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2017 (5) TMI 371
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....ing out of the said complaint qua the petitioner. (B) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned verification order dated 12th January, 2012, of the Metropolitan Magistrate issuing summons to the petitioner in Criminal Case No.259 of 2012, (Annexure A). (C ) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 26th November, 2013, passed by the Sessions Court in Criminal Revision Application No.109 of 2012, (Annexure B) qua the petitioner (D) Pending hearing and final disposal of present petition, Your Lordships may be pleased to stay further proceedings in connection with or pursuant to impugned complaint dated 14th December, 2011/12th January, 2012, registered as Criminal Case No.259 of 2012. (E) Your Lordships may be pleased to grant ad interim relief in terms of para 7(D) above. (F) Any other and further reliefs as may be deemed just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case may kindly be granted." 3. The writ applicant herein is one of the accused persons in a complaint filed by the respondent....
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.... 8. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the complaint deserves to be quashed so far as the applicantaccused herein is concerned. The law so far as the liability of a Director of a Company under Section 141 of the Act is concerned, is no longer res integra. The Supreme Court in the case of National Small Industries Corporation Limited v. Harmeet Singh Paintal and another (2010) 3 SCC 330 has explained, the law very succinctly: 1) Leave granted in all the above special leave petitions. The appeals arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) Nos. 445- 461 of 2008 have been filed by the appellant-National Small Industries Corporation Limited against the common judgment and order dated 24.10.2007 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in a batch of cases whereby the High Court quashed the summoning orders passed by the trial Court against respondent No.1 - Harmeet Singh Paintal, under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short the Act) 2) The connected criminal appeal arising out of S.L.P. Crl. No. 1079 of 200....
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....d not make the payment to the appellant. The appellant, on 11.01.1999, filed a complaint before the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi against respondent No.1 and others under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act. By order dated 04.02.1999, the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, after recording evidence summoned the accused persons including respondent No.1 herein. 8) Respondent No.1 filed an application before the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi for dropping of proceedings against him. By order dated 08.09.2004, the Metropolitan Magistrate dismissed the said application. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent filed a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the High Court for quashing of the complaint. The High Court, after finding that the averments against respondent No.1 are unspecific and general and no particular role is assigned to the appellant, quashed the summoning order insofar as it concerned to him. 9) In this factual matrix, the issue which arises for determination before this Court is whether the order of the High Court quashing the summoning orders insofar as the respondents are concerned is sustainable and what should be....
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....ion 141 should be, at the time the offence was committed, was in-charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. Every person connected with the company shall not fall within the ambit of the provision. Only those persons who were incharge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the time of commission of an offence will be liable for criminal action. It follows from the fact that if a Director of a Company who was not incharge of and was not responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time, will not be liable for a criminal offence under the provisions. The liability arises from being in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed and not on the basis of merely holding a designation or office in a company. 13) Section 141 is a penal provision creating vicarious liability, and which, as per settled law, must be strictly construed. It is therefore, not sufficient to make a bald cursory statement in a complaint that the Director (arrayed as an accused) is in charge of and responsible to the company....
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....onsent and connivance of the accused Nos. 2 to 9. 19) Now, let us consider whether the abovementioned complaint in both cases has satisfied the necessary ingredients to attract Section 141 insofar as the respondents, namely, Directors of the company are concerned. 20) Section 141 of the Act has been interpreted by this Court in various decisions. As to the scope of Section 141 of the Act, a three-Judge Bench of this Court considered the following questions which had been referred to it by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in SMS Pharmaceuticals vs. Neeta Bhalla and Anr. (2005) 8 SCC 89: (a) Whether for purposes of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, it is sufficient if the substance of the allegation read as a whole fulfil the requirements of the said section and it is not necessary to specifically state in the complaint that the person accused was in charge of, or responsible for, the conduct of the business of the company. (b) Whether a director of a company would be deemed to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for conduct of the business of the company and, therefore, deemed to be guilty of the offence unless he proves to the contrary. ....
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.... sufficient to make the person liable under Section 141 of the Act. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. The requirement of Section 141 is that the person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a director in such cases. (c) The answer to Question (c) has to be in the affirmative. The question notes that the managing director or joint managing director would be admittedly in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. When that is so, holders of such positions in a company become liable under Section 141 of the Act. By virtue of the office they hold as managing director or joint managing director, these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Therefore, they get covered under Section 141. So far as the signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2)....
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....rsons are responsible therefor. In the event, ultimately, the prosecution is found to be frivolous or otherwise mala fide, the court may direct registration of case against the complainant for mala fide prosecution of the accused. The accused would also be entitled to file a suit for damages. The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are required to be construed from the aforementioned point of view. 24) In Saroj Kumar Poddar vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2007) 3 SCC 693, while following SMS Pharmaceuticals case (supra) and Sabhita Ramamurthy case (supra), this Court held that with a view to make the Director of a company vicariously liable for the acts of the company, it was obligatory on the part of the complainant to make specific allegations as are required under the law and under Section 141 of the Act and further held that in the absence of such specific averments in the complaint showing as to how and in what manner the Director is liable, the complaint should not be entertained. 25) The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:- 12. A person would be vicariously liable for commission of an offence on the part of a company only in the e....
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....was in charge and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company. Merely being a Director of the company in the absence of above factors will not make him liable. 8. To launch a prosecution, therefore, against the alleged Directors there must be a specific allegation in the complaint as to the part played by them in the transaction. There should be clear and unambiguous allegation as to how the Directors are in-charge and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. The description should be clear. It is true that precise words from the provisions of the Act need not be reproduced and the court can always come to a conclusion in facts of each case. But still, in the absence of any averment or specific evidence the net result would be that complaint would not be entertainable. 27) The said issue again came up for consideration before a three-Judge Bench of this Court recently in Ramraj Singh vs. State of M.P. & Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 729. In this case, the earlier decisions were also considered in detail. Following the decisions of SMS Pharmaceuticals case (supra), Sabhita Ramamurthys case (supra), Saroj Kumar Pod....
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....s., (2007) 5 SCC 54, learned counsel for the appellants argued that this Court has not allowed the recalling of summons in a criminal complaint filed under sections 138 and 141. However, a perusal of the judgment would reveal that this case was of recalling of summons by the Magistrate for which the Magistrate had no jurisdiction. Further, para 22 of the judgment would reveal that in the complaint 23...allegations have not only been made in terms of the wordings of section but also at more than one place, it has categorically been averred that the payments were made after the meetings held by and between the representative of the Company and accused nos. 1 to 5 which would include Respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 30) In para 24, this Court concluded that: it is therefore, not a case where having regard to the position held by the said respondents in the Company, they could plead ignorance of the entire transaction. Furthermore, this Court has relied upon S.M.S. Pharamaceuticals case (three-Judge Bench) (supra), Saroj Kumar Poddars case (supra) and N.K. Wahis case (supra). 31) Relying on the judgment of this Court in N. Rangachari vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd., (2007) 5 SCC 1....
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....upra) this Court had reiterated the view in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals case (supra). The Court then concluded in para 11 that: it was clear from the aforequoted judgments that the entire matter would boiled down to an examination of the nature of averments made in the complaint.... On facts, the Court found necessary averments had been made in the complaint.... 33) Though, the learned counsel for the appellants relying on a recent decision in K.K. Ahuja vs. V.K. Vora & Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 48, it is clearly recorded that in the complaint it was alleged that the accused were in-charge of and was responsible for the conduct of the day-to-day business of the accused Company and further all the accused were directly and actively involved in the financial dealings of the Company and the same was also reiterated in the pre-summoning evidence. Furthermore, this decision also notes that it is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint that the person accused was incharge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company. 34) After noting Saroj Kumar Poddars case (supra) and N.K. Wahis case (supra), this Court further noted in para 9 that: &&the prevailing trend appea....
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....sibility of complying with that provision; Provided that the person so charged has given his consent in this behalf to the Board; (g) where any company does not have any of the officers specified in clauses (a) to (c), any director or directors who may be specified by the Board in this behalf or where no director is so specified, all the directors: Provided that where the Board exercises any power under clause (f) or clause (g), it shall, within thirty days of the exercise of such powers, file with the Registrar a return in the prescribed form. 38) But if the accused is not one of the persons who falls under the category of persons who are responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company then merely by stating that he was in-charge of the business of the company or by stating that he was incharge of the day-to-day management of the company or by stating that he was in-charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, he cannot be made vicariously liable under Section 141(1) of the Act. To put it clear that for making a person liable under Section 141(2), the mechanical repetition of the requirements under....
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....who have been arrayed as accused, by virtue of their vicarious liability, I propose to take note of the relevant portion of the complaint, which reads thus: 4) For and on behalf of accused No.1 Company, the accused No.2 had given cheque as security. In the year 2000 some cheques had arisen between the complainant firm and the accused No.2 and the accused No.1 Company did not pay legitimate amount of the complainant firm, therefore, the complainant has filed SPL. Civil Suit No.35 of 2000, 36/2000 and 37/2000 in the Civil Court at Amreli for recovery of dues, wherein the Court granted exparte interim injunction below Ex. 5 in SPL. Civil Suit No.36 of 2000... xxx xxx xxx 17) ...The accused No.3 to 13 and 17 and 17 to 19 are the directors of accused No.1 company, and they are in charge of day-to-day management of affairs of accused No.1 company hence, they are also responsible persons for the management of accused No.1 company... ...Moreover, the accused No.3 to 13 and 17 to 19 did not take proper care and caution to prevent occurrence of offence of dishonour of cheque nor did they make arrangement of money. The aforesaid cheque issued by accused No.1 company has returned/dish....
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....n beings who are natural persons. Such offence can be tried according to the procedure established by law. But there are offences which could be attributed to the juristic persons also. If the drawer of a cheque happens to be a juristic person like a body corporate it can be prosecuted for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. Now there is no scope for doubt regarding that aspect in view of the clear language employed in Section 141 of the Act. In the expanded ambit of the word company even firms or any other associations of persons are included and as a necessary adjunct thereof a partner of the firm is treated as a director of that company. Thus when the drawer of the cheque who falls within the ambit of Section 138 of the Act is a human being or a body corporate or even a firm, prosecution proceedings can be initiated against such drawer. In this context the phrase as well as used in sub-section (1) of Section 141 of the Act has some importance. The said phrase would embroil the persons mentioned in the first category within the tentacles of the offence on a par with the offending company. Similarly the words shall also in subsection (2) are capable of bringing the third ....
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.... of his agent. [State of Shewprasad, AIR 1956 All. 610 : 1956 Cr.L.J. 1156] 80 In K.K. Ahuja (supra), the Supreme Court while explaining the vicarious liability of persons of the company observed as under: 16. Having regard to section 141, when a cheque issued by a company (incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956) is dishonoured, in addition to the company, the following persons are deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished : (i) every person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company; (ii) any Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer of the company with whose consent and connivance, the offence under Section 138 has been committed; and (iii) any Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer of the company whose negligence resulted in the offence under Section 138 of the Act, being committed by the company. While liability of persons in the first category arises under sub-section (1) of Section 141, the liability of persons mentioned in categories (ii) and (iii) arises under sub-sect....
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.... responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. The words "every person who, at the time of the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible for the conduct of the business of the company" occurs not only in section 141(1) of the Act but in several enactments dealing with offences by companies, to mention a few section 278 B of the Income Tax Act, 1961, Section 22C of Minimum Wages Act, 1948, Section 86A of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948, Section 14A of Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, Section 29 of Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, Section 40 of The Air 13 (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and Section 47 of Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974. But neither section 141(1) of the Act, nor the pari materia provisions in other enactments give any indication as to who are the persons responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company. Therefore, we will have to fall back upon the provisions of Companies Act, 1956 which is the law relating to and regulating companies. 20 Section 291 of the said Act provides that subject to the provisions of that ....
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....D.N. Mehta [1971 (3) SCC 189] followed in State of Karnataka v. Pratap Chand [1981 (2) SCC 335] and Katta Sujatha vs. Fertiliser & Chemicals Travancore Ltd. [2002 (7) SCC 655]. This Court held that the words refer to a person who is in overall control of the day to day business of the company. This Court pointed out that a person may be a director and thus belongs to the group of persons making the policy followed by the company, but yet may not be in charge of the business of the company; that a person may be a Manager who is in charge of the business but may not be in overall charge of the business; and that a person may be an officer who may be in charge of only some part of the business. 23 Therefore, if a person does not meet the first requirement, that is being a person who is responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, neither the question of his meeting the second requirement (being a person in charge of the business of the company), nor the question of such person being liable under sub-section (1) of section 141 does not arise. To put it differently, to be vicariously liable under subsection (1) of Section 141, a person should fulfi....
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....he company', this Court obviously had in mind, persons described in clauses (e) and (f) of section 5 of Companies Act. Be that as it may. 27 The position under section 141 of the Act can be summarized thus : (i) If the accused is the Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director, it is not necessary to make an averment in the complaint that he is in charge of, and is responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company. It is sufficient if an averment is made that the accused was the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director at the relevant time. This is because the prefix `Managing' to the word `Director' makes it clear that they were in charge of and are responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company. (ii) In the case of a director or an officer of the company who signed the cheque on behalf of the company, there is no need to make a specific averment that he was in charge of and was responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company or make any specific allegation about consent, connivance or negligence. The very fact that the dishonoured cheque was signed by him ....
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....e of Section 141 of the N.I. Act could not be held liable. I take notice of the fact that some of the accused are Office Bearers, like the Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Financial Controller. Some of the Directors are nominated Directors and also Non-Executive. 82 I am also not impressed by the argument of Mr. Ponda that as the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. are circumscribed, and should be exercised only in cases where the Court finds an abuse of the process of law, all the applications deserve to be outright rejected, leaving all the legal contentions open to be canvassed before the trial Court. 83 In Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Koley etc [2011 Criminal Law Journal 1626], the Supreme Court held as under: 21 In our judgment, the above observations cannot be read to mean that in a criminal case where trial is yet to take place and the matter is at the stage of issuance of summons or taking cognizance, materials relied upon by the accused which are in the nature of public documents or the materials which are beyond suspicion or doubt, in no circumstance, can be looked into by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdic....
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.... Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharastra, AIR 2015 SC 675] 86 In Pooja Ravinder Devidasani (supra), the Supreme Court made the following observations in para 30, which I deem fit to refer and rely upon : 30. Putting the criminal law into motion is not a matter of course. To settle the scores between the parties which are more in the nature of a civil dispute, the parties cannot be permitted to put the criminal law into motion and Courts cannot be a mere spectator to it. Before a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence under Section 138/141 of the N.I. Act, making a person vicariously liable has to ensure strict compliance of the statutory requirements. The Superior Courts should maintain purity in the administration of justice and should not allow abuse of the process of the Court. The High Court ought to have quashed the complaint against the appellant which is nothing but a pure abuse of process of law. 87 A Division Bench of this Court (to which I was a party) in the case of Ionic Metalliks and others [Special Civil Application No.645 of 2014 decided on 9th September 2014], while examining the challenge to the legality and validity of a master circular dated....
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....tional Directors together shall not exceed the maximum strength fixed in the Articles for the Board. 4. Alternate Director: If so authorized by the Articles or by a resolution passed by the company in general meeting, the Board may appoint an Alternate Director to act for a Director ("Original Director"), who is absent for whatever reason for a minimum period of three months from the State in which the meetings of the Board are ordinarily held. Such Alternate Director will hold office until such period that the Original Director would have held his or her office. However, any provision for automatic re-appointment of retiring Directors applies to the Original Director and not to the Alternate Director. 5. 'Shadow' Director: A person, who is not appointed to the Board, but on whose directions the Board is accustomed to act, is liable as a Director of the company, unless he or she is giving advice in his or her professional capacity. Thus, such a 'shadow' Director may be treated as an 'officer in default' under the Companies Act. 6. De facto Director: Where a person who is not actually appointed as a Director, but acts as a Director and is held out by....
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....s Exchange Board of India ("SEBI")), as amended by SEBI from time to time. The Agreement provides for the following further categories of Directors: Categories under Listing Agreement 1. Executive Director; 2. Non-executive Director; and 3. Independent Director. Executive and non-executive Directors An Executive Director can be either a Whole-time Director of the company (i.e., one who devotes his whole time of working hours to the company and has a significant personal interest in the company as his source of income), or a Managing Director (i.e., one who is employed by the company as such and has substantial powers of management over the affairs of the company subject to the superintendence, direction and control of the Board). In contrast, a non-executive Director is a Director who is neither a Whole-time Director nor a Managing Director. Clause 49 of the Agreement prescribes that the Board shall have an optimum combination of executive and non-executive Directors, with not less than fifty percent (50%) of the Board comprising non-executive Directors. Where the Chairman of the Board is a nonexecutive Director, at least one-third of the Board should comprise ind....
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.... allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused. This has assumed all the more significance in view of the recent trend found that in respect of offences under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act alleged against a company, all the Directors of the company are being routinely roped in as accused with a statement that they are in-charge of and r....
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....on in facts of each case. But still in the absence of any averment or specific evidence the net result would be that complaint would not be entertainable. 90 In Gunmala Sales Private Limited (supra), the Supreme Court, after an exhaustive review of all its earlier decisions on Section 141 of the N.I. Act, summarized its conclusion as under: a) Once in a complaint filed under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act the basic averment is made that the Director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed, the Magistrate can issue process against such Director; b) If a petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of such a complaint by the Director, the High Court may, in the facts of a particular case, on an overall reading of the complaint, refuse to quash the complaint because the complaint contains the basic averment which is sufficient to make out a case against the Director; c) In the facts of a given case, on an overall reading of the complaint, the High Court may, despite the presence of the basic averment, quash the complaint because of the absence of mor....