AI Drafter 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1963 (6) TMI 37
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....le was served on the Opposite Party by affixation, in his absence. That being treated as defective service, the Registrar of this Court directed fresh service of notice on the opposite party both in the ordinary way and by registered post. It appears from the report of the process-server, dated January 26, 1963, that the opposite party refused to accept the notice this time and the same had to be served by affixation. The notice sent to the opposite party by registered post also came back with the endorsement by the postal peon that the same had been refused by the addressee opposite party, on February 2, 1963. 4. When, in these circumstances, this Rule was placed before us for hearing, on May 24, 1963, the opposite party personally appeared in Court and Mr. Arun Prokash Chatterjee and Mr. Hemesh Chandra Sen, Advocates, stood up as if representing the opposite party. We found, however, that above named two learned Advocates had not filed any power, executed by the opposite party, authorising them to represent the case of the opposite party. We could not therefore, hear them on that day but proceeded to hear the opposite party himself. In answer to our questions Nos. 10 to 16, he....
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....suit for eviction of the one Sm. Lilavati Debi and the present opposite party (respectively defendant No. 1 and 2 in that suit) from the aforesaid premises, being T.S. 258 of 1953 of the Second Court of Munsif at Alipore, on the following allegations (Annexure 'A' to the affidavit-in-opposition): 1. One Rameswar Sharma since deceased was the plaintiff's tenant at will from month to month at a monthly rent of Rs. 225/- in respect of premises No.70 Raja Basanta Roy Road, described in the schedule annexed. 2. The said Rameswar Sharma died sometime ago leaving him surviving the defendant No.1 as his only heir and legal representative who has in law stepped into his shoes as the plaintiff's tenant in terms hereinbefore mentioned. 3. The plaintiff was however receiving rent of the said premises through the defendant No.2, but in the name of the said late Rameswar Sharma. 4. The said defendant No. 2 had been asserting that really he was the tenant but under the name of late Rameswar Sharma, the latter having had, according to him no interest in the said tenancy. 5. That plaintiff has, however, under legal advice, served notices of ejectment upon both the def....
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....posite party was the sole tenant. The opposite party himself deposed in the said suit and in his evidence stated: I became the tenant long ago in or about 1939. I am not sure of the date. 12. The learned Munsif decreed the suit, on December 18, 1956 and ordered: That the suit be decreed on contest with costs. The plaintiff do get khas possession of the suit premises on eviction of the defendant therefrom. The decree for ejectment shall not be executed till the end of February, 1957. 13. The present opposite party preferred an appeal against the decree before the second Additional Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore. The learned Subordinate Judge found that the plaintiff did not reasonably and bonafide require the premises for her own use and occupation. By his decree, dated August 21, 1957, he allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. Against the appellate decree, the present petitioner filed a second appeal to this Court, being S.A. 770 of 1958. That appeal came up for hearing before this Bench on July 28, 1960 and was decreed in terms of settlement. The material portion of the decree passed by this Court is hereinbelow set out - Upon this appeal coming on fo....
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....sentation and must be treated as receipt for mesne profit. A copy of the letter is annexure 'C' to the Supplementary affidavit by the petitioner. To the aforesaid letter the opposite party sent the following reply, on September 3, 1960 (Annexure C(1) to the Supplementary Affidavit: - I am surprised to read the contents of registered letter dated 31.8.60 received by me yesterday. After the High Court case was over I approached you and you kindly settled new tenancy of the above premises and upon payment of the rent for July, 1960 by me, you granted me proper rent receipt for July, 1960 as your tenant on 17th August, 1960. I am surprised that you should now try to go back. I have never made any misrepresentation to you nor did I manage to obtain the rent receipt concerned on any misrepresentation. The entire allegations are after-thoughts and cannot hold good against the clear rent receipt and the creation of a fresh tenancy. The question of treating the said rent receipt as one for mesne profits cannot and does not arise. 18. There was a reply, to the letter sent by the petitioner on September 7, 1960, to the following effect (Annexure C(2) to the Supplementar....
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....to the Supplementary Affidavit]: - It is no use repeating the directions in the order of 28th July, 1960 passed by the Hon'ble High Court but by fresh tenancy it has been given a complete go-bye on 17th August, 1960 when I met your father, representing you in the normal course, and settled fresh tenancy upon payment of rent. As your father always represented you in all negotiations with me, I did not know nor did I enquire if you were present; but I emphatically deny that I persuaded him to accept the money in terms of the High Court order or that I paid the money at all in terms of the High Court order or that the rent receipt which he granted me under the fresh tenancy was or could be equivalent to the monthly rent of mesne profit. The receipt is in clear and unambiguous language one for rent and has nothing to do with alleged mesne profit. I reiterate that your father representing you (as he had done throughout) entered into a fresh tenancy and that he had full authority to do so and no amount of denial will avail you of getting rid of that fresh tenancy. I deny that fresh tenancy is either a story or a concoction of a fertile brain. The order of the Hon'ble Hig....
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....s alleging that he has any tenancy right in respect of 70, Raja Basanta Roy Road, Calcutta under the decree-holder or her heir, executors and legal representatives - (c) that the terms and conditions of the above-mentioned decree passed by Hon'ble High Court shall be binding on both the parties as before and will remain in operation accordingly. (d) that the three letters dated 3.9.60, 9.9.60 and 12.9.60 written by the aforesaid decree-holder and the objection petition filed by the aforesaid judgment-debtor under Section 57 of the Civil Procedure Code before the 2nd Munsif Court, Alipore on 7th day of January, 1951 in Title Execution Case No.77 of 1960 are hereby withdrawn by the said judgment-debtor and cease to have any valid effect as they were written and filed under misconception by the judgment-debtor. 4. The aforesaid decree-holder in her turn will not proceed further with the execution proceedings for the period of default in payment of mesne profits from the date of passing of the said decree by the Hon'ble High Court upto this day of 2nd February, 1961, provided by said judgment-debtor pay in a lump all the balance of mesne profits....
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....- The case of the petitioner consists only of some vague and loose statements which find no basis nor any consistency anywhere and it is not at all proved in this case that the petitioner paid or offered the same amount to the decree-holder as required under the terms of the solenama of the aforesaid Misc. Case. The Money was sent on 15.3.61, which was much beyond the prescribed time * * * * it appears that the petitioner has not complied with the terms of the solenama and the decree-holder can proceed with the execution case and the objections of the petitioner have no basis at all. 25. Against the aforesaid order the opposite party preferred a Miscellaneous Appeal, being Misc. Appeal No.394 of 1961. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal on June 23, 1961 with the following observations (Annexure B to the affidavit-in-reply): Further I have grave doubts if the judgment-debtor opposite party had the required money with him before 15.3.61, or if he had the willingness to part with the money on that date. His petition reveals that he was meeting Dr. K.K. Hazari the father of the decree-holder, repeatedly in order to obtain the original challan in respect of the deposit ....
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....ted. 27. The opposite party alleges in paragraph 5 of the affidavit-in-opposition that on July 25, 1962, he had sent the following letter to the petitioner, under certificate of posting: - Re. Premises 70, Raja Basanta Roy Road, Calcutta-29. Please send your representative to take delivery of the above premises on July 30, 1962, preferably in the morning. Kindly take notice of it. 28. Again on July 30, 1962, the opposite party alleges, he wrote the following letter to the petitioner under certificate of posting: - Sub.: - 70 Raja Basanta Roy Road. I had asked you by my letter dated 25.7.62 to arrange taking delivery of possession of the above premises to-day morning as per order of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Banerjee and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amaresh Roy in S.A. 770 of 1958. You however rang me up to inform that because of the order of stay of delivery of possession passed by the Hon'ble High Court in 2nd Misc. Appeal No.131 of 1961, you dared not take delivery of possession of the premises lest you should commit contempt and accordingly you wished me to continue in possession. I hereby put on record the aforesaid telephonic conversation. I make it cle....
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.... our consideration. He contended, in the first place, that the consent decree passed in S.A. 770 of 1958 was adjusted when a fresh tenancy was granted in favour of the opposite party with effect from July, 1960, as evidenced by rent receipt Ex. 3, (hereinabove quoted). Therefore, the petitioner became relieved of the undertaking, if any, given to this Court. He contended, in the next place, that the decree in S.A. 770 of 1958 was varied or adjusted by the compromise entered into in Misc. Appeal 71 of 1961 (Annexure B to the petition) and since the opposite party had faithfully acted in accordance with the terms of that compromise, he must not be deemed to have fallen within the mischief of the decree in S.A. 770 of 1958. He contended further that the opposite party had complied with the undertaking, if any, given to this Court by offering possession of the disputed premises to the petitioner by his letters dated July 25 and 30, 1962, sent to the petitioner under certificate of posting and he should not be proceeded against for breach of the undertaking to this Court. Alternatively, he contended that the undertaking, if any, was not expressly given to this Court and should be constr....
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....posite party. He could not also explain away why he had agreed never to set up the plea of new tenancy in respect of the disputed premises, in the compromise petition filed in Misc. Appeal No. 71 of 1961. 36. In view of what we have stated above, we cannot make much of the argument that the consent decree passed in S.A. 770 of 1958 had been adjusted by a fresh tenancy created in favour of the opposite party, which relieved him of the undertaking given to this Court. 37. The argument that the decree in S.A. 770 of 1958 was varied and adjusted by the compromise between the parties in Misc. Appeal No. 71 of 1961 is also unconvincing. So also is the story that the opposite party had acted faithfully, in accordance with the terms of that compromise and for that reason must not be deemed to have fallen within the mischief of the breach of the undertaking contained in the decree in S.A. 770 of 1958. The compromise in Misc. Appeal No.71 of 1961 did not vary or adjust the consent decree in S.A. 770 of 1958. Clause 1 of the terms of settlement in Misc. Appeal No. 71 of 1961 (hereinbefore quoted) expressly stated that the parties shall abide by the terms of the decree in S.A. 770 of 195....
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....Dassee v. Sarnalatika Dassee, (AIR 1940 Cal 227), Sen, J. observed: - There is a Certificate of Posting. Learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner mentioned a case where it was proved that a certificate of posting had been forged. That may be so, but it would be entirely wrong for me to work on the presumption that the certificate of posting was a forgery. On the other hand I should presume that the letter was posted and that it reached its destination unless something is shown to the contrary. 40. Then again, there is the decision in (3) Dhanapati devi v. The Corporation of Calcutta, (AIR 1952 Cal 467) in which Chakrvartti and Das Gupta, JJ. observed as follows: - In addition to this entry in the Minutes, the Corporation also exhibited a Register of letters sent by it to parties in cases heard and dealt with by the Building Committee. There appears on that Register under the date June 25, 1949 an item numbered 37 and against that item there is an entry to the effect that a letter was sent to the petitioner at 10/2, Syed Sally Lane under a certificate of posting. The necessary postage stamps covering all the letters mentioned in the page, are affixed in the Register itse....
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....ose and it is urged that a combination of the two facts is required to raise such a presumption. We are quite clear that the illustration only means that each one of these facts is relevant. It cannot be read as indicating that without a combination of these facts no presumption can arise. Indeed that section with the illustrations thereto has nothing to do with presumptions but only with relevance. Some cases relating to this have been cited before us. We have considered the same but it is unnecessary to deal with them. 42. We have, therefore, to proceed on the basis that the certificates of posting relied upon the opposite party raise the presumption that the covers alleged to contain the two letters addressed to the petitioner (hereinbefore quoted) were posted by the opposite party. The normal presumption under Section 114 illustration (f) of the Evidence Act will also be that the covers were delivered to the petitioner. A presumption is not, however, proof and may be rebutted. In the instant case the petitioner denies the receipt of two letters in her affidavit-in-reply. The question for our consideration is whether the denial is sufficient to rebut the presumption that the ....
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..... 27. Anything in writing to show that he agreed to keep you as a tenant? - No, nothing. 28. When was that? - At the time he gave the receipt to me when I had been to him. 29. You do not remember the date? - 17th of August, possibly of 1960. 43. He did not hesitate to say all these even though he had himself stated in writing, in the compromise petition in Misc. Appeal No. 71 of 1961, that his theory of new tenancy was a misconception and that he would not in future repeat the story. Then again, in answer to our question Nos.71 to 83, the opposite party gave the following answers: - 71. It is more than that. You made a definite case to the effect that there was a new settlement with you upon payment of rent for July, 1960. Is not that correct. - Yes, when I got the receipt there was a new settlement. 72. And you further stated in the letter that you approached the petitioner directly and she gave the receipt. - The receipt was given to me by Mr. Hazari after he had consulted her. 73. Then it is not true that you approached the lady directly and had the talk face to face. - So far as all the talks, that have taken place were with Dr. Hazari. Of course she had be....
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....their food and when ever I used to have a talk with Dr. Hazari, I used to ask him if you consulted her. He said, yes. 82. That is not what you wrote in the letter. How do you reconcile what you wrote in the letter with what you say now? - In her letter she had stated that she was not present and in reply to that letter I had stated I did not know whether you were present or not. 83. If you had written otherwise a that time, would you say now that she was physically present at the time of negotiation? - I say she was present because she lives there in the same house. 44. The unreliability of this part of the evidence is apparent on the face of the answers given. Further in answer to our question Nos.110 to 118, he gave the following answers: - 110. You have stated in your evidence that you sent a Telegraphic Money Order on the 10th February, 1961; is that right? - Yes. 111. Would it be wrong to suggest that you sent the Telegraphic Money Order on 15th March, 1961? - That would be wrong to say that it would be sent on 15th March. If the money was due on the 2nd, I sent T.M.O. certainly before the 15th of that month. 112. So you will maintain that you did not send th....
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....id two letters to the petitioner and that the said letters were actually delivered to the petitioner, we have further to see whether the opposite party did act up to the letters and did leave the premises after having tendered possession thereof to the petitioner. According to the evidence given by the opposite party himself he did not leave the premises and shift to elsewhere until October, 1962 (Vide his answers to Q. 127 to Q, 139). If he continued to possess the premises till October, 1962, he cannot be said to have honoured the undertaking to given up possession with the expiry of July, 1962. The fact that the opposite party at all left the disputed premises is also disputed. But irrespective of the dispute, it is clear that he did not leave the disputed premises at least upto October, 1962. If the opposite party felt himself bound by the undertaking, it was his plainest duty to leave the premises after having informed the petitioner that he was going to leave and irrespective of whether the petitioner would come and take delivery of possession from him. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we feel constrained to think that the opposite party might have made a show of ....
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.... 'to undertake' is 'to give a formal promise or pledge'. That is, to give a formal promise or pledge to any one, not necessarily to a Court. It, therefore, follows that if the ordinary meaning is given to the word 'undertakes' paragraph 6 should read: 'the defendant hereby formally promises or pledges to remove the said Kali image...' What the respondent urges us to do is to read into paragraph 6 the words 'undertakes to Court.' The words are not there. It must be remembered that this compromise agreement was negotiated between the parties outside Court. They were agreeing to certain terms and amongst other things, the defendant promised or undertook to remove this image when called upon to do so. The agreement he made was not with the Court, but with the plaintiff respondent, and prima facie he undertook to remove this image with the plaintiff respondent. When this paragraph is to be construed we must bear in mind that it is found in a document executed by two parties, the plaintiff and the defendant and the promises made by the plaintiff are promises made to the defendant and the vice versa. How, therefore, can the undertaking to remo....
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....s to me the Court must first construe para 6 of the compromise and ascertain its meaning. Once that meaning is ascertained, the meaning cannot be changed merely because a decree was passed in terms of the compromise. The terms of the decree must mean precisely the same as the terms of the compromise. Gentle, J. followed a single Judge decision of this Court in 42 CWN 203. In that case the word 'undertake' was used in a paragraph in a compromise, although there was nothing to suggest that the undertaking was to a Court. The compromise was made a rule of Court, and Panckridge, J. came to the conclusion that the undertaking mentioned in the compromise was an undertaking to the Court. the learned Judge gives no reasons for so holding beyond the fact that the word 'undertake' was used. But as I have stated the mere user of the word 'undertake' does not mean a promise to a Court. It merely means a solemn promise to some one and where the word appears in an agreement between A and B, it appears to me that if A undertakes, he obviously undertakes to B, and not to a Court. In Building and Land Trust (India) Ltd. v. Tilok Chand Surana, (unreported) decided on 22.5.....
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....he Calcutta High Court in Nisha Kanto v. Saroj Bashini, AIR 1948 Cal 194; (49 Cr LJ 567). In that case a Division Bench consisting of Sir Trevor Harries, C.J. and Mukhejea, J. had to consider a similar question. There also reliance was placed upon the practice on the original side. And the learned Chief Justice expressed the opinion that the sooner the practice was stopped the better. According to the learned Chief Justice, if one of the terms of the compromise was that one of the parties should give an undertaking to the Court, then the compromise should make it clear that such was the case, and if it did not make it clear and the compromise merely stated that one of the parties 'undertakes', then the ordinary construction must be given, and that is, a promise or a solemn promise given to the other party and not to the Court. Now, with very great respect to the learned Chief Justice, he seems to have taken the view that the word 'undertake' must be given its ordinary dictionary meaning. He has not considered at all as to whether, by long practice understood both by counsel and by Judges, the expression 'undertaking' had come to acquire a technical meaning. ....
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....tempt for breach of the undertaking. Their Lordships relied on an unreported decision of this Court in (8) Misc. Case No. 276 of 1956 (Per Chakravartti and Sinja, JJ.) and observed as follows: - (a) It was held by the Bench (Chakravartti and Sinha, JJ.) hearing the rule that the proceedings in contempt could not be sustained, Mr. Justice Chakravartti gave the following reason in support of the order: It is perfectly clear that while laying down the conditions, the learned Judges also had present to their minds the possibility of breaches of the conditions and for such possible breach, they themselves prescribed the penalty. It will be remembered that, according to the default clause, if any default was committed in respect of any of the conditions Nos.1, 2 and 4, the Rule would stand discharged and the consequence of a discharge of the Rule would be that the property would revert to the possession of the receiver. It is thus clear that the learned Judges in making the order of the 15th May, 1951 did not impose any absolute obligation on the opposite parties in respect of preserving the cinema house in a proper condition but gave them a choice. The choice was that they w....
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.... cases like the present where the consequences of default are provided for in the order itself, the undertaking should not be construed as being an unqualified one. In my opinion the first contention of the petitioner must be given effect to. The undertaking said to have been given to the Court in the circumstances of this case, should not be regarded as an unqualified undertaking and a failure to keep to the terms thereof cannot therefore be regarded as justifying the exercise of the discretionary powers of this Court to order committal for contempt. (b) "In the present case, the undertaking to the Court was not formally embodied in the order directing the compromise to be recorded, nor was it specifically set forth in the decree. It may be that the clear implication of the order was that there was an undertaking to the Court to vacate the premises on or before the 2nd January, 1952. At the same time a litigant in the position of the opposite party might have been under a bona fide misapprehension as to the effect of the order of this Court and the decree passed therein. 55. In order to apply the proposition of law laid down in above quoted decision we have to const....
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....ourt the judgment-debtor opposite party is himself under no misapprehension. In answer to our questions 1 to 9, the opposite party gave the following reply: - Do you remember that Second Appeal No. 770/58 in which you were the respondent was disposed of on terms agreed upon between the appellant and yourself? - Yes I remember. 2. On the date of settlement you were personally present in the Court. Do you remember? - Yes. 3. On that date did you give an undertaking to this Court that you will quit, vacate and render peaceful possession of the disputed premises on the expiry of the month of July, 1962? - Yes. 4. Now, did you honour that undertaking and quit the premises on the expiry of July, 1962? - Yes. 5. When did you do this? - On the 25th July, 1962, I wrote a letter under postal certificate and on the 30th I received a telephone call stating that they could not take possession because there was a stay from another bench. I do not remember the exact number. 6. Who obtained that stay order? - I moved that application before July, 1962, I got the stay. 7. Stay of the undertaking given by you in this Court? - That was in another case. 8. Do you say that you o....
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....consideration, he allegedly attempted to deliver possession of the premises in his capacity as tenant. It is only before this Court, he took up a changed attitude. In answer to our question Nos. 52, 53, 144 to 174 he gave the following answers: - 52. (Amaresh Roy, J.) Then is it your evidence that you left the door ajar and went away? - I went away from there and Lilabati Sharma had already turned up there and she turned me out. I have nothing to do with her. They are only harassing me. 53. (Banerjee, J.) Who is this Lilabati Sharma? - The wife of Sree Rameswar Sharma, in whose name the electricity bill stands even to-day. There is telephone also in the name of Unity Production in which Mr. Rameswar Sharma is a partner. *** 144. How did Lilabati come to the scene? - I really do not know but when summons were served I came to know that she was a tenant. 145. Which summons? - Lilbati has filed some suit against the land-lady. 147. How are you concerned in that suit? - I have been made a party by her. 148. You know nothing about this Lilabati? - I only know that she was the wife of my partner Rameswar Sarma, who is the real tenant. ....
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....became tenant long ago in or about 1939 (Shown)? - At that time sub-tenancy was allowed. May be for that reason I said it. 170. I am not concerned with your speculation. Tell me how do you reconcile this with your statement now? - At that time Mr. Sarma was living and I was living with him and as subtenant I was there. 171. Then when you wrote the letter of 25th July, 1962 and the letter of the 30th July, proposing to give up possession you were making a false show; is that your evidence? - No My Lord. 172. If Lilabati was the tenant in occupation, how could you give possession of that premises to the landlady? - They had struck out the name of Lilabati, so I thought I was the tenant. I did not know law. Therefore, I was giving up possession, but later on, when I got the copies of the papers from the Court, I found that they have made Lilabati that they have made Lilabati the tenant. 173. In answer to my question on the last occasion, that was on the 24th May, you said that she (Lilabati) is the real tenant, I am not the tenant? - Yes. 174. You said in the written statement in suit No. 258 of 1953 that you were the real tenant and no one....