TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2016 (5) TMI 648
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....2003 and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Based on the sales turnover ,the petitioner had submitted the declaration in Form 'C' pertaining to the assessment years 1998-1999,1999-2000,2000-2001 and 2001-2002 reflecting the total value of sale. Acting on such representation made by the petitioner, the respondent No. 2, i.e. the Superintendent of Taxes, had computed the assessment, thereby, allowing full exemption of sales tax to the aforesaid sale transactions as per the provisions of Section 8(5) of the CST Act, 1956. However, subsequently the Form 'C' submitted by the petitioner turned out to be fake documents as a result of which the respondent No. 2 had passed an order dated 29/06/2004 for the years 1998-99 reducing the exemption earlier granted to the petitioner besides imposing penalty. Similar orders of re-assessment were also passed in respect of the other assessment years giving rise to the connected proceedings. Aggrieved by the order dated 29/06/2004, the petitioner had preferred an appeal before the respondent No. 3 (Appellate Authority ) whereby an application was also filed praying for stay of the demand. However, by the order dated 29/07/2005, the respondent No. 3 had ....
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....Tax Vs. Williamson Tea (Assam) Ltd. reported in (2010) 1 GLR 57. 5. Mr. Joshi, learned senior counsel, on the other hand submits that even though section 81(1) of the Act of 2003 prescribes a period of 60 days within which the revision is to be filed before the High Court, yet, in view of the provisions contained in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the High Court would have ample power to condone the delay by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. By referring to section 79 of the Act of 2003, the learned senior counsel submits that discretion has been conferred upon the appellate authority to condone the delay in filing an appeal upto a further period of 180 days if an appeal is presented beyond the prescribed period of 60 days. Similar provisions can be found in section 80 of the Act of 2003, whereby even the Appellate Tribunal has been conferred with the power to accept appeals filed after the expiry of 50 days for a further period of 120 days. It is, therefore, completely illogical, submits Mr Joshi, that the Legislator would have intended to deny such discretionary power of condoning the delay to the High Court, which is the superior for....
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....reads as follows :- "84. Application of section 4 and 12 of Limitation Act, 1963 - In computing the period of limitation under this chapter, the provisions of section 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Central Act 36 of 1963) shall, so far as may be, apply." 8. From a reading of the aforementioned provisions of the Act of 2003, what can be seen is that the intention of the legislature was to limit the application of the Limitations Act, 1963 only to sections 4 and 12 of the Act, to a proceeding under this chapter and section 5 has been consciously excluded from the purview of section 84. From a reading of section 84 of the Act of 2003, it is evident that the Legislature did not intend to confer upon the High Court the discretionary jurisdiction of condoning delay in filing a revision petition by invoking section 5 of the Limitations Act, 1963. Had the legislator intended to confer such discretionary power upon the High Court to condone the delay in filing a revision beyond the prescribe period of 60 days by invoking section 5 of the Limitations Act, 1963 then there was no reason for not including section 5 also in section 84 of the Act 2003. 9. A scrutiny of the s....
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....(2001) 8 SCC 470, the apex Court, while dealing with the question of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condoning the delay in filing an application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, has held that Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a special law providing a limitation period different from that prescribed under the Limitation Act and as such section 29(2) of the Limitation Act will not have any application in a proceeding under Section 34 for setting aside arbitral award. In the said decision, the Apex Court had observed that :- "10. This decision recognises that it is not essential for the special or local law to, in terms, exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act. It is sufficient if on a consideration of the language of its provisions relating to limitation, the intention to exclude can be necessarily implied. As has been said in Hukumdev Narain Yadav V. Lalit Narain Mishra reported in (1974) 2 SCC 133 (SCC p. 146, para 17). "If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement t....
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....ther and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court." 15. In the decision of the Division Bench of this court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Williamson Tea (Assam) Ltd. (Supra), a question as to the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act in case of appeal to High Court under the Income Tax Act, 1961, had arisen for consideration of this Court, whereby it was held that section 5 of the Limitation Act would have no application in such matters and the delay in preferring an appeal cannot be done by relying upon order IV Rule 3A of the CPC when it is presented beyond the period of limitation. 16. What crystallizes from the aforesaid judicial pronouncements is that the statutory period for preferring appeal and/or revision under a special Act cannot be enlarged by taking recourse to section 29(2) of the Limitation ....