AI Drafter 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1974 (9) TMI 118
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....nt is the owner of the building in question. The building was constructed sometime in 1958. The appellant on 1 November, 1958 let out the building to the respondent on a lease, for three years. The lease was on monthly basis. The lease expired on 31 October, 1961. The appellant filed an application before the Rent Controller, Chandragiri for eviction of the respondent from the building. The application was under section 10(2)(i) read with section 3 (1 )(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction Control) Act, 1960 hereinafter referred to as the Act. On 30 September, 1963, the Rent Controller dismissed the application for eviction. On 7 October, 1963 the appellant gave a notice to the respondent determining the lease and....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....rt held that the appellant was precluded by the principle of waiver from claiming any relief in the suit. The High Court relied on the decision of this Court in Lachoo Mall v. Radhey Shyam [1971] 3 S. C. R. 693 A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 2213. The appellant there was a tenant. The landlord wanted to demolish the house and construct a new building. The landlord and the tenant entered into an agreement. The agreement was that the tenant would vacate the shop on condition that after the completion of the construction of the house, the tenant would resume the possession of the shop. The agreement further provided that the landlord would not be entitled to derive benefits from the Rent Control and Eviction Act. Section 1-A of the U.P. Rent Control and ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....he benefit. On that reasoning, this Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and restored the decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit in Lachoo Mal's case (supra). Lachoo Mal's case (supra) has no application to the present case which raises the question as to whether the appellant has waived the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit for eviction of the respondent. In the present case the issue in the suit under appeal as framed in the trial Court was whether the appellant became estopped from pleading that the Rent Control Act could not apply to the building. The concurrent finding of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court is that the building was constructed in the year 1958. The Act would not apply....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... decision of any conclusive effect. (See Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed. Vol. 15 para 384). Abandonment of right is much more than mere waiver, acquiescence or laches. The decision of the High Court in the present case is that the appellant has waived the right to evict the respondent. Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage, benefit, claim or privilege which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed. Waiver can also be a voluntary surrender of a right. The Doctrine of waiver has been applied in cases where landlords claimed forfeiture of lease or tenancy because of breach of some condition in the contract of tenancy. The doctrine which the courts of law will recognise is a rule of judicial....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... principle is that neither estoppel nor res judicata can give the court jurisdiction under the Acts which those Acts say it is not to have. The Rent Control Acts operate in rem. These Acts give a status to the house from which certain legal consequences follow. In the present case, the building in question is beyond doubt outside the protection of Rent Control Acts. The foundation of the doctrine of estoppel is that the representation must be of existing facts and not of mere intention (See Dawson's Bank Ltd. v. Nippon M. K. Kaisha 62 I. A. 100. There must be a statement of fact and not a mere promise to do something in future. The appellant proved that the appellant made a mistake of fact in regard to the building, being outside ....