TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2006 (11) TMI 674
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ceed with the reference for a long time. Another notice was issued by Appellant asking the then incumbent of the office of Superintending Engineer to proceed with the arbitration. He, however, instead of proceeding with the arbitration sought for directions in this behalf from his superior officers. On 23.8.2002, he expressed his inability to continue with the proceedings. A notice under Section 14 of the 1996 Act was again served. A proposal was made thereunder to nominate another independent person as an Arbitrator. The Irrigation Department of the State of Bihar asked the Superintending Engineer to conclude the arbitration proceedings within three months by an office order dated 20th November, 2002. An objection, however, was filed by Appellant questioning the jurisdiction of the said Arbitrator on the premise that his nomination has already been terminated. On the said plea that the named Arbitrator in terms of Clause 23 could not have functioned as such, an application under Section 11 of the 1996 Act was filed before the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court. Justice P.S. Sahay, a former Judge of the Patna High Court was appointed but the Superintending Engineer fixed a date....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....tion 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act, the court of the Principal Civil Court should be held to be not empowered to hear an appeal against an order of the arbitral tribunal insofar as if Section 37 of the 1996 Act is not construed, a second appeal being prohibited, no appeal shall ever lie against the order of the District Judge, Principal Civil Court before the High Court. (ii) As the order of the nominee of the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court under Section 11 of the 1996 Act is a judicial order, in view of the provisions contained in Section 42 thereof, a proceeding was maintainable only before the High Court. The purport and object sought to be achieved by the 1996 Act vis-'- vis the Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short "the 1940 Act") is well known. The 1996 Act makes a radical departure from the 1940 Act. It has embodied the relevant rules of the modern law but does not contain all the provisions thereof. The 1996 Act, however, is not as extensive as the English Arbitration Act. Different statutes operated in the field in respect of a domestic award and a foreign award prior to coming into force of the 1996 Act, namely, the 1940 Act, the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act,....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;" It is not disputed before us that the Patna High Court does not exercise any original civil jurisdiction. The definition of "court" as noticed hereinbefore means the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court which exercises the original civil jurisdiction. If a High Court does not exercise the original civil jurisdiction, it would not be a 'court' within the meaning of the said provision. Constitution of the courts vis-'-vis the hierarchy thereof is governed by the 1857 Act, Section 3 whereof reads as under: "3. Classes of Courts \026 There shall be the following classes of Civil Courts under this Act, namely: - (a) The Court of the District Judge; (b) The Court of the Additional Judge; (c) The Court of the Subordinate Judge; and (d) The Court of the Munsif." Chapter III of the 1857 Act relates to ordinary jurisdiction of the civil courts. Section 18 provides for extent of original jurisdiction of District and Subordinate Judge in the following terms: "18. Extent of original jurisdiction of Distric....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ppeals against certain orders of the court, while s 37(2) provides appeal against certain orders of the arbitral tribunal. However, s 37(3) prohibits a second appeal against the appellate order under s 37(1) and (2). However, in view of the provisions of s 5, a second appeal against the appellate order under s 37(1) and (2) would not be permissible, even if s 37(3) had not been enacted. It was, therefore, not really necessary to enact this provision, and it seems to have been enacted by way of abundant caution." In this case, it is not necessary for us to go into the question as to whether Sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the 1996 Act would debar an appeal from appellate order passed under Sub-section (2) of Section 37 thereof. The consequences of the statutory embargo would ensue but then the question will have to be considered as and when occasion arises therefor. Sub-section (2) of Section 37 of the 1996 Act prescribes for an appeal to a court. We do not see any reason as to why having regard to its plain language, the definition of "court" shall not be put into service. It may be true that the interpretation clause provides for "unless the context otherwise requires". If appl....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ning that the Award has to be filed in this Court alone and no other, the same cannot be defeated by a specious plea that the right of appeal would be denied" Section 31(4) of the 1940 Act reads, thus: "(4) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, where in any reference any application under this Act has been made in Court competent to entertain it, that court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that reference and the arbitration proceedings shall be made in that court and in no other Court." In M/s. Guru Nanak Foundation (supra), analysing the said provision, this Court held: "It opens with a non-obstante clause and is comprehensive in character. The non-obstante clause excludes anything anywhere contained in the whole Act or in any other law for the time being in force if it is contrary to or inconsistent with the substantive provision contained in subsection (4). To that extent it carves out an exception to the general question of jurisdiction of the court in which Award may be filed elsewhere provided in the Act in respect of the proceed....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... context of the phrase which would define it. It should not be vague or ambiguous. The definition of words must be given a meaningful application; where the context makes the definition given in the interpretation clause inapplicable, the same meaning cannot be assigned. In State of Maharashtra v. Indian Medical Assn. one of us (V.N. Khare, C.J.) stated that the definition given in the interpretation clause having regard to the contents would not be applicable. It was stated: (SCC p. 598, para 8) 'A bare perusal of Section 2 of the Act shows that it starts with the words "in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires \005". Let us find out whether in the context of the provisions of Section 64 of the Act the defined meaning of the expression "management" can be assigned to the word "management" in Section 64 of the Act. In para 3 of the Regulation, the Essentiality Certificate is required to be given by the State Government and permission to establish a new medical college is to be given by the State Government under Section 64 of the Act. If we give the defined meaning to the expression "management" occurring in Section 64 of the Act, it would mean the State Government is r....