TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2008 (10) TMI 650
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....07, 735/2007 and 736/2007 are persons who have been charged in respect of offences under the provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, in terrorism related cases. In these appeals, they have also challenged the said judgment dated 13.4.2005 of the Gujarat High Court in SCA Nos. 1103 and 1105 of 2005, and other judgments of the said High Court and the judgment of the Bombay High Court which follow the said decision. The appellants in these appeals will be referred to as POTA accused'. 3. These appeals involve questions relating to the constitutional validity as also the interpretation of section 2(3) and (5) of Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Act 2004. While the relatives of victims are aggrieved by the rejection of their challenge to section 2(3) and (5) of the said Act, the POTA accused are aggrieved by the direction to read section 2(3) subject to section 321 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. To appreciate the rival contentions, the reasons that led to enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 and its repeal, require to be noted. 4. To meet the challenge of terrorists indulging in wanton killings, arson, looting, and other heinous crimes in vario....
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....n of the enforcing authorities under the Act and screen the cases registered under the provisions of the Act and decide the further course of action in every matter and so on." 6. In 1995, TADA was allowed to lapse. A few years later, the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 2001, was promulgated on 24.10.2001, followed by Prevention of Terrorism (Second) Ordinance promulgated on 30-12-2001. In 2002, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, (POTA' for short) was enacted replacing the Prevention of Terrorism (Second) Ordinance, 2001. Section 60 of POTA provided for constitution of Review Committees to discharge the functions specified in sections 19(4), 40 and 46 of POTA. The said section is extracted below: "60. Review Committee: (1) The Central Government and each State Government shall, whenever necessary, constitute one or more Review Committee for the purposes of this Act. (2) Every such Committee shall consist of a Chairperson and such other members not exceeding three and possessing such qualifications as may be prescribed. (3) A Chairperson of the Committee shall be a person who is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court, who shall be app....
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.... to make any direction issued by the Review Committee on review, about the existence of prima facie case for proceeding against the accused under POTA, binding on the Central Government as well as State Government and the police officer investigating the offence. 8. The constitutional validity of sub-sections (4) to (7) of Section 60 inserted by the Prevention of Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2003 was challenged by the Government of Tamil Nadu in the Madras High Court. It was contended, inter alia, that enacting a provision that made the decisions of the Review Committee binding on the State Government was an encroachment upon the power and authority of the State to prosecute an offender. It was also contended that a provision that a proceeding pending in a court shall be deemed to have been withdrawn when the Review Committee opined that there is no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused, would amount to interference with judicial functions and encroachment of judicial power' by the executive, in violation of the constitutional scheme. 9. The High Court of Madras upheld the validity of sub-sections (4) to (7) of Section 60 of POTA. But it further held that the ....
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...., one way or the other, cannot amount to interference in the judicial process." 10. The State of Tamil Nadu challenged the judgment of the Division Bench of Madras High Court by filing Special Leave Petition before this Court. While dismissing the Special Leave Petition on 8-3-2004 this Court observed as follows:- "By the amendment, the decision of the Review Committee is made binding on the Central Government, State Governments and the Police Officers investigating the offence. The High Court has held, in our-view correctly, that these amendments are based on the recommendations made by the Constitution Bench of the Court in Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in (1994) 3 SCC 569 and the judgment of this Court in R.M. Tiwari vs. State (1996) 2 SCC 610. These are the provisions which provide safeguards against misuse of' the stringent provisions of such an Act. In our view, the High Court has correctly held that the challenge cannot be sustained. The High Court has also correctly held that the directions given by the Review Committee could only be subject to Section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code". 11. In view of adverse reports about the misuse of the ....
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....te of issuance of the direction by such Review Committee in this regard. (4) The Review Committee constituted by the Central Government under sub-section (1) of Section 60 of the principal Act shall, while reviewing cases, have powers of a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of the following matters, namely:- (a) discovery and production of any document; (b) requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or office. (5) The Central Government may constitute more Review Committees, as it may consider necessary, for completing the review within the period specified in sub-section (3)." 12. The provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5) of section 2 of the Repealing Act were challenged before the High Court of Gujarat, by the relatives of victims. By judgment dated 13.4.2005, the High Court upheld the constitutional validity of the said provisions of the Repealing Act. The High Court was of the view that the provisions of section 2(3) of the Repealing Act were similar to the provisions of section 60(4) to (7) of POTA. Therefore following the decision of Madras High Court relating to the validity of section 6....
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....d the observations of this Court in R.M.Tiwari and Shaheen Welfare Association referred to by the High Court at this stage. Section 321 of the Code relates to withdrawal from prosecutioin. The relevant portion thereof reads thus: "The public prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case may, with the consent of the court at any time before the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried; ..." In R.M.Tiwari (supra), a case under TADA, this court observed: "7. It is, therefore, clear that the Designated Court was right in taking the view that withdrawal from prosecution is not to be permitted mechanically by the court on an application for that purpose made by the public prosecutor. It is equally clear that the public prosecutor also has not to act mechanically in the discharge of his statutory function under Section 321 CrPC on such a recommendation being made by the Review Committee; and that it is the duty of the public prosecutor to satisfy himself that it is a fit case for withdrawal from prosecution before he seeks the consent of t....
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..... Bedi JJ, on 22.2.2007, being of the view that the provisions of section 60 of POTA were different from the provisions of section 2 of Repealing Act, they directed that the matter should be heard by a larger bench. The reference order (after correcting certain typographical errors) reads thus: "It appears that similar provisions, though not exactly in the same terms, under the earlier Ordinance and the Amendment Act came up for consideration before the High Courts in India and one of the judgments was appealed against and was disposed of by this Court by its order of 8th March, 2004. This Court noticed that by the amendment of 2002 the decision of the Review Committee is made binding on the Central Government, the State Governments and the Police Officers investigating the offence. This Court went on to observe that the High Court had correctly held that the challenge cannot be sustained. The High Court had correctly held that the direction given by the Review Committee could only be subject to Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We notice that by reason of the amendment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the provisions introduced namely, sub-sections....
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....in cases where investigations are pending, the investigations shall be closed forthwith. They contend that the clear legislative intent is that after the repeal of POTA, continuance of any proceedings initiated under POTA in which cognizance has been taken by the court, shall be subject to the opinion of the Review Committee under section 2(3) of the Repealing Act and once the Review Committee holds that there was no prima facie case to continue the proceedings against the accused, the case shall be deemed to have been withdrawn with effect from the date of issuance of the direction by such Review Committee. It is submitted that in such cases, Section 321 of the Code would have no application and there is neither any need for the Public Prosecutor to file any application for withdrawal from prosecution, nor any need or occasion for the court to consider whether consent should be given for such withdrawal from prosecution, as the proceedings are deemed to have been withdrawn with effect from the date of the issuance of the direction by the Review Committee. 17. The counsel for the State of Gujarat, on the other hand, contended that the High Court had rightly held that sub-section....
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....call an enquiry or trial in a court, save in the manner and to the extent provided for in the law, is itself a violation of the law. Whatever needs to be done must be done in accordance with the law. The function of administering justice, under our constitutional order, belongs to those entrusted with judicial power. One of the few exceptions to the uninterrupted flow of the court's process is Section 321 Cr.P.C., 1973. But even here it is the Public Prosecutor, and not any executive authority, who is entrusted by the Code with the power to withdraw from a prosecution, and that also with the consent of the court. We repeat for emphasis. To interdict, intercept or jettison an enquiry or trial in a court, save in the manner and to the extent provided for in the Code itself, is lawlessness. The even course of criminal justice cannot be thwarted by the executive, however, high the accused, however sure government feels a case is false, however unpalatable the continuance of the prosecution to the powers-that-be who wish to scuttle court justice because of hubris, affection or other noble or ignoble consideration. Justicing, under our constitutional order, belongs to the judges. Amo....
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....Union, as set out in its counter is extracted below: "However, in view of the difference in language between Section 60(5), 60(6) and 60(7) as added by POTA (Amendment) 2003 and Sec. 2(3) of the Repeal Act, the issues raised by the petitioners necessitate examination. It is respectfully submitted that the language used in sub section 2(3) of the Repeal Act ex-facie reveals that Section 60(5) of the amended POTA (2003) has been omitted by the legislature in the provisions of Section 2(3) of the Repeal Act. Section 60(5) of the former Act made the opinion of the Review Committee binding on the Central Government, State Government and the Police Officer investigating the case. Section 2(3) of the Repeal Act is a new provision, enacted by the legislature, which provides for deemed withdrawal of a case (even if cognizance has been taken by the court), if the Review Committee forms an opinion that there is no prima facie case made out." 20. The learned Additional Solicitor General elaborating upon the said stand submitted that the power exercised by the Review Committee under section 2(3) of the Repealing Act, though not subject to the supervising power of the Special court u....
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....er of the Parliament to repeal a law is co-extensive with the power to enact such a law. (See Justice G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation - 11th Edition, Page 633). (e) The Legislature may prescribe special procedure to meet special situations and to meet special objectives so long as they are not arbitrary or discriminatory. [Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra - 1952 SCR 435 and In Re : The Special Courts Bill, 1978 - 1979 (1) SCC 380]. (f) If any Central Act is repealed, without making any provision for savings, the provisions contained in section 6 of General Clauses Act, 1897 will apply. But where the repealing Act itself contains specific provisions in regard to savings, the express or special provision in the Repealing Act will apply. Section 6 of General Clauses Act makes it clear that it will not apply, when a different intention appears in the Repealing Statute. Where the provision relating to savings is excluded, the repeal will have the effect of complete obliteration of the statute. (vide State of Orissa v. M.A.Tullock and Co. - 1964 (4) SCR 461, Nar Bahadur Bhandari v. State of Sikkim - 1998 (5) SCC 39 and Southern Petro....
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....edings, is a provision relating to winding up' matters connected with the Repealed Act. By no stretch of imagination such a provision can be termed as interference with judicial power, even assuming that such a provision in a live unrepealed statute may be considered as interference with judicial power. It is therefore unnecessary to examine whether section 2(3) of the Repealing Act is an encroachment of judicial power, though such an examination was done with reference to the challenge to section 60(4) to (7) of POTA. Many tests applied for deciding the constitutional validity of live and current statutes, may not apply to winding up' provisions in a savings clause of a Repealing Act, dealing with repeal. The Parliament has the legislative competence to make the Repealing Act. The Repealing Act repeals POTA and provides for certain savings from repeal, to meet the special features of the repealed statute. It does not violate any constitutional provisions. Hence the Repealing Act and in particular section 2(3) and (5) thereof are valid and constitutional. 25. This takes us to the second question as to the true import of section 2(3) of the Repealing Act. Sub-section (2) ....
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....n 2(3) of the Repealing Act, there is no question of bringing section 321 of the Code into play. If section 321 is held to be applicable, then the provision in section 2(3) that the cases shall be deemed to be withdrawn, is rendered nugatory and the cases are not actually withdrawn until the requirements of section 321 are complied with. That would amount to rewriting section 2(3) which is clearly impermissible. 27. The Madras High Court proceeded on the basis that the exercise of power by the Review Committee in regard to review of POTA cases, was governed by sub-sections (4) to (6) of section 60 of POTA. It found that these sub-sections provided that the decision of the Review Committee on review, was binding only on the State Government and police officers and not on the public prosecutor or the court. The Madras High court got over sub-section (7) of section 60 of POTA (which provided that when the Review Committee opines that there is no prima facie case, then the proceedings pending against the accused shall be deemed to have been withdrawn from the date of such direction), by holding that the said sub-section did not create any new right other than those mentioned in sub-....
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....here cognizance has been taken by the court, the cases shall be deemed to have been withdrawn, is not found in section 60(4) to (7) of POTA. Once the law made by the Parliament specifically states that wherever the Review Committee is of the opinion that there is no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused, the cases shall be deemed to have been withdrawn. If the Parliament wanted to make the provisions of section 2(3) of the Repealing Act subject to Section 321 of the Code, it would have been done by making appropriate provisions therefor. As that is not done, plain meaning of the words of the legislation has to be given effect to. 29. Section 2(3) of the Repealing Act also contains clear indications which exclude section 321 of the Code. They are : (i) The review is by Review Committee with a sitting or retired Judge of the High Court as the Chairman, having the power of a civil court in respect of discovery and production of documents and requisitioning records. (ii) All cases registered under POTA are required to be reviewed irrespective of whether any application was made by an aggrieved person or not, so as to find out whether there is a prima facie case for pro....
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....ed person could challenge the opinion expressed by the Review Committee by invoking judicial review, the apprehension that there will be no remedy in the event of wrong opinion by Review committee, is unwarranted. The opinions of the Review Committee under section 2(3) of the Repealing Act are limited in number and are required to be given as an one time measure with reference to a repealed statute. The availability of judicial review under Article 226 in the event of errors and abuse, is a sufficient safeguard and deterrent against any wrong doing by the Review Committee. 32. We therefore hold that once the Review Committee on review under section 2(3) of the Repealing Act, expresses the opinion that there is no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused, in cases in which cognizance has been taken by the Court, such cases shall be deemed to have been withdrawn. The only role of the Public Prosecutor in the matter is to bring to the notice of the court, the direction of the Review Committee. The court on satisfying itself as to whether such an opinion was rendered, will have to record that the case stands withdrawn by virtue of section 2(3) of the Repealing Act. The co....
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.... short the "Cr.P.C.") into POTA 2002. 3. The Madras High Court ordered the Special Court to give "due consideration" to the Review Committee's decision. A two-Judge Bench of this Court on 8.3.2004, in a short order while dismissing the special leave petition arising out of the Madras High Court judgment, upheld the application under section 321 of Cr.P.C. The said order is reproduced as under:- "the Special Leave Petitions are filed against the judgment of the High Court challenging the amendments to the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 which gives to the Review Committee powers which earlier it did not have. By the amendment, the decision of the Review Committee is made binding on the Central Government, State Governments and the Police Officers investigation the offence. The High Court has held, in our view correctly, that these amendments are based on the recommendations made by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (1994) 3 SCC and the judgment of this Court in R.M. Tiwari v. State (1998) 2 SCC 610. There are the provisions which provide safeguards against misuse of the stringent provisions of such an Act. In our vi....
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....under the 2002 Act for determining whether there is a prima-facie case for proceeding against the accused under the said Act. One starking similarity between the two sets of provisions is that once the Review Committee forms an opinion that there is no prima-facie case for proceeding against the accused under the 2002 Act, the pending cases were treated as automatically withdrawn. Therefore, keeping in view the ratio of the judgment of Madras High Court which has been approved by the Supreme Court, we are inclined to agree with the learned Additional Solicitor General that the impugned provisions should be read in conjunction, with Section 321 of the Code and same do not, in any manner, encroach upon the judicial power of the State and that the opinion formed by the Review Committee on the prima-facie nature of the case under the 2002 Act has to be given due weightage by the Special court and accepted unless there are exceptional reasons for not doing so." (emphasis added] 7. It appears as though the Gujarat High Court considered "proceedings pending against the accused" to include those proceedings in which the Special Court had taken cognizance of the matter. From this limited....
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.... a two-Judge Bench. Several States had constituted Review Committees, to review cases brought under TADA, 1987. The Committees were appointed in compliance with Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569. Relying on Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Others (1983) 1 SCC 438 (and other cases that analyzed section 321 of Cr.P.C. in the absence of a statute to the contrary, the Court found that the Committee's recommendation to withdraw was not binding and was subject to section 321 of Cr.P.C. This case does not apply to the present dispute because the Court was not dealing with POTA (Repeal) 2004, whose text expressly states that the Committee can deem a case withdrawn. Instead, the case was interpreting the State Review Committee's interpretation of Kartar Singh's directions, which are ambiguous as to whether section 321 of Cr.P.C. should apply to the Committee(s) it spawned. 10. The Madras High Court took a similar stand but more closely adhered to the case law that has interpreted section 321 of Cr.P.C. by retaining the public prosecutor's ability to make an independent decision. The High Court observed thus: "The words in sub-section (7) of ....
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....Cr.P.C. is a general provision that can be subjected to special laws. 14. On the other hand, judicial review should not suffer the same fate. A violation of judicial review is another way of saying that the separation of powers between the principal three organs of the State have been violated. Judicial review forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution. and when judicial review is removed - even at the trial court level - the question becomes one of degree : has the basic structure been destroyed? Our short answer is that because POTA (Repeal) 2004 has not removed judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136, the basic structure has not been destroyed. Given the gravity of this question, I deem it necessary to explain my reasoning. 15. The Courts' powers to grant consent to a prosecutor's request to withdraw exits in the absence of section 321 of Cr.P.C. This is because in the matter concerning judiciary, it should have the final say over cases that have been placed before it. It goes without saying that the Court's decision to grant consent to an application for withdrawal is a judicial function. If it is granted, the case is over. Resolving legal ....
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.... Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 288 referred to and approved the above judgment. Separation Of Powers Is Part of The Basic Structure: 18. In His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala and Another (1973) 4 SCC 225, the Court opined that separation of powers is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India. (1973) 4 SCC 225, per Sikri, C.J., as paras 292 and 293, per Shelat and Grover JJ at para 582 - "Demarcation of power between the legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary". 19. I need not dwell on the fact that the separation of powers is part of the basic structure. This has been well established in a plethora of cases. [See: S.R. Bommai and Others v. Union of India and Others (1994) 3 SCC 1, Per Chandrachud, J. at 2742, per Beg. J. at 2426-30, 2472, per Ray, C.J., at 2320; State of Bihar and Another v. Bal Mukund Sah and Others (2000) 4 SCC 640 (para 32); I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2 SCC 1; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 (Suppl) SCC 1; Minerva Mills Ltd. and Others v. Union of India and Others (1980) 3 SCC 625; Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India and Others (1991) 4 SCC 699; I. Man....
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....into the Constitution. [Para 3]. Article 329A(1) and (2) provided that, in the future, a Prime Minister's election to either House of Parliament could not be questioned by the judiciary. [Paras 5-6]. 24. Article 329(A)(4) stated that no election laws apply or shall be deemed to have applied to Parliamentary elections. [Para 8]. In addition, it nullified any court order that had voided an election. [Para 8]. Article 329(A) (5) directed the Court to dismiss any appeal pending before the Supreme Court consistent with 329(A)(4). [Para 9]. Article 329(A)(6) stated that the provisions of 329 would go in effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution. [Para 10]. 25. The Court struck 329A(4), holding it in violation of the basic structure. Article 329(A)(4) appropriated the Court's power to adjudicate election laws, encroaching on the judiciary in violation of separation of powers. In voiding this part of the 39th Amendment, the Court declared that separation of powers and judicial review (by necessary implication) are part of the basic structure because of the retrospective effect of the Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 40 of 1975. I turn to a number of relevant....
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....of self-preservation (even if history has not repeatedly brought it home), that discretion is the better part of valour" Social Dimensions of Law and Justice-Julius Stone (1966). p. 668.] Courts have, by and large, come to check their valorous propensities. In the name of the Constitution, the Parliament may not also turn its attention from the important task of legislation to deciding court cases for which it lacks the expertise and the apparatus. If it gathers facts, it gathers facts of policy. If it records findings, it does so without a pleading and without framing any issues. and worst of all, if it decides a Court case, it decides without hearing the parties and in defiance of the fundamental principles of natural justice." 28. This raises the issue of the Review Committee's competence to decide the court case. Even a ruling wherein prima facie cases are withdrawn, the decision to withdraw is final and terminates the case in favour of the accused. A case has thus been decided. The question regarding the Committee's competence loses some relevance when I consider that the aggrieved party could still file an appeal against such a decision. Nevertheless, the Review Co....
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....to provide for a judicial forum; instead, other forums would have also been acceptable. [paras 198 and 207]. His concern was that no forum whatsoever was provided. In the instant case, a judicial forum - the High Courts and the Supreme Court - is there for those who are aggrieved by the Review Committee's decision. 34. Justice Mathew's opinion shows how judicial review is necessarily linked to the separation of powers doctrine. By stripping the Court of judicial review of election cases, Article 329A(4) bestows a power on an organ of government that is incapable of providing a just result. Justice Mathew stated at para 325 that: "It was an essential feature of democracy as established by the Constitution, namely, (that there should be a) a resolution of an election dispute by an authority by the exercise of judicial power by ascertaining the adjudicative facts and applying and applying the relevant law for determining the real representative of the people." 35. At para 327, Justice Mathew holds Article 329A(4) unconstitutional, in violation of the separation of powers. Given that our separation of powers is somewhat flexible, he finds that the Parliament coul....
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....ing power of Parliament would stand enlarged, contrary to the decision of this Court in Kesavananda Bharati's case. This would undoubtedly damage the basic structure of the Constitution, because there are two essential features of the basic structure which would be violated, namely, the limited amending power of Parliament and the power of judicial review with a view to examining whether any authority under the Constitution has exceeded the limits of its powers, I shall immediately proceed to state the reasons why I think that these two features form part of the basic structure of the Constitution." 37. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 is another case wherein the Court struck down a constitutional amendment that sought to remove judicial power. This Court reviewed the 42nd Amendment through which the Parliament sought to insert Articles 323-A and 323-B in the Constitution. [para 5]. Article 323-b (2) empowered the Parliament or the State Legislatures to set up Tribunal to resolve a wide variety of disputes: tax cases, foreign exchange matters, industrial and labour cases, ceiling or urban property, criminal matters etc. [para 35]. Article 323-B(3)(d) exclu....
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....ds, given that the Review Committee's job is to act as a filter. Where there is obviously no case against the accused, the Review Committee should withdraw the case. That is, "... where the Review Committee is of the opinion that there is no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused," then the case shall be deemed withdrawn. [See POTA (Repeal) 2004, S. 3(a) and (b)]. Where there is some evidence that suggests that a case against the accused might exist, the Review Committee must allow the proceedings to continue. 42. Those who are aggrieved by the Review Committee's decision to withdraw still have judicial recourse under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under this Article, it may take appropriate steps in the High Court (or in this Court) against the Review Committee's decision to withdraw. One cannot say that the aggrieved parties are without a remedy, when those parties can approach the High Court (or this Court). I make it clear that the High Court should examine the aggrieved parties' cases, if those parties choose to contest the Review Committee's decision to withdraw. 43. Unlike the provisions at issue in the Election case, Minerva Mills, L....
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.... trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. Section 5: "Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by another law for the time being in force." 47. The Special Act must be deemed to supercede the provisions of the general Act. In Harbans Singh and Others v. The State, AIR 1953 (All.) 179 at p. 18, the U.P. Private Forests Act (Act No. 6 of 1949) was a special statute that precluded Magistrates of the First Class from trying violations under the Act. Under Schedule III of the general Cr.P.C. of 1898, Magistrates of the First Class had the power to try similar offences. The Allahabad High Court held that the special law must trump the general and set aside the conviction entered by the Magistrate of the First Class. The Court relied on Section 5 of the CrPC 1898, from which S. 5 of the CrPC, 1973 borrowed: "Para 4. It is, therefore clear that the powers conferred under the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are subject to any special provi....
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....reading of the statute, withdrawal occurs on the spot. Under the other, it is to languish before the public prosecutor. 51. If the public prosecutor approves of the decision to withdraw, then it is presented to the Special Court for a final decision. Inserting section 321 of Cr.P.C. itself into POTA (Repeal) 2004 defies logic and produces an absurd result. "The object of the construction of a statute being to ascertain the will of the Legislature, it may be presumed that neither injustice nor absurdity was intended." (Owen Thomas Mangin v. Inland Revenue Commissioner, [1971) 2 WLR 39, p. 42 (PC) (Lord Donovan), as referred in Justice G.P. Singh's celebrated book, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 11th Edition, 2008 at page 129. 52. The appellant further argued that requiring two withdrawals disregards Parliamentary intent. The Statute's Statement of Objects and Reasons expresses the Parliament's intent. It reads as under: "1. The provisions of Terrorism Act, 2002 was enacted as a Special law to deal with terrorist acts. 2. There have been allegations of gross misuse of the provisions of the Act by some State Governments. Views have been exp....