12) TMI 24
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....year there was a further petition by the respondents, praying that since they had paid more than twice the amount of the principal sum as well as the costs, the Court might be pleased to record under the Act full satisfaction of the decree. In February 1939 a Full Bench of the Madras High Court, in another case, Nagaratnam v. Seshayya ('39) 26 AIR 1939 Mad 36 held that the Act was within the competence of the Legislature, and accordingly the subordinate Judge allowed the two petitions and recorded full satisfaction of the decree. A revision application to the High Court was dismissed, but the High Court gave a certificate Under Section 205, Constitution Act. The appeal now comes before this Court, and the substantial question to be decided is whether the Act was within the powers of the Madras Legislature, though there are subsidiary questions also involved. 2. The Act is an attempt to deal in a very drastic manner with the problem of rural indebtedness, which has vexed legislators since the days of Solon. It contains, as other provincial Acts passed on the same subject during the last few years have also contained, many unusual and at first sight startling provisions. It appl....
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....nterest is to be calculated at that rate until payment or until such date after the institution of a suit to recover the amount as the Court directs. These provisions are not easily to be reconciled with the provisions of the Madras Act, where debts based upon promissory notes are concerned. The Court was therefore invited by counsel for the appellant to say that the Act was beyond the competence of the Madras Legislature, because it dealt with debts which in a great number of cases would be debts based upon promissory notes; or that, if not wholly invalid, it was at any rate beyond the competence of the Legislature in so far as it might affect such debts, or alternatively ought to be construed as not applying to them. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court, in the case already cited, have decided that the Madras Act does not trench in any way upon the exclusive powers of the Federal Legislature. "We do not regard the Madras Agriculturists Belief Act," said the learned Chief Justice, delivering the judgment of the Court, as really affecting the principles embodied in the Negotiable Instruments Act. Negotiation of a promissory note is not prohibited, nor is it said that a m....
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....an scarcely be doubted that Parliament had those provisions in mind when it enacted the later Act. By Section 91, Canadian Act, the Dominion Legislature is given a general power to legislate for the peace, order and good government of Canada "in relation to all matters not coming within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned to the Legislatures of the Provinces", and without prejudice to the generality of the power so given the exclusive legistative authority of the Dominion is expressly declared to extend to all matters coming within the classes of subjects enumerated in the section. Section 91 further declares that any matter coming, within any of the classes so enumerated shall not be deemed to come within the class of matters of a local or private nature comprised in the enumeration of the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Provinces [this corresponds to Section 100(1), Government of India Act]. Then Section 92 gives the Provincial Legislatures exclusive authority to make laws in relation to matters coming within the list of (provincial) subjects enumerated in that section, the last class in. the list being described as "generally ....
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....h respect to negotiable instruments or promissory notes; and it seems to me quite immaterial that many, or even most, of the debts with which it deals are in practice evidenced by or based upon such instruments. That is an accidental circumstance which cannot affect the question. Suppose that at some later date money-lenders were to adopt a different method of evidencing the debts of those to whom they lend money; how could the validity or invalidity of the Act vary with money-lenders' practice? I am of opinion therefore that the Act cannot be challenged as invading the forbidden field of List I, for, it was not suggested that it dealt with any item in that List other than No. 28. 8. It was then contended that, even if not wholly invalid, either the Act was invalid in part, in so far as it did or might affect promissory notes, or that it ought to be construed as not applying to promissory notes at all. But these questions do not in my opinion arise in the present case, because the liability on which the Act operated was a liability under a decree of the Court passed before the commencement of the Act. It had ceased to be a debt evidenced by or based on the promissory note, for....
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....he impugned Act does not really affect the principles embodied in the Negotiable Instruments Act, for, that proposition seems to me much too broadly stated. I doubt whether any provincial Act could, in the form of a debtors' relief Act, fundamentally affect the principle of negotiability or the rights of a bona fide transferee for value. Perhaps the position is different where the promissory note has never changed hands and is sued upon by the original payee; and it may be (though I do not decide the question) that an Act such as the Court is now considering can operate upon the original debt in such cases, even though the creditor has taken a promissory note in respect of his debt. If it were otherwise, the power of Provincial Legislatures to enact remedial legislation in a field peculiarly their own would be very greatly hampered; so much so, indeed, that the Central Legislature might well find itself compelled to review the situation. But it would perhaps be inadvisable that I should say more on this occasion. 11. I think that the appeal should be dismissed. As the respondents did not enter an appearance there will be no order for costs. It is not the practice of this Court....
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....sion would be wholly inconclusive and therefore utterly useless, as it would be impossible to give any direction to a subordinate Court to select one opinion in preference to the other. Secondly, it is emphasised that a Judge who does not concur is not prevented from delivering a dissenting judgment. The sub-section does not say that reasons cannot be stated separately by the Judges who concur in one judgment. No doubt the practice of the Judicial Committee, unlike that in the House of Lords, is that one of their Lordships delivers the judgment, which is taken to be on behalf of all. But obviously there are three main reasons for it. In the first place, the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council is in the form of a report submitted to His Majesty. It would accordingly be wholly inappropriate to submit conflicting opinions to His Majesty. In the second place, their Lordships hear appeals from the Dominions, India and the Colonies, and it is desirable that it should not appear that there has been any divergence of opinion, so that there may be no doubts as to the correctness of the law which the Courts have to follow. In the third place, the Privy Council is the ultimate Co....
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....in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured, due from an agriculturist, payable under a decree or order or otherwise, with two exceptions. Section 7 lays down: Notwithstanding any law, custom, contract or decree of Court to the contrary, all debts payable by an agriculturist at the commencement of this Act, shall be scaled down in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. No sum in excess of the amount as so scaled down shall be recoverable from him or from any land or interest in land belonging to him; nor shall his property be liable to be attached and sold or proceeded against in any manner in the execution of any decree against him in so far as such decree is for an amount in excess of the sum as scaled down under this chapter. 17. Section 8 relates to debts incurred before 1st October 1932 and provides: (1) All interest outstanding on 1st October 1937 in favour of any creditor of an agriculturist whether the same be payble under law, custom or contract or under a decree of Court and whether the debt or other obligation has ripened into a decree or not, shall be deemed to be discharged, and only the principal or such portion thereof as may be outstanding shall be de....
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....substantially be with respect to matters in one list or the other. A remote connexion is not enough. Those words do not connote the idea that it must be absolutely and exclusively within one list and not encroaching, not even in an indirect way, upon any other. 21. As pointed out by me in the U. P. Regularizations of Remissions Act case, United Provinces v. Mt. Atiqa Begum ('41) 28 AIR 1941 FC 16 their Lordships of the Privy Council in dealing with Canadian cases have repeatedly laid down the test that in order to see whether an Act is in respect of a particular subject, one must look to "its true nature and character" and to its "pith and substance". It is quite wrong to assume that the doctrine of pith and substance laid down by their Lordships is some special doctrine exclusively applicable to the Canadian Constitution. Indeed, Lord Atkin in the House of Lords in Gallagher v. Lynn (1937) 1937 AC 863 at p. 870 applied this doctrine previously applied to the Constitution in a Federal system, to the Constitution of the Northern Ireland. His Lordship held that in pith and substance the Milk and Milk Products Act, 1934, was not a law "in respect of"....
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....he provisions contained therein fall within List II or List III, the province would have prima facie an authority to legislate, unless it can be shown that it is with respect to any matter in List I, or is void on account of any repugnancy. 23. The substance - The substance of the Act is to give relief to agriculturists in respect of interest accruing upon the debt due from them. In one aspect it relates to money-lending and money-lenders because the reduction of interest on loans made to them by money-lenders would affect money-lending transactions. It is certainly a measure relating to agriculturists in the main, though an agriculturist is defined in a somewhat wider sense and though the debt due from him is not confined to loans taken for agricultural purposes, but includes any liability due from him. But, there can at the same time be no doubt that the scheme of the Act is to benefit the agriculturists as a class and relieve them from onerous burden of high interest, from which the Provincial Legislature thought they had been unfairly suffering. It may be, literally speaking, difficult to say that benefit to agriculturists (defined in a somewhat wide way) is included in the te....
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....ell. But List I, Entry No. 28 specifically and expressly assigns "cheques, bills of exchange, promissory notes and other instruments" to the Federal Legislature. Being of all-India importance there was a special reason for assigning negotiable instruments to the Federal Legislature. A uniformity of practice as regards these for the whole of India is necessary. As they can be freely negotiated, they can circulate from province to province, and after successive endorsements can even be sued upon in provinces other than those in which they were executed. As they pass from hand to hand, holders in due course have to be protected. They are allowed to presume that the consideration evidenced by such instruments is due in full. Holders in due course cannot be expected to inquire and ascertain whether the original maker had been an agriculturist or not; and it would be grossly unfair to such holders, if after having paid almost full consideration for such instruments, they were confronted in a suit brought upon them with a provincial law that cuts down interest which accrued even prior to the passing of that Act. As the impugned Act deals with debts in general, it would be diffic....
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....nstrued as to make a nullity of a particular power conferred by the same Act and operating in the same field, when by reading the former in a more restricted sense effect can be given to the latter in its ordinary and natural meaning. 28. My brother Jayakar J., on p. 118, relying on the ruling In re Marriage Legislation in Canada.(1912) 1912 AC 880 at pp. 885 to 887 adhered to the principle of exception and observed: In other words, as I interpret the two entries, entry No. 45 (List I) may be said to contain a general power to levy excise duty at all stages. As an exception to this, a portion of the power is cut out and allocated to the provinces under entry No. 48 (List II). It operates as an exception to the general power conferred by entry No. 45. 29. On the other hand, at p. 94, I did not feel myself able to apply the principle that where a particular power comes within both the two mutually exclusive jurisdictions, as in Canada, it should be regarded as an exception to the general one. I pointed out that an exception falls within and not outside a general provision, the essence of the principle being that a particular exception restricts a general provision, although covere....
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....gned to the Provincial Legislatures Under Section 92. The exception itself is, however, subject to the exclusive power of the Dominion Legislature with respect to matters specifically enumerated in Section 91. It is then emphasized that any matter coming within any of the classes of subjects specified in Section 91 shall not be deemed to come within the class of matters of local or private nature comprised in the enumeration of the classes of subjects assigned to the Provincial Legislatures. The difficulty in Canada has been that the power of the Dominion Legislature extends to the very wide field "peace, order and good government,'' and also includes the residuary power in respect of matters not allocated to the provinces. Another difficulty is that the last class in Section 92 is also expressed in general language "generally all matters of a merely local or private nature in the province." Again, the provinces have power as regards "property and civil rights in the province." There is a further complication arising from the categories direct and indirect taxation. In particular, while Section 91 specifically mentioned "26. Marriage and Divorc....
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...., statutes which they could not enact. 33. Indian section - Now although the object of Section 100, Government of India Act, is the same, the language is not identical. Taking Section 100 strictly literally, it would certainly follow from the double restriction imposed on a Provincial Legislature that its exclusive power is limited so as to ensure that, Federal laws must dominate in the fields of Lists I and III. While the Federal Legislature is given power, it is expressly provided that "a Provincial Legislature has not power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I." And this exclusion of power is "notwithstanding anything in the two next succeeding sub-sections." Again, in Sub-section (2), while both the Federal Legislature and a Provincial Legislature have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III, this is "notwithstanding anything in the next succeeding sub-section." The exclusive power of a Provincial Legislature with regard to matters in List II is provided for in Sub-section (3), but it is again emphasized that this last sub-section is "subject to the two preceding sub-section....
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....f the note. Section 79 in more specific language lays down: When interest at a specified rate is expressly made payable on a promissory note or bill of exchange, interest shall be calculated at the rate specified, on the amount of the principal money due thereon, from the date of the instrument, until tender or realization of such amount, or until such date after the institution of a suit to recover such amount as the Court directs. 35. Parties cannot even contract out of their statutory rights. Thus, in the case of a promissory note or bill of exchange, interest has to be calculated till at least the institution of the suit, at the rate specified therein. Any provincial law providing that the interest prior to the suit should be curtailed or cut down, is prima facie in conflict with it. It will be trenching upon a field already occupied by Section 79. 36. After the Negotiable Instruments Act, came the Usurious Loans Act (Act 10 of 1918), as amended by Act 28 of 1926, which also was a Central Act. Now usurious loans undoubtedly come within "money-lending", which is specifically included in List II. As pointed out by me in the U. P. Regularization of Remissions Act case....
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....a decree is to be passed in future. Nor does it even protect bona fide holders in due course. Had the provision been confined to the interest after the suit was filed, there would have been no such conflict. Interest pendente lite is in the discretion of the Court Under Section 34, Civil P.C., and the Court's power to allow it is left untouched by Section 79, Negotiable Instruments Act. It draws no distinction between the original promisee and a holder in due course. The special hardship that would be inflicted on the latter is not at all taken into account in the Act and the special protection given to bona fide holders in due course by the Negotiable Instruments Act read with the Usurious Loans Act is destroyed. Had it been confined to the scaling down of the interest before a decree is passed, it might have come within the modification introduced by the Usurious Loans Act. But it affects decrees previously passed on promissory notes, which could not have been touched at all under the existing Indian laws in Madras. It is thus not a case where the power of a Provincial Legislature eo nomine in the absence of any Central legislation is to be considered, but a case where such l....
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.... indissolubly connected. Section 8 treats the liability as a debt wholly irrespective of the fact whether it is a decretal debt or not. I do not read these provisions as indicating that even if the contract could not be interfered with the decree can be amended. It rather seems to me that both the contract and the decree obtained on it hang together and must stand or fall together so far as the lists go. 41.Their Lordships of the Privy Council have laid down in several cases that part of an Act can be held valid and another part invalid, if they are severable. "If the offending provisions are so interwoven into the scheme that they are not severable," the whole is ultra vires: In re the Initiative and Referendum Act. ('19) 6 AIR 1919 PC 145. In Attorney-General for British Columbia v. Attorney-General for Canada ('37) 24 AIR 1937 PC 93 at page 388, their Lordships found "the whole texture of the Act so inextricably interwoven" that one part could not be contemplated as existing independently of the other. In Shyamakanta Lal v. Rambhajan Singh ('39) 26 AIR 1939 FC 74 at p. 213, I had relied on these cases and pointed out that: It is a well-establish....
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....e with the jurisdiction and powers of Courts, except with respect to matters coming within their lists. Entries No. 53 of List I, No. 2 of List II and No. 15 of List III make that perfectly clear. If a Legislature is not competent to deal with a subject matter, then it is equally incompetent to affect the jurisdiction and powers of the Court with respect to that matter. If this were not so, the result would be that even though a Legislature may have no power to legislate directly on a particular subject embracing a pecuniary liability, it could indirectly legislate that when the dispute comes in a Court, the decree should be passed in a particular way, or a decree already passed should be amended in that way. This would introduce a serious anomaly and would enable Legislatures freely to encroach upon other fields indirectly, and at the same time effectively. 44. In Ramnandan Prasad v. Madhwanand Ramji ('40) 27 AIR 1940 FC 1 at p. 5 I have expressed the opinion that the provision in Section 11, Bihar Money-Lenders Act (3 of 1938) that "no Court shall . . . pass a decree for an amount of interest, etc." affected the powers of Courts. In the Bihar case, Lachmeshwar Pras....
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....pugnancy in certain cases makes the law of the Central Legislature prevail over that of the Province, even though there would be competency if there had been no such Central legislation. It has been suggested by the Advocate-General of India that by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 316 of the Act "a Federal law" referred to in Section 107(1) should include "an existing Indian law" on a sub-; ject which falls within List I. His point is that the expression "which the Federal Legislature is competent to enact" merely means a subject in List I and that it applies to all previous laws of the Central Legislature and is not necessarily confined to laws of the Indian Legislature passed after the coming into force of the Government of India Act. This contention, if accepted, would raise several difficulties. According to strict grammar, the present tense "is competent to enact" would not necessarily mean 'had been or was competent to enact'. Furthermore, the existing Indian law with respect to matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, is expressly mentioned as an alternative to "Federal law". There is therefore no poin....
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....ion of Section 316 is consequential, that is to say, is the result of the exercise of the powers conferred by the provisions of this Act. So that it again follows that this later provision also must refer to the laws of the Indian Legislature which in future come to be enacted by the Indian Legislature, in the exercise of the powers conferred by this Act on such Legislature. Three different kinds of expressions have been used in the Act viz., "Federal law", "existing Indian law" and "laws of the Indian Legislature". There is absolutely no reason to suppose that Federal law was intended to include any part of the existing Indian law. I am accordingly unable to see that there is anything in the language of Section 316 which would make the expression "Federal law" in Section 107 (1) include a previously existing Indian law on a subject falling in List I. Of course, if there were a fresh enactment by the Indian Legislature after Part III has come into force and before the Federation comes into existence, then the provisions of Section 107(1) would certainly apply to it. For purposes of the transitional period, one may paraphrase the sub-section a....
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....strictions on the power to legislate with regard to the Concurrent List, where the whole field is open to a Provincial Legislature, it would be all the more necessary to impose even more drastic limitations on the powers of a Provincial Legislature to make legislation repugnant to the existing Indian law with respect to matters which have been expressly taken out of the authority of the Provincial Legislature. The principle of repugnancy embodied in Section 107 was presumably borrowed from the trend of decisions in Canadian cases, and might have been borrowed in full, so as not to leave a gap. But, even if this subsection is not comprehensive, it does not follow that there is any gap which cannot otherwise be filled up. Apparently, it was thought that as the provinces had been given any authority to legislate with respect to matters falling in List I, all cases where there is an encroachment would be met by Section 100 itself. 51. Unoccupied field - The doctrine which has been evolved with regard to the Canadian cases is that if the encroachment is merely incidental, then there is no defect so long as the trespass is upon an unoccupied field. Engrafted upon the doctrine of inciden....
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....e can be a domain in which provincial and Dominion legislation may overlap, in which case neither legislation will be ultra vires if the field is clear, but if the field is not clear and the two legislations meet the Dominion legislation must prevail. 54. In Board of Trustees of Northern Irrigation District v. Independent Orders of Foresters (1940) 1940 AC 513 at pp. 531, 532, the Lord Chancellor declining to put a 'restricted interpretation' on the term "interest," observed: Even if it could be said that the Act relates to classes of subjects in Section 92 as well as to one of the classes in Section 91, this would not avail the appellants to protect the Provincial Act against the Interest Act of 1927, passed by the Dominion Parliament, the validity of which, in the view of their Lordships is unquestionable . . . . Dominion legislation properly enacted Under Section 91 and already in the field must prevail in territory common to the two Parliaments. 55. In Jai Gobind Singh v. Lachmi Narain Ram ('40) 27 AIR 1940 FC 20 at p. 51 where the amount due on an earlier promissory note had formed part of the mortgage money, I distinguished the case by pointing out th....
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....arte blanche could hardly have been contemplated. The scheme of Section 100 of the Act is to exclude completely from the authority of the Provincial Legislature the power to legislate with respect to subjects in List I. If in consequence of certain difficulties that Provincial Legislatures would experience by a rigid enforcement of such an exclusion we must in interpreting the words "with respect to" import the Canadian doctrine of permissibility of incidental encroachment, we must then at the same time import the other allied doctrine also that such an encroachment is permissible only when the field is actually unoccupied. It is only in this way that actual clash between the centre and provinces can be avoided, which I think we must. This will also explain the apparent gap in Section 107(1) of the Act, that gap being filled in by the provisions of section 100. 57. The result is that the effect of Sections 8 and 19, Madras Act, is to compel Courts to reopen decrees passed on the basis of promissory notes before the Act came into force, and recalculate the amounts due on them disallowing all interest outstanding on 1st October 1937, and even the principal if double the am....
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....Legislature. The learned counsel for the appellant, while contesting the validity of the impugned legislation, conceded that it was a genuine and bona fide, though drastic attempt at a solution of the problem of agricultural indebtedness which has long been recognized as a pressing problem in this country. The Usurious Loans Act passed by the Indian Legislature in 1918 only conferred certain discretionary powers on the Court, and its operation was not limited to agriculturists; it proved ineffective to check the growing burden of rural indebtedness. Recommendations for more drastic measures were made from responsible quarters, but no further action was taken by the Indian Legislature. The inclusion of "money-lending and money-lenders" in List II of Schedule 7 to the Constitution Act justifies the inference that Provincial Legislatures must have been considered better fitted to deal with the subject with adequate knowledge of local conditions and requirements. Both before and after 1935, the local Legislatures in the several provinces have enacted more drastic measures for the purpose. The common feature of these measures was that they compelled the Court to reduce substan....
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.... holder of a promissory note or other negotiable instrument, including the right to recover full interest as per terms of Sections 79 and 80 of that Act: see Sagarmal Marwari v. Bhuthu Ram ('41) 28 AIR 1941 Pat 99 With reference to these intermediate views a further question was raised and discussed before us, namely whether the liability of the respondent in the present case was or was not such as could be validly reduced by an enactment of the Provincial Legislature. In dealing with the questions above stated, the Madras Full Bench and the Advocate-General of Madras (in his arguments before us) relied on certain principles of interpretation laid down by the Judicial Committee in decisions relating to similar questions raised under the British North America Act. In the Patna High Court, more than one learned Judge has strongly protested against importing these principles - particularly what is described as the "pith and substance" rule-into the construction of the Government of India Act; and in Sagarmal Marwari v. Bhuthu Ram ('41) 28 AIR 1941 Pat 99 Meredith J., observed: There are peculiar provisions in Section 100, Government of India Act, and in my view they....
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....tion 91, for if so, by the concluding words of that section it is excluded from the powers conferred by Section 92. 63. The position of the Provincial Legislatures under the Indian Constitution Act in respect of the subjects enumerated in List II and in relation to the subjects specified in List I is in essence the same as that above stated in regard to the powers of the Provincial Legislature Under Section 92, British North America Act. It will be clear from the decisions that the rules of interpretation adopted in the Canadian cases were evolved only as a matter of reasonableness and common sense and out of the necessity of satisfactorily solving conflicts arising from the inevitable overlapping of subjects in any system of distribution of legislative powers. That they need not be limited to any special system of federal constitution is made clear by the fact that in Gallagher v. Lynn (1937) 1937 AC 863 at p. 869, Lord Atkin applied the "pith and substance" rule when dealing with a question arising under the Government of Ireland Act-which did not embody a federal system at all-and in Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board ('39) 26 AIR 1939 PC 36 at pp. 719....
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.... inclusion of debts due under negotiable instruments has rendered the Act wholly or in part invalid or inoperative. 65. The argument of total invalidity need not be dealt with at any length, not only because it was not seriously pressed, but also because there is little force in it. If an enactment deals in part with matters beyond the competence of the Legislature which enacted it, it must be held to be wholly invalid only in cases where the valid and invalid provisions are inseparably intermixed or the innocent provisions are merely ancillary to the offending provisions. This cannot be said to be the position in the present case. Further, as there is no provision in the Act dealing in terms with negotiable instruments, any objection based on the wide scope of the Act may be obviated by so interpreting the general terms used in the Act as to limit them to cases with which alone the Legislature was competent to deal: see Macleod v. Attorney-General for New South Wales (1891) 1891 AC 455 at page 459. 66. The Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court held that the Act is not invalid or inoperative even in respect of debts due under negotiable instruments, because in the opinion ....
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....ce on the same page, their Lordships recognize that this rule may sometimes also apply in favour of the provinces, for otherwise the purpose of assigning the particular item to the province will be frustrated. It does not seem to me necessary for the purpose of this case to decide these questions, because the liability here sought to be reduced with the aid of the provisions of the Madras Act, had long before the date of the enactment of that Act passed into a decretal liability and was no longer one under a promissory note or other negotiable instrument. 68. For the same reason, it seems to me unnecessary to express a definite opinion on another contention of Sir B.L. Mitter, namely that the provisions of the impugned Act may also be void Under Section 107(1), Constitution Act, in so far as they are repugnant to the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The validity of this contention will depend upon the import of the expression "federal law" occurring in the opening part of Sub-section (1) of Section 107. It may be conceded that the words "which the Federal Legislature is competent to enact" may refer to the first list also and they need not be quali....
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....der whether or not the claim of the appellant belonged to a category that could be affected by provincial legislation. The recitals in the promissory note on which the suit was instituted and the admission made in para. 6 of the affidavit filed by the appellant's agent on 3rd October 1938 in the Coimbatore Sub-Court in the present proceedings show that the appellant is a money-lender and the promissory note related to the balance due on account of previous money dealings between the parties. Apart from the existence of the promissory note, the case would clearly fall under the head "money-lending and moneylenders" in item 27 of List II. Under this head, it would probably make no difference in respect of the Provincial Legislature's power to deal with such a case that a decree had been passed in respect of the debt, because, the creditor would not be any the less a "money-lender" on that account. If there should be any doubt on this ground, it might be sufficient to read this head, with item 2 in the same list (jurisdiction and powers of Courts). Even if it should be found necessary to call in aid the powers under the Concurrent List, on the ground that t....