2018 (1) TMI 873
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....respect of the Loan and the Funded Interest Loan, as more particularly set out in the said Statement of Claim, produced herewith and marked as Annexure 'N' to this Application, (including stamp duty of Rs. 6,00,000/- and incidental expenses incurred by the Applicant on behalf of Defendant No.1 in respect of the Deed of Simple Mortgage dated 4.5.2002, as requested by Defendant No.1 vide its letter dated 28.2.2002 produced herewith and marked as Annexure "Q") together with further interest at the rate of 17% per annum and additional interest by way of liquidated damages @ 2% per annum from the date of the Application till payment. (b) this Hon'ble Tribunal be pleased to declare that:- (i) The movable fixed assets of the 1st defendant (as more particularly described in Annexure 'B-1' to this Application), are legally and validly hypothecated and charged in favour of the Applicant towards the payment of the amounts due by the 1st Defendant to the Applicant as more particularly set out in the Statement of Claim annexed as Annexure 'N' to this Application. (ii) The immovable properties of the 2nd defendant at Southegowdana village an....
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....ver of the immovable properties of the 2nd defendant at Southegowdana village and Gokere village in Karnataka (as more particularly described in Annexure 'F-1' to this application), with all powers as provided by law, including the power of sale and direct the Receiver to sell the said immovable properties on such terms and conditions as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and hand over the sale proceeds to the applicant towards satisfaction of the applicant's claim herein, and in case of any shortfall to recover the same from the defendant Nos.1 to 3. (f) this Hon'ble Tribunal be pleased to issue a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant Nos.1 to 3 by themselves, or through their servants, agents, attorneys or through any person or party acting for or on behalf of these defendants from selling, alienating, encumbering, leasing or creating any type of third party rights in respect of:- (i) the 1st defendant's hypothecated movable fixed assets (as briefly described in Annexure 'B-1' to this application) or any part thereof. (ii) the 1st defendant's immovable properties at Kumbalgodu village and Sadashivnagar in Ban....
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....ve within 3 days to the appellant's counsel. In the event of failure, the appellants are at liberty to get Rs. 10,000/- towards damages and it is liable to be deducted in the Statement of Account from the date of the OA within 15 days from the date of receipt of this order, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore, is directed to dismiss the OA granting liberty after getting the full details the banker can file a suit within three months thereafter." 7. Being aggrieved against the order of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Chennai dated 11.03.2015 made in M.A. No.131 of 2013, instant civil revision petition has been filed on the grounds inter alia that the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Chennai, has failed to consider that the Statement of Accounts was only a piece of evidence enabling the applicant bank to prove its claim. The failure to file the statement of accounts could only result in the applicant being unable to rely on the same to prove the claim. However, the applicant can always adduce evidence to prove the claim, by relying on the original cause of action, de hors the statement of accounts. Therefore, the order of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Chen....
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.... this court to the sequence of events from 2002, failure of the bank in not accounting for the insurance claim, Mr.B.Dhanraj, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 3 submitted that order of DRAT, Chennai in M.A. No.131 of 2013, dated 11.03.2015, does not call for any interference, as the bank has failed to submit the statement of accounts to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore. He further submitted that, as per the direction of the Appellate Tribunal, DRT, Bangalore, has dismissed O.A. No.326/2002 on 29.09.2015 and an appeal in R.A. (S.A.) No.7 of 2016 has been preferred before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Chennai, by the petitioner herein. 11. He further submitted that When the consequential order of dismissal by DRT is tested by way of appeal, the challenge to the initial order i.e. order in M.A. No.131 of 2013 dated 11.03.2015 impugned before us, has no legs to stand and therefore, instant civil revision petition is not maintainable. Arguments have also been advanced on the merits of the claim made by the bank. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 12. Adverting to the contention of the learned counsel for the resp....
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....he OA, granting liberty, after getting the full details, the banker has to file a suit within three months thereafter. 20. For non-submission of the Statement of Accounts, from the date of Original Application within 15 days of the order of the Appellate Tribunal, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore, has dismissed O.A. No.326/2002, against which S.A.(RA) No.7/2016 has been filed. 21. Question to be addressed is, when the consequential order of DRT, Bangalore dismissing O.A. No.326 of 2002 is assailed in R.A. (S.A.) No.7 of 2016, whether the initial order made in M.A. No.131 of 2013 dated 11.03.2015 on the file of DRAT, Chennai can be independently assailed? 22. When the Appellate Tribunal has passed an order, directing DRT, Bangalore to dismiss the original application, for the above said reason, DRT, Bangalore, which is hierarchically subordinate, is bound to implement the order passed by the Appellate forum. Thus, DRT, has implicitly, dismissed O.A. No.326 of 2002. Though an appeal in R.A.(S.A.) No.7 of 2016, has been filed, challenging the dismissal order, DRAT, Chennai, cannot review the order made in M.A. No.131 of 2013 passed in the year 2015. 23. When jurisdiction....
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....to the Tribunal:- (1) Where a bank or a financial institution has to recover any debt from any person, it may make an application to the Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction,- (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of making the application, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of making the application, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in party, arises. (2) Where a bank or a financial institution, which has to recover its debt from any person, has filed an application to the Tribunal under sub-section (1) and against the same person another bank or financial institution also has claim to recover its debt, then, the later bank or financial institution may join the applicant bank or financial institution at any stage of the proceedings, before the final order is passed, by making an application to that Tribunal. (3) Every application under sub-section (1) or subse....
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....by raised ought not be disposed of by way of counter-claim but in an independent action, the applicant may, at any time before issues are settled in relation to the counter-claim, apply to the Tribunal for an order that such counter-claim may be excluded, and the Tribunal may, on the hearing of such application, make such order as it thinks fit. (12) The Tribunal may make an interim order (whether by way of injunction or stay or attachment) against the defendant to debar him from transferring, alienating or otherwise dealing with, or disposing of, any property and assets belonging to him without the prior permission of the Tribunal. (13) (A) Where, at any stage of the proceedings, the Tribunal is satisfied, by affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant, with intent to obstruct or delay or frustrate the execution of any order for the recovery of debt that may be passed against him,-- (i) is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property; or (ii) is about to remove the whole or any part of his property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; or (iii) is likely to cause any damage or mischief to the property or....
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.... preservation and improvement of the property, the collection of the rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal of such rents and profits, and the execution of documents as the owner himself has, or such of those powers as the Tribunal thinks fit; and (e) appoint a Commissioner for preparation of an inventory of the properties of the defendant or for the sale thereof. (19) Where a certificate of recovery is issued against a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) the Tribunal may order the sale proceeds of such company to be distributed among its secured creditors in accordance with the provisions of section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 and to pay the surplus, if any, to the company. (20) The Tribunal may, after giving the applicant and the defendant an opportunity of being heard, pass such interim or final order, including the order for payment of interest from the date on or before which payment of the amount is found due up to the date of realization or actual payment, on the application as it thinks fit to meet the ends of justice. (21) The Tribunal shall send a copy of every order passed by it to the appl....
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.... the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority, upon the character of the rights of the persons affected, the scheme and policy of the statute and other relevant circumstances disclosed in the particular case." iii) In Sarpanch Lonand Gram Panchayat v. Ramgiri reported in AIR 1968 SC 222, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 5, held as follows: "5.....But the High Court is vested with the power of judicial superintendence over the tribunal under Article 227 of the Constitution. This power is not,greater than the power under Article 226 and is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority, see Nagendra Nath Bora and another v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, and others. The High Court will not review the discretion of the Authority judicially exercised, but it- may interfere if the exercise of the discretion is capricious or perverse or ultra vires." iv) In Kraipak v. Union of India & Ors. reported in [1970] 1 SCR 457, the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus: ".....Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was requ....
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....administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form. 7. The expressions "natural justice" and "legal justice" do not present a water-tight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigants' defence. 8. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is co....
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....one essential requirement was that the Tribunal should be impartial and have no personal interest in the controversy, and further that it should give 'a full and fair opportunity' to every party of being heard. 12. Lord Wright referred to the leading cases on the subject. The most important of them is the Board of Education v. Rice (1911 AC 179:80 LJKB 796), where Lord Loreburn, L.C. observed as follows: "Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have originated, the practice of imposing upon departments or offices of State the duty of deciding or determining questions of various kinds. It will, I suppose usually be of an administrative kind, but sometimes, it will involve matter of law as well as matter of fact, or even depend upon matter of law alone. In such cases, the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts. I need not and that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides for that is a duty lying upon everyone who decides anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial....The Board is in the nature of the arbitral tribunal, and a Court ....
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....should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. Expression 'civil consequences' encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations, and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life. 16. Natural justice has been variously defined by different Judges. A few instances will suffice. In Drew v. Drew and Lebura (1855(2) Macg. 1.8, Lord Cranworth defined it as 'universal justice'. In James Dunber Smith v. Her Majesty the Queen (1877-78(3) App.Case 614, 623 JC) Sir Robort P. Collier, speaking for the judicial committee of Privy council, used the phrase 'the requirements of substantial justice', while in Arthur John Specman v. Plumstead District Board of Works (1884- 85(10) App.Case 229, 240), Earl of S....
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....e'. At times and particularly in continental countries, the form 'audietur at altera pars' is used, meaning very much the same thing. A corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and particularly the audi alteram partem rule, namely 'qui aliquid statuerit parte inaudita alteram actquam licet dixerit, haud acquum facerit' that is, 'he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right, will not have been what is right' (See Bosewell's case (1605) 6 Co.Rep. 48-b, 52-a) or in other words, as it is now expressed, 'justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done'. Whenever an order is struck down as invalid being in violation of principles of natural justice, there is no final decision of the case and fresh proceedings are left upon. All that is done is to vacate the order assailed by virtue of its inherent defect, but the proceedings are not terminated. 28. Let us consider few cases on the scope of power of superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. (i) In Jodhey v. State reported in AIR 1952 All. 788, after hearing the history ....
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....akin to them are drawn within the purview of its supervision and cannot claim exemption from it merely by virtue of the fact that they do not come within the strict category of civil, revenue, or criminal Courts as known under the ordinary law of the land. Certain other minor changes in this Article are also noteworthy. A contrast of the marginal note appended to Article 227 of the Constitution of India with the marginal notes of Section 224, Government of the India Act, 1935, Section 107, Government of India Act 1915, and Section 15, High Courts Act, 1861, is instructive. The marginal note of Article 227 of the Constitution of India is "Power of superintendence over all Courts by the High Courts". This may be contrasted with the marginal note of Section 224, Government of India Act, 1935, which was "Administrative functions of the High Court" and the marginal note of Section 107, Government of India Act, 1915, which was "Powers of High Court with respect to subordinate Courts". Similarly, the marginal note of Section 15, High Courts Act, 1861, was "High Courts to superintend and to frame rules of practice for subordinate Courts", The alteration in this marginal note also emphasise....
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....to four clauses. The first clause enunciates the general power of supervision given to High Court over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It is couched in a language which would vest the High Court with a power that is not fettered with any restriction and must embrace all aspects of the functions exercised by every Court and tribunal. On a proper interpretation of this clause it is difficult to my mind to hold that the powers of superintendence are confined only to administrative matters. There are no limits, fetters or restrictions placed on this power of superintendence in this Clause and the purpose of this Article seems to be to make the High Court the custodian of all justice within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction and to arm it with a weapon that could be wielded for the purpose of seeing that justice is meted out fairly and properly by the bodies mentioned therein. To fulfil this function it seems to me that the power of superintendence of the High Court over judicial matters is as necessary as over administrative matters. As a matter of fact judicial function of a Court is not less important than it....
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.... Statutes in India, the fact that the judgment or order of a Court or tribunal has been made final by an Act or the fact chat the body performing judicial functions is special tribunal constituted under a Statute cannot be set up as a bar to the exercise of this power by the High Court. The prohibited area is to be found within the four corners of the constitution itself and nowhere else. 15. The fact that these unlimited powers are vested in the High Court should, however, make the High Court more cautious in its exercise. The self-imposed limits of these powers are established and laid down by the High Courts themselves. It seems to me that these powers cannot be exercised unless there has been an unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction not possessed by Courts or a gross abuse of jurisdiction possessed by them or an unjutifiable refusal to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them by law. Apart from matters relating to jurisdiction, the High Court may be moved to act under it when there has been a flagrant abuse of the elementary principles of justice or a manifest error of law patent on the face of the record or an outrageous miscarriage of justice which calls for remedy. U....
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....at no one need respect it. The underlying policy is that all inferior courts and authorities have only limited jurisdiction or powers and must be kept within their legal bounds. This is the concern of the Crown, for the sake of orderly administration of justice, but it is a private complaint which sets the Crown in motion." (Administrative Law, Eighth Edition, page 591). 8. The learned authors go on to add that problem arose on exercising control over justices of the peace, both in their judicial and their administrative functions as also the problem of controlling the special statutory body which was addressed to by the Court of King's Bench. "The most useful instruments which the Court found ready to hand were the prerogative writs. But not unnaturally the control exercised was strictly legal, and no longer political. Certiorari would issue to call up the records of justices of the peace and commissioners for examination in the King's Bench and for quashing if any legal defect was found. At first there was much quashing for defects of form on the record, i.e. for error on the face. Later, as the doctrine of ultra vires developed, that became the dominant....
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....it of certiorari. The limit of the jurisdiction of the High Court in issuing writs of certiorari was considered by this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Ahmad Ishaque 1955-I S 1104 : ((s) AIR 1955 SC 233) and the following four propositions were laid down :- "(1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction; (2) Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice; (3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous. (4) An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari if it is a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere....
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....garded any mandatory provisions of the law but what can be said at the most was that it had disregarded certain executive instructions not having the force of law, there is not case for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226." 14. The Constitution Bench in T.C. Basappa Vs. T. Nagappa & Anr., (1955) 1 SCR 250, held that certiorari may be and is generally granted when a court has acted (i) without jurisdiction, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction. The want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject-matter of the proceedings or from the absence of some preliminary proceedings or the court itself may not have been legally constituted or suffering from certain disability by reason of extraneous circumstances. Certiorari may also issue if the court or tribunal though competent has acted in flagrant disregard of the rules or procedure or in violation of the principles of natural justice where no particular procedure is prescribed. An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari subject to the following factors being available if the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when ....
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....he judgments of inferior Courts of civil jurisdiction".* These observations would indicate that in England the judicial orders passed by civil Courts of plenary jurisdiction in or in relation to matters brought before them are not held to be amenable to the jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari." 17. A perusal of the judgment shows that the above passage has been quoted "incidentally" and that too for the purpose of finding authority for the proposition that a judge sitting on the Original Side of the High Court cannot be called a court 'inferior or subordinate to High Court' so as to make his orders amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Secondly, the abovesaid passage has been quoted but nowhere the Court has laid down as law by way its own holding that a writ of certiorari by High Court cannot be directed to Court subordinate to it. And lastly, the passage from Halsbury quoted in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar's case (supra) is from third edition of Halsbury Laws of England (Simond's Edition, 1955). The law has undergone a change in England itself and this changed legal position has been noted in a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Rup....
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....ority in abundance is available for the proposition that an error apparent on face of record can be corrected by certiorari. The broad working rule for determining what is a patent error or an error apparent on the face of the record was well set out in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde and Ors. Vs. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, (1960) 1 SCR 890. It was held that the alleged error should be self-evident. An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or an error in a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions cannot be called a patent error. In a writ of certiorari the High Court may quash the proceedings of the tribunal, authority or court but may not substitute its own findings or directions in lieu of one given in the proceedings forming the subject-matter of certiorari. 21. Certiorari jurisdiction though available is not to be exercised as a matter of course. The High Court would be justified in refusing the writ of certiorari if no failure of justice has been occasioned. In exercising the certiorari jurisdiction the procedure ordinarily followed by the High Court is to command the inferior court ....
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.... in Article 227 of the Constitution. In that sense Article 227 of the Constitution has width and vigour unprecedented. Difference between a writ of certiorari under Article 226 and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. 24. The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram and Ors. Vs. Smt. Radhikabai and Anr., (1986) Supp. SCC 401. Proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory.Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as w....
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....cised suo motu as well. 26. In order to safeguard against a mere appellate or revisional jurisdiction being exercised in the garb of exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, the courts have devised self-imposed rules of discipline on their power. Supervisory jurisdiction may be refused to be exercised when an alternative efficacious remedy by way of appeal or revision is available to the person aggrieved. The High Court may have regard to legislative policy formulated on experience and expressed by enactments where the Legislature in exercise of its wisdom has deliberately chosen certain orders and proceedings to be kept away from exercise of appellate and revisional jurisdiction in the hope of accelerating the conclusion of the proceedings and avoiding delay and procrastination which is occasioned by subjecting every order at every stage of proceedings to judicial review by way of appeal or revision. So long as an error is capable of being corrected by a superior court in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction though available to be exercised only at the conclusion of the proceedings, it would be sound exercise of discretion on....
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....to the revisional jurisdiction conferred on it. Does the amendment in Section 115 of C.P.C have any impact on jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227? 29. The Constitution Bench in L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 261, dealt with the nature of power of judicial review conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution and the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227. It was held that the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution and on the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is part of the basic structure of the Constitution, forming its integral and essential feature, which cannot be tampered with much less taken away even by constitutional amendment, not to speak of a parliamentary legislation. A recent Division Bench decision by Delhi High Court (Dalveer Bhandari and H.R. Malhotra, JJ) in Criminal Writ Petition NO.s.758, 917 and 1295 of 2002 - Govind Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) decided on April 7, 2003 (reported as [2003] 6 ILD 468 makes an indepth survey of decided cases including almost all the leading decisions by this Court and holds - "The power of the High Court under Ar....
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....ent of India Act, 1915, is not a limitless power available to be exercised for removing hardship of particular decisions. The power of superintendence is a power of known and wellrecognised character and should be exercised on those judicial principles which give it its character. The mere misconception on a point of law or a wrong decision on facts or a failure to mention by the Courts in its judgment every element of the offence, would not allow the order of the Magistrate being interfered with in exercise of the power of superintendence but the High Court can and should see that no man is convicted without a legal reason. A defect of jurisdiction or fraud on the part of the prosecutor or error on the "face of the proceedings" as understood in Indian practice, provides a ground for the exercise of the power of superintendence. The line between the two classes of case must be, however, kept clear and straight. In general words, the High Court's power of superintendence is a power to keep subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. 32. The principles deducible, well-settled....
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....rs from patent error of law and further causes manifest injustice to the party aggrieved then the same can be subjected to writ of certiorari. The Full Bench added that every interlocutory order passed in a civil suit is not subject to review under Article 226 of the Constitution but if it is found from the order impugned that fundamental principle of law has been violated and further such an order causes substantial injustice to the party aggrieved the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is not precluded. However, the following sentence occurs in the judgment of the Full Bench:- "where an aggrieved party approaches the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution against an order passed in civil suit refusing to issue injunction to a private individual who is not under statutory duty to perform public duty or vacating an order of injunction, the main relief is for issue of a writ of mandamus to a private individual and such a writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution would not be maintainable." 36. It seems that the High Court in its decision impugned herein formed an impression from the abovequoted passage that a prayer for issuan....
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.... supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e., when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of s....
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....distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case. 39. Though we have tried to lay down broad principles and working rules, the fact remains that the parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution cannot be tied down in a straitjacket formula or rigid rules. Not less than often the High Court would be faced with dilemma. If it intervenes in pending proceedings there is bound to be delay in termination of proceedings. If it does not intervene, the error of the moment may earn immunity from correction. The facts and circumstances of a giv....
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....unal or authority, a writ of Certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal/authority has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit an admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. It is needless to mention that a pure error of fact, however grave, cannot be corrected by a writ. 23. It is useful to refer the decision of this Court in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 675 wherein, in para 38, held as under: "38.(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice." 24. It is clear that whether i....
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....ppropriate case in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. 12. The above said law is again reiterated by the Apex Court in Singaram Singh v. Election Tribunal, AIR 1955 SC 425 and Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division & Appeals, AIR 1958 SC 398. 13. In T.Prem Sagar v. M/s.Standard Vacuum Oil Company, AIR 1965 SC 111, it has been held that in writ proceedings if an error of law apparent on the fact of the records is disclosed and the writ is issue, the usual course to adopt is to correct the error and send the case back to the special Tribunal for its decision in accordance with law. It would be inappropriate for the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction to consider the evidence for itself and reach its own conclusions in matters which have been left by the legislature to the decisions of specially constituted Tribunals. 14. In Joint Registrar of Co-Operative Societies, Madras & others v. P.S.Rajagopal Naidu, Govindarajulu and others, AIR 1970 SC 992, the Apex Court has held that the High Courts should not act as a Court of appeal and re-appraise and re-examine the r....
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....denied that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are extraordinary and discretionary powers as distinguished from ordinary statutory powers. No doubt, Article 227 confers a right of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises the jurisdiction but no corresponding right is conferred upon a litigant to invoke the jurisdiction under the said article as a matter of right. In fact power under this article casts a duty upon the High Court to keep the inferior Courts and Tribunals within the limits of their authority and that they do not cross the limits, ensuring the performance of duties by such Courts and Tribunals in accordance with law conferring powers within the ambit of the enactments creating such Courts and Tribunals. Only wrong decisions may not be a ground for the exercise of jurisdiction under this article unless the wrong is referable to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of power by the subordinate courts and tribunals resulting in grave injustice to any party" 19. In State v. Navjot Sandhu, (2003) 6 SCC 641, the Apex Court, at page 656, para ....
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....on of India, over all Courts and tribunals is basically to keep the subordinate courts/tribunals/appellate authorities constituted under statutes within their bounds and not for correcting mere errors. The exercise of power is limited to want of jurisdiction, errors of law, perverse findings, gross violation of principles of natural justice and like the one. It may be exercised, if it is shown that grave injustice has been done to the person, who has invoked the jurisdiction with such grievance, the Court does not act as an appellate authority to reappraise the evidence and come to a different conclusion. Even if two views are possible, in exercise of power, the Court would not be justified in substituting its own reason for the reasons of the subordinate courts/tribunals or appellate tribunals/boards. Of course, the power of this Court is not taken away, where the statutory appellate tribunal/board brushes aside the evidence on conjunctures and without giving cogent reasons, which would result in error apparent on the face of the records. Unless, the errors questioned are apparently error, perverse and the findings are not supported by any materials, the exercise of power under Ar....
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