TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2012 (11) TMI 1234
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....g 0-2-3 and 0-7-1 (9500 sq.mtrs.) in Survey Nos. 2 and 3 respectively, situate in the revenue estate of village Shirwame Taluka and District Thane, was owned by the predecessors-in-interest of the Appellants, namely, Kana Ganpat Joshi, Maruti Kana Joshi, Dinanath Ganpat Joshi and Gopinath Ganpat Joshi. A very large chunk of land including the said land stood notified Under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') on 6.6.1964 for the establishment of the Ulhas Khore Project i.e. a project for industrial development. However, no subsequent proceedings were taken up thereafter, and the acquisition proceedings lapsed. The predecessors-in-interest of the Appellants were not merely illiterate farmers, but were also absolutely unaware of their rights and hence too inarticulate to claim them. Thus, they could be persuaded by the officers of the Respondent authorities to hand over possession of the said land. Actual physical possession of the said land was taken by the State authorities and handed over to the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (hereinafter called as the 'Development Corporation') in the year 1964 itself. ....
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....the Appellants. The Respondents herein have placed various affidavits on record and the facts of the case have fairly been admitted. 6. The Appellants were deprived of their immovable property in 1964, when Article 31 of the Constitution was still intact and the right to property was a part of fundamental rights under Article 19 of the Constitution. It is pertinent to note that even after the Right to Property seized to be a Fundamental Right, taking possession of or acquiring the property of a citizen most certainly tantamounts to deprivation and such deprivation can take place only in accordance with the "law", as the said word has specifically been used in Article 300-A of the Constitution. Such deprivation can be only by resorting to a procedure prescribed by a statute. The same cannot be done by way of executive fiat or order or administration caprice. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar, etc. etc. v. State of Gujarat and Anr. AIR 1995 SC 142, it has been held as follows: - In other words, Article 300-A only limits the power of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There is no deprivation without due sanction of law. Deprivation by any ....
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....e must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. There is a distinction, a true and concrete distinction, between the principle of "eminent domain" and "police power" of the State. Under certain circumstances, the police power of the State may be used temporarily, to take possession of property but the present case clearly shows that neither of the said powers have been exercised. A question then arises with respect to the authority or power under which the State entered upon the land. It is evident that the act of the State amounts to encroachment, in exercise of "absolute power" which in common parlance is also called abuse of power or use of muscle power. To further clarify this position, it must be noted that the authorities have treated the land owner as a 'subject' of medieval India, but not as a 'citizen' under our constitution. 10. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the Rule of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of disc....
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....le ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay. The court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have infact emerged, by delay on the part of the Petitioners. (Vide: Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and Ors. AIR 1970 SC 769; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. AIR 1987 SC 1353; Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur and Ors. AIR 1993 SC 802; Dayal Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 2003 SC 1140; and Shankara Co-op Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar and Ors. AIR 2011 SC 2161) 13. In the case of H.D Vora v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. AIR 1984 SC 866, this Court condoned a 30 year delay in approaching the court where it found violation of substantive legal rights of the applicant. In that case, the requisition of premises made by the State was assailed. 14. The High Court committed an error in holding the Appellants non-suited on the groun....
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....te records were not available, or that the Appellants approached the authorities at a belated stage are contrary to the evidence available on record and thus, cannot be accepted and excused as it remains a slur on the system of governance and justice alike, and an anathema to the doctrine of equality, which is the soul of our Constitution. Even under valid acquisition proceedings, there is a legal obligation on the part of the authorities to complete such acquisition proceedings at the earliest, and to make payment of requisite compensation. The appeals etc. are required to be decided expeditiously, for the sole reason that, if a person is not paid compensation in time, he will be unable to purchase any land or other immovable property, for the amount of compensation that is likely to be paid to him at a belated stage. 18. While dealing with the similar issue, this Court in K. Krishna Reddy and Ors. v. The Special Dy. Collector, Land Acquisition Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh AIR 1988 SC 2123, held as under: ...After all money is what money buys. What the claimants could have bought with the compensation in 1977 cannot do in 1988. Perhaps, not even one half of it. It is ....