TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1982 (4) TMI 288
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....plea that the premises in question were not " public Premises" within the meaning of the said Act and therefore the authority under the said Act had no jurisdiction to entertain the said eviction proceedings . This plea failed before the Estate Officer . The petitioners preferred an appeal before the appellate authority under the act. The Appellate Authority i.e. The Principal Judge , City Civil Court , Bombay dismissed their appeals . The petitioners then filed writ petitions on the Original Side of this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution . The writ petitions were dismissed by the learned judge . Hence the present appeals. 2. The only question that falls for consideration in all these appeals is whether the premises in question are " public Premises" within the meaning of S. 2(e) of the said Act. Admittedly , the premises in question are not owned by the Central Government nor are they requisitioned by them . However, it is the case of the Government that they are " public premises" firstly because they have been taken on lease from their owners and secondly because in any event , they " belong to the Central Government". According to....
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....rement, he failed to vacate the premises and therefore, after giving noticeon 17-2-1972 and holding an enquiry, the Estate officer passed an order or eviction against him on 28-7-1972. The appeal filed by him being Appeal No.108 of 1972 was dismissed on 2-8-1973. The writ petition filed by him was also dismissed by the learned single judge by the impugned order dated 3-7-2979. The appellant in Appeal No. 217 of 1979 is Ram Kumar Gehl and is in occupation of flat No.2 in the same building. He was in the employment of the union of India as commanding officer No.1, (Maharashtra) Air squaron, N.C.C. up to 1-6-1971. He was allotted the said flat on 19-7-1968. In spite of his reitrement from service on 1-6-1971, he failed to vacate the flat and therefore the Estate officer, after giving him notice on 22-11-1971 and holding enquiry passed an eviction order on 2-5-1972. The appeal against the said order being Appeal No.89 of 1972 was dismissed on 2-8-1973. His writ petition was dismissed on 3-7-1979. 4. Appeal No.215 of 1979 relates to a flat in a building called Helioplis situate at colaba, Bombay-5 This flat was also taken on lease by the central Government from the owner of the buildi....
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....nt. In spite however, of their retirement, they have been continuing to occupy the same unauthorisedly for the last more than 10 years on the only plea that the Estate office has no authority to evict them because the premises are not "public premises" within the meaning of the said Act. In order to appreciate the controversy as to whether the premises in question are public premises or not it will be necessary first to examine the definition of public premises given inthe said Act. Admittedly the present premises are not covered by the definition of public premises given in sub-cl. (2) of clause (e) of section 2 of the said Act. Therefore the only definition that need be consided in the present case is the one given in sub-clause (1) of the said clause. That defination is as follows : "S. 2(e) 'public premises' means (1) any premises belonging to or taken on lease on requisitioned by, or on behalf of the central Government, and includes and such premises which have been placed by the Government, whether before or after the commencement of the public preises (Eviction of Unauthorised occupants) Amendment Act, 1980, under the control of the secretariat of ei....
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....upants. Hence the premises fell within the definition of public premises and hence the appellants were liable to be evicted from them. The Estate officer held that the appellants being allottees from the Government were estopped fromdisputing the title of the Government to the premises. He also held that the premises belonged to the Government as tenant and therefore they were public premises and therefore he had jurisdiction to pass the eviction orders in question. The Appelate Authority viz. The principal Judge, city civil court Bombay, dismissed the appeals of the appellants on three grounds. In the first instance, he held that the appellants were estopped under S. 116 of the Evidence Act from challenging the title of the central Government since they were admittedly let in the premises by the Government. Secondly, he held that the appellants had no locus standi to challenge the validity of the lease between the landlords and the Government even assuming that there was no compliance with the provisions of Art. 299(1) of the constn. (S. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935). Thirdly, he held that in any case the premises "belonged" to the central Government sinc....
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....nal evidence was sought to be led to prove correspondence with regard to the lease in respect of the flats in the building Reviera. In support of this application it was stated that prior to Feb. 1980the authorities were not aware that here existed the relevant documens. It was only accidentally that a Lower Division clerk working in the office of the ewestern Naval command, Bombay, had come across the said documents while he has taking search of the old records for some othe purpose in office of the Military Estate officer. In this connection it was pointed out that the executive duties connected with the buildings hired for use of Defence services were earlier discharged by the Garrison Enginner and the same were transferred to the military Lands and cantonment service with effect from 2-1-1968 and hence the records connected with the lands and buildings hired were also transferred to the said office after that date. The records being old were consigned to the record room of the military Estate office and till the said Lower Division clerk stumbled upon the docements in question the authorities were not aware of their existence. Hence the same could not be produced in the proceed....
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....y a mere offer and acceptance. It may be remembered that it was not the case of the respondents that there was no correspondence on the subject to show that there was an agreement of lease between the parties. What was stated on their behalf before the lower courts was that there was no formal deed of lease and hence there was no written contract of lease. It is therefore incorrect to contend that since the respondents had admidded that there was only an oral lease, the correspondence on the subject should not be permitted to be produced. We are further of the view that in order to meet the ends of justice, and to prevent an abuse of the process of the court, we should exercise our inherent powers and permit the production of the said documents. It is for this reason again that we were of the opinion that the reliance placed on behalf of the appellants on the two authorities of the appellants on the two authorities of the supreme court was not well conceived. In fact, in (supra) the court has in terms stated as follows :- "It is well settled that additional evidence should not be permitted at the appellate state in order to enable one of the parties to remove certain lacuna i....
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....within the definition of "public premises" under the said Act. 9. Before we discuss the relevant documentary evidence and its effect, it is necessary to state the legal position on the suject viz., whether the Government can enter into an oral contract and if not, the requirements of law needed to be complied with by the Government before entering into a contract. The lease in the present case in respect of the premises in Reviera covered by Appeal Nos.207, 217 of 1979 is admittedly of the year 1942. The lease in respect of the premises in Helipolis, covered by Appeal No. 215 of 1979 is of the year 1943 and the lease in respect of the flat in building jrishna kunj coveredby Appeal No.216 of 1979 is of the year 1965. Therefore in the case of the first two leases it is the provisions of section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and in the case of the lease of 1965 it is the provisions of Art. 299(1) of the constn. Which would be applicable. However, the two provisions are pari materia and nothing turns on the question whether one or the other provisions applies to the respective leases. 10.One more question which we need answer before we examine the relevant aut....
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.... the lease has continued on the same old basis. As regards the premises in building " Reviera" ( Appeals Nos. 207, 214, and 217 of 1979) again, it is an admitted position that the rent is being paid monthly by the government and there is no rent reserved yearly. Thus, we are of the view that in all these cases , the lease being monthly there was no need to register the same and therefore the lease agreement between the Government and the owners concerned, cannot be said to be invalid on that account . This is also the findings of all the authorities below and we see no reason to differ from the same much less to interfere with it . 11. Coming now to the question whether these leases can be said to be valid in the face of the provisions of S. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 or Art . 299(1) of the Constn . as stated earlier the provisions being similar, it will be suffient if we quote the provisions of Art. 299(1) of the Constn. Which are as follows :- "299 (1). All contracts made in the executive power of the Union or of the State shall be expressed to be made by the President, or by the Governor of the State , as the case may be, and all such contracts....
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....l defect, the principal could not have been sued. But that is just the kind of case that S. 230(3). Contract Act is designed to meet. It would, in our opinion, be disastrous to hold that the hundreds of Government officers who have daily to enter into a variety of contracts, often of a petty nature, and sometimes in an emergency, cannot contract orally or through correspondence and that every petty contract must be affected by a ponderous legal document couched in a particular form. It may be that Government will not be bound by the contract in that case.But that is a very different thing from saying that the contracts as such are void and of no effect. It only means that the principal cannot be sued ; but we take it there would be nothing to prevent ratification, especially if that was for the benefit of the Government. There is authority for the view that when a Government officer acts in excess of authority Government is bound if it ratifies the excess: see 'Collector of Masulipatam v . Cavaly Venkata Narrainapah', (1859-61) 8 Moo Ind App 529 at p. 554 (N). We accordingly hold the contracts in question here are not void simply because the Union Government could not hav....
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.... in the Official Gazette, but there was nothing in the section itself to preclude authorisation being conferred ad hoc on any person, and when that fact is established, the requirements of the section must be held to have been satisfied. From the correspondence placed on record in that case, the court found that the Executive Engineer concerned had been authorised by the Governor acting through his Secretary, to execute the agreement for a referance to arbitration. The Court found that the correspondence showed that it was the secretary who from the very inception took a leading part in arranging for arbitration. He was throughout speaking in the name of and on behalf of the Government and he did so " as directed." The subject matter of the arbitration was a claim which concerned the Government. The proposal at the earlier stages to amend a clause of the original contract so as to include an arbitration also showed that the intention of the parties was to treat the agreement for arbitration as part and parcel of the contract. Even after the agreement was executed , the secretary made corrections and modifications in the agreement on the basis that it was the Government Th....
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.... ineffective or invalid for the reason that the officer making the request was not authorised under S. 175(3) of the Government of India Act or, if the said officer was authorised to make the said request the request becomes inoperative because the request was not followed up by a contract executed in the manner prescribed in S. 175(3) of the Government of India Act . In either case the thing has been delivered or the work has been done without a contract and that brings in Section 70 . It would not be reasonable to suggest that in recognising the claim for compensation under S. 70 the Court is either directly or indirectly nullifying the effect os S. 175(3) of the Government of India Act or treating as valid a contract which is invalid. The fiels covered by the two provisions are separate and distinct. There is no conflict between the two provisions . In the functioning of a vast organisation represented by by a modern state government officers have to invariably enter into a variety of contracts which are often of a petty nature . Sometimes they have to act in a emergency , and in many occasions, in the pursuit of welfare policy of the State Government , officers may have to ente....
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....ontended that the obligation under section 70 of the contract Act arises only in circumstances in which English law would have created an obligation on the basis of an implied contract or a quasi contract and that there could be no implied contract or quasi contract with the government because a contract could be made with it only in accordance with S. 175(3) of the Government of India Act . Now it has been repeatedly held that a resort to english law is not justified for deciding a question arising on our statute unless the statute is such that it cannot be reasonably understood without the assisstance of English Law . Indeed there is good authority for saying that S. 70 was framed in the form in which it appears with a view to avoid the niceties of English Law on the subject , arising largely from historical reasons and to make the position simple and free from frictions of law and consequent complications : see Pllock on contracts (13th Ed. ) p. 10 Furthermore , we do not see that S. 175(3) in any way prevents a contract with the Government being implied or a Government from incurring an obligation under quasi contract. A contract implied in law or a quasi contract is not a real....
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....on ( supra) and has explained the said position by stating that the court had in a earlier case held that a contract made in contravention of Art. 299(1) of the Constn. Could be ratified by the Government if it was for its benefit and as such it could not take the case of the contractor outside the purview of S. 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act . A contract which is void may not be capable of ratification , but, since according to the court the contract in question could have been ratified it was not void in the technical sense,. ( Underlying ours) . It was for this reason according to the court that in that case the following observations were made : " the Government may not be bound by the contract but that is a very different thing from saying that the contract was void and of no effect and that it only meant that the principal ( Government ) could not be sued , but there will be nothing to prevent ratification if it was for the benefit of the Government". In Union of India v. A. L. Rallia Ram , the court after referring to the decision in ( supra) held that S. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 did not in terms require a formal document of contra....
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....ect , the amount was recoverable under any other provision of law. Whiledealing with this question , the court specifically referred to the above said decisions and interpreted them in paras 6 to 9 of the judgment. While interpreting the decision in (supra) the court stated that it was held there the following three conditions had to be satisfied under S. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 viz. (1) the contract must be expressed to be made by the Governor or the Governor General , (2) it must be executed in writing ,and (3) the execution should be by such persons and in such manner as the Governor or the Governor General might direct or authorise. According to the court, it was further held that S. 175(3) did not prescribe any particular form in which the authority must be confirmed and where an ad hoc authority was conferred on any person , the requirement must be held to have been satisfied . ( supra) was interpreted by the court as laying down that if a contract was to bind the Government it had, (a) to be expressed to be made by the Governor or Governor General , (b) to be executed on behalf of the Governor or the Governor General , and (c) to be executed by an officer....
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....duly authorised in this behalf by the President of India . A contract whether by a formal deed or otherwise by persons not authorised by the President cannot be binding and is absolutely void. In Timber Kashmir Pvt. Ltd . v. Conservator of Forests , Jammu , again while construing the provisions of Art. 299(1) , the court observed that although a contract cannot be executed without sanction , nevertheless if the sanction could be either expressly or impliedly given by or on behalf of the government , and if some acts of he Government could fasten some obligation upon the Government , the lessee could also be estopped from questioning the terms of the grant of the sanction even where there is no written contract executed to bind the lessee. When there is any question to be decided as to whether the Government had sanctioned the leases, its actions, apart from the execution of leases, could be considered . But, once there has been a valid execution of leases by duly authorised officers, the documents would be the best evidence of sanction also . That was one of the objects of prescribing a formal mode of execution of instruments on behalf of the Government apart from the need to prot....
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....rceable contracts in English Law are afforded by certain contracts which are not evidenced by a signed writing as required by certain statutes; contracts in respect of which the right of action is barred by the Limitation Act 1939 and contracts with a foreign sovereign or ambassador. In most cases the defect of unenforceability is curable . Thus, if a written evidence of a contract of guarantee or a contract for the sale of an interest in land comes into existence , the contract becomes enforceable, though it was made orally ; a right of action barred by the Limitation Act, 1939 may revive if the defendent makes a written acknowledgment of his indebtedness, or a part payment; a foreign sovereign or an ambassador may waive his immunity. An unenforceable contract may be indirectly enforceable by other means than bringing an action . Thus a statute barred debt may be recoverable indirectly if the creditor has a lien on goods of the debtor which are in his possession. Sometimes the contract is enforceable by one party but not by the other . Thus an contract for the sale of an interest in land can be enforced by the party who has not signed the note or memorandum against the other who h....
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....ligations under them or if the formal defects in them are curable by such as ratification, the contracts need not be held to be absolutely void and can be said to exist validly for all other purposes. In particular they can be said to exist validly when third parties challenge their validity. In cases such as the present one where the validity of a contract is questioned in a collateral proceeding and for a collateral purpose by persons who have benefitted by such contracts, such as the present allottees, it will have to be held that such contracts do validly exist. We may however add that the view taken by the learned single Judge that the contracts in the present case being of monthly tenancy can be oral because Section 107 of the T.P.Act permits is erroneous and contrary to law. When Government is a party to a contract the question to be considered is not whether a general statute such as the T.P. Act or the Contract Act permits a contract in a particular form, but whether the contract is in compliance of the mandatory provisions laid down in that behalf by the fundamental statute. Such provisions stand superimposed on the general law and have to be satisfied in addition to the....
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...."Appropriation and hiring of houses for military officers and messes, etc.- (a) Accomodation required for all military officers (including R.A.F. officers and departmental officers) and messes for units, etc., for which a mess allowance is laid down in Pay and Allowance Regulations or in other Government orders, may be appropriated under the cantonments (House Accomodation) Act, No. VI of 1923 as amended by Act IX of 1930, or hired , except in a hotel by a local M.E.S. concerned , under the orders of the O.C. station , provided that suitable quarters owned or hired by Government are not available ( but see exceptions mentioned in para 3 (b) (iii) . )". There is no dispute that the M.E.S. officer referred to therein is the garrison Engineer. Although it is not clear from the copy of the " Defense Services Regulations - Regulations for the Military Engineer Services 1978" ( which is the reprint of the original Regulations ) produced before us as to under what provisions the said regulations were made , there is no difficulty in holding these Regulations which are printed and published in a book form have been issued under the authority of the Government of India....
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.... that day. In view of the Military Engineer Services Regulations the Garrison Engineer had an authority to take the said premises on hire and it was he who had taken the same for and on behalf of the government of India and the rent was also being paid by him on their behalf . Although therefore, there is no formal document of lease, these facts on record viz. Letter dated 17-2-1943, the occupation of the flat from 23-2-1943, and rent receipts showing the payment of rent all along by the Government from its funds by an officer authorised for the purpose show that there was a contract of lease entered into between the landlord of the premises on the one hand and the Garrison Engineer on the other for and on behalf of the Government of India . This is therefore not a case of an oral lease but a lease spelt out from the documents on record. II. In appeal No.216 of 1979 we are concerned with a flat in the building "Krishna Kunj" . The document which is on record is the agreement dated 4-6-1965 entered into between the Trustees of the building and the President of India . The President of India has been described in that agreement as the tenant . This agreement recites that t....
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....it can seriously be doubted that the monthly tenancy was for and on behalf of the Government of India , and the agreement for the purpose was entered in to by the Garrison Engineer i.e. the officer authorised on that behalf . This again is not a case of no agreement . The old agreement of 17-9-1945, the new agreement of 4-6-1965 , the rent receipts and the occupation of the premises continuously show that the contract of a monthly tenancy had come into existence validly between the parties. III . In appeals nos.207, 214 and 217 of 1979 which relate to the premises in building Reviera , there is no formal document of lease, although the correspondence on record, the occupation of the premises and the payment of rent as evidenced by the rent reciepts ever since their occupation from the year 1942 show that there is a validly concluded contract of monthly tenancy between the land lord and the Government of India. In the correspondence the first in the series of letters is a letter dated 13.4.1942 , Exihibit 3(a) which is addressed by the Flag Officer to the Commodore, informing that the Government of India had given its sanction to the hiring of the premises at a monthly rental of &#....
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....t. It appears that by his letter Dated 9.9.1942 (Ex.8 ) the Assesor and Collector of the Bombay Municipal Corporation had made a query to the Garrison Engineer asking him to forward information with regard to the lease of the premises and the Garrison Engineer by his letter dated 11.9.1942 (Ex.19 ) had informed the Assesor and the Collector , that the tenency commenced from 1.9.1942 and the monthly rent of the premises was ₹ 5,800/-. It therefore appears that although the premises were occupied on 31.7.1942, the tenancy had commenced from 1.9.1942.This it appears was because the premises were not ready for occupation in all respects as evidenced from the letters exchanged between the parties which are a letter (Ex.12 ) Dt; 25.6.1942 from the solicitors of the owners to the commodore, Royal Indian Navy, and another letter (Ex.17 ) Dt; 20.7.1942 from the Garrison Engineer to the solicitors of the owners. We have also on record a letter dated 30.10.1942 (Ex.9 )from the Station Staff Officer, Head Quarters Bombay , to the Garrison Engineer (Hiring) informing him that sanction was accorded to the hiring of the said premises on a monthly rental of ₹ 5,800/- with effect from 1....
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....on clearly establish that there have been valid leases of the premises between the Government of India and the landlords concerned. The validity of these leases further is not challenged by either of the parties to the contracts for the alleged failure to comply with the requirements of S. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 or Art. 299(1) of the constitution as the case may be. In fact both the parties to the contract has accepted the leases as valid and have been fulfilling their respective obligations under them. We are further of the view that assuming that there is some non-compliance with the statutory requirements in executing the said leases, in the first instance,the Government has not disowned the same and secondly it has every right to ratify them since it is for its benefit and the Government has ratified them. In fact, the Government has been pursuing proceedings against the allottees i.e. the present appellants on the basis that the leases are valid. 18. Assuming that we are wrong in the view we have taken that the statutory requirements have been complied with in respect of the leases, there is no reason why in the present case, a presumption under section ....
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....d it is not open for them to go into the validity of those facts. Not only that but their finding that such facts do exist and therefore give them the jurisdiction can only be challenged by the procedure laid down to the said Act and not in a separate proceeding. If a Tribunal appointed under an Act is vested with jurisdiction to try cases arising out of the said Act, the Tribunal is also vested with the power to decide the existence or non-existence of facts giving rise to such jurisdiction, and the Tribunal's finding thereon even if wrong can be assailed only before the authorities if any under the Act. Unless such finding is without any evidence on record or perverse or contrary to the evidence it is not liable to be questioned in a separate proceeding such as the Writ Petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Consin. We may in this connection refer to the relevant authorities. In, Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani, at page 242 in para 78 of the judgment the Court has observed as follows:- "One other question arises in this connection and that relates to the second and alternative contention raised by the learned Attorney-General. When the legislature Attorney-....
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....rt, while dealing with the jurisdiction of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under S. 24(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 44 of 1954, has stated as follows:- " ... ... ... ... The Chief Settlement Commissioner has, therefore, power under sub-section (2) to cancel an allotment if he is satisfied that the order of allotment of land has been "obtained by means of fraud, false representation or concealment of any material fact." The power is judicial and by the use of the expression "is satished" the Chief Settlement commissioner is not made the final arbiter of the facts on which the conclusion is reached. The jurisdiction of the Chief Settlement Commissioner arises only if an allotment is obtained by means of fraud, false representation or concealment of material facts. The relevant satisfaction is a jurisdictional fact on the existence of which alone the power may be exercised. A superior authority or the High Court in a writ petition would, therefore, be entitled to consider whether there was due satisfaction by the Chief Settlement Commissioner on material placed before him and that the order was made not arbitrarily, capr....
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....ng decision on the question of residence. It is while commenting upon this decision of the Division Bench that the Supreme Court observed that the Bench was under an impression that the Income-tax Officer was the sole Judge of the fact that whether the firm in question was resident or non-resident. According to the Court further no authority, much less a quasi-judicial authority can conter jurisdiction on itself while considering a jurisdictional fact wrongly. The question whether the jurisdictional fact has been rightly decided or not is a question which is open for examination by the High Court in an application for a Writ of Certiorari. In . State of U. P. V. Anand Swarup, the question which fell before the Court was one arising out of the provisions of U. P. Government Premises (Rent Recovery and Eviction) Act, 1952. The point at issue was whether the premises were requisitioned by the Government and, if by the District Magistrate, whether they were requisitioned by him in exertcise of the powers validly delegated to him by the Government. This question arose in a suit which was filed by the occupant of the premises against the Government for a permanent injunction restraining....
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....satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction to pass orders. The Tribunal is not the sole Judge of the question whether the jurisdictional fact has been rightly or wrongly decided. If the decision is without evidence, perverse, contrary to facts or without application of mind, it can be corrected However no authority has gone to the extent of saying that although the jurisdictional facts are extablished, the Tribunal can enquire into their validity or otherwise, We are therefore of the view that once the jurisdictional facts are establishe it is not open for such Tribunal to conduct a collateral enquiry into the validity or otherwise of the said facts. In a case such a the present one, once the authorities under the At satisfy themselves that the premises are taken on lease by the Government, the Tribunal Is not required to go into the question of the validity of the lease. 21. On behalf of the appellants, two authorities of his Court were cited to show that the lease must positively be established to have been taken by and on behalf of the Government and unless it is done it cannot be held that the government is a tenant of the premises. The first is an unreported decision of the Divi....
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....ee of the premises. The defence taken by the Military Estate Officer was that the premises were taken on lease by the Government of India and not by the Military Estate Officer and therefore the suit was bad in law. The trial Court held that the lease was through the Government of India and therefore notice under Section 80 of the Civil P. C. Was necessary and since no such notice was given, the suit was not inaintainable. The Appeal Bench of the Small Causes Court held that there was no compliance with the provisions of Art. 299(1) of the Constn, and hence there was no valid contract of lease between the Government of India and the landlord. The Court therefore came to the conclusion that there was no lease in favour of the Government of India. However, the Court held that the Military Estate Officer against whom the decree was sought was not a legal entiry and therefore no decree could be passed in the suit. The Appeal Court therefore dismissed the plaintifs suit. If is aggrieved by his decision that the plaintiffs came in writ petition under Ar. 227 of the Constn. Before this court and while dealing with this simation, the learned single Judge took the view that it was not estab....
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....t;belonging to the Central Government" in the definition of "public premises" in S. 2(c) of the said Act. There is no doubt that the expression "belonging to" does not mean the same thing as "owned by". The two expressions have two different connotations. The expression "belonging to" will take within its sweep not only ownership but also rights lesser than that of ownership. It must be remembered in this connection that the expressions used in the statute are to be interpreted and given meaning in the context in which they are used. The present Act has been placed on the stature book to give a summary remedy to the government to evict persons in occupation of publie premises to obviate the long ordeal of trial in a civil Court and of further proceedings thereafter. Hence a wider meaning will have to be given to the expressions used in the Act for defining the concept of public premises. So viewed there is no reason why the premises of which possession for the time being premises of which possession for the time being vests in the government and which are allotted by the Government to others while so in possession should not be held to b....
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....f user of the premises in question. If this is so, then the premises can property be said to "belonging to" does not merely include the right of ownership but also something less than that and since further the premises of which the absolute right of user vests in a person can be said to belong to him. The present premises will squarely be embraced by the definition of public premises within the meaning of the said Act. We may usefully refer, in this connnection, to two authorities. In , Laxmipat Singhania v. Larsen & Toubro Ltd., the facts were that the plaintiff had filed a suit for eviction against the defendants who were a Company to whom a portion of the building was let out. The plaintiff's predecessor had taken on lease the land from the Port Trust for constructing the building. After constructing the building, he had let out a portion of the same to the defendants. The question was whether the building belonged to the Port Tust or to the plaintiff. If it belonged to the Port Trust the Rent Court had no jurisdiction in view of S. 4(1) of the Bombay Rent Act. While holding that the building belonged to the plaintiff the Court observed as follows (at p. 209 of A....
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....ed to the lessor and not to the lessee. That is not the case before me. The case here arises between the lessee and those to whom he had let the premises. I have no doubt in my mind that qua the defendants in these two suits the premises in suit belong to the plaintiff and to nobody so long as the lease is subsisting. That being so, those premises are not excluded from the operation of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, and this Court has therefore no jursdiction to entertain or try either of these suits" In S. R. B. Kaikwad v. Union of India, what fell for consideration was the status of the Central Government as the lessee when the lease is determined and the Government becomes a statutory tenant under the Bombay Rent Act. While construing the meaning of public premises in this context, the Court observed as follows: - "Even where the lease in favour of the Central Government is determined and the Central Govt, become a statutory tenant under the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 the premises do not cease to be public premises within the meaning of Section 2(e) The Act is not so much concerned with the title as with the possessory rights vested in the Ce....
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.... premises belong to such person though he is not the owner of the same. In the preearlier it can validly be held that the premises belong to the Central Government. Even assuming therefore that we are wrong in our conclusion that the premises are leased to the Central Government, the premises will be public premises within the meaning of the said Act and therefore the orders passed evicting the appellants are valid in law. 23. The Appellate Authority viz. The Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Bombay, has also held that by virtue of the possessory title of the Government, it can be said that the premises "belong to" the Government and therefore they are public premises. The nature of the possessory title as explained earlier is that a person in possession is entitled to remain in possession as against the whole world except the true woner. Even the owner cannot dispossess him except by due process of law. If this is so and if the present appellants have come into the premises under the cover of the possessory title of the Central Government, there is no reason why the phrase "belonging to" should not be construed to include such possessory title. We have out ow....