TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1997 (3) TMI 632
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.... properties has been sought to be protected under the umbrella stated to have been provided by the Instrument of Accession and Articles 294 and 295 of the Constitution of India. The action of the State Legislature in enacting the laws with respect to the properties of the former ruler of Mysore has also been challenged on the grounds of inherent lack of jurisdiction under Part XI read with Schedule 7 of the Constitution of India. In order to hold that the action of the State Legislature was unconstitutional, reliance is placed upon various provisions of Part III and Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. All these pleas and the contention raised are with respect to the dispute raised regarding the acquisition by legislative action of the Bangalore Palace (hereinafter called 'the Palace'), admittedly the acknowledged private property of the former ruler of Mysore. Controversy raised is with respect to the enactment of The Bangalore Palace (Acquisition and Transfer) Act, 1996 (Karnataka Act No. 18/1996) (hereinafter called 'The Act'). 2. The petitioners have stated that the value of the Palace and the adjoining lands is ₹ 3,000 crores, approximately. It is....
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.....6.1949. On 25.11.1949, the Maharaja is stated to have formally made a proclamation to the effect that the Constitution of India, after its adoption by the Constituent Assembly, shall be the Constitution for the State of Mysore (Annexure 'E'), on 23.1.1950, an agreement is stated to have been entered into between the Governor General of India and the Maharaja of Mysore regarding the privy purse, private property and rights and privileges (Annexure 'F'). Article II of the Agreement ensured that the Maharaja shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties belonging to him on the date of Agreement. Under Article IV, the Government of India is stated to have guaranteed the succession according to law and custom to the Gaddi of the State and to the personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles of the Maharaja. 5. Pursuant to the Agreement, the Maharaja submitted the list of Immovable properties held by him as private properties, on 26.1.1950, which is attached with the petition as Annexure 'G'. The palace was included in the list of private properties. By a letter dated 8.1.1951, Sri V.P. Menon, the then Secretary of Stat....
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....till pending in this Court. It is alleged that not being satisfied with the declaration filed by the heirs of the ruler and in colourable exercise of power vested in it, the State Government initiated proceedings for acquisition of land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 12.8.1986 (Annexure 'L'). It was stated that the land was intended to be acquired for a public purpose, viz., "Preservation of artistic and historical heritage of the State". Objections are stated to have been filed by the petitioner and others on 17.9.1986 (Annexure 'O'). A declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is stated to have been published on 9.9.1987 and notice for taking possession and passing of the order was given on 5.9.1989 (Annexure 'Q'). Both the notification and the dedication have been challenged in Writ Petition No. 4284/1988 and five other connected Writ Petitions. This Court, while dealing with the aforesaid Writ Petitions, stayed further proceedings vide order dated 15.9.1989, initiated pursuant to the aforesaid notification and declaration. Thereaft....
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....ated to be covering the moveable properties, which could not be brought within the Land Acquisition Proceedings. The acquisition of moveables of the palace is alleged to be tantamounting to acquisition without legal authority. The creation of the Board for the purpose of Section 7 and Chapter III of the impugned Act is intended to be used for ulterior purposes and not for the proclaimed purpose for which the Act is stated to have been enacted. As earlier noticed, the action of the respondent is stated to be contrary to the Constitutional guarantees ensured to the former rulers. The Act is stated to be the by-product of un-legislative competence, after surrendering of the State legislative powers in favour of the Union Parliament in terms of Article 252 of the Constitution. It is submitted that after surrendering the legislative power under Entry 18 List II in favour of the Parliament, the State Legislature had no jurisdiction to enact the impugned Act under Article 246(2) of the Constitution of India. It is urged that the subject covered by the impugned Act and the Ceiling Act is the same when examined by applying the principle of 'pith and substance' of the legislation. Th....
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.... to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified and constitutional mandate contained in Clause (b) of Article 39 of the Constitution of India, directing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community be so distributed as best to subserve the common good. The Act is claimed to be intended to achieve the object of building a welfare state and an egalitarian social order, by fixing certain social and economic goals for immediate attainment by bringing about a social revolution, which it is stated to fulfill the basic need of the common man and change the structure of the society, without which political democracy has no meaning. The Act is made not only for implementing the directive principles, but also to achieve the goals set forth in the preamble to the Constitution, particularly after its amendment by means of the 42nd Constitutional amendment. Article 31-C of the Constitution saves the Act from the attack of being void on the ground of inconsistency with or for allegedly taking away or abridging any of the rights conferred by Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. As the impugned Act fulfills the requirement of Article 31-C, it i....
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....parate. The reliance of the petitioners upon Articles 294 and 299 of the Constitution has been seriously contested and it is pointed out that the agreement relied upon by the petitioners being pre-Constitution, could not be relied upon, in view of the specific bar imposed by Article 363 of the Constitution. The contention that once the State exercises its power of eminent domain, that power cannot be again exercised in respect of the same property, is stated to be devoid of any substance, as in prior proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, the property had not vested in the State Government, as no award had been passed against the petitioners. The reliance of the petitioners on violation of the fundamental rights as guaranteed by Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution is stated to be misconceived and it is submitted in the alternative that the respondents are not quality of violation of the guarantees of any of the aforesaid Articles. The scope and purport of Section 5(c) and Section 40 of the impugned Act are disparate. It is claimed that by incorporating various provisions in the impugned Act, the Legislature has ensured proper superintendence, direction, control and manageme....
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....ataka Appellate Tribunal. Whereas the legal representatives and heirs and transferees of late Jayachamarajendra Wadeyar have in some Writ Petitions questioned the legality of the order passed by the Appellate Authority and these Writ Petitions are pending hearing before the High Court of Karnataka, it has become necessary to pass a law different from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and to make provision for appointment of a Commissioner of payment to pass appropriate orders in conformity with the final decision in the above Writ Petitions in determining the amount payable in respect of the entire holding, and: Whereas, for the purpose herein before stated it is expedient to provide for the acquisition and transfer of the Bangalore Palace and the open space around it, by legislation." Section 1 deals with the title and commencement of the Act. Subsection 2 of Section 2 defines Bangalore Palace to mean, "the Palace of Bangalore and all the vacant land attached thereto including Buildings : regalia, paintings, sculptures and all other pieces of art, whether moveable or immovable and more fully described in Schedule I." Section 3 reads: "Decl....
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....he removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the mortgagee of any property referred to in sub-section (4) or other person holding any charge, lease, lien or other interest in or in relation, to any such property shall be entitled to claim in accordance with his rights or interest, payment of the mortgage money or other dues in whole or in part out of the amount specified in Section 8 and also out of the amount determined under Section 9, but no such mortgage, charge, lien or other interest shall be enforceable against any property which has vested in the State Government. (6) If, as the appointed day, any suit, appeal or other proceeding of whatever nature, in relation to any property which has vested in the State Government under Section 4, instituted or preferred by or against the legal representatives or heirs or other interested persons, is pending, the same shall not abate, be discontinued, or in any way prejudicially affected by reason of the transfer of the Palace or anything contained in this Act, but the suit, appeal or other proceeding may be continued, prosecuted and enforced by or against the State Government or, where the Palace is directed under Section 7 to ves....
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....o from the amounts determined under subsection (1), in accordance with the rights and interests of the creditors of the legal representatives or heirs, or other person as the case may be." Chapter III deals with the management of the Palace. Section 10 provides that the general superintendence, direction, control and management of the Palace, the right, title and interest in relation to the Palace which is vested in the State Government, shall, where a direction has been made by the Government under sub-section (1) of Section 7 vest in the Board and thereupon the Board be entitled to exercise, to the exclusive of all other persons, all such powers and do such things as may be authorised to do in relation to the Palace. Section 11 deals with the duties of the persons incharge of the management of the Palace and Section 12 refers to the duties of persons to account for assets in their possession. Chapter IV deals with the Commissioner of Payments. It comprises of Sections 13 to 21. Section 13 reads as under: "Appointment of Commissioner of payments : (1) The State Government shall, for the purpose of disbursing the amount payable under Sections 8 and 9, by notification i....
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....se may be, may make a claim to the Commissioner with regard to every payment made by the State Government or the Board after the appointed day for discharging any liability of the legal representatives or heirs or other interested persons in relation to the Palace in respect of any period prior to the appointed day. Every such claim shall have priority in accordance with the priorities attached under this Act to the matters in relation to which such liability has been discharged by the State Government or the Board. (3) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the liabilities of the legal representatives or heirs or other interested persons in relation to the Palace in respect of any transaction prior to the appointed day, which have not been discharged on or before such day shall be the liabilities of legal representatives or heirs or other interested persons, as the case may be." Section 16 reads: "Claims to be made to the Commissioner : Every person having a claim with regard to any of the matters specified in Schedule II in relation to the Palace before the appointed day shall prefer such claim before the Commissioner within thirty days from the appointed day: Pro....
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....Commissioner shall after such investigation as may, in his opinion, be necessary and after giving the claimant a reasonable opportunity of being heard, determine the nature and extent of such claims and by order in writing admit or reject the claim in whole or in part and in determining the nature and extent of the claims of the legal representatives, heirs or other persons, the Commissioner shall take into consideration, the effect of the final order passed in the Writ Petitions pending against the orders of the Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, and the rights of the State Government thereunder. The Commissioner shall also decide any dispute as to the person or persons who are entitled to the amount and any dispute as to who are the legal representatives of any deceased claimant. (5) The Commissioner shall have the power to regulate his own procedure in all matters arising out of the discharge of his functions, and shall, for the purpose of making an investigation under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely: ....
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....and charges paid to or levied by or on behalf of the Board under this Act. iii) all grants and contributions made by the State Government or any other authority; iv) all contribution and donations made by any person; v) sums raised by way of loan by the Board with the previous sanction of the State Government; and vi) any other sums. Section 29 deals with the utilisation of the funds and provides: "The fund may be utilised for all or any of the following purposes, namely: i) maintenance, management and administration of the Palace; ii) laying out and maintenance of public park; iii) preservation of tree growth in the premises of Palace; iv) for development of Botanical Museum and Horticulture garden in the Palace premises; v) for payment of salaries and allowances of the Executive officer and other Officers appointed under Section 24; vi) for any other purpose as may be prescribed. Section 30 deals with audit and Section 31 with budget. Section 32 provides that the provisions of the Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of....
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....d; h) any other matter which is required to be or may be prescribed." Sub-section 3 of Section 38 provides : "Every rule made by the State Government under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be, after it is made, before each House of the State Legislature, while it is in session for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or both Houses agree that the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be, so however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule." Section 40 reads : "Abatement of proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: On and from the appointed day all notifications issued under any of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in respect of the Palace shall stand withdrawn and proceedings if any, taken in pursuance of such notificati....
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....words and figures, "the principles specified in Clause (b) or Clause (c) of Article 39". Article 31-C, as amended reads thus: ""31-C : Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31, and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy: Provided that where such law is made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent."" Section 4 of the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act is beyond the amending power of the Parliament and is void since it damages the basic or essential features of the Constitution and destroys its basic structure by a total exclusion of challenge to any law on the ground that it is . inconsistent w....
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....tion was considered by a 13-Judges' Bench of the Apex Court in keshavananda gharathi's case. Section 2(a) and 2(b) of the Constitution (25th Amendment) Act, 1971 was held to be valid and constitutional by majority judgment of 9 judges. The majority of the Judges also considered the scope of Section 3 of the Constitution (25th Amendment) Act, 1971 and held that the first part of the aforesaid Section was valid and the second part, viz., "and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy , shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy" is invalid. Section 3 of the Amendment Act reads as follows: "After Article 31-B of the Constitution, the following Article shall be inserted, namely: "31-C : Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in Clause (b) or Clause (c) of Article 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31; and no law containing a declaration th....
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....ecause the question as regards the validity of Article 31-C is no longer res Integra. The opening clause of Article 31-C was upheld by the majority in Kesavananda Bharathi AIR1973SC1461 and we do not quite see how the petitioners can be permitted to go behind that decision. The Learned Counsel addressed to us an interesting argument on the principles governing the theory of precedent, and he argued that, in the welter of judgments delivered in Kesavananda Bharathi, it is impossible to discern a ratio because different learned Judges gave different reasons in support of the conclusions to which they came. It is well known that six learned Judges who were in minority in Kesavananda Bharati upheld the first part of Article 31-C, which was a logical and inevitable consequence of their view that there were no inherent or implied limitations on the parliament's power to amend the Constitution. Khanna J. did not subscribe to that view but, all the same, he upheld the first part of Article 31-C for different reasons. The question of validity of the Twenty-fifth Amendment by which the unamended Article 31-C was introduced into the Constitution was specifically raised before the Court an....
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....icle 14 could not be brought in by a side wing. To insist on nexus between the law for which protection is claimed and the principle of Article 39-B was not insist on fulfilment of the requirement of Article 14. It was declared that, "they are different concepts and in certain circumstances, may even run counter to each other. That is why the need for the immunity afforded by Article 31-C. Indeed there are bound to be innumerable cases where the narrower concept of equality before law may frustrate the broader egalitarianism contemplated by Article 39-B." The existence of the words and figures "the principles specified in Clause (b) or Clause (c) of Article 39" was held to be an inseparable part of Article 31-C. 17. While considering some provisions of the Maharashtra Housing and Development Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the Maharashtra Act), the Apex Court in the STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR. v. BASANTIBAI MOHANLAL KHETAN AND ORS. [1986]1SCR707 , dealt with the constitutionality of the Maharasthra Act on the touch stone of Article 31-C in the light of its earlier pronouncements and held: "Even granting for purposes of argument that sub-sections ....
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....1-C, the Court has to satisfy itself about the character of the legislation by studying all parts of it. The question whether an Act is intended to secure the objects contained in Article 39-B or not does not depend upon the declaration by the Legislature but depends on its contents. We have already dealt with the object of the Act, with which we are concerned in this case. In interalia makes provision for acquisition of private lands for providing sites for building houses or housing accommodation to the community. The title to the land of the private holders which are acquired first vests in the State Government. Later on, the land is developed and then distributed amongst the people as house sites. It also provides for reserving land for providing public amenities without which people cannot live there. Community centres, shopping complexes, parks, roads, drains, playgrounds, are all necessary for civic life and these amenities are enjoyed by all. That is also a kind of distribution. In State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy [1978]1SCR641 dealing with the question whether nationalisation of bus transport was covered by Article 39-B, Justice Krishna Iyer has observed thus: &quo....
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.... the offending Statute was enacted for securing the principles specified in Clause (b) or Clause (c) of Article 39, the same shall not be void on the ground of its being inconsistent with, or taking away or abridging any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19. There is no substance in the argument that Article 31-C is unworkable, non-existent and inoperative. The reliance of the Learned Counsel for the petitioners on an order of reference made by two-Bench judgment in PROPERTY OWNERS' ASSOCIATION AND ORS. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. 1992(1)BomCR152 would not change the settled position of law, unless the larger Bench of the Supreme Court takes a contrary view. Even in the Property Owners Association's case cited supra, the two-Bench judgment of the Supreme Court has not taken any contrary view. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties, the Judges forming the Bench formed a tentative opinion and recommended for a reference to a larger Bench with the observations: "Having heard Learned Counsel for sometime, we. have formed the opinion that it would be more appropriate for a Bench of not less than five Judges to consider and decide these ques....
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....-serve the common good, the protective shield sought to be allegedly, wrongly, falsely and malafidely claimed would not be available to save the Act from the challenge on the grounds of violating Articles 14 and 19. 21. The object of Clause (b) and (c) of Article 39 has been declared to be the breaking-up of concentration of wealth and the distribution of material resources with the intention to achieve the building of a Welfare State and an egalitarian Social Order. The provisions have been incorporated ensure "dispensation of social justice and economic justice". H.M. Seervai in Constitutional Law of India referred to the objects sought to be achieved by Articles 38 and 39 and on the basis of various judicial pronouncements observed: "Article 38 provides that the State shall endeavor to promote the welfare of the people by effectively securing and protecting a social order in which social, economic and political justice shall inform all the institutions of national life. This Article gives content to that part of the preamble of our Constitution which refers to social, economic and political justice. Having laid down the principle which should inform all institu....
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....policies which reflect the policy of the State. 23. In Keshavanand Bharati's case (supra) it was observed that the object of the Clauses (b) & (c) of Article 39 was to fix certain social and economic goals for immediate attainment by bringing about a non-violent social revolution to fulfill the basic need of the common man and to change the structure of the society without which political democracy had no meaning. If the impugned statute is found to be aiming at securing any of the objectives mentioned in Article 39(b) & (c) of the Constitution the protective umbrella of Article 31C would shield the such law from the onslaught of the rigour of Articles 14 & 19 of the Constitution. What would be important in this regard is to ascertain as to whether the impugned legislation dealt with the material resources of the community which were intended to be distributed to subserve the common good. 24. Mrs. Chidambaram who led the arguments on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the shield of Article 31C of the Constitution was being used as a sword against her clients. It was submitted that the Palace and the adjoining lands could not be termed to be the material resources of the....
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....., ETC. v. RANGANATHA REDDY AND ANR., etc., etc. [1978]1SCR641 it was defined as: "And material resources of the community in the context of re-ordering the national economy embraces all the national wealth, not merely natural resources, all the private and public sources of meeting material needs, not merely public possessions." In Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co.'s case (supra) the 'material resources' were explained as:- "The next question for consideration is whether the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act is a law directing the policy of the State towards securing "that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good, Coal is, of course, one of the most important known sources of energy, and, therefore, a vital national resource. Shri Sen argued that material resources had first to be acquired by the State before they could be distributed. A law providing for acquisition was not a law for distribution. We are unable to appreciate the submission of Shri Sen." To the same effect is the judgment of the Apex Court in STATE OF TAMIL NADU v. L.ABU KAVUR BAI. [1....
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..... STATE OF GUJARAT and ANR. AIR1995SC142 , the Court deal with its earlier pronouncements with respect to 'resources of the community' and the 'distribution' as contemplated by Article 39(b) of the Constitution and held: "It is, therefore, clear and we so hold that the material resources of community is of wide concept and must be broadly interpreted to bring within its sweep all resources, natural or physical resources, moveable, immovable, corporeal and incorporeal, tangible or intangible properties etc. Private sources or property are part of material resources of the community. All things that produce wealth for the community are material resources. The word "distribution" equally must be construed broadly to include not only allotment of resources to public use but also dispensation of largess 1o the poor to provide access to equal opportunity; In other words it is a broad based concept and it should not be confined within narrow confines. Mines, minerals and quarries embedded in the land are material resources of the community amenable to public use or for distribution." 26. It was argued that the key and genesis of the Article is the &#....
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....ction under Article 31-C or the Act actually had any nexus with those principles. There may not be any dispute to this proposition of law, particularly after the judgment in Kesavananda Bharati's2 case (supra) by which the later part of Article 31-C was held to be invalid. Judicial review has been acknowledged to be the essential feature of the Indian Constitutional system. It is well settled by the Apex Court that when protection of Article 31-C is sought as a shield to a particular statute, the Court examining the constitutionality of the offending enactment is entitled to examine whether the impugned enactment really seeks to give effect to the public policy underlying the Article 39(b) or (c) regardless of any legislation having been made by the legislature which made the enactment. In our country, the rule of law prevails which has been guaranteed by the Constitution. In a State which has a written Constitution and where pattern of government is democratic as we have in our country, the one outstanding feature of it is the supremacy of law in the realm commonly known as rule of law. The term 'rule of law' connotes the undisputed supremacy of law and envisages state....
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.... stated that any decision, whether executive, administrative or judicial or quasi-judicial, is no decision if it cannot be 'just', i.e. an impartial and objective assessment of all the pros and cons of a case, after due hearing of the parties concerned." 28. In the back drop of various pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it has to be ascertained as to whether the impugned statute is entitled to the protective umbrella and the shield provided to it by Article 31C read with 39(b) of the Constitution. If upon analysis it is found that the impugned Act has been enacted in furtherance of the directive principle of the State Policy declared under Article 39(b) the statutes shall be held to be protected for the limited purposes as enshrined in Article 31C but if it is found that the purpose declared in Section 3 of the impugned Act is merely a cloak, such protection may not be granted and the impugned Act, in that event, shall have to be decided on the touch-stone of Articles 14 & 19 of the Constitution. To arrive at the right conclusions the Court shall be entitled to pierce the cloak if needed but would not substitute its opinion for the opinion of the legislature. In oth....
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....a "house" belonging to the reigning monarch as a part of the royal possessions (33 Hen.8, c.12); but in order that it may be exempt from the execution of civil process it must be a house where the monarch is "then demur rant or abiding, in his royal person "(s.1, ibid., A-G v Dakin, L.R.4 H.L.338). When a house has been a royal residence and is kept up as Hampton Court Palace is e.g. is provided out of the civil list with a guard of honour and a chaplain, and the monarch has a pew in its chapel, and the gardens and vineries are kept in order at the royal expense and partly for the royal enjoyment-that is strong evidence that it is still a royal palace, but it is insufficient to constitute it a royal residence, which means a palace to which the monarch "could immediately return and reside in his own person, if he were pleased to do so" (per Ellenborough C.J., Winter v. Miles, 10 East 580);" 30. The castles of the feudal lords and the palaces of the monarchs were alleged to be not made of mud and bricks but raised on the human skeletons and built with their flesh and blood. The palaces were stated to be the by-product of the exploitation of the poo....
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.... be ignored. In the preamble of the Act it is specifically stated that the palace is to be preserved as a monument and the surrounding open space developed to serve public purpose. An exclusive botanical museum, horticultural garden and a tree park is to be developed for the purposes of serving the acutely affected ecological needs of people of Bangalore. The land adjacent to the palace is intended to be used as the lung space and the park areas. The preservation of the palace as a monument, development of the open space into botanical museum, horticulture garden, tree park and preservation of the land as lung space and park areas clearly, unambiguously and categorically lead to the conclusion that the property, the subject matter of the Act, is intended to be distributed by providing an access to the common citizen which would admittedly sub-serve the common good. The definition of Bangalore palace in Section 2(2) of the Act also indicates that the palace is nothing but a material resource of the community which comprises of not only the palace and land but includes the buildings, regalia, paintings, sculptures and other pieces of art. Providing access to the common man to the pal....
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....egarding which a memorandum was issued by the Ministry of States in the year 1949. The list was not exhusitlve, but was drawn up to inform provincial and Union Governments about their status. It contained 34 privileges, which included several exemptions from the operation of the Indian laws, the enjoyment of Jagirs and personal property of the rulers and members of their families, the payment by the states of the marriage expenses of the brothers and sisters of the rulers, immunity from some processes of Courts of law, immunity from requisitioning of the private properties of the rulers and their families, etc. Under Section 6 of the Provincial Constitution Order, 1947, the Maharaja of Mysore executed an Instrument of Accession which was followed by supplementary Instrument of Accession on 23.1.1949. On 25.11.1949, the Maharaja promulgated a proclamation, under which he surrendered his sovereign powers and accepted the Constitution of India by adopting it for the State of Mysore. After this proclamation, the Government of India entered into an agreement with the Maharaja on 23.1.1950. This agreement has been termed to be a Quid Pro Quo being in the nature of consideration for the s....
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.... an Act of the State Legislature. 34. In order to properly adjudicate this plea, it is necessary to have a bird's eye view of the development of the Constitution of India in the present form. The evolutionary process initiated on 26th of January, 1950 has been continued by various amendments made from time to time. The Constitution of a developing country cannot remain stagnant. The Constitutional law has to develop according to the needs of the Society and the mandate of the people. The various amendments made in the Constitution include the 42nd amendment, by which a revolutionary change by legislative means was made in the preamble of the Constitution, declaring that India was to be a Socialist Republic, besides being a secular, sovereign and a democratic Republic. Socialism has not been defined in the Constitution, but is commonly understood to mean, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need". Even if such a definition is not accepted, it can safely be said that by introduction of the word socialism in the preamble of the Constitution the Union Parliament aimed at to eliminate inequality of income and status and standards of life with the....
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....ather will enter the portals of higher education and contribute to national wastage. After the education is completed, socialism aims at equality in pursuit of excellence in the chosen avocation without let or hindrance of caste, colour, sex or religion and with full opportunity to reach the top not thwarted by any considerations of status, social or otherwise. But even here the less equipped person shall be assured a decent minimum standard of life and exploitation in any form shall be eschewed. There will be equitable distribution of national cake and the worst off shall be treated in such a manner as to push them up the ladder. Then comes the old age in the life of every one, be he a monarch or a mahatma, a worker or a pariah. The old age overtakes each one, death being the fulfilment of life providing freedom from bondage. But here socialism aims at providing an economic security to those who have rendered unto society what they were capable of doing when they were fully equipped with their mental and physical prowess. In the fall of life the State shall ensure to the citizens a reasonably decent standard of life, medical aid, freedom from want, freedom from fear and the enjoya....
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.... of the Constitution it is that we seek to interpret, whatever statute it is whose constitutional validity is sought to be questioned, we must strive to give such an interpretation as will promote the march and progress towards a Socialistic Democratic State." 39. All the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners have heavily relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in MADHAVA RAO SINDIA v. UNION OF INDIA [1971]3SCR9 , the case which is popularly known as, "the first privy purses abolition case". In that case, as per majority, it was held that the recognition of the status of the rulers and their rights was not a temporary measure and was not liable to be varied or repudiated in accordance with "state policy". The agreements were held to have been recognised and were not political agreements, which could be set at naught by a unilateral act of the Union of India. By the merger agreements, the princes had seized to retain any vestige of sovereign rights or authority quo their former status. The plea of the Union of India that the dispute in respect of the right to privy purses under Article 222(1) of the Constitution was born under Article 363 of the ....
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.... India on the basis of merger agreement and in lieu thereof, was promised to be paid the privy purse and assured of the protection of his properties. The 26th Amendment Act was termed to be, "an ugly epitome of immorality perpetuated by the Indian Parliament." It was stated to be an unholy assault on the spirit which was impermissible, being against the principle of justice, fairness and reasonableness. The repealed Articles were stated to be integral part of the Constitutional scheme as their underlying purpose was claimed to be to facilitate stabilisation of the new order and ensure organic unity of India. The deletion of Article 291 was stated to be amounting to a gross breach of the principle of political justice enshrined in the preamble to the Constitution. The privy purses and other privileges were claimed to have been conferred upon the former rulers as consideration for surrendering all their sovereign rights and contributing to the unity and integrity of the country. It was further submitted that but for the co-operation of the rulers, Bharath would have been fundamentally different from the Bharath that came into being on account of accession and merger of the ....
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....ogic in such a submission. No principle of justice, either economic, political or social is violated by the Twenty-sixth Amendment. Political justice relates to the principle of rights of the people, i.e., right to universal suffrage, right to democratic form of Government and right to participation in political affairs. Economic justice is enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution. Social justice is enshrined in Article 38. Both are in the Directive Principles of the Constitution. None of these rights are abridged or modified by this Amendment. We feel that this contention need not detain us any more, and, therefore, we shall pass on to the next point in debate." 42. Referring to the plea that the ground of privy purses and the privileges was a just quid pro quo of the rulers of the Indian states for surrendering their sovereignty and rights over their territories, the Court declared : "This argument based on the ground of breaking of solemn pledges and breach of promise cannot stand much scrutiny. To say that without voluntary accession, India, i.e. Bharat would be fundamentally different from that Bharat that came into being prior to the accession is untenable muc....
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.... , on consideration of their past position. Hence there is no question of breaking of solemn pledges or breach of promises etc. given to the Rulers. Therefore, the repudiation of the same cannot be said to have amounted to any breach of those guarantees and promises resulting in alteration of the basic structure of the Constitution. 43. Dealing with the other submissions made on behalf of the petitioners, as noted earlier herein, the Court held: "As regards the submission that the amendment is an ugly epitome of immorality perpetrated by the Indian Parliament, it has been seriously opposed by the learned Attorney General that this argument based on immorality has only to be stated to be rejected and that it is an elementary principle of jurisprudence that a law cannot be interpreted on the basis of moral principles. In this connection, reference may be made to the following passage in. Dias's Jurisprudence, Fifth Edition, at pages 355 and 356. It reads thus: "As a positivist, Prof. Hart excludes morality from the concept of law, for he says that the positivists are concerned to promote 'clarity and honesty in the formulation of the theoretical and moral issue....
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....ividual, as it were, by the hand through all the details of his life, all his relations with his fellows. Legislation cannot do this; and, if it could, it ought not to exercise a continual interference and dictation over the conduct of men. Morality commands each individual to do all that is advantageous to the community, his own personal advantage included. But there are many acts useful to the community which legislation ought not to command. There are also many injurious actions which it ought not to forbid, although" morality does so. In a word legislation has the same center with morals, but it has not the same circumference."Reference may also be made to Krishna Kumar v. Union of India (1991)ILLJ191SC . The above passages remind us of the distinction between law and morality and the line of demarcation which separate morals from legislation. The sum and substance of it is that a moral obligation cannot be converted into a legal obligation. In the light of the above principle, the Attorney General is right in saying that Courts are seldom concerned with the morality which is the concern of the law makers. According to him, there is no unreasonableness, unfairne....
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....expressed to be made and executed in the name of the President or the Governor, or such person specially authorised in that behalf and in the manner specifically prescribed. In the absence of a valid contract, there is no corresponding obligation of its enforcement by or against the Government, except by way of a suit. Article 299 would not be applicable to contracts executed in exercise of statutory powers. Strictly speaking, the agreements executed between the former ruler and the Domination of India cannot be termed to be contracts for the purposes of Article 299. Assuming, but not holding that such agreements amounted to contracts, the violation of the terms of such contract may be enforced by way of suit or claim of damages in accordance with law. The fetter of limitation upon the plenary powers of legislation within the ambit of the legislative heads specified in the VII Schedule of the Constitution could only be imposed by the Constitution itself and not by any obligation which had been undertaken by either the Domination Government or the Provincial or a State Government. Powers conferred upon the State Legislature under Article 226 cannot be subjected to any alleged contra....
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....etters or limitations on this power, e.g. in Article 303 or Article 286(2). But unless and until the Court came to the conclusion that the Constitution itself had expressly prohibited legislation on the subject either absolutely or conditionally the power of the State Legislature to enact legislation within its legislative competence was plenary. Once the topic of legislation was comprised within any of the entries in the Lists 2 and 3 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution the fetter or limitation on such-legislative power had to be found within the Constitution itself and if there was no such fetter or limitation to be found there, the State Legislature had full competence to enact the impugned Act no matter whether such enactment was contrary to the guarantee given, or the obligation undertaken by the Dominion Government or the Province of Bombay or even the State of Bombay. The Petitioners would have a legitimate grievance in the matter of the deprivation of their rights of ownership of the jagir lands in so far as the States and their subjects were discriminated against, but they would not be able to have their grievance redressed by this Court for the simple reason tha....
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....at it was in contravention of the guarantee given in Clause 5 of the letters of guarantee. But that position is of no avail to the petitioners." 46. There is yet another aspect of the matter which is required to be taken note of and that is the bar of interference by Courts in disputes arising out of the treaties and agreements entered into or executed before the commencement of the Constitution by any ruler or against an Indian State to which the Government of the Dominion of India or any of its predecessor Government was a party and which is or has been continued in operation after its commencement. The Supreme Court considered the scope of Article 363(1) in the case of STATE OF SERAIKELLA v. UNION OF INDIA [1951]2SCR474 (C) and held: "The plaintiff contends firstly that it had signed the Instrument of Accession through its Ruler. The State next complains that, acting beyond the powers given over under the Instrument of Accession, the Dominion of India and the State of Bihar are making laws which they have no power to make, having regard to the Instrument of Accession, and are wrongfully interfering with the administration of the State beyond the rights given to them....
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....t of exercise of the legislative power in terms of entry 42 of List-Ill of the VII Schedule. It is submitted that a perusal of preamble of the Act would clearly and unambiguously lead to the conclusion that the impugned Act was legislation with respect to a matter covered by entry 18 of List-II of the VII Schedule regarding which the legislative powers had been absolutely surrendered by the State Assembly along with some other States of the Country. It is contended that even if the Act was covered by entry 42 of List-Ill, the same was liable to be quashed to the extent of inconsistency. Inconsistency is alleged to be writ large in the whole of the enactment rendering it to be declared unconstitutional and beyond the competence of the State Legislature. 49. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the parties it is relevant to have a reference to various provisions of the constitution applicable in the case. Part-XI of the Constitution governs the relations between the Union and the States and Chapter-1 thereof deals with the legislative relations. The scheme of the Constitution shows that there is a three-fold distribution of legislative powers between Union and the States mad....
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....nt to legislate two or more States by consent and adoption of such legislation by any other State:- (1) If it appears to the Legislatures of two or more States to be desirable that any of the matters with respect to which the Parliament has no power to make laws for the States except as provided in Articles 249 and 250 should be regulated in such States by Parliament by law, and if resolutions to that effect are passed by all the Houses of the Legislatures of those States, it shall be lawful for Parliament to pass an Act for regulating that matter accordingly, and any Act so passed shall apply to such States and to any other State by which it is adopted afterwards by resolution passed in that behalf by the House or, where there are two Houses, by each of the Houses of the Legislature of that State. (2) Any Act so passed by Parliament may be amended or repealed by an Act or Parliament passed or adopted in like manner but shall not, as respects any State to which it applies, be amended or repealed by an Act of the Legislature of that State. Article 254: Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States: (1) If any provisions of a law made....
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.... by the Parliament by Law. Now therefore in pursuance of Clause (i) of Article 252 of the Constitution this assembly hereby resolves that the imposition of a ceiling on Urban Immovable property and acquisition of such property in excess of a ceiling in all matters connected thereto, or ancillary and incidental thereto should be regulated in the State of Karnataka by Parliament by law." 52. It is acknowledged position of law that the State Legislature have plenary powers of legislation within the field of legislature entrusted to it but subject to certain Constitutional restrictions as specified in part-XI of the Constitution. In the exercise of such a power it will be competent of the Legislature to enact a law which is either prospective or retrospective. Within the frame work or Article 246 the Parliament and State Legislature have respectively exclusive powers to make laws with respect to any matters enumerated in the list in the VII Schedule for which specific provision is made under Part-XI of the Constitution. When a question is raised as to whether a State Legislature was competent to enact a law, the Court is required to find-out whether the topic of legislation is co....
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....S JETHABHAI AND ANR. [1951]2SCR51 , the Apex Court in this case held: "...............it would be useful to notice sorrier of the well settled rules of interpretation laid down by the Federal Court and this Court in the matter of construing the entries. The power to legislate is given to the appropriate Legislatures by Article 246 of the Constitution. The entries in the three Lists are only Legislative heads or fields of legislation they demarcate the area over which the appropriate Legislatures can operate. It is also well settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of the entries. But some of the entries in the different Lists or in the same Lists may overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other, it is then the duty of this Court to reconcile the entries and bring about harmony between them. When the question arose about reconciling entry 45 of List I, duties of excise, and entry 18 of List II, taxes on the sale of goods, of the Government of India Act, 1935, Gwyer, C.J., in Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Sprit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, In the matter of MANU/FE/0001/1938MANU/FE/0001/1938, observed: ....
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....m one of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935 must be understood in a restricted sense excluding from their scope "jurisdiction and powers of Courts" specifically dealt with in item 2 of List II. In the words of the learned Judge, if such a construction was not given "the wider construction of entry 1 would deprive entry 2 of all its content and reduce it to useless lumber." This rule of construction has not been dissented from in any of the subsequent decisions of this Court, It may, therefore, be "taken as a well settled rule of construction that every attempt should be made to harmonize the apparently conflicting entries not only of different Lists but also of the same List and to reject that construction which will rob one of the entries of its entire content and make it nugatory". 54. In STATE OF BIHAR v. SIR KAMESHWAR SINGH MANU/SC/0103/1959MANU/SC/0103/1959 : [1959]37ITR388(SC) the Apex Court held that the entries in the Lists I, II and III were designed to define and delimit the respective areas of the Legislative competence of the Legislatures and do not impose any implied restriction on the legislative power c....
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....on of the respective legislatures and made the observations noted herein under: "There are numerous decisions of the Privy Council, the Federal Court and the Supreme Court in support of the proposition that the pith and substance of the Act has to be looked into and an incidental trespass would not invalidate the law, vide for example Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna and Advocate General of Bengal 1947 FCR 28: (AIR 1947 PC60) Kerala State Electricity Board v. Indian Aluminum Co [1976]1SCR552 The earlier case of this Court reported in A.S. Krishna v. State of Madras, 1957CriLJ409 Almost a direct decision on this point is to be found in an unreported decision of this Court in S.K. Pasari v. Abdul Ghafoor, Civil Appeal No. 306 of 1964, D/-4.5.1964(SC). The question for consideration in that case was whether the State Government had power under Section 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act as introduced by the Bihar Amendment to deal with a revision in relation to an Inter-State permit. The High Court had taken the view that it had no such power, as, such a provision falls within Item 42 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, namely, Inter-State ....
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....oresaid to the facts and the provisions of the Act. It is not an Act which deals with any Inter-State trade of commerce. Even assuming for the sake of argument that carriage of passengers from one State to the other in one sense a part of the inter-State trade and commerce, the impugned Act is not one which seeks to legislate in regard to the said topic. Primarily and almost wholly it is an Act to provide for the acquisition of contract carriages, the Inter-State permits and other properties situated in the State of Karnataka. In pith and substance it is an Act of that kind. The incidental encroachment on the topic of Inter-State trade and commerce, even assuming there is some, cannot invalidate the Act. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was enacted under Entry 20 of List III of Schedule Seven of the Government of India Act, 1935 corresponding to Entry 35 of List HI of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The subject being in the Concurrent List and the Act having received the assent of the President, even the repugnancy, if any, between the Act and the Motor Vehicles Act stands cured and cannot be a ground to invalidate the Act. Entry 42 of List III deals with acquisition of prope....
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....in terms of Article 252(1) of the Constitution, in view of the provisions of Article 246(2) of the Constitution which otherwise authorise the Union Parliament to make law with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List-Ill in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. In that event the law made by the Parliament was to prevail and the law made by the State Legislature had to yield under Article 254 of the Constitution. It is therefore crystal-clear that what the State Legislature had intended to surrender in favour of the Union Parliament was with respect to the subject covered by Entry 18 of the II List and not by Entry 42 of the III List. The law made by the Legislature in pursuance to Entry-42 of List III of the Constitution would be valid unless it is shown to be inconsistent with any such law made by the Union Parliament. The reliance of the petitioners on this Judgment is therefore of no help to them. Similarly, the reliance of the Learned Counsel for the petitioners on MAHARAO SAHEB SHRi BHIM SINGHJI, ANANTALAKSHMI PATHABI-RAMASHARMA YETHURI AND ORS.; ETC., ETC., V. UNION OF INDIA, AIR 1981 SC 234 , is of no help to them in as much as in that case the Court examined the....
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....e tenant is a law regulating the imposition of ceiling on land holding. Equally it cannot be said that the pith and substance of the law imposing the ceiling on land holding covers the subject of conferring ownership of land on the tenant. There are two distinct powers and therefore the law-making competence can be in two different legislative bodies. Consequently it is difficult to hold that the provisions of Chapter III of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act are outside the legislative competence of the State Legislature. In Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal this Court observed as under: "The entries in the three Lists are only legislative heads or fields of legislation; they demarcate the area over which the appropriate Legislatures can operate, it is. also well settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of the entries. But some of the entries in the different Lists or in the same Lists may overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other. It is then the duty of this Court to reconcile the entries and bring about harmony between them" 8. It is well settled that the legislative power of the ....
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.... the Entry of the State List was subject to the Entry of Union List and it was open for the parliament to declare that it was expedient in the public interest that the control should vest in the Central Government. It was for the Parliament to determine the extent of the declaration which was to be commensurate with the public interest. Once such a declaration was made and the extent specified, the subject of legislation to the extent laid down came within the exclusive subject for legislation by the Parliament and any legislation made by the State after such declaration which trenched upon the field disclosed in the declaration was to be held unconstitutional because the field was held to have been abstracted from the legislative competence of the State Legislature. In the instant case there is no such conflict between the field of legislations covered by List I and II of the VII Schedule. The effect of the State legislation will have to be examined in the light of the provisions of Articles 246, and 252 r/w 254. 60. The mere fact that the Urban Land Ceiling Act and the impugned Act deal with the lands and buildings cannot be made a basis to urge that there existed a conflict and....
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....urrender is made, the State Legislature cannot deal with that field of legislation would amount to holding that the Constitution of India can be amended by a resolution of the State Assembly without recourse to the provisions of Article 368 of the Constitution. No State Legislature has the power to amend the Constitution by surrendering or usurping the power of legislature. The effect of the surrender of the legislative power in favour of the Parliament would be that a law made by the Parliament pursuant to such surrender would prevail over a State Law and the provisions of the State Law to the extent of the repugnancy would be void. Though Article 254 may not be applicable to a Law made by the Parliament under Article 252, yet the principle underlying Article 254 would be applicable, by reason of the words, "any such Act so passed shall apply to such State" in Article 252(1) and the bar of its amendment are repelled by any State Legislature under Article 252(2). Dealing with such a situation a Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh in TUMATI RANGAYYA ETC. v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS. AIR1978AP106 , held: "If Article 254 does not apply, we must look to Article 252....
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....es by construing them so as to avoid them being repugnant to each other. While considering the extent of repugnancy provisions of Clause 2 of Article 254 has to be kept in mind. If the President assents to a State law, it will prevail notwithstanding repugnancy to an earlier law of the Union on a subject covered by the Concurrent List, as was held by the Apex Court in U.P. ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. LTD. (In Voluntary liquidation) v. R.K. SHUKLA AND ORS (1969)IILLJ728SC . In that case while determining Section 6-R (2) of U.P. Act 1 of 1957 it was held that as the Act had received the assent of the President, the said Section was to prevail over Section 25-J(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 by virtue of Article 254(2) of the Constitution. The provisions were held applicable in determining the rights and obligations of the parties in respect of retrenchment compensation. We are of the firm belief that the field of legislation covered by the Act pertains to a matter regarding which no resolution was passed in terms of Article 252 of the Constitution. As the Act deals with a distinct field of legislation, there is no question of looking at the alleged repugnancy or overlapping, as argu....
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....ed to be served on the person concerned together with a notice stating that any objection to the draft statement be preferred within thirty days of the service thereof. The competent authority thereafter has to consider the objections received within the time specified and after giving the object or a reasonable opportunity of being heard, should pass such orders as it may deem fit. As soon as may be after the service of the final statement on the person concerned, the competent authority is required to cause a notification giving the particulars of the vacant land held by him in excess of the ceiling limit, to be published for the information of the general public in the official gazette of the State concerned. After considering the claims of the persons interested in the vacant land, the competent authority is required to determine the nature and extent of such claims and pass such orders as it deems fit. Under Section 11, payment of the amount for vacant land acquired has to be made to the person or persons having interest in the land, which is deemed to have been acquired in terms of Section 11 of the Act. Under Section 12, the constitution of the Urban Land Tribunal for the pu....
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....e by the State Legislature deals with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list and contains some provisions which are repugnant to the provisions of the law made by the Parliament, the Act Would not be held unconstitutional on that account, in view of the fact that it was reserved for consideration of the President and has received his assent. Article 254(2) of the Constitution provides: "Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State: Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State." Article 254(1) is subject to the provisions of Clause (2) and if a statute passed the test of Clause (2),....
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....he State Act is concerned, it will prevail in the State and overrule the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. Such a state of affairs will exist only until Parliament may at any time make a law adding to, or amending, varying or repealing the law made by the State Legislature under the proviso to Article 254." 65. The obtaining of the President's asset to the State law cures the repugnancy of the State law with reference to an earlier Central law. In order to satisfy ourselves, we have also perused the records shown by the Advocate General, from which it transpired that the Presidential assent in terms of proviso to Clause (2) to Article 254 had been obtained. The records reveal that after the Bangalore Palace (Acquisition and Transfer) Ordinance, 1992 was approved by the Cabinet, it was sent to the Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi on 13.5.1992 to obtain the previous instructions of the President. When the matter was under consideration, in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Sri Srikantadatta Wadeyar, one of the petitioners, made a representation to the President of India to withhold the consideration of the proposed Ordinance on several g....
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....tters specified in Schedule II in relation to the Palace is entitled to prefer claim before the Commissioner, within the time specified and under Section 17, such claims made shall have priority in accordance with the principles enumerated under Section 17. Schedule II of the Act specifies the categories to whom claims are to be paid in order of the priorities specified therein. It is contended that after payment of the claims of such authorities and the institutions, no amount would be left payable to the petitioners, which means that they will be deprived of the property without payment of any compensation. 68. Prior to the insertion of Article 300-A, the right to property of a citizen was guaranteed by Article 31, which was included in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31 essentially comprised of two parts. While Clause (1) dealt with the guarantee of the right of property save by authority of law, Clause (2) dealt with compulsory acquisition of the property. Vide Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978, Article 31 was omitted. Clause (1) of the said Article was taken away from the Chapter of the Part III of the Constitution and inserted a Article 300-A in Chapter VI. Claus....
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....elevant notification published in the official gazette is sine qua non. The State when exercise the power of eminent domain under Article 300-A and acquires or requisition or taken possession of the property of a citizen to give effect to any of the directive principles envisaged in Part IV of the Constitution the question emerges whether the same yardstick of payment of just equivalent or indemnification to the owner of the property expropriated should be applicable or Article 300A per force brings it in operation? Since Article 30(2) itself provided payment of compensation, when property was acquired preceding 25th Constitution Amendment Act, 1971, this Court interpreted the word "compensation" as aforesaid, but when Article 30(2) itself was omitted from the Constitution, the question arises whether payment of compensation is a sine qua non for deprivation of property under Article 300A? In any democracy governed by rule of law, Constitution is the Supreme Law of the land. Rescore Pound, a sociological jurist whose writings have virtually opened new vistas in the sphere of justice, stated that 'the justice meant not as an individual or ideal relations among men but ....
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....ted. However, fixation of the amount or specification of the principles and the manner in which the amount is to be determined must be relevant to the fixation of amount. The amount determined need not bear reasonable relationship. In other words, it is not illusory. The adequacy of the resultant amount cannot be questioned in a court of law. However, the validity of irrelevant principles are amenable to judicial scrutiny." 69. Even prior to the 44th Amendment, the Apex Court in B.SHANKARA RAO. v. STATE OF MYSORE [1969]3SCR1 held that under the common law of eminent domain as recognised in Anglo Saxon jurisprudence the State cannot take the property of its subject unless such property is required for a public purpose and without compensating the owner for its loss. But in view of the limitations provided for under Article 31(2) enacting that no law shall be made which takes away or abridges these safeguards, and any such law, if made, shall be void, there can be no room for implication and the words "acquisition of property" are required to be understood in their natural sense of the act of acquiring property, without importing into the phrase an obligation to pay c....
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....change being dependent, in some degree, upon trial and error, should not be substituted. The community's economic burden for social and economic reforms being the ethos of the Constitution be kept in mind while dealing with the legislation enacted for the purposes of achieving the objects of Article 39(b) with the protective umbrella of Article 31-C. Basu, in his "Shorter Constitution of India' (12th Edition) states, "After the amendments made by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978, nobody shall have any right to compensation under the Constitution, unless the law which expropriates his. property offers any compensation." This view was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar's case supra. Basu further states: "We have, therefore, to examine whether the condition to pay compensation inherent in the doctrine of Eminent Domain, can be imported into Entry 42 even after the vortex of constitutional amendments which have taken place since that Doctrine had been applied in Kameswar's case. But before that, we should realise that this present argument involves a patent legal fallacy : It assumes that the extra-constitutional principle o....
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...., which have been specifically denied, cannot be made the basis for determining as to whether the compensation directed to be paid was illusory or not. At the cost of repetition, it is stated that because the Legislature, in its wisdom, has determined the compensation at an amount of Rs. Eleven crores, we are not in a position to substitute our opinion for the wisdom of the Legislature. It is presumed that the Legislature must have had some material evidence before it to come to the conclusion regarding the amount of compensation. The mere escalation of the prices of the properties in recent times cannot be made a basis for ascertaining the market value as stated by the petitioners. Keeping in view the purpose and object for which the Palace and the lands surrounding it are being acquired, the recourse to the provisions of Article 39(b) and Article 31-C and the deliberated efforts of the Legislature, we are satisfied that the Act cannot be quashed on the alleged ground that some sums of money are liable to be paid out of the compensation amount to the persons and authorities mentioned in Schedule II of the Act, would not be sufficient to conclude that the petitioners have been depr....
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.... of persons or things upon which such laws are to operate. Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment does not, perse, amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. In order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions are required to be fulfilled, viz., (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others who are left out of the group; and (2) that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. So long as the classification is shown to be based on a rational basis and all persons falling under the same class are treated alike, there can be no question of violating the equality clause. The Supreme Court in JYOTI PERSHAD and ORS. v. ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE UNION TERRITORY OF DELHI AND ORS. [1962]2SCR125 held that a statute or rule made thereunder applying in equally to persons or things similarly situated would be a direct violation of Article 14. A classification may be reasonable, even though a single individual is treated as a class by himself, provided there are special circumstances....
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....plicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself; (b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles; (c) that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds; (d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest; (e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality, the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; and (f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a Legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances br....
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.... matters of common knowledge. In such a case, the Court will strike down the law as an instance of naked discrimination, as it did in Amirunnisa Begum v. Mahboob Begum, [1953]4SCR404 (K) and Ramprasad Narain Sahi v. State of Bihar, [1953]4SCR1129 (L). A statute may not make any classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions but may leave it to the discretion of Government to select and classify persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply, In determining the question of the validity or otherwise of such a statute, the Court will not strike down the law out of hand only because no classification appears on its face or because a discretion is given to the Government to make the selection or classification but will go on to examine and assertion if the statute has laid down any principle or policy for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of the selection or classification. After such scrutiny, the Court will strike down the statute if it does not lay down any principle or policy for guiding the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of selection or classification, on the ground that th....
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....LOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE, PATNA ETC. v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. [1988]3SCR311 the Supreme Court reiterated the legal position and held : "Much reliance has been placed by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner on the decision of this Court in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar, [1959]1SCR279 . In that case, the Central Government in exercise of its power under Section 3 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952, issued a notification dated December 11, 1956 appointing a Commission of Enquiry to enquire into and report in respect of certain companies mentioned in the schedule attached to the notification and in respect of the nature and extent of the control and interest which certain persons named in the notification exercised over these companies. Das, C.J., speaking for the Court, observed that it was not established that the petitioners and their companies had been arbitrarily singled out for the purpose of hostile and discriminatory treatment and subjected to a harassing and oppressive enquiry. It was further observed that nowhere in the petitions was there even an averment that there were other persons or companies similarly situated as the petitioner....
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....S. v. STATE OF MADRAS AND ORS. [1969]1SCR90 is misplaced. REG. MALAFIDES : 77. Relying upon Dr. K.R. LAKSHMANAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 1996CriLJ1635 Learned Counsel for the petitioners have submitted that the Act being the result of colourable exercise of power, the Court can ascertain the legality of the action and that mere reference to the provisions of Article 31-C would not deprive the Court from lifting the veil to see the real intention. It is contended that the persistent efforts made by the State to take possession of the property leads to then conclusion that the action of the respondents was malafide and on that ground as well, the Act was liable to be quashed. This argument is also without any substance, inasmuch as the allegations of alleged malafides are vague and ambiguous and do not refer to any specific instance. It also does not refer to the cause of alleged colourable exercise of power and jurisdiction against the petitioners. In order to succeed on the ground of malafides, a petitioner is required to place before the Court circumstances, which, if not controverted, would lead to the conclusion that the action taken was not in public interest, but was for extra....
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....The Club was found to be not owning or controlling any material resources of the community, which were to be distributed in terms of Article 39(b) of the Constitution. In that case, the Court found : "Horse racing is a game of skill, the horse which wins the race is given a prize by the Club. It is a simple game of horse racing where the winning horses are given prizes. Neither the "material resources of the community" nor "to subserve the common good" has any relevance to the twin functioning of the Club. Similarly, the operation of the Club has no relation or effect on the "operation of the economic system". There is no question whatsoever of attracting the directive principles contained in Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. The declaration in Section 2 of the Act and the recital containing aims and objectives totally betray the scope and purpose of Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. While Article 39(b) refers to "material resources of the community", the aims and objects of the Act refer to the "material resources of the Madras Race Club". It is difficult to understand what exactly are the material resource....
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....in the State, there was every likelihood of the same being used malafidely and with ulterior purposes. It is submitted that the delegation of the powers is excessive and its exercise has been the result of extraneous considerations. It is alleged that the date has been appointed with retrospective effect, which was not warranted under the law. The vesting of the property within the meaning of Section 4 of the Act is only for the purposes of executing the scheme of the Act and not with a view to clothing it with any extra-ordinary power, the exercise of which could be termed to be malafide. The term "vesting" has a variety of meanings, which have to be gathered from the context in which it is used. It may mean full, ownership or only possession for a particular purpose or clothing the authority with power to deal with the property as the agent of another person or authority: The vesting does not necessarily mean the passing over of the ownership. The Supreme Court in THE FRUIT and VEGETABLE MERCHANTS UNION v. THE DELHI IMPROVEMENT TRUST [1957]1SCR1 held : "That the word "vest" is a word of variable import is shown by provisions of India statutes also. For ....
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....elegated legislation, and that such legislation is valid." "After referring to the observation of Lord Selborne in her Majesty, the Queen v. Buran 1877 8 IA 178 Venkatarama Ayyar, J. concluded thus: "This is clear authority that a provision in a statute conferring a power on an outside authority to bring it into force at such time as it might, in its own discretion, determine, is conditional and not delegated legislation, and that it will be valid, unless there is in the Constitution Act any limitation on its power to enact such a legislation." 83. The Supreme Court, in ORIENT PAPER AND INDUSTRIES LIMITED and ANR. ETC. v. STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS. AIR 1991 SC 672 again considered this aspect of the matter and held : "We may, in this connection, set out the words of Lord Selborne in Her Majesty the Queen v. Burah (1877)5 IA 178 to which Venkatarama Ayyar J. referred : "The Legislature determined that, so far, a certain change to take place; but that it was expedient to leave the time, and the manner, of carrying it into effect to the discretion of the Lieutenant Governor... the proper Legislature has exercised its judgment as to place, person, law....
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....eclares for the abatement of the proceedings pending under the Land Acquisition Act, the same was liable to be quashed, being an interference with the judicial process, particularly when the varies proceedings are pending in this Court. The argument is also without any legal substance, inasmuch as it is acknowledge that the Legislature is competent to put an end to the finality of a judicial decision and pass a validating Act to declare to be valid, a law which has been pronounced to be void by the Court. The Supreme Court, in I.N. SAKSENA v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AIR 1976 6C 2250, referred to the distinction between a "legislative" Act and a "judicial" Act and held that in some specific cases, the line which separates the two categories may not be easily discernible. Adjudication of the rights of the parties according to law enacted by the Legislature is a judicial function in the performance of which, the Court interprets and gives effect to the intent and mandate of the Legislature as embodied in the statute. It is, however, for the Legislature to lay down the law, prescribing norms of conduct which will govern the parties and transactions and require the C....
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....visions of Part III of the Constitution." The Legislature, however, cannot declare any pending judicial proceedings to be invalid or directly over-rule a judicial decision. It can only render ineffective the judgment of a competent Court by changing the basis of legislative enactment upon which that judgment had been founded. If, without altering the legal basis of the pronounced judgment of a Court of law, the Legislature only declares the earlier judicial decision as invalid or not binding, it would be unconstitutional. The Legislature cannot encroach upon the judicial powers of the Court to adjudicate future disputes relating to any subject. In the instant case, it is found that the Act passed by the said Legislature is within the legislative competence in terms of Article 246 of the Constitution, not any particular defect which the Court had found in relation to the petitioners has been removed and the Act is not inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. No right of the petitioners, which was allegedly adjudicated in their favour is intended to be taken away by the Act. All the authorities have so far decided the cases against the petitioners. The....
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..... The late Maharaja is stated to have handed over 110 acres of the Palace land to the petitioner-Company on 30.11.1970. In 1974, Sri S.D.N.R. Wadeyar, the son of late Maharaja filed a suit in O.S. No. 145/1974, questioning the above arrangement. The late Maharaja died on 23.9.1974 and after his death, a settlement was arrived at between the parties to the suit, which was withdrawn on 30.1.1979. Despite the settlement, differences again arose between the two families which were settled vide another settlement arrived at on 29.1.1982. Two company petitions filed by Sri S.D.N.R. Wadeyar against the petitioner-Company were dismissed on 20.4.1989, against the Original Side Appeal No. 10 to 13 of 1989 were filed in this Court. At the stage of final hearing of the appeals, the parties again agreed to give effect to the settlement arrived at between them on 29.1.1982 with some modified terms. The application in terms of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed on 19.5.1994. The Division Bench made an order on 6.6.1994 that the compromise be recorded. The parties thereafter filed a joint memo, reporting compliance. Under the compromise, the Chamaraju group was separated from....
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....ing an order of compulsory purchase of the property under the Income Tax Act and that reasons recorded in the order would not be substituted of the opportunity of being heard. Keeping in view the revision of Section 269-UD(1) of the Income Tax Act, the Court found that in a case where a presumption of an attempt to evade tax may be raised by the appropriate authority concerned, such a presumption should not be drawn. The very fact that an imputation of tax evasion arises where an order of compulsory purchase is made and such an imputation casts a slur on the parties to the agreement to sell lead to the conclusions that before such an imputation can be made against the parties concerned, they must be given an opportunity to show cause that the undervaluation in the agreement for sale was not with a view to evade tax. The observance of principles of natural justice was held to be the pragmatic requirement of fair play in action. The Court, while dealing with the relevant section of the Act, held : "Section 269-UD, in express terminology, provides that the appropriate authority may make an order for the purchase of the property "for reasons to be recorded in writing".....