AI Drafter 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2004 (2) TMI 32
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
..... The contention of the assessee was that it is not merely a blender of tea, it produces a new and distinct type of tea having a pre-determined quality in terms of taste, liquor, aroma and hygienically packed through mechanical contrivances which the assessee markets in packets and under different brand names and, therefore, the assessee should be considered not only as a blender of tea but also a manufacturer or at least a producer of certain types of tea in packed condition. An argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant was only to the aforesaid aspect and therefore the facts relating to items other than tea need not be discussed here. The Assessing Officer held that at best the assessee can be considered to be engaged in "processing" only for which deduction for investment allowance under section 32A of the Act would not be available and accordingly the claim of the assessee towards the same was not entertained by the Assessing Officer. The assessee preferred an appeal which was dismissed. Further appeal filed by the assessee before the Tribunal having also failed, the present appeal was filed by the assessee. Dr. Pal, learned counsel for the appellant, drew....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... 387 (Cal). Mr. Kapoor, learned counsel appearing for the Revenue, contended that in the present case admittedly even after completion of the process undertaken by the assessee tea remained tea and there was no new product and, therefore, the assessee could not have been held to be involved in any manufacturing process or in production. With regard to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, it has been contended that the said law does not become a declaration of law by the apex court when the special leave petition filed against the said judgment was dismissed on the merits. Reliance was placed on behalf of the Revenue on the judgment in the case of Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [2000] 245 ITR 360 (SC) and the Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 334. In reply to the said argument, Dr. Debi Prasad Pal, placed reliance on further judgments in the cases of Kalpetta Estates Ltd. v. CIT [1996] 221 ITR 601 (SC); Junior Telecom Officers Forum v. Union of India [1993] Suppl. 4 SCC 693; Babu Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 116 and Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm v. K. Santhakumaran, AIR 1999 SC 1486. After c....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....record before the assessing authority and the Tribunal by way of affidavits and statements of the technical experts, wholesalers, bulk consumers and retailers. 50. For the said reasons, keeping in view the law laid down in Ujagar Singh's case and the uncontroverted facts brought on record, it is quite permissible to take it as a possible view that the packaged blended tea produced in the industrial unit of the petitioner is a manufactured product, the contributing inputs being garden teas of various colour and flavour and the packing materials." Another Division Bench of this court in the case of Aippeejay Pvt. Ltd. [1994] 206 ITR 367 while considering the similar aspect took into consideration a similar business of blending different types of tea and selling them so blended in the market, for the purpose of finding whether the assessee there could be said to be manufacturing or producing articles within the meaning of section 80J(4)(iii) of the Income-tax Act. It took into consideration that when various types of tea procured blended and sold whether it amounted to manufacturing or producing any article within the scope of section 32A or 80J of the Act. The Division Bench re....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....erits, it has only one meaning that the apex court approved the finding recorded in the impugned judgment on the merits and, therefore, the judgment of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court got the stamp of approval from the apex court and therefore, is a law declared within the meaning of article 141 of the Constitution of India. But the law in this regard appears to have been settled by the apex court in the case of Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [2000] 245 ITR 360 holding, inter alia, as follows: "A petition seeking grant of special leave to appeal may be rejected for several reasons. For example, it may be rejected (i) as barred by time, or (ii) being a defective presentation, (iii) the petitioner having no locus standi to file the petition, (iv) the conduct of the petitioner disentitling him to any indulgence by the court, (v) the question raised by the petitioner for consideration by this court being not fit for consideration or deserving being dealt with by the apex court of the country and so on. The expression often employed by this court while disposing of such petitions are-'heard and dismissed', 'dismissed', 'dismissed as barred by time' and so on. May be....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....away the jurisdiction of any other court, Tribunal or authority to express any opinion in conflict with or in departure from the view taken by this court because; permitting it to do so would be subversive of judicial discipline and an affront to the order of this court. However, this would be so not by reference to the doctrine of merger . . . To sum up, our conclusions are: . . . (iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Cou....