TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2004 (8) TMI 78
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ed of by respondent No. 1 by the impugned order, of course, with reasons. It appears from the impugned order that while rejecting the prayer of the petitioner, respondent No. 1 observed that the assessee maintains the accounts in such a way that unless the previous year's assessment is completed the next year's cannot be taken up for consideration. The first hearing for the assessment year of 1984-85 could be fixed on August 1, 1986, though the return was filed on July 26, 1984, and the assessment thereof was completed on March 24, 1987. The case could not be taken up for consideration until the previous year's assessment of 1983-84 was completed on February 24, 1986. Hence, the delay in taking up the case for hearing from March 1, 1986, to July 31, 1986, is held not attributable to the assessee and the provisions of rule 40(1) are applicable for this period. The officer concerned further reasoned that the company manages the accounts in such a way that it is difficult to find the actual income, rather it helps suppress income. Consequently, a deep scrutiny and examination of accounts and enquiries were necessary which is evident from the fact that in each year huge additions of in....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ich is basically different and distinct from the provision of rule 40(5). His further argument is that once it is established that the reasons for delayed assessment are not attributable to the assessee, the power coupled with duty to grant waiver is a matter of course and mandatory. In support of his contention he has relied on the decisions of the Bombay High Court reported in 89 ITR 144 (Bom) (sic) and CIT v. Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd. [1996] 217 ITR 216. He has also relied on a decision reported in Brig. Anant Singh v. CIT [2003] 261 ITR 335 (Delhi), 337. He distinguishes the decision of the Kerala High Court reported in Deputy CIT v. P.M. Antony [2002] 257 ITR 616 cited by Mr. D.K. Some appearing for the Revenue. Dr. Pal submits that the aforesaid decision was rendered on factually different circumstances, and moreover the same was rendered under rule 40(5). Drawing my attention to rule 40(5) of the said Rules, he submits that in this case the discretion is certainly vested with the officer concerned as regards power of waiver, and such discretion must be exercised judicially and not capriciously or whimsically. Dr. Pal further submits that in this case the writ petition sh....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....is, in my view, should not be entertained though such point was taken at the first instance. As rightly argued by Dr. Pal the revisional jurisdiction cannot be an efficacious and alternative remedy to discourage the writ court to entertain the writ petition. An efficacious and alternative remedy would be such effective machinery that the litigant can agitate all points both on fact and law. The right of appeal is one of such alternative remedy as in the appellate jurisdiction one can raise all points regarding facts unlike the revisional jurisdiction. Even in all situations an appeal cannot be said to be an alternative effective remedy as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana reported in [1985] 3 SCC 267. If the litigant is debarred from agitating all questions, I think the revisional provision cannot be an efficacious and alternative remedy. The meaning of the word "alternative" is clear enough to suggest that all questions both procedural and substantial can be decided by such a forum, which can be a substitute for the ordinary forum. I have examined the provisions of section 264 of the Income-tax Act, which appear to be the power of r....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....the Assessing Officer. It appears to me that the Assessing Officer has recorded that returns for the assessment year was duly filed and the same was completed almost after two years. The reasons given in the impugned order are that unless the previous assessment was completed, the subsequent assessment could not be undertaken because it has got the chained connections and/or relations. Mr. Some has rightly reminded me that the reasoning of the quasi-judicial authority should not be upset by the superior court in exercise of power of judicial review. But this does not mean that patently absurd and irrational reasons should be supported because of limited jurisdiction. It is not understood by this court nor any reason is assigned as to why the previous assessment, namely, the assessment of 1982-83 could not be completed within the time, if the same has connection with the subsequent assessment order. Therefore, this reason for delayed action by the Assessing Officer is not acceptable as being rationally justified reasons, even applying the layman's intelligence. Ordinarily the assessment should have been completed within one year. I find from the record that the application was ini....