TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2010 (8) TMI 943
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.... the landlord's interest diminishing the value of the property contrary to Section 12(1)(m) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 as grounds for eviction. The suit was contested by the appellant and eventually dismissed by the Trial Court holding that none of the allegations made by the respondent had been proved by her. Aggrieved by the said dismissal, the respondent appealed to the High Court of Judicature at Jabalpur. The High Court passed an order dated 4th May, 2006 holding that the appellant was not in default of payment of rent so as to justify an order of his eviction under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. The Court further held that the respondent had failed to prove that the appellant had caused any nuisance or that he had caused substantial damage to the premises owned by the landlord as envisaged under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. In so far as construction of a wall by the tenant contrary to Section 12(1)(m) was concerned, the High Court held that the additional construction raised by the tenant did not provide any cause of action for his eviction. The Court further held that in order to warrant eviction the construction must be of such as materially alters the ac....
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....even in the past he had sent demand drafts to the respondent for payment of rent due to her which drafts were received by her maid servant. 5. The appellant alleges that although the respondent had received the bank draft sent to her, the same was not encashed nor any acknowledgement sent to the appellant. He did not even receive any communication from the landlady pointing out that the amount had to be deposited in the Trial Court and not to be paid directly to her. The silence and inaction on the part of the respondent was according to the appellant deliberate and under the advice of her husband who is a practicing lawyer and also the power of attorney holder of the respondent. 6. Four months after the demand draft was sent the respondent filed an application before the Trial Court praying for a decree under Section 12(1)(m) of the Act stating that the deposit of Rs. 10,000/- directed by the High Court had not been made by the appellant. The error in the making of the deposit thus came to the knowledge of the appellant only when he received a copy of the application moved by the respondent. 7. In the meantime, the respondent had challenged the order passed by the High Court in....
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....inquiry which the High Court had directed into the question of deposit of the amount by the appellant. This Court felt that since no deposit had been made in terms of the decree passed by the High Court, the Executing Court could proceed with the execution of decree passed on 4th May, 2006. At the same time this Court left it open to the Executing Court to proceed with the inquiry as directed by the High Court. The operative portion of the order passed by this Court reads as under: "We have heard Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-decree holder and Mr. Rohit Arya, learned senior counsel for the respondent and have also considered the conditional decree and the application for extension of time and other materials on record. In our view, for the purpose of executing the decree, whether money has been deposited or not, it was not necessary to hold an inquiry whether in fact Smt. Durga had received the bank draft or not because in the conditional decree of the High Court, it was made clear that such amount must be deposited in the trial Court which was not done by the respondent. In this view of the matter, we are of the view that t....
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.... 2009, which was dismissed by the High Court on 30th July, 2009, relying upon the order passed by this Court on 5th May, 2009 and that passed by the High Court on 17th June, 2009. The present appeals assail the correctness of the said two orders. 12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. An inadvertent mistake in the deposit of the amount directed by the High Court has turned out to be a fertile ground for time consuming and expensive litigation before this Court and the Courts below. The essence of the matter is that the High Court had directed deposit of Rs. 10,000/- towards compensation payable to the respondent landlady for the damages caused to the premises in the occupation of the tenant-appellant. The appellant's case was that instead of the deposit of the said amount before the Trial Court as directed by the High Court, he had committed a bonafide mistake in getting the bank draft for the said amount prepared in the name of the respondent and sending the same to her under Registered A.D. In support of that submission, the appellant had produced material to show that a bank draft had indeed been prepared in the name of the respo....
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....Court was, however, correct in holding that it could not extend time for making the deposit as the same had been stipulated by the High Court nor could the Executing Court go behind the decree. Holding of an inquiry into the question whether the appellant had made the payment directly to the respondent was also correctly found to be unnecessary by the Trial Court, no matter this Court had left the conduct of such an inquiry open to the Executing Court. The fact of the matter was that the appellant had not made the deposit in the manner required in the decree. Whether or not the alternative mode for payment was equally good, may not have called for any consideration, if the parties had agreed to accept the alternative mode, as a satisfactory compliance with the decree to give quietus to the controversy. Where alternative mode is not accepted as a satisfactory solution by the parties, as in the present case the only remedy left to the party required to do an act like making of a deposit was to do so in accordance with the terms of the decree and in case there was a delay in the doing of the act, seek extension of time on grounds that would justify such extension. Since the High Court....
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....s extension of time, even if the original period fixed has expired, and Section 149 is equally liberal. A fortiori, those sections could be invoked by the applicant, when the time had not actually expired. That the application was filed in the vacation when a Division Bench was not sitting should have been considered in dealing with it even on 13.7.1954, when it was actually heard. The order, though passed after the expiry of the time fixed by the original judgment, would have operated from 8.7.1954. How undesirable it is to fix time peremptorily for a future happening which leaves the Court powerless to deal with events that might arise in between, it is not necessary to decide in this appeal. These orders turn out, often enough to be inexpedient. Such procedural orders, though peremptory (conditional decrees apart) are in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, completely estop a Court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. For example, it cannot be said that, if the appellant had started with the full money ordered to be paid and came well in time but set upon ....
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....absence of a negative provision, it undoubtedly enjoys." 19. Reference may also be made to the decisions of this Court in Jogdhayan v. Babu Ram, 1983 (1) SCC 26, Johri Singh v. Sukh Pal Singh, 1989 (4) SCC 403 and Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta, 1985 (3) SCC 53. 20. In Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union of India, 2005 (6) SCC 344, this Court had an occasion to examine whether the restriction placed by the amendment of Section 148 on the power of the Court to grant extension of time beyond 30 days was reasonable. This Court held that a power that is inherent in the Court to pass orders that it considers necessary for meeting the ends of justice and preventing abuse of the process of the Court cannot be taken away by putting an upper limit on the period for which an extension can be granted. Extension beyond the maximum period of 30 days was accordingly held permissible in the following words: "The amendment made in Section 148 affects the power of the Court to enlarge time that may have been fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code. The amendment provides that the period shall not exceed 30 days in tota....