TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2010 (11) TMI 936
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....aid to have made an announcement that he had created a Wakf and dedicated and donated all his movable and immovable properties including the land in villages Chowki Mubarikabad and Sadhora Khurd to the said school for charitable purposes, namely, advancement and promotion of education to the public and poor students. In 1917, he formed Ramjas College Society and got the same registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 as a charitable institution. The objects of the Society were as under: "i) To provide school and university education for boys and girls. ii) To maintain schools, colleges, boarding houses and training institutes for training of teachers. iii) To provide means for imparting technical and industrial education in connection with the institutions under the control of foundation. iv) To provide means for imparting a sound moral and catholic religious education free from superstitious and controversial matters and based on the Vedas and ancient shastras. v) To encourage and take part in Scientific Research of various kinds as well as in the study translation and publication of the Sanskrit literature and philosophy of ancient India. vi) To amalgamate with t....
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....f the cases filed by appellant No.1 and their result are detailed below: Chowkri Mubarikabad (i) The first writ petition bearing No.409/1968 was filed by appellant No.1 in the Delhi High Court for quashing notifications dated 13.11.1959 and 28.2.1968 issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act respectively mainly on the ground that its land is exempted from acquisition in terms of clause (d) of notification dated 13.11.1959 because it was a Wakf property. This assertion was contested by the respondents. They pleaded that the property in dispute is neither a Wakf nor it can be treated as Wakf because it had not been created by a Muslim. The learned Single Judge was of the view that the adjudication of the writ petition would need determination of complicated questions of fact and such questions cannot be decided under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thereupon, the counsel appearing on behalf of appellant No.1 sought leave of the Court to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file a civil suit. His prayer was granted by the Court. (ii) Immediately after disposal of the writ petition, appellant No.1 filed Suit No.451/1971 with the following substantive prayer: "A decree for de....
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....rds in CWP No.4343/1997 and prayed for quashing the action of the respondents to take possession of the acquired land. It further prayed for issue of a mandamus to respondents to release land by issuing notification under Section 48 of the Act. Appellant No.1 filed another writ petition (CWP No.5493/1999) for grant of a declaration that land situated in village Sadhora Khurd continues to be in its possession. By an order dated 26.4.2000, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed CWP No. 4343/1997 but gave a direction to the Lt. Governor to pass appropriate order on the application made by appellant No.1 for denotification of the acquired land. Similar order appears to have been passed in CWP No. 5493/1999. (vi) In the meanwhile, Bhagwan Dass filed CWP No.1811/1995 by way of public interest litigation and prayed for issue of a mandamus to the respondents to take possession of 730 bighas of land and use the same as per the plan of Zone B-5. That petition was disposed of by the Division Bench of the High Court on 26.4.2000 by taking cognizance of the statement made by the counsel appearing for the Delhi Development Authority that a decision had been taken not to release land of ....
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....swas was taken by DDA on "as is where is" basis as land was not physically vacant. The said area is replete with factories. The Anand Parbat Industrial Area as it has come to be popularly known, has come up in a haphazard and unplanned manner and has over the years, also become degraded and decrepit. The congested and unsystematic growth of factories in the area has turned it into a veritable public hazard. Safety considerations are wanting. Most of the lanes are too narrow for a fire tender to enter. The electricity distribution system is problematic. The other infrastructure and basic services are also inadequate. Apart from being a congested and degraded cluster of factories operating in sub- optimal conditions, the area is also hazardous where public safety requirements warrant early remedial measures. The area is mentioned in the Master Plan of Delhi as "Industrial". There are thus sound and compelling reasons to effect redevelopment of the area in the overall public interest. For this the entire land mass needs to be physically taken over, planned, roads and lanes straightened and widened to the extent feasible and new infrastructure laid down as per the plans. Institutional....
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....ed by Muslim Law by a non-Muslim or a person not professing the Islamic faith. He further submitted that merely because Rai Sahib Kedar Nath was a Hindu and had performed havan etc. before renouncing the property in favour of the Society for a charitable purpose is not sufficient to deny benefit of exemption to appellant No.1 in terms of clause (d) of notification dated 13.11.1959. Learned counsel further argued that exemption clause contained in notification dated 13.11.1959 should be liberally construed in a manner which will benefit dedication made for charitable purpose irrespective of caste and/or religion, else the impugned notification will become discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. In support of his arguments, learned counsel produced three compilations of which one contains copies of the orders passed by the Delhi High Court, this Court as also the one passed by the Lt. Governor of Delhi and a copy of notification dated 4.4.2002 issued under Section 48 of the Act for release of 67 bighas 14 biswas of land of village Sadhora Khurd. The second volume contains extracts of text books and commentaries on Mohammadan Law/Muslim Law and the thir....
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....ior counsel is that clause (d) of notification dated 13.11.1959 cannot be interpreted as including every dedication of property for charitable purpose and the expression `Wakf property' must be given a restricted interpretation so as to include the property attached to the Wakf created by Muslims only. 10. We have considered the respective submissions. In our view, the appeal deserves to be dismissed because the appellants have not approached the Court with clean hands. In Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, acquisition of the land situated at Sadhora Khurd was challenged on the ground of violation of Section 5-A of the Act and also on the ground that land in question is exempted from acquisition because it is a Wakf property. Another plea taken by appellant No.1 was that if the land belonging to educational and charitable institutions established by Hindus and non- Muslims is not treated as Wakf property, then the exemption clause (d) is liable to be declared void for violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. While rejecting the argument that the acquisition proceedings were vitiated due to violation of Section 5-A of the Act, this Court noted that the appellants had made....
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....ome with clean hands and should not conceal the material facts. The objection regarding not affording an opportunity of personal hearing in respect of objections filed under Section 5-A of the Act was one of the main planks of the grounds raised in the writ petition as well as in the special leave petition filed before this Court and ought we know if such ground had not been taken this Court would have entertained this appeal or not. The appellants have taken the advantage of obtaining the stay order also from this Court which is continuing for the last 14 years as the special leave petition was filed in 1978 itself. It may be further noted that a common objection petition under Section 5-A of the Act in respect of both the lands situated in Mubarikabad as well as in Sadhurakhurd was filed on December 11, 1959 through Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate. The said objections were heard in the presence of Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate and disposed of by one common order Annexure `X' and we cannot believe an ipse dixit explanation made orally during the course of arguments on behalf of the appellants that they had no knowledge of any personal hearing being given to Shri Ratan Lal Gup....
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....situated in Mubarikabad there was no justification for filing the Writ Petition No. 213 of 1973 in respect of the land situated in Sadhurakhurd as the suit was not decided in 1973 but was in fact dismissed on March 21, 1977. We find no justification for filing the writ petition in respect of the land situated in Sadhurakhurd in 1973 and subsequently withdrawing the writ petition on March 30, 1977 reserving the liberty to file a fresh suit but thereafter again filing the writ petition on January 7, 1978 instead of suit." (emphasis supplied) 11. In S.L.P.(C) No. 15017/2000 and connected matters, appellant No.1 had specifically raised a plea that its property is exempted from acquisition because it is a Wakf property, but failed to convince the Court to nullify the acquisition proceedings on that ground. 12. A careful reading of the judgment in the Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India (supra) and the order passed in the special leave petitions clearly shows that even though the question whether the land belonging to appellant No.1 is exempted from acquisition in terms of clause (d) of notification dated 13.11.1959 was not decided in the first case and the appeal was dismissed mainly....
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.... order and they succeeded in this venture because while issuing notice on 26.11.2001, this Court directed that there shall be stay of dispossession. 14. The principle that a person who does not come to the Court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but also to the cases instituted in others courts and judicial forums. The object underlying the principle is that every Court is not only entitled but is duty bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have any respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or by making misstatement or by suppressing facts which have bearing on adjudication of the issue(s) arising in the case. In Dalglish v. Jarvie 2 Mac. & G. 231, 238, Lord Langdale and Rolfe B. observed: "It is the duty of a party asking for an injunction to bring under the notice of the Court all facts material to the determination of his right to that injunction; and it is no excuse for him to say that he was not aware of the im....
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....orary purposes on visits for sixty-eight days; that she spent about twenty of these days in London at her brother's house, 213, King's Road, Chelsea, generally in company with other guests of her brother; that she was also in the United Kingdom during the year ending April 5, 1914, for temporary purposes on visits, and spent part of the time at 213, King's Road aforesaid; and that since the month of November, 1914, she had not been in the United Kingdom. From the affidavits filed on behalf of the Commissioners and of the surveyor of taxes, who showed cause against the rule nisi, and from the affidavit of the applicant in reply, it appeared that in February, 1909, a leasehold house, 213, King's Road, Chelsea, had been taken in the name of the applicant's brother. The purchase-money for the lease of the house and the furniture amounted to 4000l., and this was paid by the applicant out of her own money. The accounts of household expenses were paid by the brother and subsequently adjusted between him and the applicant. The Divisional Court without dealing with the merits of the case discharged the rule on the ground that the applicant had suppressed or misrepresente....
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....these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice-delivery system which was in vogue in the pre-Independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final." (emphasis supplied) 16. In our view, the appellants are not entitled to any reli....
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....eg v. Seth Behari Lal AIR 1941 All. 225 and Jai Dayal v. Dewan Ram Saran Das AIR 1939 Lahore 686 and observed: "I cannot read the term `wakf' property as embracing property impressed with the character of a charitable trust amongst the Hindus. A property burdened with the obligation of a charitable trust as understood in Hindu law cannot be called a wakf property in a legal sense. In a non-legal, popular sense it may be possible to use the expression wakf indiscriminately for and in relation to any property set apart for charity. But in legal technology the word `wakf' has a definite and accepted connotation. It is in that sense that the word has to be understood. For the true interpretation of the word one must turn to Mohammadan law and see what it means. Now the question is was Rai Kedar Nath making a wakf of his properties when in the meeting of 1916 he made a declaration in favour of charity. The answer to this question is in a resounding negative. This is on the assumption that a Hindu can create a wakf though such cases are rare. The function held at that meeting shows that Rai Kedar Nath did two things. He renounced his interest in his private property. He dedica....
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....annot be said that the property of appellants, which may be Hindu charitable trust, would be termed as `waqf property'. The learned Single Judge, to our mind, rightly held that while using his expression in the impugned Notification issued by the statutory authority under Section 4 of the Act the statutory authority would be presumed to be aware of the legal implication of the term `waqf property'. Therefore, this term cannot be read as to embrace property impressed with the character of a charitable trust amongst the Hindus. Once the meaning of the words `waqf property' is clear, it is difficult to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that `popular' meaning should be given or that statutory authority loosely used the expression `waqf' and `trust'. If the interpretation suggested by the appellants of the term `waqf property' is accepted, it would amount to obliterating the distinction otherwise statutorily recognized by the Indian Trusts Act. No such interpretation can be given which nullifies the effect of the Provision of a Statute. While interpreting such a Notification like the one issued under Section 4 of the Act, the conno....