TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2005 (5) TMI 53
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.... appeal before the Tribunal beyond a period of 160 days along with an application for condonation of delay. The Tribunal by the impugned order rejected the application for condonation of delay. Heard Sri D.K. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, and Sri A.N. Mahajan, learned standing counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue. With the consent of counsel for both the parties, the present appeal is being decided at the admission stage itself. We have perused the order of the Tribunal. In our opinion while considering the application for condonation of delay, the Tribunal has taken a pedantic view. In the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, it was explained by Sri Udit Kohli, one of the partners of the firm that anot....
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.... the appeal was to be filed at Agra and for filing of appeal so many formalities have to be carried on which require effective involvement and in case a person is ill, it is not expected from him to get the appeal prepared and filed. The illness of Udit Kohli has not been disputed. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the reasons given by the appellant for the delay in filing the appeal were sufficient and liable to be condoned. In the various cases the apex court held that in the matters of condonation of delay a pragmatic view should be taken and there should be a liberal approach. The law of limitation is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublica ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to liti....
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....day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense and pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that the judiciary ....
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.... where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach ..." In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra reported in, [1977] 47 Comp Cas 453 (SC); AIR 1976 SC 237, the hon'ble Supreme Court held that discretion given by section 5 should not be defined or crystallised so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. In Brij Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram reported in AIR 1917 PC 156 it was observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under section 5 is whether....