TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1990 (2) TMI 308
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....edure Code, 1908 to set aside sale of immovable property sold in execution of a decree. Has the deposit to be made within 30 days from the date of sale as required by sub-rule (2) of Rule 92 of Order XXI or within 60 days from the date of sale as provided in Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1963? The High Court by the impugned judgment held that Article 127 governed the period of limitation to make a deposit in terms of Rule 89. In coming to that conclusion the High Court followed its earlier decision in Thangammal & Ors. v. K. Dhanalakshmi & Anr., AIR 1981 Mad. 254 and the decision of this Court in Basavantappa v. Gangadhar Narayan Dharwadkar & Anr., [1986] 4 SCC 273. In the latter decision, a Bench of two Judges of this Court held that....
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....72 of the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976 with effect from 1.2.1977. The object of the amendment was to afford an opportunity to the applicant to make good any deficiency in the amount deposited under Rule 89 when the deficiency occurred by reason of clerical or arithmetical mistake on his part. That amendment has no relevance to the point in issue as regards the period of limitation except to emphasise that sub-rule (2) of Rule 92 had received the special attention of Parliament in 1976. Parliament addressed itself particularly to the sub-rule, and yet did not, apart from the special contingency provided for by the amendment, think it necessary to extend the period generally prescribed under Rule 92(2) to make the deposit which ....
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....ns. Article 127 thus relates solely to the making of an application and not to a deposit. This Article governs applications made under Rules 90 and 91 as well, but we are not concerned with them. It is true that prior to the Amending Act 104 of 1976, the period prescribed for the making of an application was identical to that for the making of a deposit. But as a result of the amendment, different periods are now prescribed for the making of the deposit and the application. That it was the legislative intent to provide different periods of limitation for these two matters is, from the language used in the two enactments, clear and explicit. The reason why the legislature provided for different periods for the two matters which are the nece....
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....ication to set aside a sale in execution of a decree on deposit under Rule 89 of Order XXI is required to be made within thirty days from the date of the sale. Experience shows that this period is too short and often causes hardship because the judgment-debtors usually fail to arrange for moneys within that time. Banks usually take more than thirty days to sanction loans and advances. In the circumstances, entry 127 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act is being amended to increase the period of limitation to sixty days in respect of an application to set aside a sale in execution of a decree. This increase in the period of limitation will not affect the purchaser because five per cent of the purchase money is required to be paid to him. Th....
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.... omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. "No case can be found to authorise any court to alter a word so as to produce a casus omissus": Per Lord Halsbury, Mersey Docks v. Henderson. [1888] 13 App. Cas. 595, 602. "We cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left there": Crawford v. Spooner, [1846] 6 Moore P.C. 1, 8, 9. Where the language of the statute leads to manifest contradiction Of the apparent ....
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....t. In no other respect did the legislature evince an intention to extend the period prescribed for making the deposit. It would perhaps have been better, more logical, reasonable and practical, as stated by the Kerala High Court in Dakshayini & Ors. v. Madhavan, AIR 1982 Kerala 126, to enlarge the period for making the deposit so as to make it identical with that prescribed for making the application, and such extended period would have better served the object of the amendment, namely, ameliorating the plight of the judgment-debtor, but such are matters exclusively within the domain of legislation by Parliament and the Court cannot presume deficiency and supply the omission. The legislature did not do more than what it did. It has, in our ....