TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2016 (1) TMI 900
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....4D for refunds granted earlier in revisions for giving effect to appellate order etc. The assessee submitted that such interest can be charged only if the refund originates from an order passed u/s.143(1) and not otherwise. To support this view, the assessee has placed reliance on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of CIT v. Ramco Industries (Tax Case No.1343/2009) . Aggrieved, the assessee went in appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax(Appeals). 4. On appeal, the Commissioner of Income-tax(Appeals) observed that the provisions of sec.234D of the Act were introduced into the statute w.e.f. 1.6.2003. The Commissioner of Income-tax(Appeals), further observed that in the case of ITO v. Ekta Promoters Pvt. Ltd.(113 ITD 719)[Del]{SB} , wherein it was held that provisions of sec.234D of the Act, which have been brought on statute from 1.6.2003, will have application only with effect from A.Y. 2004-05 and, therefore, interest u/s.234D cannot be charged for earlier years even though regular assessment for those years were framed after 1.6.2003 or refund was granted for those years after said date. Further, the Commissioner of Income-tax(Appeals) observed that in the....
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....t the Bench while arguing orally, we have circumspected on the issue on the issue but we are unable to state as to whether refund u/s 143(1) of the Act was granted or not granted during this year to the assessee. The assessee had not clearly brought the facts of this issue either before the ld. CIT(A) or before the Tribunal. The only averment was regarding chargeability of interest in the light of the abovementioned Hon'ble Madras High Court's decision. In the assessment order, the date of processing of return u/s 143(1) of the Act has not been mentioned and the assessment was passed u/s.143(3) on 31.3.2005 which was subjected to reassessment proceedings and further assessment order was passed u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 147 on 23.12.2009. In these circumstances, we are unable to decide the issue and for that matter, the ground raised by the Revenue in this regard as Ground No.3 (3.1 to 3.4) has to be dealt with after recalling the order to that extent. Accordingly, in the given facts and circumstances of the case, where Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court's decision remained to be considered, we recall the order in question for the limited purpose of deciding this issue, and d....
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....817 held that where lease deed allowing use of land even for excavation purposes and where rent was deposited in advance, then only adjustment of such rent was not deductible. We think the issue is squarely covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and therefore we confirm the order of ld CIT(A)." Respectfully following the above orders of this Tribunal, we are inclined to dismiss this ground of appeal of the assessee. 12. The next ground raised by the assessee in its appeal is that the Commissioner of Income-tax(Appeals) erred in confirming the disallowance of additional depreciation in respect of additions to plant and machinery in the previous assessment year (2005-06). 13. The ld. AR submitted that sub clause (iia) of sec.32(1) before its amendment by the Finance Act, 2005, allowed an assessee in respect of an existing industrial undertaking to claim 15% additional depreciation if achieves substantial expansion by way of increase in installed capacity by 10% or more and he relied on the decision of the Tribunal in the cases of Devi Polymers in ITA No.165/Mds/2014 dated 9.4.2014 and also Dy.CIT v. Cosmo Films Ltd., 13 ITR 340(Delhi)(Trib.). 14. On the ....
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....t not to have restricted the depreciation permissible under the said section by resorting to the second proviso to section 32(1) of the Act. The learned counsel however fairly pointed out before us that in the second proviso to section 32(1) of the Act, that very clause (iia) itself was inserted by Finance Act, 2002 with effect from 01.04.2003. Therefore, it was imperative that on and after 01.04.2003, the claim of the assessee made under section 32(1)(iia) of the Act, had to be necessarily assessed by applying the second proviso to section 32(1) of the Act. Therefore, when there was statutory stipulation providing for restriction to 50 per cent of the amount allowable under section 32(1)(iia) of the Act, no fault can be found with the conclusion of the Assessing Authority as well as that of the Appellate Authority and the Tribunal in having affirmed the action of the Assessing Authority. We, therefore, do not find any scope to entertain the said question of law." 15. In the present case the assessee used new plant and machinery below 180 days and therefore, additional depreciation shall be allowed only 50%. We find that the above decision of the Hon'ble Jurisdictional....
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.... is not a decretal amount. The Finance Act, 2005, prescribed the procedure to be followed for the recovery of the AED credit availed by the assessee and interest payable thereon. The Finance Act required the amount to be paid back to the government, which could be paid back in instalments with interest at the rate of 13% per annum. Therefore, the interest payable on AED is part of the duty payable and provisions of sec.43B are applicable. Being so, the argument of the ld. AR that interest payable on AED is only compensatory in nature and does not fall within the purview of sec.43B cannot be upheld. Hence, the judgment relied on by the CIT(A) in the case of Shree Pipes v. DCIT (289 ITR 154)is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case, wherein it was held that "interest accrued on delayed payment of tax which is otherwise allowable as deduction under the provisions of the Income-tax Act while computing the total income is part of tax within the meaning of section 43B. The liability towards interest due was not allowable." In view of this, we are of the opinion that the CIT(Appeals) is justified in disallowing the claim of the assessee. 21. The next ground in this appeal....
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.... mercantile system, the disallowance made by the AO is in order. Therefore, no interference is called for on the action of the AO. The other plea of the assessee that it is consistently following the above practice and the same has been accepted by the Department will also not come to its rescue because reliance on "rule of consistency" alone cannot be the basis for such allowance as held by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Ostwal Agro Mills Ltd. (183 Taxman 241(SC). Further, estoppel will not operate in such a situation and the Department is entitled to judge the accounts of an assessee each year on their merits (Jamne Das Rameswar Das v. CIT 21 ITR 109(Punj.). Accordingly, this ground is dismissed and the appeal of the assessee in ITA No.1376/Mds/10 is dismissed. 25. In ITA No.1377/Mds/2010, the first ground is with regard to confirming the disallowance of amortization of lease charges paid in respect of leasehold land, taken on lease by the assessee and used in its business. 26. As discussed in earlier assessment year 2006-07, this issue is squarely covered against the assessee by the order of the Tribunal in ITA No.1849 and 2230/Mds/2004 dated 13.10.2006.Accordingl....