TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2018 (9) TMI 455
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....as made under the provisions of the said Act. Chapter II of the Act deals with the establishment of Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal. The provisions relevant for our purposes are Sections 3 to 6. Section 3 deals with establishment of the Tribunal by the Central Government to be known as the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Section 4 talks of composition of the Tribunal. Section 5 deals with the qualifications for appointment as Presiding Officers. Once appointed, the term of office of a Presiding Officer is stipulated in Section 6. There have been amendments to the various provisions of this Act in the year 2016. Also, the Act which was earlier known as the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 is given a new nomenclature and is now known as the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 by the Finance Act, 2017. Unamended Sections 3 to 6 were as under: "3. Establishment of Tribunal.-(1) The Central Government shall, by notification, establish one or more Tribunals, to be known as the Debts Recovery Tribunal, to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on such Tribunal by or under this Act. (2) The Central Government shall also specify, in....
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....apter VI of the Finance Act, 2017, shall continue to be governed by the provisions of this Act, and the rules made thereunder as if the provisions of section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017 had not come into force." Some other provisions are also amended, but those are not relevant for the purposes of these cases. 4) All the petitioners were appointed before the amendment to Section 6. Thus, at the time of their appointment, the term of their office was "five years or till attaining the age of 62 years, whichever is earlier". These officers have not completed five years of service. However, they are completing/or have attained 62 years of age after coming into force amended Section 6. In the aforesaid backdrop, the question that arises for consideration in these petitions is as to whether the petitioners are entitled to complete the term of five years taking advantage of the amended provision which gives such Presiding Officers to continue until attaining the age of 65 years or to continue till they reach the age of 65 years, whichever is earlier. 5) For the sake of convenience, we may give particulars in respect of Transfer Case (Civil) No. 301 of 2017 and, at the same time, take....
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....bunal having regrd to the enhanced age of retirement, in his writ petition. 28.02.2017 By way of an interim order, the Madras High Court stays the release of R. Ravindra Bose, Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal-II, Chennai having regrd to the enhanced age of retirement. 04.10.2017 The Union of India filed five transfer petitions qua the aforementioned petitions pending before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Delhi and High Courts of Allahabad, Madras, Jharkhand. A sixth transfer petition was filed in respect of WP(L) No. 2358/2016 filed by Mohd. Zafar Imam before the Bombay High Court. This officer had already demitted office on 17.09.2016. On 04.10.2017, this Court issued notice in the aforementioned transfer petitions being TP(C) Nos. 1315-1320/2017 and stayed further proceedings before the courts concerned. 14.11.2017 This Court allowed all six transfer petitions (TP(C) Nos. 1315-1320/2017) and also passed an interim order reinstating Mohd. Zafar Imam as Presiding Officer, DRT II, Mumbai. 26.12.2019 The petitioner will be completing the age of 65 years. 06.01.2020 The petitioner will be completing the term of five years on this date. 6) As per the provision....
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....the incumbent would lead to assigning a perverse object to the amendment which would be totally illogical. For this proposition, judgment in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan & Anr. (2011) 7 SCC 639 is relied upon. Reliance is also placed on Boucher Pierre Andre v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi & Anr. (1975) 1 SCC 192 10) Contrasting the provisions of Section 6 with Section 6A of the Act, it is argued that proviso to Section 6A categorically makes a provision to the effect that the Presiding Officer appointed before the commencement of Finance Act, 2017 shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017 as if the said provisions had not coming to force. It was submitted that there is no such proviso added to Section 6 which makes the intention of the legislature very clear, namely, the Presiding Officers who were in office as on the date of amendment would be governed by the newly inserted Section 6. 11) Mr. Banerjee, learned ASG appearing for the respondent Union of India contradicted the aforesaid arguments raised by the petitioners with the following submissions: No right has accrued by virtue of amendment ....
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....g "operational" work was introduced first time in the definition and the words "skilled" and "unskilled" were made independent categories unlinked to the word "manual". It can be seen that the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1984 was enacted by Parliament on 31- 8-1982. However, the amendment itself was not brought into force immediately and in sub-section (1) of Section 1 of the amending Act, it was provided that it would come into force on such day as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint. Ultimately, by a notification the said amendment was brought into force on 21-8-1984. Although this Court has held that the amendment would be prospective if it is deemed to have come with effect on a particular day, a provision in the Amendment Act to the effect that amendment would become operative in the future, would have similar effect. 22. Therefore, by the application of the tests mentioned above, it is clear that the definition of workman as amended must, therefore, be presumed to be prospective. 12) We have given our due consideration to the arguments advanced by the counsel for the parties on both sides and have also perused the relevant m....
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....s of two steps: first, the old rule is made to cease to exist and, next, the new rule is brought into existence in its place. The rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all. No doubt, in certain situations, the Court having regard to the purport and object sought to be achieved by the Legislature may construe the word "substitution" as an "amendment" having a prospective effect. Therefore, we do not think that it is a universal rule that the word 'substitution' necessarily or always connotes two severable steps, that is to say, one of repeal and another of a fresh enactment even if it implies two steps. However, the aforesaid general meaning is to be given effect to, unless it is found that legislature intended otherwise. Insofar as present case is concerned, as discussed hereinafter, the legislative intent was also to give effect to the amended provision....
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....e against him, the petitioner contended that by reason of Section 428 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, which came into force from April 1, 1974, the period of detention from November 10, 1971 upto July 16, 1973 was liable to be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed upon him and he could be required to undergo imprisonment only for the remainder of the term which, after taking into account the remission granted on account of good behaviour, expired on August 12, 1974. The petitioner claimed that he was, therefore, entitled to be freed on August 12, 1974 and his detention in jail since that date was illegal. The petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the High Court of Delhi challenging the validity of his detention since August 12, 1974 but the High Court took the view that since the conviction of the petitioner by the Sessions Court had taken place prior to the coming into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 428 had no application and the petitioner was bound to suffer imprisonment for the full term of three years calculated from the date of conviction, namely, July 16, 1973. The habeas corpus application in the High Court ....
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....oming into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure. Even where an accused person has been convicted prior to the coming into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure but his sentence is still running, it would not be inappropriate to say that the "accused person has, on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term". Therefore, where an accused person has been convicted and he is still serving his sentence at the date when the new Code of Criminal Procedure came into force. Section 428 would apply and he would be entitled to claim that the period of detention undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the case should be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him and he should be required to undergo only the remainder of the term. Of course, if the term of the sentence has already run out, no question of set off can arise. It is only where the sentence is still running that the section can operate to restrict the term. This construction of the section does not offend against the principle which requires that unless the legislative intent is clear and compulsive, no retrospective operation should be given to a statute. On this interpr....
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....journments and prolonged hearings. In order to facilitate expeditious disposal of recovery applications, it has been decided to amend the said Acts and also to make consequential amendments in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and the Depositories Act, 1996." (emphasis supplied) 20) In order to fulfill the aforesaid objective of reducing the arrears and tackle the issue of pendency of cases in various Debt Recovery Tribunals, 'purposive interpretation' is to be given. In Reserve Bank of India, the Court explained this principle in the following manner: "33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context....