TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1999 (4) TMI 615
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....r leases obtained by Caltex (India) Ltd. would vest in the Central Government. Section 7(3) of the Act specifically provided that on the expiry of the term of any lease, if so desired by the Central Government, be renewed or continued, so far as may be, on the same terms and conditions on which the lease was originally granted or entered into. The Amalgamation Order provided in clause 5 thereof savings of contract etc. entered into by M/s Caltex (India) Ltd. as they would be subsisting or having effect immediately before the appointed day be of as full force and effect in favour of the appellant and may be enforceable fully and effectually as if the appellant had been a party thereto or as if it had been executed in favour of the appellant. 2. By a letter dated 23-5-1979 the appellant exercised the option of renewal of the lease for a further term of 10 years from the expiration of the present tenure of the lease in question. Thereafter, on 13-9-1989, the appellant wrote to the respondent that in terms of Section 5 and Section 7(3) of the Act they exercised their right to renew the lease for a further period of 20 years commencing from 1-10-1989 on the same terms and conditions on....
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....having been executed between the parties, clause 3(g) of the lease deed was not acted upon and, therefore, the appellant cannot enforce a second renewal after the renewed term of 10 years which expired in 1989. The object of Sections 5(2) and 7(3) of the Act being to give some breathing time, these provisions contemplate renewal of a lease for one term and, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to exercise any option for a further period after the renewed term of 10 years expired in 1989 and consequently the communication dated 13-9-1989 was without jurisdiction and such a power was not available to the appellants. The contention that the Central Government not having expressed its desire was not accepted by the High Court on the view that the appellants could not hold the lease subsequent to 1989 and, therefore, the position of the appellant was that of a trespasser and is, therefore, bound to pay damages at the rate of Rs. 5000 per month and thus accepted that contention also. The High Court further took the view that if the respondent is desirous of continuing the sale of petroleum, there was no justification on the part of the Corporation to engage another person and forcib....
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....f ten years and that provision read with the statutory provisions of Sections 5 and 7 of the Act would enable the appellants to exercise such option. Therefore, it was submitted that this Court should interfere with the impugned decision of the High Court. 6. Shri S. K. Dholakia, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent refuted each one of the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants and submitted that the ground of laches or maintainability of the petition much less the nature of the remedy that would be available to the respondent was not at all raised in specific terms before the High Court and when the High Court had entertained the petition and exercised its jurisdiction, it is no longer open to the appellants to raise such contentions for the first time before this Court. 7. In the absence of constitutional or statutory rights being involved a writ proceeding would not lie to enforce contractual obligations even if it is sought to be enforced against the State or to avoid contractual liability arising thereto. In the absence of any statutory right Article 226 cannot be availed to claim any money in respect of breach of contract or tort or otherwise. In ....
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....use 3(g) of the lease deed provided as under "That the lessor shall upon the written request by the lessee before the expiry of the term hereby created grant to it a lease of the demised premises for a further term of 10 (ten) years from the expiration of the term hereby granted at a monthly rent of Rs. 1720 and containing the like covenants and provisos as are herein contained including a clause for one renewal for a further term of 10 (ten) years at a monthly rent of Rs. 1920 and on the same terms to conditions as herein contained so as to give the lessee at its option an aggregate of two renewals each of ten years. Upon such exercise of the right of renewal a fresh lease incorporating all the terms and conditions with clause 3(g) suitably modified on each renewal or deleted in the case of last renewal, shall be executed and registered by both the parties to these presents." The High Court took the view that in the absence of a deed of lease clause 3(g) in the original deed had not been acted upon though the appellant had exercised his option by letter dated 23-5-1979. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that this view of the High Court cannot be supported at all i....
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....view taken by the High Court is perfectly in order. 12. The lease had been granted with effect from 1-10-1969 in favour of M/s Caltex (India) Ltd. and on the coming into force of the Act on 23-4-1977 the appellant had stepped into its shoes and from that day onwards the appellant has been in possession of the same till now. The crucial question whether the option for renewal either in terms of the lease deed or in terms of the Act had been availed of or not is the controversy between the parties now. Litigation between the parties has been going on from 1993 onwards. On the expiry of the term the deed provides for renewal for two terms of 10 years each on the same terms and conditions except for enhancement of rent and execution of fresh deed modifying the clause relating to renewal. The appellant gave notice of renewal in terms of the provisions of (i) the deed in the letter dated 23-5-1979, and (ii) the Act in the letter dated 13-9-1989. Now it is not necessary to examine the effect of renewal for the earlier period as even on the appellant's own showing it is invoking the statute in the latter notice and not the terms of the deed. If that is so, the appellant could seek for....