TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1976 (3) TMI 234
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....se to this appeal are: Natha Singh, appellant No. 1 herein, was recorded in revenue records as land-owner in respect of 39 standard acres and 9 3/4 units of land in village Malout, 53 standard acres and 5 1/2 units in village Kanamgarh and 4 standard acres and 2 units in village Bhagwanpur. By his order dated July 5, 1959, the then Collector, Ferozepore, acting under the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' declared an area of 63 standard acres and 1 1/4 units out of the aforesaid land aggregating 93 standard acres and 1 1/4 units as surplus in the hands of Natha Singh. Rajinder Singh and Jarnail Singh, appellants Nos. 2 and 3 herein, who are the sons of appellant No. 1, w....
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....he Collector, Ferozepore. Aggrieved by these orders, the appellants took the matter in revision to the Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab, who also by his order dated March 3, 1967, affirmed the aforesaid orders of the Collector, Ferozepore, and Commissioner, Jullundur Division. All these orders were challenged by the appellants before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by means of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution but the same, as already stated, was dismissed in limine. The High Court, however, granted a certificate to the appellants under Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitution. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Hardayal Hardy has contended that the writ petition filed by the appellants could not, in the fact....
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....ch are relevant and necessary for disposal of the appeal should be allowed to be produced. With regard to the first contention advanced on behalf of the appellants, it is sufficient to observe that it has been time and again observed by this Court that in dealing with a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court cannot exercise the jurisdiction of an appellate court and cannot re-examine or disturb the findings of fact arrived at by an inferior court or a tribunal in the absence of any error of law. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants based on the revenue record is concerned, it may be remarked that it has been concurrently found by the Collector and the Commissioner who examined the orig....
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....who examined the revenue record found that there was no land which fell within that category. It cannot be disputed that a land-owner who wishes to claim the benefit of the exclusion of 'banjar qadim' or 'banjar jadid' land from the purview of land has to prove that it was not at the relevant date being put to any agricultural purpose or a purpose subservient to agriculture or used for pasture. No such proof seems to have been adduced in the instant case. It is also important to note that even before the Commissioner, the appellant did not plead that any 'banjar' land was not left out of consideration while assessing the 'Surplus Area'. All that was urged before the Commissioner was that the land comprised in....
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.... receive and admit additional evidence is not an arbitrary one but is a judicial one circumscribed by the limitations specified in Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the additional evidence is allowed to be adduced contrary to the principles governing the reception of such evidence, it will be a case of improper exercise of discretion and the additional evidence so brought on the record will have to be ignored. The true test to be applied in dealing with applications for additional evidence is whether the appellate court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it, without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. (See Arjun Singh Alias Puran v. Kartar Singh and Ors.(1). In the in....