AI Drafter 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1992 (7) TMI 340
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....a Lower Grade Hindi Teacher in the Saraswathi Vilasam U.P. School, Kondazhy in a temporary vacancy for the period from 10th June 1980 to 11th August 1980. That appointment was duly approved by the Assistant Educational Officer concerned. She was again appointed in a leave vacancy from 5th September 1980 to 28th November 1980, which was also approved. Thereafter, when a vacancy arose in the same post between 10th January 1989 to 22nd March 1989, the manager did not appoint anybody. In a subsequent temporary vacancy for the period from 3rd July 1989 to 1st September 1989, the fifth Respondent in the writ petition (second Appellant) was appointed. The Petitioner contended that her claims under Rule 51A of Chapter XIV-A of the Kerala Education Rules were unjustly overlooked. She contended that no notice was given to her by the manager as contemplated by Note 2 to Rule 51A. She made a representation on 7th July 1989 to the manager as well as to the Assistant Educational Officer, and requested not to approve the appointment of the second Appellant. When there was delay, she filed O.P. No. 6454 of 1989, which was allowed on 14th August 1989 directing disposal of the representation. Therea....
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....ibed under Rule 1(2) will not apply in the case of teachers claiming preference for appointment under Rule 51A. The learned Single Judge then went into the question of relinquishment and observed that there had been several bad practices among managers to obtain relinquishment letters even at the time of appointment, and that therefore unless the procedure prescribed under Note 2 to Rule 51A is strictly followed, there is no question of forfeiture of the right under Rule 51A. For the said purpose, the learned Single Judge relied on a decision of this Court in Nirmala v. D.E.O. I.L.R. 1976 Ker. 149, wherein it was held that it was imperative on the part of the manager to issue an appointment order to claimant under Rule 51A in the address available, when a vacancy arises. If a statute provides that an act has to be done in a particular manner, that act can be done only in that manner as stated in University of Kashmir, v. Dr. Mohd. Yasin A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 238. The learned Single Judge then held that there could be no question of waiver of right under Rule 51A as long as the procedure prescribed under Note 2 to Rule 51A has not been followed, that context it was observed that it was n....
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....-3 relinquishment letter dated 7th September 1982 alleged to have been given by the 8th Respondent to the manager. Thereafter the 8th Respondent filed a revision before the Government, which allowed the revision by Ext. P-7 order dated 11th February 1992 holding that there was no relinquishment of right in accordance with the provisions contained in the Kerala Education Rules. Questioning the said order the writ. Petitioner filed the O.P. and the same was dismissed by the learned Single Judge relying upon the decision in P.V. Vijayalakshmy Kutty's case 1992 (1) K.L.J. 56, which is the subject matter of W.A. No. 233 of 1992. It is against this judgment that the writ Petitioner has preferred this appeal. 4. The point for consideration in these appeals is whether there could be a valid relinquishment or forfeiture of a right accrued under Rule 51A of Chapter XIV-A of the K.E.R., if the procedure under note 2 to Rule 51A was not followed? 5. For the purpose of deciding the above question, we shall assume that in both the cases the relinquishment letters were issued, and they were issued voluntarily by persons who were having a preferential right to appointment under Rule 51A.....
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....he contract Act. After referring to the inequality of bargaining power and contracts of adhesion the Supreme Court referred to unconscionable bargains also. "Public Policy" observed their Lordships, "however is not the policy of a particular Government. It connotes some matter which concerns the public good and the public interest. The concept of what is for the public good or in the public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or the public interest has varied from time to time. As new concepts take the place of old, transactions which were once considered against public policy are now being upheld by the Courts and similarly where there has been a well recognised head of public policy, the Courts have not shirked from extending it to new transactions and changed circumstances and have at times not even flinched from inventing a new head of public "policy". After referring to the two schools of thought, namely, the narrow one, and the broad one, in regard to public policy and to the statement made by Borrough, J. in Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 2 Bing. 229 : 130 E.R. 294 that public policy is an 'unruly horse', the Supreme Court referred to the ....
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.... clear days. It is only when such an option is not exercised by the teacher, her or his preferential right would be forfeited. It is now well settled that if a statute prescribes that an act has to be done in a particular manner, that act can be done only in that manner, and in no other manner. If a statute gives a power to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden: Taylor v. Taylor (1875) 1 Ch. D. 426 quoted in State of Gujarat v. Shantilal A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 654 and Kashmir University v. Mohd. Yusin A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 238. 9. A case more directly on the point is the one in Ramachandra v. Govind: A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 915 as it relates to surrender of rights by a tenant under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, and the rules made thereunder. We say that the said decision is more apposite because in the present case, we are dealing with relinquishment of a right a teacher in respect of his or her prefrential claim under Rule 51A of the Kerala Education Rules, while in the Bombay case, surrender by tenant of his tenancy rights was the subject of consideration under the Bombay ....