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2018 (1) TMI 873
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....as more particularly set out in the said Statement of Claim, produced herewith and marked as Annexure 'N' to this Application, (including stamp duty of Rs. 6,00,000/- and incidental expenses incurred by the Applicant on behalf of Defendant No.1 in respect of the Deed of Simple Mortgage dated 4.5.2002, as requested by Defendant No.1 vide its letter dated 28.2.2002 produced herewith and marked as Annexure "Q") together with further interest at the rate of 17% per annum and additional interest by way of liquidated damages @ 2% per annum from the date of the Application till payment. (b) this Hon'ble Tribunal be pleased to declare that:- (i) The movable fixed assets of the 1st defendant (as more particularly described in Annexure 'B-1' to this Application), are legally and validly hypothecated and charged in favour of the Applicant towards the payment of the amounts due by the 1st Defendant to the Applicant as more particularly set out in the Statement of Claim annexed as Annexure 'N' to this Application. (ii) The immovable properties of the 2nd defendant at Southegowdana village and Gokere village, Bangalore District, in Karnataka (as more particul....
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....lage in Karnataka (as more particularly described in Annexure 'F-1' to this application), with all powers as provided by law, including the power of sale and direct the Receiver to sell the said immovable properties on such terms and conditions as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and hand over the sale proceeds to the applicant towards satisfaction of the applicant's claim herein, and in case of any shortfall to recover the same from the defendant Nos.1 to 3. (f) this Hon'ble Tribunal be pleased to issue a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant Nos.1 to 3 by themselves, or through their servants, agents, attorneys or through any person or party acting for or on behalf of these defendants from selling, alienating, encumbering, leasing or creating any type of third party rights in respect of:- (i) the 1st defendant's hypothecated movable fixed assets (as briefly described in Annexure 'B-1' to this application) or any part thereof. (ii) the 1st defendant's immovable properties at Kumbalgodu village and Sadashivnagar in Bangalore (as briefly described in Annexure 'C-1' to this application), or any part thereof. (iii) The....
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....d it is liable to be deducted in the Statement of Account from the date of the OA within 15 days from the date of receipt of this order, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore, is directed to dismiss the OA granting liberty after getting the full details the banker can file a suit within three months thereafter." 7. Being aggrieved against the order of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Chennai dated 11.03.2015 made in M.A. No.131 of 2013, instant civil revision petition has been filed on the grounds inter alia that the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Chennai, has failed to consider that the Statement of Accounts was only a piece of evidence enabling the applicant bank to prove its claim. The failure to file the statement of accounts could only result in the applicant being unable to rely on the same to prove the claim. However, the applicant can always adduce evidence to prove the claim, by relying on the original cause of action, de hors the statement of accounts. Therefore, the order of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Chennai directing dismissal of the OA for non filing of Statement of Accounts must be held to be only a direction issued in "terroram". 8. On this....
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.... respondents 1 to 3 submitted that order of DRAT, Chennai in M.A. No.131 of 2013, dated 11.03.2015, does not call for any interference, as the bank has failed to submit the statement of accounts to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore. He further submitted that, as per the direction of the Appellate Tribunal, DRT, Bangalore, has dismissed O.A. No.326/2002 on 29.09.2015 and an appeal in R.A. (S.A.) No.7 of 2016 has been preferred before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Chennai, by the petitioner herein. 11. He further submitted that When the consequential order of dismissal by DRT is tested by way of appeal, the challenge to the initial order i.e. order in M.A. No.131 of 2013 dated 11.03.2015 impugned before us, has no legs to stand and therefore, instant civil revision petition is not maintainable. Arguments have also been advanced on the merits of the claim made by the bank. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 12. Adverting to the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the insurance money received by the bank, has not been accounted for, DRAT, Chennai has observed and ordered as hereunder: "After receiving ....
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....rom the date of Original Application within 15 days of the order of the Appellate Tribunal, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore, has dismissed O.A. No.326/2002, against which S.A.(RA) No.7/2016 has been filed. 21. Question to be addressed is, when the consequential order of DRT, Bangalore dismissing O.A. No.326 of 2002 is assailed in R.A. (S.A.) No.7 of 2016, whether the initial order made in M.A. No.131 of 2013 dated 11.03.2015 on the file of DRAT, Chennai can be independently assailed? 22. When the Appellate Tribunal has passed an order, directing DRT, Bangalore to dismiss the original application, for the above said reason, DRT, Bangalore, which is hierarchically subordinate, is bound to implement the order passed by the Appellate forum. Thus, DRT, has implicitly, dismissed O.A. No.326 of 2002. Though an appeal in R.A.(S.A.) No.7 of 2016, has been filed, challenging the dismissal order, DRAT, Chennai, cannot review the order made in M.A. No.131 of 2013 passed in the year 2015. 23. When jurisdiction is conferred on the Debts Recovery Tribunal to adjudicate the claim, on the basis of the rival contentions and evidence to be adduced, directing the Tribunal to dismiss the OA, on t....
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....t, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of making the application, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of making the application, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in party, arises. (2) Where a bank or a financial institution, which has to recover its debt from any person, has filed an application to the Tribunal under sub-section (1) and against the same person another bank or financial institution also has claim to recover its debt, then, the later bank or financial institution may join the applicant bank or financial institution at any stage of the proceedings, before the final order is passed, by making an application to that Tribunal. (3) Every application under sub-section (1) or subsection (2) shall be in such form and accompanied by such documents or other evidence and by such fee as may be prescribed: Provided that the fee may be prescribed having regard to the amount of debt to be recovered: Provided further that ....
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....plication, make such order as it thinks fit. (12) The Tribunal may make an interim order (whether by way of injunction or stay or attachment) against the defendant to debar him from transferring, alienating or otherwise dealing with, or disposing of, any property and assets belonging to him without the prior permission of the Tribunal. (13) (A) Where, at any stage of the proceedings, the Tribunal is satisfied, by affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant, with intent to obstruct or delay or frustrate the execution of any order for the recovery of debt that may be passed against him,-- (i) is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property; or (ii) is about to remove the whole or any part of his property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; or (iii) is likely to cause any damage or mischief to the property or affect its value by misuse or creating third party interest, the Tribunal may direct the defendant, within a time to be fixed by it, either to furnish security, in such sum as may be specified in the order, to produce and place at the disposal of the Tribunal, when required, the said property or the value of the same, or such port....
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....) Where a certificate of recovery is issued against a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) the Tribunal may order the sale proceeds of such company to be distributed among its secured creditors in accordance with the provisions of section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 and to pay the surplus, if any, to the company. (20) The Tribunal may, after giving the applicant and the defendant an opportunity of being heard, pass such interim or final order, including the order for payment of interest from the date on or before which payment of the amount is found due up to the date of realization or actual payment, on the application as it thinks fit to meet the ends of justice. (21) The Tribunal shall send a copy of every order passed by it to the applicant and the defendant. (22) The Presiding Officer shall issue a certificate under his signature on the basis of the order of the Tribunal to the Recovery Officer for recovery of the amount of debt specified in the certificate. (23) Where the Tribunal, which has issued a certificate of recovery, is satisfied that the property is situated within the local limits of the jurisdiction of two or more Tribunals, ....
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....r the tribunal under Article 227 of the Constitution. This power is not,greater than the power under Article 226 and is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority, see Nagendra Nath Bora and another v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, and others. The High Court will not review the discretion of the Authority judicially exercised, but it- may interfere if the exercise of the discretion is capricious or perverse or ultra vires." iv) In Kraipak v. Union of India & Ors. reported in [1970] 1 SCR 457, the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus: ".....Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially. there was no room for the application ofthe rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose ofthe rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries." It was further held in the said judgment as follows: "What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depe....
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....legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigants' defence. 8. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse or....
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....iding or determining questions of various kinds. It will, I suppose usually be of an administrative kind, but sometimes, it will involve matter of law as well as matter of fact, or even depend upon matter of law alone. In such cases, the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts. I need not and that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides for that is a duty lying upon everyone who decides anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial....The Board is in the nature of the arbitral tribunal, and a Court of law has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from the determination either upon law or upon fact. But if the Court is satisfied either that the Board have not acted judicially in the way I have described, or have not determined the question which they are required by the Act to determine, then there is a remedy by mandamus and certiorari". 13. Lord Wright also emphasized from the same decision the observation of the Lord Chancellor that the Board can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties to the c....
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.... umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life. 16. Natural justice has been variously defined by different Judges. A few instances will suffice. In Drew v. Drew and Lebura (1855(2) Macg. 1.8, Lord Cranworth defined it as 'universal justice'. In James Dunber Smith v. Her Majesty the Queen (1877-78(3) App.Case 614, 623 JC) Sir Robort P. Collier, speaking for the judicial committee of Privy council, used the phrase 'the requirements of substantial justice', while in Arthur John Specman v. Plumstead District Board of Works (1884- 85(10) App.Case 229, 240), Earl of Selbourne, S.C. preferred the phrase 'the substantial requirement of justice'. In Vionet v. Barrett (1885(55) LJRD 39, 41), Lord Esher, MR defined natural justice as 'the natural sense of what is right and wrong'. While, however, deciding Hookings v. Smethwick Local Board of Health (1890(24) QBD 712), Lord Fasher, M.R. instead of using the definition given earlier by him in Vionet's case (supra) chose to define natural justice as 'fundamental justice'. In Ridge v. Baldwin (1963(1) WB 569, 578), Harman LJ, in the Court of Appeal countered natural justice with 'fairplay in action....
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....tice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done'. Whenever an order is struck down as invalid being in violation of principles of natural justice, there is no final decision of the case and fresh proceedings are left upon. All that is done is to vacate the order assailed by virtue of its inherent defect, but the proceedings are not terminated. 28. Let us consider few cases on the scope of power of superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. (i) In Jodhey v. State reported in AIR 1952 All. 788, after hearing the history of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Allahabad High Court hold thus, "9. A comparison of the above provision of law with analogous provisions of law prior to the Constitution of India brings into prominence some important features of the new state of law established by the constitution. The most important feature of Article 227, Constitution of India, is that it has omitted any restriction on the power of the High Court to interfere in judicial matters, which was imposed by Sub-section (2) of Section 224, Government of India Act, 1935. In this way, it has enlarged the power of the High C....
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....nstitution of India is "Power of superintendence over all Courts by the High Courts". This may be contrasted with the marginal note of Section 224, Government of India Act, 1935, which was "Administrative functions of the High Court" and the marginal note of Section 107, Government of India Act, 1915, which was "Powers of High Court with respect to subordinate Courts". Similarly, the marginal note of Section 15, High Courts Act, 1861, was "High Courts to superintend and to frame rules of practice for subordinate Courts", The alteration in this marginal note also emphasises the fact that the powers of the High Court under the Constitution extend not merely to administrative functions but embraces all functions, whether administrative or judicial. It also indicates that this power under the Constitution extends to all Courts and is not confined to "subordinate Courts" as indicated by the marginal note of Section 107, Government of India Act, 1915. A comparison of the draft Constitution with the enacted Constitution shows that the marginal notes were inserted under the authority of and with the knowledge of the Constituent Assembly. Under the above circumstances the view regarding the....
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....superintendence in this Clause and the purpose of this Article seems to be to make the High Court the custodian of all justice within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction and to arm it with a weapon that could be wielded for the purpose of seeing that justice is meted out fairly and properly by the bodies mentioned therein. To fulfil this function it seems to me that the power of superintendence of the High Court over judicial matters is as necessary as over administrative matters. As a matter of fact judicial function of a Court is not less important than its administrative function. In fact it is more necessary to rectify lapses in judicial matters than defects in administrative matters. A judicial error might affect the rights, liberty and freedom of the subject whereas an administrative error might not do so. To my mind superintendence over judicial functions is a necessary complement of superintendence over administrative functions and it is sometimes very difficult to say where the one ends and the ether begins. If the High Court is to perform this function efficiently and effectively, it must act on both sides, otherwise the very power of superintendence will be crippl....
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....e powers cannot be exercised unless there has been an unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction not possessed by Courts or a gross abuse of jurisdiction possessed by them or an unjutifiable refusal to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them by law. Apart from matters relating to jurisdiction, the High Court may be moved to act under it when there has been a flagrant abuse of the elementary principles of justice or a manifest error of law patent on the face of the record or an outrageous miscarriage of justice which calls for remedy. Under this power, the High Court will not be justified in converting itself into a Court of appeal and subverting findings of fact by a minute scrutiny of evidence or interfering with the discretionary orders of Court. Further, this power should not be exercised, if there is some other remedy open to a party. Above all, it should be remembered that this is a power possessed by the Court and is to be exercised at its discretion and cannot be claimed as a matter of right by any party." ii) In Trimbak v. Ram Chandra reported in AIR 1977 SC 1222, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: " It is a well-settled rule of practice of this Court not to inte....
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....he Court found ready to hand were the prerogative writs. But not unnaturally the control exercised was strictly legal, and no longer political. Certiorari would issue to call up the records of justices of the peace and commissioners for examination in the King's Bench and for quashing if any legal defect was found. At first there was much quashing for defects of form on the record, i.e. for error on the face. Later, as the doctrine of ultra vires developed, that became the dominant principle of control" (page 592). 9. The nature and scope of the writ of certiorari and when can it issue was beautifully set out in a concise passage, quoted hereafter, by Lord Chancellor Viscount Simon in Ryots of Garabandho and other villages Vs. Zamindar of Parlakimedi and Anr. - AIR 1943 PC 164. "The ancient writ of certiorari in England is an original writ which may issue out of a superior Court requiring that the record of the proceedings in some cause or matter pending before an inferior Court should be transmitted into the superior Court to be there dealt with. The writ is so named because, in its original Latin form, it required that the King should "be certified" of the proceedings to b....
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....e court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous. (4) An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari if it is a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision." 11. In the initial years the Supreme Court was not inclined to depart from the traditional role of certiorari jurisdiction and consistent with the historical background felt itself bound by such procedural technicalities as were well-known to the English judges. In later years the Supreme Court has relaxed the procedural and technical rigours, yet the broad and fundamental principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction have not been given a go-by. 12. In the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction the High Court proceeds on an assumption that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject- matter has the jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly. The High Court would not, therefore, for the purpose of certiorari ....
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.... if the court or tribunal though competent has acted in flagrant disregard of the rules or procedure or in violation of the principles of natural justice where no particular procedure is prescribed. An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari subject to the following factors being available if the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law but a mere wrong decision is not amenable to a writ of certiorari. 15. Any authority or body of persons constituted by law or having legal authority to adjudicate upon questions affecting the rights of a subject and enjoined with a duty to act judicially or quasi-judicially is amenable to the certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court. The proceedings of judicial courts subordinate to High Court can be subjected to certiorari. 16. While dealing with the question whether the orders and the proceedings of subordinate Court are amenable to certiorari writ jurisdiction of the High Court, we would be failing in our duty if we do not make a reference to a larger Bench and a Constitution Bench decisi....
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....orari by High Court cannot be directed to Court subordinate to it. And lastly, the passage from Halsbury quoted in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar's case (supra) is from third edition of Halsbury Laws of England (Simond's Edition, 1955). The law has undergone a change in England itself and this changed legal position has been noted in a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra Vs. Ashok Hurra and Anr. - (2002) 4 SCC 388. Justice SSM Quadri speaking for the Constitution Bench has quoted the following passage from Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn.(Reissue) Vol.1 (1) : "103. Historically, prohibition was a writ whereby the royal courts of common law prohibited other courts from entertaining matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the common law courts; certiorari was issued to bring the record of an inferior court in the King's Bench for review or to remove indictments and to public officers and bodies, to order the performance of a public duty. All three were called prerogative writs." "109. Certiorari lies to bring decisions of an inferior court, tribunal, public authority or any other body of persons before the High Court for revi....
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.... of certiorari. 21. Certiorari jurisdiction though available is not to be exercised as a matter of course. The High Court would be justified in refusing the writ of certiorari if no failure of justice has been occasioned. In exercising the certiorari jurisdiction the procedure ordinarily followed by the High Court is to command the inferior court or tribunal to certify its record or proceedings to the High Court for its inspection so as to enable the High Court to determine whether on the face of the record the inferior court has committed any of the preceding errors occasioning failure of justice. 22. Article 227 of the Constitution confers on every High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction excepting any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the armed forces. Without prejudice to the generality of such power the High Court has been conferred with certain specific powers by sub-Articles (2) and (3) of Article 227 with which we are not concerned hereat. It is wellsettled that the power of superintendence so conferred on the High Court is administrative ....
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.... yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. 25. Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the occasions wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ of certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in the given facts and circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost obliterated in practice. Probably, this is the reason why it has become customary with the lawyers labeling their petitions as one common under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, though such pr....
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....very stage of proceedings to judicial review by way of appeal or revision. So long as an error is capable of being corrected by a superior court in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction though available to be exercised only at the conclusion of the proceedings, it would be sound exercise of discretion on the part of the High Court to refuse to exercise power of superintendence during the pendency of the proceedings. However, there may be cases where but for invoking the supervisory jurisdiction, the jurisdictional error committed by the inferior court or tribunal would be incapable of being remedied once the proceedings have concluded. 27. In Chandrasekhar Singh & Ors. Vs. Siva Ram Singh & Ors., (1979) 3 SCC 118, the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution came up for the consideration of this Court in the context of Sections 435 and 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code which prohibits a second revision to the High Court against decision in first revision rendered by the Sessions Judge. On a review of earlier decisions, the three-Judges Bench summed up the position of law as under :- (i) that the powers conferred on the High Court under Article 22....
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.....s.758, 917 and 1295 of 2002 - Govind Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) decided on April 7, 2003 (reported as [2003] 6 ILD 468 makes an indepth survey of decided cases including almost all the leading decisions by this Court and holds - "The power of the High Court under Article 226 cannot be whittled down, nullified, curtailed, abrogated, diluted or taken either by judicial pronouncement or by the legislative enactment or even by the amendment of the Constitution. The power of judicial review is an inherent part of the basic structure and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution." The essence of constitutional and legal principles, relevant to the issue at hand, has been correctly summed up by the Division Bench of the High Court and we record our approval of the same. 30. It is interesting to recall two landmark decisions delivered by High Courts and adorning the judicial archives. In Balkrishna Hari Phansalkar Vs. Emperor, AIR 1933 Bombay 1, the question arose before a Special Bench: whether the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court by Section 107 of Government of India Act 1915 can be controlled by the Governor-General e....
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....rds, the High Court's power of superintendence is a power to keep subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. 32. The principles deducible, well-settled as they are, have been well summed up and stated by a twojudges Bench of this Court recently in State, through Special Cell, New Delhi Vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afshan Guru and Ors., JT 2003 (4) SC 605, para 28. This Court held : (i) the jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the state Legislature; (ii) the supervisory jurisdiction is wide and can be used to meet the ends of justice, also to interfere even with interlocutory order; (iii) the power must be exercised sparingly, only to move subordinate courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority to see that they obey the law. The power is not available to be exercised to correct mere errors (whether on the facts or laws) and also cannot be exercised "as the cloak of an appeal in disguise". 33. In Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur Vs. M/s. Swaraj Developers & Ors., (2003) 4 Scale 241, another two-Judges bench of this Co....
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....ion under Art.226 of the Constitution would not be maintainable." 36. It seems that the High Court in its decision impugned herein formed an impression from the abovequoted passage that a prayer for issuance of injunction having been refused by trial court as well as the appellate court, both being subordinate to High Court and the dispute being between two private parties, issuance of injunction by High Court amounts to issuance of a mandamus against a private party which is not permissible in law. 37. The above quoted sentence from Ganga Saran's case cannot be read torn out of the context. All that the Full Bench has said is that while exercising certiorari jurisdiction over a decision of the court below refusing to issue an order of injunction, the High Court would not, while issuing a writ of certiorari, also issue a mandamus against a private party. Article 227 of the Constitution has not been referred to by the Full Bench. Earlier in this judgment we have already pointed out the distinction between Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution and we need not reiterate the same. In this context, we may quote the Constitution Bench decision in T.C. Basappa Vs. T. N....
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....or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (iii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e., which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be ....
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....f proceedings. If it does not intervene, the error of the moment may earn immunity from correction. The facts and circumstances of a given case may make it more appropriate for the High Court to exercise selfrestraint and not to intervene because the error of jurisdiction though committed is yet capable of being taken care of and corrected at a later stage and the wrong done, if any, would be set right and rights and equities adjusted in appeal or revision preferred at the conclusion of the proceedings. But there may be cases where 'a stitch in time would save nine'. At the end, we may sum up by saying that the power is there but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the dictates of judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience and practical wisdom of the Judge. iv) In Following Surya Devi's case, cited supra, in Jeya v. Sundaram Iyyar reported in 2005 (4) MLJ 278, this Court held that, "when it is shown that the trial Court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction, properly applying the provisions of law, or when it is so that the trial Court has wrongly exercised its jurisdiction, offending the statute, then, invoking the supervisory....
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....reby occasioning failure of justice." 24. It is clear that whether it is a writ of Certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. It is also clear that the High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. 25. As observed in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai (supra), the exercise of jurisdiction under article 226 or 227 of the Constitution cannot be tied down in a straight jacket formula or rigid rules. To put it clear though the power is there but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the dictates of judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience and practical wisdom of the judge. vi....
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....and re-examine the relevant facts and circumstances which led to the making of order. 15. In Muni Lal and others v. Prescribed Authority and others, AIR 1978 SC 29, it has been held that the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion different from that of the prescribed Authority. 16. In Ganpat Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde, AIR 1978 SC 955, the Apex Court has held that the High Courts cannot justify the exercise of its discretionary powers under Article 227of the Constitution as to the finding of fact; unless such finding of fact is clearly perverse and patently unreasonable. 17. In Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S.Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447, the Apex Court at page 460, para (4) has held thus:- " It is true that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution the High Court could go into the question of facts or look into the evidence if justice so requires it, if there is any misdirection in law or a view of fact taken in the teeth of preponderance of evidence. But the High Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 277 of the Constitution to look into the fact in the absence of....
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....:- "Thus the law is that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeking that they obey the law. The powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used, to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even with an interlocutory order. However, the power under Article 227 is a discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court, such a source of power, when the High Court itself does not terms purport to exercise any such discretionary power. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence , under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate court and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to warra....
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....h in such orders may not be available. ix) In Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement reported in AIR 2009 SC 712, at paragraph 81, held as follows: " 81. The power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution conferred on every High Court over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction is very wide and discretionary in nature. It can be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to meet the ends of justice. It is equitable in nature. While exercising supervisory jurisdiction, a High Court not only acts as a court of law but also as a court of equity. It is, therefore, power and also the duty of the Court to ensure that power of superintendence must 'advance the ends of justice and uproot injustice'." 29. Statement of accounts, would reveal, the loan availed, amounts paid, and amount transferred by any other institution, in the case on insurance claim amount. Even taking it for granted that such statement is not filed, still it is always open to both parties, to adduce evidence, in Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore, in support of their rival contentions. Public money to the tune of Rs. 21,76,42,758.42 is involv....