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TaxTMI 
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1967 (5) TMI 73
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....lected as the President of the Board. On October 26, 1966 a notice of intention to move a motion of no confidence in the appellant was presented by certain members of the Board. to the District Magistrate, Aligarh. The District Magistrate issued notices to the members on November 17, 1966 fixing November 25, 1966 as the date for the meeting of the Board to consider the non-confidence motion. This was done under s. 87-A of the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916. On November 22, 1966, the petitioner tiled a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Allahabad asking that the meeting be stopped. The case was listed before the High Court on December 1, 1966. Before this date the meeting of the Board was adjourned to De....
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.... total strength of the Board and must be accompanied by a copy of the motion which it is proposed to makeand should be delivered in person by any two of the members signing the notice to the District Magistrate. This was done. Sub-sections (3), (4), (5) and (6) then provide as follows:- "(3) The District Magistrate shall then convene a meeting for the consideration of the motion to be held at the office of the Board, on the date land at the time appointed by him which shall not be earlier than thirty' and not later than thirty-five days from the date on which the notice under sub-section (2) was delivered to him. He shall send by registered post not less than seven clear days before the data of the meeting a notice of such meeting and....
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....ion shall not for any reason be adjourned". The contentions of the appellant are based upon the provisions of sub-ss. (3) and (5 ) and it is contended that there has been a breach of these provisions and therefore the resolution is void. Three arguments in this connection have been raised before us and we shall mention them. now. The first contention is that the notice which was sent out by the District Magistrate by registered post did not allow seven clear days before the date of the meeting as required by the latter part of subsection (3). In advancing this argument the learned counsel for the appellant contends that the critical date is not the date on which the notice is despatched but the date on which the notice is received. S....
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....n "not less than thirty days" and, therefore, thirty clear days must intervene between the two terminal days. In support of his contention the learned counsel relies upon a ruling reported in Sin. Haradevi v. State of Andhra and Another(A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 229) in which the expression "not earlier than three days" was equated to the expression "not less than three days" that is to say, three clear days. He also relies upon certain other rulings which deal with the expression "not less than so many days". In our judgment the expression "not earlier than thirty days" is not to be equated to the expression ,.not less than thirty days". It is no doubt true that where the expression is "no....
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....would include the 30th day but not the 29th day because 29th day must be regarded as earlier than thirty days. If the provision were "not earlier than thirty days and not later, than thirty days" it is obvious that -only the 30th day could be meant. This proves that the fixing of the date of the meeting was therefore in accordance with law. We respectfully disapprove of the view taken in the Andhra Pradesh case. The third point arises under the following circumstances. The District Magistrate had arranged with the District Judge for a stipendiary judicial officer to preside over the meeting to be convened.-on November 25. The District Judge had nominated. one Mr. R. R. Agarwal, Additional Civil Judge, Aligarh for this purpose. M....
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.... the judicial officer knows in advance that he would not be able to attend the meeting that he had not the power to adjourn the meeting in advance. No visible profit results from such a construction. In fact, the words of sub-s. (5) are that if the judicial officer is unable to preside at the meeting he may, after recording his reasons, adjourn the meeting to such other date and time as he may appoint. This can happen not only at :the meeting but also before the date of meeting if the judicial officer is in a position to say that he would be unable to preside at the meeting. If this were not so some unforeseen event which requires the presiding officer to be absent would frustrate the entire non-confidence motion because the judicial office....