AI Drafter 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2016 (4) TMI 802
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....f the wealth tax authorities below, this is the second round of litigation before us. The issues involved in the three appeals are as under: WTA 51/Del/2012 3. The assessee company constructed a building on the plot of land taken on lease from Delhi Development Authority at 1, Zamrudpur Community Centre, Kailash Colony, New Delhi. The company let out the building during the year ended 31.3.1988 and received a rent of Rs. 18 lakhs. The original cost of the building including the accessories was Rs. 36.78 lakhs whereas the written down value as at 31.3.1988 was Rs. 28.62 lakhs. The assessee company claimed a deduction of Rs. 5,45,831/- on property tax levied but the deduction was limited to Rs. 3,90,979/- based on the property tax actually paid by the assessee. Further, the assessee had claimed a deduction of Rs. 30,42,575/- on account of liabilities which was completely disallowed by the AO on the ground that the assessee could not file any evidence to substantiate the same. Both these additions/disallowances were upheld by the Ld. CWT (A) and the assessee is in appeal contesting both the additions. The Ld. AR submitted that the valuation date is of 31.3.1988. The assessment o....
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....31/-. The total liability was Rs. 91,10,920/-. Accordingly, the debt incurred in connection with the building was calculated as under: Value of the property/total assets x total liability i.e.Rs.27,08,531/Rs.94,48,028 x Rs. 91,10,920 = Rs. 26,11,890 5.1 This addition/disallowance was upheld by the Ld. CWT (A) and the assessee is in appeal contesting the same. The Ld. AR has taken the same plea as in AY 1988-89, however, for the sake of brevity, the same is not being reproduced again. WTA No. 53/D/2007 6. The appellant company let out the building to Projects & Development India Pvt. Ltd. The said tenant occupied the property only up to 20th May, 1991. The monthly rent paid was @ Rs. 1,72,500/-. The rent for the month of April, 1991 was Rs. 1,72,500/- and for the period 1.5.91 to 20.5.91 @ Rs. 1,72,500/- was Rs. 1,11,290/- and the rent for the period 1.4.91 to 20.5.91 aggregated to Rs. 2,83,790/-. Thereafter the building remained vacant till 31.3.1992. However, the AO proceeded to calculate the gross maintainable rent by multiplying Rs. 1,72,500/- by 12 to arrive at a figure of Rs. 20,70,000/-. This issue was set aside by the Ld. CWT (A), to the file of the AO f....
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....statutes and later on in Para 59 discussed the issue related to these appeals. These paragraphs are being reproduced for ready reference as under: "28. Let us now take up for consideration the argument of the learned counsel for the assessee that taxing statutes are to be construed strictly and in favour of the assessee. No exception can be taken to the proposition that fiscal statutes should be interpreted strictly and in cases of doubt, the benefit of construction must be given in favour of the assessee. However, this rule applies only to charging sections and not to machinery sections or to provisions which give relief to the taxpayer. In Gursahai Saigal v. CIT [1963] 48 ITR (SC) 1, it has been held that the rule of strict construction applies primarily to charging provision in a taxing statute and has no application to a provision not creating a charge for the tax but laying down the machinery for its calculation or procedure for its collection and such machinery provisions have to be construed by the ordinary rules of construction. One important consideration in construing a machinery section is that it should be so construed as to effectuate the liability imposed by ....
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....n's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. Lord Reid has said that he prefers to see a mistake on the part of the draftsman in doing his revision rather than a deliberate attempt to introduce an irrational rule: 'the canons of constructions are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution'." Crawford in his Statutory Construction, page 256, has stated the principle thus: "Since the Legislature must express its intention by a written statute that intention, in any instance, must primarily be ascertained from the language used in the statute itself, and not from conjectures alinude. In other words, before the court can resort to any other source for assistance, it must first seek to find the legislative intention from the words, phrases and sentences which make up the statute subject to construction. If the meaning of the language of the statute is plain, then, according to the rule announced in innumerable cases, there is really no need for construction as the legislative intention is revealed by the apparent meaning, that is, the meaning clearly expressed by the lang....
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....ht to be supplied, if the statute is otherwise meaningless or if an amendment without interpolation is ineffective. Similarly, a plain misnomer may be corrected, or a statute made intelligible by the addition of a word suggested by the statute. It is proper for the court to supply such omissions because they are in fact a part of the statute, having been intended to be included in the statute when drafted and enacted." 32. to quote Craies on Statute Law, 7th edition, p. 94: "If the language of an Act of Parliament is clear and explicit, it must as already stated, receive full effect, whatever may be the consequence. Of many Acts, however, it can fairly be said, as was said by Lord Herschell in Western Suburban, etc., Building Society v. Martin [1886] 17 QBD 609 of the Building Societies Act, 1884, that no construction 'is free from difficulty, and no construction carries out a clear, defined and wellindicated policy on the part of the Legislature'. If (as is often the case) the meaning of an enactment, whether from the phraseology used or otherwise, is obscure, or if the enactment is, as Brett L.J. said in The R. L. Alston [1883] 8 PD 5 'unfortunately ....
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.... of the statute, and construe the language of s. 2(d) of the Prize Competitions Act, 1955, in the light of the indications furnished by them." In CIT v. Indian Bank Ltd. Sikri J. stated the ratio thus (p. 79): "In our opinion, in construing the Act, we must adhere closely to the language of the Act. If there is ambiguity in the terms of a provision, recourse must naturally be had to well-established principles of construction but it is not permissible first to create an artificial ambiguity and then try to resolve the ambiguity by resort to some general principle." 34. In Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher [1949] 2 All ER 155, 164; 2 KB 481 at p. 498), Denning L.J. spelt out the principles of interpretation of statutes in the following terms: "Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even, if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Act....