TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2016 (8) TMI 1033
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....d under the Act and therefore the same is required to be set aside. 3. The learned CIT(A) has also grossly erred in upholding the addition as made by the assessing officer to the extent of Rs. 1707441/- as unexplained gold and diamond under the provision of section 69A of the Act. 4. The learned CIT(A) ought to have appreciated the explanation of the appellant and given credit to the extent of 1233 gms of gold and 20 Ct of diamond which was already declared by the Shri Sandeep palke in his wealth - tax return. 5. The learned CIT(A) further failed to have appreciate the fact that jewelry belonging to other lady member i.e Gayatri Palke to the extent of 65.7 gms were out of her husband earning who is an NRI working in Dubai for which confirmation has also been obtained and given to department. Hence, the CIT(A) accepting the same ought to have deleted the same in Toto. 6. The CIT(A) without giving the opportunity to the appellant to submit the details erred in upholding the addition as made by the assessing officer to the tune of Rs. 20,000/- found during the course of search which was out of his agricultural income. 7. The learned CIT(A) erred in confirming the....
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.... CIT(A) are arbitrary, excessive and ought to be deleted in toto. 10. For these and such other grounds that may be urged at the time of hearing, the assessee prays that the appellant may be allowed. " 3. In the above appeals, the assessees raised the grounds challenging that the assessment orders passed are barred by limitation. Since this ground of appeal goes to the very root of the matter, at the first instance, we shall dispose of the same. 4. Brief facts of the case are as under: A search and seizure operation was carried out under the provisions of sec.132 of the Income-tax Act,1961 ['the Act' for short] in the case of the assessee Shri Yogesh Achar on 08/07/1992 and unexplained jewellery and cash was seized. Subsequent to search operations, assessee filed return of income on 29/03/1994 declaring a total income of Rs. 68,215/-. The case was taken up for scrutiny assessment after issuing statutory notice u/s 143(2) u/s 143(2) of the Income-tax Act,1961 ['the Act' for short]. During the pendency of scrutiny assessment proceedings, the assessee filed application before the Income-tax Settlement Commission [hereinafter referred to as 'ITSC'] u/s 245C of the Act for the a....
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....tion 245C is rejected by it or is not allowed to be proceeded with by it, the period commencing from the date on which such application is made and ending with the date on which the order under sub-section (1) of section 245D is received by the Commissioner under subsection (2) of that section---- shall be excluded". In the present case, the 245C application was made on 20/09/1995. The order u/s 245D(l) had been received by the CIT on 26/12/1995. The duration involved is 97 days. This period is clearly excludible under this clause. The Hon'ble High Court of Madras has also specifically referred this clause while passing the order on 16/07/2009 in the assessees case in the Writ Appeal No. 970 and 971 of 2001. b. Section 245F(2) of the acts reads as under: "Where an application made under section 245C has been allowed to be proceeded with under section 245D, the Settlement Commission shall, until an order is passed under sub-section ('4) of section 245D, have, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) of that section, exclusive jurisdiction to exercise the powers and perform the functions of an income-tax authority under this Act in relation to the case". In the present....
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....02/2001 passed by the learned single judge. Therefore, the assessment proceedings could be revived only after the order of Hon'ble ,Madras High Court dated 16/07/2009 received in this office on 04/08/2009. Therefore, the entire period between 21/05/1998 to 04/08/2009 i.e. 4093 days are excludible under the clause (i) and (ii) of explanation 1 to section 153 as mentioned above. d. In view of the above, the period between 20/09/1995 and 04/08/2009 i.e. 5,067 days are to be excluded while computing the time available for completing the assessments. The assessment for A.Y. 1993-94 in the case of the assessee, would have got time barred on 31/03/1996 (two years from the end of the assessment year in which the income was first assessable as per section 153(1)(a)) if no exclusion period is available. However, if the period of 5,067 days as calculated above is excluded then the time is available till 12/02/2010 for completing the assessment u/s 143(3). Therefore, the present assessment order is within time. 6. Being aggrieved an appeal was filed before the CIT(A) who held that the order of assessment passed was well within the period of limitation vide paras.15 to 17 of his order....
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....t's claim that no exclusion was available for the period of 191 days (from 21.05.1998 to 01.12.1998) from the date ITSC passed the order under section 145D(4) to the date the Hon'ble High Court of Madras granted stay of the ITSC order, and that this period of 191 days was to be set off against the period available from 2 1.09.1995 to 31.03.1996. It must be borne in mind that, in the absence of the stay petition moved by the appellant, no further proceeding before any forum would take place, since the ITSC's order under section 145D(4) would become final. In such eventuality, the assessing officer would have neither the occasion nor the need to revive the assessment proceeding. Hence the question of the period of limitation would not arise. The question of reviving the assessment arose only because of the observation of the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in its final order that the order would not stand in the way of the assessing authority from proceeding in accordance with law. The final order of the Hon'ble High Court being the culmination of a process started by the appellant firm itself, it is most unreasonable to now argue that the time it took to move a stay....