TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2011 (1) TMI 1343
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....Power to enact laws, thus, is vested in the Parliament as well as in the State Legislative Assemblies within their respective spheres. This is the paramount source for enactment of law, i.e., direct exercise of legislative power by the respective constituents. On the issue of distribution of powers between the Centre and the State, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India v. Union of India [(1989) 3 SCC 634], noticed that the constitutionality of a law becomes essentially a question of power which, in a federal constitution, turns upon the construction of the entries in the legislative lists. Interpretative process, as a tool of interpretation, introduced new dimensions to the expansion of law enacted by Legislature, through Judge made law. Amongst others, doctrines of `legislation by reference' and `legislation by incorporation' are the creation of judicial pronouncements. One of the earliest instances, where the Privy Council, then responsible for Indian Judicial system, accepted the plea of `legislation by incorporation' and interpreted the statute accordingly in the case of Secretary of State for India in Council v.....
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....as law of universal application without appropriately modifying the stated position of law to bring it in complete harmony with the constitutional mandate. In the case of Gauri Shankar Gaur v. State of U.P. [(1994) 1 SCC 92], one member of the Bench of this Court, relied upon the principle stated in Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. (supra) and held that in a case of legislation by incorporation, subsequent amendment or repeal of the provisions of an earlier Act adopted cannot be deemed to have been incorporated in the adopting Act which may be true in the case of legislation by reference. This judgment was relied upon by another Bench of this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Sant Joginder Singh Kishan Singh [1995 Supp.(2) SCC 475]. The amendments in various relevant laws and introduction and application of newly enunciated principles of law resulted in varied opinions. A Bench of this Court in the case of Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra [(2004) 8 SCC 505] (hereinafter referred to as `Girnar Traders-I) expressed certain doubts on the correctness of the law stated in the case of Sant Joginder Singh (supra) and referred the matter to a larger Bench. ....
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.... notice issued by the appellant. Despite confirmation of the purchase notice, the second respondent Jalgaon Municipal Council did not take any steps under Section 126 of the MRTP Act, nor did it apply to the State Government for acquisition of the land under reservation. Ultimately, on 3-10-1991, the first respondent State Government issued a notification under Section 126(4) of the MRTP Act read with Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, declaring that the land concerned was required for a public purpose as indicated in the notification. This notification expressly mentions that the period of three years prescribed under Section 126(2) of the MRTP Act was over and, therefore, the State Government was acting under sub-section (4) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act. It is the case of the appellant that it had no knowledge of this declaration dated 3-10-1991 as no individual notice has been served on it, though this declaration was published in the Official Gazette on 15-10-1991. Despite the declaration under Section 126(4) of the MRTP Act, as aforesaid, nothing happened till March 1994. On 23-3-1994 the appellant issued second purchase notice under Section 49(1) of the MRTP....
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....the directions were not complied within the period of one year, as set out by us, whether the petitioner is entitled for the reliefs prayed for in this petition". The High Court held: "on perusal of the documents submitted before us we are satisfied that the requisite steps have been taken by the Special Land Acquisition Officer for acquisition of the subject land and after Writ Petition No. 2829 of 1996 was disposed of, there was no necessity to initiate fresh action by the Planning Authority as contemplated under Section 126(1)(c) of the MRTP Act". In this view of the matter, the writ petition came to be dismissed. Hence, this appeal by special leave. Mr V.A. Mohta, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant urged that the scheme of the MRTP Act shows that, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1) of Section 126, if the State Government is satisfied that the land specified in the application is required for a public purpose, it may make a declaration to that effect in the Official Gazette in the manner specified in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and such declaration is deemed to be a declaration duly made under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The proviso ....
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....onsequently, the period of limitation prescribed under Section 11-A for making the award would squarely apply. Appellant urges that while sub-section (4) of Section 126 may save a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 from becoming bad because of lapse of time (though, subject to the modification with regard to the market value of the land prescribed therein), there is nothing in the MRTP Act which precludes, expressly or by direct implication, the provisions of Section 11-A from applying to govern the period within which the award has to be made. In the facts of the present case, there is no dispute that the declaration under Section 126(4) was made on 3-10-1991 and published in the Official Gazette on 15-10-1991, while the award is said to have been made on 18-2- 1999. In these circumstances, the award not having been made within the period of two years from the date of the declaration under Section 6, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land would lapse by reason of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Appellant relies heavily on the Statement of Objects and Reasons attached to the Bill preceding Act 68 of 1984. The atten....
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....n provided in sub-section (4) of Section 126 of the Act is a clear indication that failure to make the award within two years from the date of the declaration under sub-section (2) of Section 126 of the Act, would not render the notification published under Section 125 of the Act non est." The appellant urges that Sant Joginder Singh (supra) needs reconsideration by a larger Bench. Upon careful consideration of the contentions urged before us, we are inclined to accept the submissions of Mr. Mohta for more than one reason. First, although the MRTP Act and similar Regional Town Planning Acts did not contain specific provisions for payment of compensation, when they were challenged as infringing Article 14 of the Constitution, their validity was upheld by reading the provisions as to payment of compensation contained in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 into the Regional Town Planning Acts. (See in this connection Gauri Shankar Gaur v. State of U.P. (1994) 1 SCC 92 and Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao (1973) 1 SCC 500) Secondly, Sant Joginder Singh (supra) appears to have been doubted by a judgment Paragraphs 30 and 31 of another Bench of two learned Judges in Maharashtra SR....
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....ciple should apply in the matter of attracting the provisions of Section 11-A of Act 68 of 1984 also to the acquisition under the MRTP Act. Thirdly, if the provisions of the MRTP Act are read as contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, in the light of Sant Joginder Singh (supra) then it would be open to the authorities, after issuing a declaration under sub-section (3), to go into hibernation and leave the matter hanging in perpetuity. That certainly would seriously affect the rights of the landholder preventing him from developing the land or alienating it, merely because the authority chooses to act under one Act instead of the other. This again, would attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution, not only on account of discrimination, but also on account of arbitrariness. We, therefore, see no good reason as to why the provisions introduced in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by Central Act 68 of 1984 should not be read into an acquisition under Chapter VII of the MRTP Act, to the extent not precluded by the MRTP Act, 1966. Section 11-A being one such section, it may have to be applied to the acquisition under Chapter VII of the MRTP Act. For these ....
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....ased from the reservation. The Court, vide its order dated 31st March, 1997, rejected all the prayers and directed as under: "The respondents No.1 and 3 are directed to initiate the proceedings for acquisition of the lands in question within one year from today and complete the same within the time prescribed under the Act. In case the authorities fail to initiate the acquisition proceedings within the prescribed period, the lands of the petitioner shall be deemed to have been released from the reservation. Petition is disposed of accordingly." Final award was passed by the LAO on 10th February, 1999 and he issued notices to the parties under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act on 18th February, 1999. The appellant approached the High Court of Bombay, again, by filing Writ Petition No.822 of 2000 in which the basic challenge to the action of the respondent was on the ground that the concerned authorities including the Planning Authority had failed to take steps for acquisition in terms of the order of the Court dated 31st March, 1997 within one year and, thus, the reservation had lapsed. The land of the appellant, thus, should be deemed to have reverted to the app....
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....hat Sant Joginder Singh's case (supra) appears to have been doubted by judgments of other Benches of this Court in the cases of Maharashtra SRTC, Nagpur Improvement Trust and U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (supra) in which it was held that the provisions with regard to compensation in terms of Central Act 68 of 1984, including Sections 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act would be applicable to an acquisition under Chapter VII of the MRTP Act. On the contrary, in Sant Joginder Singh's case (supra), the Court had held that there are sufficient indicia in MRTP Act itself to exclude applicability of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act in view of sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act. The Bench also felt that voice of discrimination pointed by the Seven Judge Bench in Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao [(1973) 1SCC 500] would affect a situation like the present case and such provisions may have to be read into the Land Acquisition Act. After expressing this view, the Bench chose to refer a restricted question for determination by the larger Bench that whether provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, amongst other provisions, in....
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.... by incorporation is not applicable to the present case and these judgments require reconsideration by this Court. 6. Lastly and in alternative, it is contended that any other approach would vest the concerned authorities with the choice of initiating proceedings under either of these Acts which have substantially different consequences, in fact and in law. It is also argued that if Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act is not read into or treated as part of the MRTP Act, then it will amount to discrimination between the similarly situated persons whose lands are subject matter of acquisition. Reacting to the above submissions, the learned counsel appearing for different respondents contended that: 1. The MRTP Act is a self-contained Code in itself. Consequently, it is not necessary for the Court to go into the larger question, whether it is a case of legislation by reference or legislation by incorporation. 2. In the alternative, even if the Court decides to examine this aspect, it is a clear case of legislation by incorporation. Various provisions of the MRTP Act have referred to specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and no general application of the provisio....
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....ossible only within the areas of local authorities and there was no provision to control development of land in the important peripheral areas outside the municipal limits. This resulted in development of land in the peripheral areas in an irregular and haphazard manner which was clearly demonstrated in the vast areas outside Greater Bombay, Poona and other important urban centres. The object of regional planning was to facilitate proper planning of such extensive areas of land, called Regions in the Bill, having common physical, social and economic problems so that certain matters such as distribution of population and industries, roads and highways, preservation of good agricultural lands, reservation of green belts and preservation of areas of natural scenery etc. could be dealt with and planned comprehensively on a regional level. The Bill had sought to improve the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 in regard to preparation and execution of development plans to ensure that such plans are made properly and expeditiously. Every planning Authority is required to appoint a Town Planner for carrying out surveys and to prepare an existing land use map and formulating pr....
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....this definition. Section 2(9) of the State Act defines `development plan' to mean a plan for development or redevelopment of the area within the jurisdiction of the Planning Authority and includes revision of a development plan and proposals of a Special Planning Authority for development of land within its jurisdiction. The `regional plan' means a plan for development or redevelopment of a region which is approved by the State Government and has come into operation under the MRTP Act. The expression `town planning scheme' has not been defined as such but the term `scheme' includes a plan relating to town planning scheme in terms of Section 2(30) of the State Act. Corresponding to each plan there are authorities like `Development Authority' which means a New Town Development Authority constituted or declared under Section 113 of the MRTP Act, `Planning Authority' which means a local authority including a Special Planning Authority and the Slum Rehabilitation Authority appointed under Section 40 of this Act and Section 3(c) of the Maharashtra Slum Areas Improvement Clearance & Redevelopment Act, 1971 respectively. `Region' means any area established to be....
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.... time being in force the permission referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be granted otherwise than in conformity with the provisions of the draft of final Regional plan. (3) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub- sections (1) and (2) or any other provisions of this Act, any person intending to execute a Special Township Project on any land, may make an application to the State Government and on receipt of such application the State Government may, after making such inquiry as it may deem fit in that behalf, grant such permission and declare such project to be a Special Township Project by notification in the Official Gazette or, reject the application" Section 20 of the State Act empowers the State Government to revise or modify the regional plan in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Chapter III of the MRTP Act deals with preparation, submission and sanction of Development Plan and, primarily, provides for use of land for purposes such as residential, industrial, commercial, agricultural, recreational, schools, colleges and other educational institutions, open spaces, playgrounds, stadia, zoological gardens, green belts, nature reserves, transport and communic....
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...., estimate the value and fix difference between the values of the original plots and the values of the final plots included in the final scheme and estimate the amount of compensation payable under Section 66 of the MRTP Act, estimate the reference of claims made before him and decide the dispute of ownership amongst other specified matters. Appeal against the decision of the Arbitrator under clauses (iv) to (xi) (both inclusive) and clauses (xiv) to (xvi) of sub-section (3) of Section 72 of the State Act lies to a tribunal constituted under Section 75 of the MRTP Act. In fact, certain decisions of the Arbitrator are final and binding on the parties including the Planning Authority. However, some of such decisions do not attain finality qua filing of civil suits, e.g. disputes under Section 71 of the MRTP. Thus, an adjudicatory mechanism covering larger aspects of planning and execution is provided under the provisions of the MRTP Act. Preparation, submission and sanction of development plans are basic functions of various authorities constituted under Chapter VI of the MRTP Act with ultimate object of execution of such plan. The MRTP Act contemplates preparation, approval and fina....
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....Acquisition Act before such declaration is published. It is further provided that subject to the provisions of Section 126(4) of the MRTP Act no such declaration shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of publication of the draft regional plan, development plan or any other plan or the scheme, as the case may be. After such declaration is published, the Collector shall proceed to take order for the acquisition of the land under the Land Acquisition Act and provisions of that Act shall apply to the acquisition of the said land with the modification that date of market value of the land to be acquired shall be determined with reference to sub-section 3(i) to 3(iii) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 126 empowers the State Government to make a fresh declaration for acquiring the land where the period of one year, as specified in the proviso to sub-section (2) to Section 126 of the MRTP Act, has lapsed but then the market value of the land would be the market value on the date of publication of fresh declaration. Section 126 of the MRTP Act reads as under: "126. Acquisition of land required for public purposes specified in plans. (1)....
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.... of the said land, The declaration so published shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the said Act, be deemed to be a declaration duly made under the said section : Provided that, subject to the provisions of sub- section (4), no such declaration shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of publication of the draft Regional Plan, Development Plan or any other Plan, or Scheme, as the case may be. (3) On publication of a declaration under the said section 6, the Collector shall proceed to take order for the acquisition of the land under the said Act; and the provisions of that Act shall apply to the acquisition of the said land with the modification that the market value of the land shall be, - (i) where the land is to be acquired for the purposes of a new town, the market value prevailing on the date of publication of the notification constituting or declaring the Development Authority for such town; (ii) where the land is acquired for the purposes of a Special Planning Authority, the market value prevailing on the date of publication of the notification of the area as an undeveloped area; and (iii) in any other case the market value on the da....
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.... MRTP Act came to be amended by The Maharashtra Regional & Town Planning (Second Amendment) Act, 2009. By amendment, the portion underlined in the unamended Section, reproduced hereinafter, was deleted. The Legislature, in its wisdom, while deleting the reference to the Land Acquisition Act made lapsing of reservation a consequence of the default arising only from sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act. Where such default appeared as well as no steps for acquisition were taken within the specified time, under the amended/unamended Section 127 of the MRTP Act, the owner was required to give notice in relation to release of the property. If no steps for acquisition were taken within 12 months of such notice, the land stood de-reserved. The amended and unamended provisions of Section 127 of the MRTP Act read as under: Unamended "127. Lapsing of reservations. If any land reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose specified in any plan under this Act is not acquired by agreement within ten years from the date on which a final Regional plan, or final Development plan comes into force or if proceedings for the acquisition of such land under this Act or unde....
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....waiting for release of their respective lands because of inaction on the part of the Planning Authority in acquisition of their lands. The Legislature was obviously aware of the provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act which permitted lapse of entire acquisition proceedings after the prescribed period. Still, the Legislature opted to amend Section 127 of the MRTP Act in the manner as it had amended. The intention appears to be to remove the doubt, if any, created by the unamended provisions of Section 127 of the MRTP Act with regard to application of Section 11A of the Central Act to the State Act. Once the State Legislature has, by amendment, restricted the application of default clause only in the situations covered under Section 126(2) and 126(4) of the State Act respectively, it will then be impermissible to read Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act into the language of Section 126(2) of the State Act. The amendment ex-facie appears to be to avoid undue hardship to the owners of the land on the one hand while on the other, exclusion of the underlined portion supra especially the words `under the Land Acquisition Act', suggests the legislative intent to compl....
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.... the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and states that a Development Authority constituted under Section 113(2) of the MRTP Act is vested with the powers of a Planning Authority under Chapter VII of this Act for the purposes of acquisition either by agreement or under the Land Acquisition Act. Reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act in some of the provisions of the MRTP Act could only imply that they have solely been made for the purpose of completing the process of acquisition. Most of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, with alteration in the language, have been specifically stated under the provisions of MRTP Act itself. Sections 126 to 129 of the State Act clearly enunciate the intention of the framers that substantive provisions of Land Acquisition Act are not applicable to MRTP Act, which is a self-contained code providing procedure regarding all matters contained therein, except to the extent that provisions of Sections 9 to 11 of the Land Acquisition Act be brought into it for the limited purpose of acquiring land. Once the provisions of MRTP Act are analyzed in their correct perspective, a holistic view can be taken that it is a code in itself.....
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....plots' as defined under the MRTP Act in contradistinction to the expression `land' used in other provisions of the Act. This indicates the limited jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. Appeals lie to the Tribunal only from such orders of the Arbitrator which are specified under Sections 73 and 74 of the MRTP Act. The matters for acquisition and payment of compensation are to be finalized with the aid of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Under Section 83 of the MRTP Act, the lands can be vested in the concerned authority at different stages right from the commencement of preparation/approval of draft plan to the final plans and their execution under the provisions of the Act. Like Section 83 of the MRTP Act, Sections 116 and 128(3) of the State Act can be enforced by the planning authorities with an object to achieve planned development and as part of planning under the Act. Section 117 of the State Act again states the consequences of default. Where the land notified under Section 113 of the MRTP Act, as site of a new town, is not acquired by the Government or a development authority within a period of ten years from the date of notification, the owner is entitled to se....
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....nd need to be adequately compensated for the loss keeping in view the sacrifice they have to make for larger interest of the community. The pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods often caused hardship to the affected parties and rendered unrealistic, the scale of compensation offered to them. With this background the legislature felt that it was necessary to restructure the legislative framework for acquisition of land so that it is more adequately governed by the objective of serving the interests of the community in harmony with the rights of the individuals. Recommendations on similar lines were also made by the Law Commission and while considering these proposals for amendment, the legislature carried out various amendments of significance in the existing Land Acquisition Act. Besides enlarging the definition of `public purpose', provision was also made for acquisition of land for non-governmental companies. Further, it provided the time limit for completion of all formalities between issue of preliminary notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act was introduced which ....
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....any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded." If the award is made within the stipulated period, such award attains finality under Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act and is conclusive evidence of the true area or the value of the land as between the collector and person interested. In normal acquisition proceedings, after passing the award, the Collector may take possession of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances as per Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act. The possession can also be taken earlier as the Appropriate Government is vested with special powers in cases of urgency. In that case, the provisions of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act state the scheme to be followed by the Collector for acquisition of the land including taking of possession prior to making of an award. Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act is another important provision of this Act which empowers the Government to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken and whenever it withdraws from the acquisition, the Collector shall....
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.... as legal remedies in case of any grievances. Having stated the scheme of the two Acts, let us proceed to examine if there are marked distinctions between the statutory provisions of the two Acts and, if so, what is the scope of the same. Sl.No. Land Acquisition Act MRTP Act 1. The Land Acquisition Act is a legislation regulating only the acquisition of land for a public purpose and payment of its compensation. In other words, it is a legislation of acquisition alone and is in no way concerned with planned development. The primary object of MRTP Act is regional/town planning and development of the entire State of Maharashtra. The function of the authorities constituted under the Act is planning. The purpose of the Act primarily is planned development and acquisition is incidental thereto. 2. The lands are to be acquired only for a public purpose in terms of the notification under Section 4. The Act deals with and provides only for land required, reserved or designated for planned development. 3. Upon issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act, the owner/interested person can develop the land or utilize the same for his ....
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....of compensation. The award passed by the Collector is subject to reference and appeal under the provisions of the Act. Multiple authorities have been constituted under different provisions of the Act which are responsible for performing the specified functions. The Arbitrator nominated and the Tribunal constituted under the provisions of the Act has to perform practically all the adjudicatory proceedings except where land is to be acquired for planned development acquisition thereof and awarding of its compensation by the Collector. 8. This Act is a Central Legislation relatable to Entry 42 of List III of Schedule VII to the Constitution. This Act is a State Legislation relatable to Entries 5 and 18 of List II of the Schedule VII to the Constitution. (without prejudice to the contention of the parties) 9. The market value of the land has to be determined as of the date of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The market value has to be determined with reference to the date/dates specified in Section 126(3) and upon issuance of a declaration under Section 126(2) in the manner for issuance of declaration under Section 6 of th....
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....complete code' in itself or not. This Court in Munithimmaiah v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 326] had the occasion to consider somewhat similar question in relation to the Bangalore Act and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The provisions of Section 36 of the Bangalore Act refer to application of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The Court rejected the plea that provisions of Sections 6 and 11A of the Land Acquisition Act providing a shorter period of limitation for publication of final notification and making of an award, were applicable to acquisition made under the Bangalore Act. Further, while holding that the Bangalore Act is a self-contained code, the Court held as under : "15. So far as the BDA Act is concerned, it is not an Act for mere acquisition of land but an Act to provide for the establishment of a development authority to facilitate and ensure planned growth and development of the city of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto and acquisition of lands, if any, therefore is merely incidental thereto. In pith and substance the Act is one which will squarely fall under, and be traceable to the powers of the State Legislature under E....
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....ovisions in a special law falling under a topic of legislation exclusively earmarked for the State Legislature." A Constitution Bench of this Court in Prakash Amichand Shah v. State of Gujarat [(1986) 1 SCC 581], while dealing with the erstwhile Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 (for short, `the Bombay Act') discussed in some elaboration the working under the Land Acquisition Act vis-`-vis the Bombay Act. The Court said that development and planning carried out under the Bombay Act is, primarily, for the benefit of the public. The local authority is under an obligation to function according to the Bombay Act and has to bear part of the expenses of development. It is in one sense a package deal. The proceedings relating to scheme are neither like acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act nor its provisions are made applicable to the Bombay Act either with or without modifications as in the case of Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936. Another school of thought has taken the view that while determining whether a statute is a self-contained code or not, relevant consideration would be whether such Act contains a bar for application of other statute by specific langua....
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.... been exclusion of application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to an application under Section 8 of the Act. In view of what is stated above, the non-applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under Section 8 of the Act is certain and sufficiently clear. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act as to the express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the specific period of limitation prescribed under Section 8 of the Act without providing for either extension of time or application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act or its principles can be read together harmoniously." In the case of Church of North India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai [(2005) 10 SCC 760], Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 under which the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is expressly barred was held to be a `complete code' in itself providing adequate machinery to deal with disputes relating to management of trust property. The provisions of this Act and the scheme thereof left no manner of doubt that the Act is a complete code in itself. It provides for a complete machinery for a person interested in a trust to put forward his claim before the Charity Commissioner, who is the compete....
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....rovisions which would comprehensively deal with various aspects of the purpose sought to be achieved by that law and its dependence on other legislations is either absent or at best is minimal. The provisions of the enactment in question should provide for a complete machinery to deal with various problems that may arise during its execution. Sufficient powers should be vested in the authority/forum created under the Act to ensure effectual and complete implementation of the Act. There should be complete and coherent scheme of the statutory provisions for attainment of the object and purpose of the Act. It essentially should also provide for adjudicatory scheme to deal with grievances/claims of the persons affected by enforcement of the provisions of the Act, preferably, including an appellate forum within the framework of the Act. In other words, the Act in itself should be a panacea to all facets arising from the implementation of the Act itself. Upon analysis of the above principles and particularly keeping in mind the negative instance in the case of Mariyappa (supra), we may turn back to the provisions of the MRTP Act. The principal object of this legislation is planned dev....
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.... code in itself has one pre- dominant purpose, i.e., planned development. Other matters are incidental and, therefore, should be construed to achieve that pre- dominant object. All the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be applied to the MRTP Act. The provisions of the MRTP Act have to be implemented in their own field. As far as the provisions relating to preparation, approval and execution of the development plans are concerned, there is hardly any dependency of the State Act on the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. It may be necessary, sometimes, to acquire land which primarily would be for the purpose of planned development as contemplated under the MRTP Act. Some of the provisions of the State Act have specifically referred to some of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act but for the limited purpose of acquiring land. Thus, the purpose of such reference is, obviously, to take aid of the provisions of the Central Act only for the purpose of acquiring a land in accordance with law stated therein rather than letting any provision of the Central Act hamper or obstruct the principal object of the State Act, i.e. execution of the planned development. There can ....
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....nd the amending provisions of the former Act would not become part of the later Act. This principle is generally called legislation by incorporation. General reference, ordinarily, will imply exclusion of specific reference and this is precisely the fine line of distinction between these two doctrines. Both are referential legislations, one merely by way of reference and the other by incorporation. It, normally, will depend on the language used in the later law and other relevant considerations. While the principle of legislation by incorporation has well defined exceptions, the law enunciated as of now provides for no exceptions to the principle of legislation by reference. Furthermore, despite strict application of doctrine of incorporation, it may still not operate in certain legislations and such legislation may fall within one of the stated exceptions. In this regard, the judgment of this Court in the case of M.V. Narasimhan (supra) can be usefully noticed where the Court after analyzing various judgments, summed up the exceptions to this rule as follows : "(a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other; (b) where the two Acts are in par....
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....mental law. When the later law depends on the former law for procedural/substantive provisions or is to draw its strength from the provisions of the former Act, the later Act In Section 20 of 53 Vict. Ch 70 - Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1890. Section 1(3) of 54 and 55 Vict. Ch 19 is termed as the supplemental to the former law. The statement of object and reasons of both the Acts, i.e. the MRTP Act and the Land Acquisition Act as well as the scheme of these Acts, we have already discussed at length. They are Acts which operate in different fields. One is a Central Act while the other is a State Act. They derive their source from different entries in the constitutional lists. On behalf of the appellant, it was contended before us that the MRTP Act would be rendered unworkable and ineffective without the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. It was also contended on behalf of the appellants that reservation and acquisition has a clear legal dichotomy and if acquisition lapses it will result in lapsing of reservation by operation of provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act. Thus, it is implied that the provisions of Section 11A would form an integral part ....
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....ives power to the development authority constituted under sub-section (2) of Section 113 as having all powers of a planning authority under this Act as provided in Chapter VII for the purpose of acquisition either by agreement or under the Land Acquisition Act. This clearly shows that these provisions make reference to a specific aspect of the acquisition, i.e. for exercise of powers by the authority concerned for the purposes of Chapter VII of the State Act. Section 125 of the MRTP Act introduces a legal fiction as it requires that reservation and designation of land under the plan shall be deemed to be a public purpose within the meaning of the definition of Land Acquisition Act. Section 126 of the MRTP Act is the effective provision which refers to the Land Acquisition Act. In terms of Section 126(1), the land can be acquired for public purpose specified in the plan. It gives right to acquire even after publication of a draft regional plan. Whenever a land is required or reserved for any public purpose specified in any plan or scheme under the MRTP Act, the concerned authority may, with the exception of the provisions of Section 113A of the State Act, i.e. land designated under ....
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....ll be deemed to be released from such reservation. By amendment, the expression `if proceedings for acquisition of such land under this Act or under the Land Acquisition Act' stood deleted. This further buttresses the view that general reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act was intentionally deleted by the Legislature and in its place specific reference to the provisions of Section 126(2) or 126(4) of the State Act was made and the period of six months was increased to 12 months. The legislative intent appears to make the MRTP Act a self- contained code and does not generally advert to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for execution of planned development. The default, its consequences and remedies, thus, have been specifically provided for under Section 126 of the MRTP Act and in that regard there is apparently no need to refer to the default clause contained in Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act. We have also referred that time limitations and consequences of their default are specifically provided for in the MRTP Act by the Legislature and, therefore, it will not be appropriate to read into these provisions something which has not been stated b....
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.... provisions of Section 23 while neglecting the matters stated under Section 24 of the said Act. However, the provisions of the State Act in terms of Section 128(2) mandate that despite the property being reserved, allotted or designated for a purpose, the same shall be deemed to be released from such reservation, allotment or designation while awarding compensation. This requirement is completely distinct from provisions of Section 23 of the Central Act. In other words, the value of the land acquired shall not be diminished because it has been reserved for a particular purpose. Reference to Section 24 of the Central Act is again very specific. It also needs to be mentioned that there are provisions regarding vesting of land in the State/Authority but still reference has been made to Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act under Section 128(3) of the State Act. The specific reference to provisions of Land Acquisition Act and purpose to be achieved is clear from the language of the above-referred provisions of the State Act. In other words, wherever the State Legislature considered it appropriate, it has made specific reference to a particular provision of the Land Acquisition Act ....
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....in the manner in which it was done. If the intention of the legislature was to permit lapsing of acquisition, in that event provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, per se, would have achieved the purpose. The 2009 amendment to the State Act restricted even lapsing of the reservation or designation only if there was default in compliance to the provisions of Section 126(2) and 126(4) of the MRTP Act. General reference to acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act was deleted as it was never intended to be read as a part of the State Act. Thus, the State Legislature in its wisdom restricted the consequences only to lapsing of reservation. Now, let us examine these two settled doctrines with reference to judgments of this Court, particularly, the ones which have been relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. In the case of M/s. Ujagar Prints (supra), a Constitution Bench of this Court was dealing with the question whether the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 which defines the expression `manufacture' as defined in Central Excuse and Salt Act, 1984 which came to be enlarged by amendment of the definition the year 1980, would apply to the provi....
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....7 Act as well." Besides deciding this aspect directly with reference to doctrine afore-referred, the Bench also applied the doctrine of pith and substance. It held that entries to the Legislative List are not source of legislative power, but are merely topics or fields of legislation and must receive a liberal construction inspired by a broad and generous spirit and not in a narrow pedantic sense. The expression `with respect to' in Article 246 brings in the doctrine of `Pith and Substance'. In the understanding of the exertion of the legislative power and wherever the question of legislative competence is raised the test is whether the legislation, looked at as a whole, is substantially `with respect to' the particular topic of legislation. If the legislation has a substantial and not merely a remote connection with the entry, the matter may well be taken to be legislation on the topic. In the case of M.V. Narasimhan (supra), the Court while applying the principle of legislation by incorporation had read amendment to Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code defining a `public servant' into the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Court clarified t....
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.... new dimension founded upon a distinction between procedural and substantive provisions of the statute. In the case of Sant Joginder Singh (supra), the Court was concerned with the provisions of the MRTP Act amended by the Maharashtra Act 14 of 1971, specially failure to publish declaration within three years, as was then prescribed under proviso to Section 126(2) of the said Act, and the application of provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act which provided limitation of two years for making award. Applying the principle of distinction between procedural and substantive provisions of the statute, the Court came to the conclusion that Section 11A cannot be read into the provisions of the MRTP Act and rejected the argument as the provisions of Section 23 of the Central Act have to be applied for determining compensation, Section 11A would also automatically apply. The Court found that Section 11A was a procedural provision while Section 23 was a substantive provision and held, "So, merely because Section 23 of the Central Act would apply to acquisition under the State Act, it is not enough to hold that what is contained in Section 11A would also apply". Even, the earlie....
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....the Land Acquisition Act. Thus, there was difference of opinion on this question of law between the Judges of the same Bench. Since the appeal was dismissed on different grounds by both the learned Judges, the matter remained at that stage. The above dissent led to reference of the legal issue to a three Judge Bench in the case of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (supra) where the Court took the view that the acquisition effected under the provisions of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965, where Section 55 read with the Schedule of that Act adopted the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, such adoption was held to be legislation by reference and, therefore, the land owners would be entitled to the benefits of Sections 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 as introduced by the Central Act 68 of 1984 as otherwise it would suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and hostile discrimination. This Court while dealing with the provision of Section 55 of the Adhiniyam held that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by the Central Act 68 of 1984, relating to determination and payment of compensation, would be applicable to acquisition of land for the purposes of Adhiniyam. The ....
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....option of the construction that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by the Central Act 68 of 1984, relating to award of compensation would apply with full vigour to the acquisition of land under the MRTP Act, as otherwise it would be hit by invidious discrimination and palpable arbitrariness and consequently invite the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution. While referring to the principle stated in the case of Hindusthan Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd. (supra) and clarifying the distinction between the two doctrines, the Court declined to apply any specific doctrine and primarily based its view on the plea of discrimination but still observed. : "8. ... The fact that no clear-cut guidelines or distinguishing features have been spelt out to ascertain whether it belongs to one or the other category makes the task of identification difficult. The semantics associated with interpretation play their role to a limited extent. Ultimately, it is a matter of probe into legislative intention and/or taking an insight into the working of the enactment if one or the other view is adopted. The doctrinaire approach to ascertain whether the legislation is by incorp....
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....uisition of land; the procedure adopted under the Land Acquisition Act shall be adopted by the Collector and nothing more. The afore-referred provisions of the State Act clearly frame a scheme for planned development with limited incorporation of some of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The provisions of the State Act were amended last in point of time and, therefore, the State Legislature was aware of the relevant existing laws including Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act. The intent of the legislature to exclude the application of Section 11A clearly emerges from the fact that while amending Section 127 of the MRTP Act, it made no reference, generally or specifically, to the said provision rather it deleted reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act from the unamended provisions of Section 127. Reference to Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act in the State Act, under Section 128(3) of the State Act, is again relatable to the acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, as under Section 83 of the State Act, the land could vest in the Planning Authority even at the threshold and it is vesting of a different kind than contemplated under Sect....
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....under the MRTP Act are commenced by issuance of a declaration under Section 126(2) and then the procedure prescribed under the Land Acquisition Act is followed upto passing of award under Section 11 of that Act. Further, determination of compensation will again depend upon the principles stated in Sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act but subject to Sections 128(2) and 129(1) of the MRTP Act. Statutory benefits accrued under Sections 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act would be applicable as held by this Court in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (supra). Vesting, unlike Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act which operates only after the award is made and compensation is given, whereas under the MRTP Act it may operate even at the initial stages before making of an award, for example, under Sections 126(1)(c) and 83. While referring to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the State Legislature has not adopted, specifically or otherwise, the period mentioned in proviso to Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. On the contrary, different time frames have been postulated under different provisions of the MRTP Act. If those limitations of time are not adhered to....
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....would not operate after the prescribed period. However, in terms of Section 127 of the MRTP Act, if any land reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose specified is not acquired by agreement within 10 years from the date on which final regional plan or final development plan comes into force or if a declaration under sub-sections (2) or (4) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act is not published in the Official Gazette within such period, the owner or any person interested in the land may serve notice upon such authority to that effect and if within 12 months from the date of service of such notice, the land is not acquired or no steps, as aforesaid, are commenced for its acquisition, the reservation, allotment or designation shall be deemed to have lapsed and the land would become available to the owner for the purposes of development. The defaults, their consequences and even exceptions thereto have been specifically stated in the State Act. For a period of 11 years, the land would remain under reservation or designation, as the case may be, in terms of Section 127 of the MRTP Act(10 years + notice period). However, if the provisions of Section 11A of the Central Act were permitted....
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....g a public purpose' for which the land is acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Development plan, Regional Plan and town planning scheme are major events in the development of a State. They are controlled and guided by different financial, architectural and public interest for the development including macro and micro planning of the entire State. The provisions relating to planned development of the State or any part thereof, read in conjunction with the object of the Act, show that different time frames are required for initiation, finalization and complete execution of such development plans. The period of 10 years stated in Section 127 of the MRTP Act, therefore, cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable ex facie. If the provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, with its serious consequence of lapsing of entire acquisition proceedings, are bodily lifted and read into the provisions of MRTP Act, it is bound to frustrate the entire scheme and render it ineffective and uncertain. Keeping in view the consequence of Section 11A of the Central Act, every development plan could stand frustrated only for the reason that period of two years has....
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....njustice will be caused to the appellants inasmuch as they will have to wait for years together for finalization of the proceedings and 10 years, in any case, is an unduly long period. Per contra, the respondents argue that induction of Section 11A into the MRTP Act would hamper the scheme and would frustrate its object. We find no merit in the contention raised on behalf of the appellants. The Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the acquisition of land for planned development under the MRTP Act may be completed much prior to the time frame stipulated under Sections 126 and 127 of that Act. Once the acquisition is complete and land is vested in the State, the person interested ceases to have any interest in the land in question. Even for variety of other reasons, this contention cannot be accepted. Firstly, the provisions of the MRTP Act do provide for time limitation as well as the consequences in the event of default. Secondly, wherever there is delay, despite such framework provided under the MRTP Act, the applicants are duly compensated by payment of compensation. If the provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act are read and enforced stricto sensu in the MRT....
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.... it was contended that this rule of legislation by reference is a rule to which, so far, no exceptions have been carved out like those to the principle of legislation by incorporation as provided in the case of M.V. Narasimhan (supra). However, during the course of hearing, all the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties contended and fairly stated that the rule of legislation by reference too can have exceptions though to a limited extent. Having perused and analyzed the various judgments cited at the Bar we are of the considered view that this rule is bound to have exceptions and it cannot be stated as an absolute proposition of law that wherever legislation by reference exists, subsequent amendments to the earlier law shall stand implanted into the later law without analyzing the impact of such incorporation on the object and effectuality of the later law. The later law being the principal law, its object, legislative intent and effective implementation shall always be of paramount consideration while determining the compatibility of the amended prior law with the later law as on relevant date. It will be useful to apply the `test of intention' and `test of unwo....
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....se clearly is more than suggestive of the animus imponentis to exclude the application of the provisions of Central legislation prescribing time frame and consequences of default thereof to the State Act. It will give rise to an irresolvable conflict amongst the provisions of the two legislations if provisions like Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act are to be read into the State law. Even if the contention advanced by the appellant is accepted, for the sake of argument, it will still fall within the exceptions stated (supra) to the principle of legislation by reference. Reading such provisions into the State law would result in destroying the essence and effective implementation of the State law. We have discussed the above plea in regard to referential legislation as an alternative argument addressed by the learned counsel for the respective parties. While holding that it is a case of legislation by incorporation, we still are of the considered view that some of the amended provisions of the Central Act would be applicable to the State Act or read as a part thereof, with reference to the doctrine of pith and substance and harmonious application of the statutes. These principl....
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....pective Acts. It may not be necessary at all for an appropriate authority to always acquire the entire or part of the land included in the planned development, while there may be cases where the land is acquired for the purpose of completing planned development. With this distinction in mind, let us, again, refer to some of the relevant provisions of both the enactments. Once the notification under Section 126(2) of the MRTP Act has been issued in the manner prescribed under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the mechanism stated under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, for the limited purpose of acquisition and determination of compensation, would be read into the State Act. It is provided under the provisions of the State Act that the Collector shall take order in terms of Section 126(3) for acquisition of the land after declaration under Section 126(2) has been issued. The provisions of Section 126(3) of the MRTP Act are similar to the provisions of Section 7 of the Land Acquisition Act. Thereafter, the authority responsible for initiating the acquisition proceedings is expected to comply with the provisions of Sections 9 and 10 and finally make an award under Secti....
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....he `original plots' and the `final plots' as well as estimating the compensation payable for the loss of the area of the `original plot' in accordance with the provisions contained in clause (f) of sub- section (1) of Section 97 of the MRTP Act which deals with cost of a town planning scheme. This adjudicatory power is in relation to the `plots' as defined under Section 2(21), in distinction to compensation payable for acquired `land' as defined under Section 2(14) of the State Act. The provisions of Sections 72 and 74 of the MRTP Act grant specific power and jurisdiction to the Arbitrator and the Tribunal respectively. None of these provisions deal with the concept of land acquisition and payment of compensation in terms of the Central Act which the State legislature has specifically provided by devoting a complete chapter to acquisition (Chapter VII) in the State Act. It is also pertinent to note that predominantly the provisions of the State Act relate to planned development. The provisions of Chapter V(b) with particular reference to Sections 72, 73 and 82 to 86 of the State Act are another pointer towards the limited jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. The prin....
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....roperty or right injuriously affected by the making of town planning scheme. Even this Chapter does not talk of compensation payable for acquisition of land which is governed by Chapter VII and the relevant provisions of the Central Act. The provisions of the Central Act, which are read into the State Act by specific reference, do not cause any impediment in proper execution and attainment of the object of planned development, in fact, it is a pragmatic view which would further the cause of the State Act. The provisions which provide for a time frame, consequences of default and lapsing of the proceedings under the amended Central Act cannot be deemed to be incorporated into the State Act by fiction of law. We have already dealt with this aspect in some detail. Suffice it to note that their deemed incorporation will disturb the working under the State Act and, simultaneously, defeat its purpose. Different Benches of this Court, and for valid reasons, have taken the view that provisions of Section 6 as well as Section 11A of the Central Act are not applicable and cannot be read into the State Act. The law enunciated in the case of Gauri Shankar Gaur (supra) in so far as it is in lin....
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....n the Planning Authority, free from encumbrances, in advance of town planning scheme. Section 88 of the MRTP Act mentions vesting in the Planning Authority, free from encumbrances, as one of the effects of final scheme, for the purpose of handing over possession of the final plots to the owners to whom they are allotted in that scheme. Section 128(3) of the MRTP Act provides for vesting of land in the State Government under Section 16 or 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, as the case may be, when the land is acquired for the purpose other than the one for which it is designated and the plan or the scheme shall be deemed to be suitably varied by reason of acquisition of the said land. Section 129(1) of the MRTP Act relates to a situation where urgency provisions are invoked by the State upon an application made by the Planning Authority and possession of land is taken thereof, then it shall vest without any further assurance and free from encumbrances in the State Government. There are different kinds of vesting of lands as mentioned in the two Acts. The State Act has multi-dimensional purposes leading to primary object of planned development, while the Central Act has only one dimensi....
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....then the interested person is entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 127 of the MRTP Act by serving a notice and still if steps for acquisition are not taken within twelve months of the date of such notice for acquiring the land or the land is not acquired then the consequences of lapsing of reservation, allotment or designation shall follow. This also demonstrates the intention of the legislature, not to apply mandate of Section 11A of the Central Act to the State Act. Lapsing of acquisition is not contemplated under the scheme of either of the two Acts in question, once the land is vested in the State. Such a view will find support from the fact that under the provisions of the State Act the Government has been given power to acquire land for the purpose other than the one for which it was specified in the plan, i.e. the purpose of acquisition can be changed. Whenever such a situation arises, in that event, the relevant plan or scheme shall also be deemed to be suitably varied by such acquisition in terms of Sub- sections (1), (1A) and (2) of Section 128 of the State Act. Application of doctrine of pith and substance and incidental encroachment to the issue raised in the pr....
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....en taking into consideration the extent to which such provisions can be harmonized, could resolve such a controversy and permit the laws to operate in their respective fields. The question of repugnancy arises only when both the legislatures are competent to legislate in the same field, i.e. when both, the Union and the State laws, relate to a subject in List III [(Hoechst Pharamaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar [(1983) 4 SCC 45)]. We have already noticed that according to the appellant, the source of legislation being Article 246 read with Entry No. 42 of the Concurrent List the provisions of the State Act in so far as they are in conflict with the Central Act, will be still born and ineffective. Thus, provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act would take precedence. On the contrary, it is contended on behalf of the respondent that the planned development and matters relating to management of land are relatable to Entry 5/18 of State List and acquisition being an incidental act, the question of conflict does not arise and the provisions of the State Act can be enforced without any impediment. This controversy need not detain us any further because the contention is squa....
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....marcate the legislative heads or fields of legislation and the area over which the appropriate legislatures can operate. These Entries have always been construed liberally as they define fields of power which spring from the constitutional mandate contained in various clauses of Article 246. The possibility of overlapping cannot be ruled out and by advancement of law this has resulted in formulation of, amongst others, two principal doctrines, i.e. doctrine of pith and substance and doctrine of incidental encroachment. The implication of these doctrines is, primarily, to protect the legislation and to construe both the laws harmoniously and to achieve the object or the legislative intent of each Act. In the ancient case of Muthuswami Goundan v. Subramanyam Chettiar [1940 FCR 188], Sir Maurice Gwyer, CJ supported the principle laid down by the Judicial Committee as a guideline, i.e. pith and substance to be the true nature and character of the legislation, for the purpose of determining as to which list the legislation belongs to. This Court in the case of Jijubhai Nanbhai Kachar v. State of Gujarat [1995 Supp.(1) SCC 596], referring to the principle of interpretation of Entries in ....
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....ral Act related to acquisition, while excluding the provisions which offend and frustrate the object of the State Act. It will not be necessary to create, or read into the legislations, an imaginary conflict or repugnancy between the two legislations, particularly, when they can be enforced in their respective fields without conflict. Even if they are examined from the point of view that repugnancy is implied between Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act and Sections 126 and 127 of the MRTP Act, then in our considered view, they would fall within the permissible limits of doctrine of "incidental encroachment" without rendering any part of the State law invalid. Once the doctrine of pith and substance is applied to the facts of the present case, it is more than clear that in substance the State Act is aimed at planned development unlike the Central Act where the object is to acquire land and disburse compensation in accordance with law. Paramount purpose and object of the State Act being planned development and acquisition being incidental thereto, the question of repugnancy does not arise. The State, in terms of Entry 5 of List II of Schedule VII, is competent to enact such a law....
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....d canons of law to tilt the balance in favour of the legislation rather than invalidating the same, particularly, when the Central and State Law can be enforced symbiotically to achieve the ultimate goal of planned development. Thus, the contentions raised by the appellants are unsustainable in law as considered by us under different heads and are liable to be rejected. Before we conclude, we must notice that learned counsel appearing for respective parties had raised certain other contentions during the course of arguments, which have not been, specifically and intentionally, dealt with by us in the judgment. Firstly, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is not necessary for us to dwell upon those contentions in any detail as we are of the considered view that the question referred could be answered by the Court without going into the merit or otherwise of these arguments. Secondly, because on application of different doctrines and principles, de hors the contentions raised and judgments relied upon in that regard including the plea of legislative abdication, we have precisely answered the question referred to the larger bench. Thus, we leave these questions open to b....