TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2015 (5) TMI 692
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....an Official Liquidator nor is a Liquidator envisaged under the Companies Act, 1956. 2. M/s. Petrofils Co-operative Limited was a National Cooperative Society (the Society for short) in which the Government of India had 84% share capital. The Society was included in Schedule II to the Multi State Co-operative Societies Act, 1984. For the purpose of manufacturing polyester filament yarn, the said Society was formed, in which Government of India was a majority stakeholder to the extent of 84%. The Society was a co-operative society registered under the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 1984. For the purpose of developing the industry Petrofils and township for the employees and staff of Petrofils, land was needed. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (GIDC for short) constituted under the Gujarat Industrial Development Act, 1962 (GID Act for short), applied to the State Government for acquisition of land for the Society, necessary for such public purpose. The State Government under a notification dated 9.6.1978 decided to acquire the required land for public purpose, namely, for establishment of Petrofils industry and construction of a township for employees of Petrofils....
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....on 16.8.2007 seeking to recover a sum of Rs. 755.42 crores (rounded off) with interest from the Society failing which the bank would take measures under the Securitisation Act. The liquidator responded to such notice under a communication dated 17.9.2007 raising objections. On 28.9.2007 IDBI bank conveyed to the liquidator that objections cannot be accepted and called upon him to handover the possession of secured assets. Before expiry of statutory period of 60 days of notice under section 13(2) of the Securitisation Act, liquidator filed Special Civil Application No.26713 of 2007 before this Court challenging the said notice issued by the IDBI bank. The Court disposed of the petition on 16.10.2007 in view of the fact that parties engaged in litigation were public sector undertakings and without permission from the high power committee, the litigation could not have been instituted. 6. After getting permission from such committee, the liquidator filed Special Civil Application No.4353 of 2008 and in the petition, he challenged the notice dated 16.8.2007 issued by IDBI under section 13(2) of the Securitisation Act. By way of amendment two prayers were added. First was for a decla....
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....be by at least one independent Government valuer. Such process for valuation report shall be completed by 31.01.2009. IDBI, which is the lead secured creditor, respondent No.1 herein, shall also be at the liberty to get the valuation report prepared of the assets of the property by the Government approved valuer, but such process for preparation of the valuation report shall be completed by 31.01.2009. The petitioner shall permit access to the assets so as to enable the valuer to prepare the report at the instance of IDBI which is the lead secured creditor. iv. Whichever highest valuation report is available on the record of the property concerned, shall be the basis for fixation of the upset price for the respective assets, may be in one lot or different lot as may be finalised by the Committee. The process for issuing advertisement, open bid, inter se bidding amongst the bidder and confirmation of sale, shall be finalised by Asset Sale Committee, but subject to the approval granted by this Court. v. It shall be specifically informed to the interested offerers who may deposit earnest money that they may be required to undertake inter se bidding even at the time when there is....
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....s of the earlier order. Civil Application Nos. 3036 to 3052 of 2009 stand disposed of." 9. On 22.6.2011, the writ petition was disposed of by the Division Bench, relevant portions of which reads as under :- "Subsequently, when the matter was taken up by the Division Bench on 23rd June, 2010, this Court while observed that there is nothing on record to satisfy that any action is taken under Section 13 (4) of the said Act and merely a notice under Section 13 (2) of the said Act has been challenged, learned counsel on behalf of the parties submitted that in view of intervention and the interim orders passed by this Court, the parties are trying to settle the dispute and number of immovable properties of Petrofils have been auction sold by the Liquidator. On their request, the case was adjourned to ensure settlement. Today when the matter was taken up, it is stated that the matter is still pending for settlement, but this Court is not inclined to grant time, as in the present case only a notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act is under challenge and this Court is not inclined to interfere with such notice, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There is also a rem....
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....mission sought for is granted and the Special Leave Petition is disposed of as withdrawn. Liberty granted to the petitioner, if need arises, to make appropriate application for modification/recalling of the orders passed by this Court. I.A. No.1 is disposed of accordingly." 11. The parties subsequently also withdrew the proceedings from DRAT pursuant to the proceedings recorded before the Supreme Court and amounts realised through sale of properties of Petrofils were also distributed pro-rata amongst the creditors. 12. The State Government has filed the review/recall application along with delay condonation application on 15.10.2013 for reviewing the judgment dated 22.6.2011 on the ground that land was acquired for public purpose by the State Government. The State Government had contributed to the cost of acquisition. Such land so acquired can be used only for public purpose for which the acquisition was made. If public purpose was either not possible to accomplished or stood exhausted, the lands could be used only for another public purpose that too with the previous sanction of the State Government. The State Government and the GIDC were not made parties to the writ petitio....
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....execute lease deeds in favour of auction purchasers for use of another public purpose and in absence of State of Gujarat in whom the land had vested, the entire auction and sale confirmation proceedings were illegal and liable to be set aside. Therefore, no further sur-rejoinder to the rejoinder filed by the petitioner and respondent no.18 or rejoinder affidavit to affidavit-in-reply filed by respondent no.16 and 17 was required to be filed. All the learned counsel for the parties submitted that the Court may proceed to finally hear and decide the matter. Therefore, we have started final hearing of the matter with the consent of learned counsel for the parties as affidavits had been exchanged. 14. We have heard Mr. M. S. Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Bharat Jani, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1, 2 and 10, Mr. Pranav Desai, learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 to 7, Mr. B. H. Bhagat, learned counsel for respondent Nos.8 and 9, Mr. K. I. Shah, learned counsel for respondent Nos.11 and 12, Mr. C. Z. Shankhla, learned counsel for respondent No.13, Mr. K. K. Pujara, learned counsel for respondent No.14, Mr. Shramik Bhatt, learned counsel for M/s Singhi &....
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.....7.2009 on the agreement of counsel for the parties agreed that upset price be fixed on the basis of advise of Petrofils Cooperative Limited (original valuation report) and IDBI (revised valuation report). This order was passed by this Court in Civil Application for direction No.6528 of 2009 on 2.7.2009. Some property was sold in the auction sale which was required to be confirmed. However, the properties which remained unsold (the properties which are in dispute in this petition), the Court permitted for fixing a fresh reduced upset price by order dated 3.8.2009. Both these orders were passed in Civil Application for direction No.6528 of 2009. By another advertisement on 6.8.2009, second tender notice was issued but again no tender was submitted inspite of reduction in upset price. The Committee obtained approval of this Court on 14.12.2009 in Civil Application No.12197 of 2009 for further reducing the upset price and for issuance of fresh tender which was accepted and fresh tender notice was advertised on 7.1.2010 by further reducing the upset price. The inter-se bidding took place in which the highest bidders were the respondent Nos.16, 17 and 18 and Civil Applications No.3040 o....
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....and in dispute and properties of the Society vested in the GIDC in view of Section 30 (2) of the GID Act and the land in dispute vested in the Corporation free from all encumbrances. Learned counsel further urged that the land was acquired under Section 17 read with Section 17-A inserted by Gujarat Act No.20 of 1965. Under Section 17-A, the land could legally vest in the Corporation owned by the State Government for using such land for public purpose. The land in dispute did not vest in the State Government as under Section 16, neither the State Government nor the Collector took possession. The land in dispute vested in the Corporation as the land was acquired under Section 17, 17-A (Gujarat Act) for fulfilling the requirement of the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation as provided in Section 30 of GID Act which had been enacted for securing the orderly establishment and organization of industries in industrial areas and industrial estates in the State of Gujarat. Learned counsel for the petitioner further urged that the public purpose was for which the land was acquired was achieved by establishment of the Society for manufacturing certain petrochemicals and for developing a....
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....covenants contained in the lease deed executed between the Society and GIDC. 17.3 He further urged that neither the Liquidator nor the Asset Sale Committee constituted by this Court had committed any illegality or irregularity in disposal of the lands in question to the auction purchasers. Initially, the Asset Sale Committee in terms of the stipulation contained in order dated 12.12.2008, had sought to sell inter alia the leasehold rights over the lands in question on the basis of the highest of the two valuations given by the Govt. approved Valuers - one appointed by the Liquidator and the other one appointed by the IDBI. But the response from the public was zero. 17.4 Thereafter, after obtaining due approval from this Court on 2.7.2009, when the Asset Sale Committee sought to sell the leasehold rights of the lands in question on the basis of the average of the two valuations given by the aforesaid two Government approved valuers and issued public notice dated 6.8.2009, again there was no response. After obtaining due approval from this Court on 14.12.2009, when the Asset Sale Committee sought to sell the leasehold rights of the lands in question on the basis of the average ....
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....re after the said party had also reportedly divided the said parcel of land into plots and sold the same to third parties. Even though the aforesaid parcel of land is a property acquired by Society through GIDC, yet even till date, the State Government has not questioned the decision of the Asset Sale Committee headed by the Liquidator to sell the said lands to M/s. Ganesh Infrastructure or the State Government was a necessary party. 18. Mr. P. K. Jani, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Mr. Parth Bhatt, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent Nos.19 to 21 has urged that the challenge in the writ petition is to the notice under Section 13 of the Securitisation Act, 2002. The issue involved in the present writ petition is that the petitioner and the respondents who are Secured Creditors could not have agreed to sell the land wherein there is an interest of the State Government. He submitted that a detailed procedure is provided under Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 for winding up of a Cooperative Society. The petitioner and the respondents who are secured creditors could not have bypassed the procedure envisaged under the said Act with consen....
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....common legal entities. There is huge difference between price offered by the auction purchasers and the actual price. Hence, there was cartel of selected persons to get the land at very low price. 18.6 He further submitted that this Court had no occasion to go into the legality, validity and propriety of the auction proceedings as the parties before this Court did not object to the auction proceedings. This Court did not assign any reasons for confirmation of sale. At that stage, the State and the office of Collector were not parties to the proceedings at that time. 18.7 He further submitted that there was no intimation to the State or GIDC about auction proceedings. Prior approval of GIDC was not taken for auction proceedings. That the entire auction proceedings were conducted behind the back of the State and the GIDC. The auction purchasers have no right, title or any interest over the land as the rights of the Society in the land were incapable of being sold to anyone. He further submitted that the auction purchasers cannot be permitted to make use of the land for commercial activities. They do not have rights to develop the land, sub-plot it, sell it or part with the poss....
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....herein that they were the highest bidder in open public auction. In paragraph 5 of the rejoinder, it has been stated that all the proceedings of the sale of the property have been done in a fair and transparent manner. This Court has confirmed the sale of a property. It is stated that the land purchased by the respondent no.18 is situated at village Ranoli for industrial purpose allotted by GIDC to the Society. The answering respondent has stepped into the shoes of the Society so far as lease is concerned. It has clearly been stated that the respondent no.18 is going to utilize the land for industrial purpose only. The description of the property given in paragraph 3 of the affidavit-in-reply filed by the Collector was inaccurate. 19.3 In paragraph 7 of the rejoinder, it has been stated that the land purchased by the respondent no.18 in open public auction which has been confirmed by this Court regarding which a notification under Section 4 was issued on 2.9.1974 and notification under Section 6 was issued on 11.6.1976 of the LA Act and the land was acquired by consent award dated 13.7.1976. The respondent no.18 had purchased the leasehold right for the remaining period of 99 ye....
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....sting huge amount of approximately Rs. 79.35 Crores and more than two years have passed, but the answering respondent is not able to enjoy the fruits of the transaction. With the permission of this Court, the answering respondent has dismantled the plant and obtained necessary no objection from various authorities to complete the formalities of transferring leasehold rights and when the lease document was about to be executed, the State Government filed the review petition which delayed the implementation of the Project by the answering respondent causing huge loss. 20. Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Hriday Bhuch for respondent Nos.16 and 17 has submitted that Section 30 (1) and (2) of GIDC Act makes GIDC the owner of the acquired land. Vesting connotes ownership and Section 30 (2) gives no indication that there is a limited vesting of land in GIDC for the purpose of management and possession. The vesting provision must be given its fullest effect in absence of any hint in the statute that GIDC cannot become the owner of the land acquired by the State for GIDC. 20.1 He further submitted that the award amount was paid by GIDC and hence, GIDC has borne....
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....nd Prestige Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. submitted its tender on 15.2.2010 for school and land located in Petrofil Nagar, Vadodara admeasuring 7,000 Sq. Mts. The bid of answering respondent was accepted as he was the highest bidder and the sale was confirmed. Similarly, bid of the respondent no.17 - Prestige Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. was also highest and the sale was confirmed. In paragraph 11, it has been stated that No Objection has been issued by GIDC, GEB, Notified Area Authority, transfer charges had been paid and all dues of the aforesaid authority were paid by the answering respondent. In paragraph 13 of the affidavit-in-reply, it has been stated that with regard to the land, a supplementary agreement was executed on 12.9.2011 between GIDC and the respondent no.16 accepting respondent no.16 to be the successor of the original licensee. 20.6 In paragraphs 14 and 15 of the affidavit-in-reply, it was stated by respondent no.16 that by letter dated 17.9.2012, the GIDC conveyed its no objection for the approval of land for development of the housing sector land for residential purpose subject to terms and conditions specified therein. 20.7 In paragraph 16, it was stated that on ....
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.... is in liquidation since 21.7.1997. The entire land in dispute was allotted to Petrofils. The purpose of allotment of land was mentioned in the lease deed in condition 2 (m) that the land would be used for establishment of the project for manufacturing of polyester filament yarn and the land would not be used for any other purpose without the permission of the lessor. In condition (r) of the lease deed, it was mentioned that in the event of liquidation of the lessee, the person in whom the title vests shall serve a notice on the lessor within one month from the date of vesting. 21.2 In paragraph 13 of the affidavit-in-reply, it has been stated that the land in dispute situated at Naldhari industrial area of GIDC, Taluka Valia, Dist. Bharuch was acquired by GIDC by notification dated 24.11.1986 and consent award/regular award as per Section 11 of the LA Act was made on 8.3.1989 and 12.1.1990. In the notification as well as in the award, the public purpose was clearly mentioned that the land is acquired for creation of Valia Industrial Estate. M/s. Petrofils Cooperative Limited entered into a lease agreement for the period of 99 years with GIDC on 8.11.1989 and the entire land was....
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.... demonstrate that the cost of acquisition had been borne wholly or in part out of public fund. It could not be disputed by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State Government that the land in dispute was acquired for public purpose for the Society. The Petrofils Cooperative Limited was a joint venture of Government of India and the weavers society known as Petrofils Cooperative Limited for manufacture of polyester filament yarn. The Central Government was holding 84% shares. The argument of learned Additional Advocate General cannot be accepted that merely because the State Government had invested Rs. 1,000/- for acquiring the land for public purpose, would mean that the land belongs to the State Government or the acquired land has vested in the State Government. It only establishes that land acquisition was for a public purpose. 23. The Apex Court in Manubhai Jehtalal Patel v. State of Gujarat, (1980) 4 SCC 553 at page 555 in paragraph 4 is extracted as under :- "4. It is not correct to determine the validity of acquisition keeping in view the amount of contribution but the motivation for making the contribution would help in determining the bona fides....
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.... of the LA Act and GIDC entered into consent award with the farmers/land owners and paid the entire compensation to them and they directly handed over possession to the GIDC and consent award was passed by the Collector under Section 11 (2) of the LA Act. The land in dispute never vested in the State nor the Collector or the State Government had taken possession from the farmers/land owners. 27. The land was acquired by the State Government under Section 30 and 31 of the GID Act and in furtherance of the object of the GID Act, the State Government entered into agreement with GIDC as provided in Section 32 of the GID Act. Section 32 of the GID Act is reproduced as under :- "(32) (1) For the furtherance of the objects of this Act, the State Government may, upon such conditions as may be agreed upon between it and the Corporation, place at the disposal of the corporation any lands vested in the State Government. (2) After any such land has been developed by, or under the control and supervision of the Corporation, it shall be dealt with by the Corporation in accordance with the regulations made, and directions given by the State Government in this behalf. (3) If any land p....
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....ed in the schedule hereunder written hereinafter called "the said land" together with the trees, houses and all other things whatsoever standing on the same or attached thereto or permanently fastened to anything attached to the same for the Industrial Township. AND WHEREAS the Government having caused an inquiry to be made in conformity with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called "the said Act") and being satisfied as a result of such inquiry that the acquisition of the said land is needed for the aforesaid public purpose had decided to acquire the said land under the provisions of the said Act and contribute sum of rupees one thousand towards the cost of such acquisition and called upon the Corporation to enter into an agreement hereinafter contained with the Government. Now these presents witness that the Corporation doth here by bind itself to pay to the Government the cost of the acquisition of the said land excluding rupees one thousand that will be paid by the Government and such charges as may be incurred by the Government or by any of the officer of the Government in respect of the said acquisition at such time or times as the Collector ....
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....ioner's office, Ahmedabad both on behalf of the Governor of Gujarat set his hand and affixed the seal hereto the day and your first above written. The common seal of the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation was affixed hereto pursuant to a resolution of the Corporation dated Sd/- Asstt. Chief Executive (Land) In the presence of :- (1) Sd/- (2) Sd/- (3) SIGNED, SEALED AND DELIVERED by Officer On Special Duty, Industries Commissioner's Office, Ahmedabad. Officer on Special Duty (LA), Industries Commissioner's Office, Ahmedabad. In the presence of (1) (2) SCHEDULE District Taluka Village S. No. Area of the land under acquisition H.A. Sq. Mt. Purpose for which the land is to be acquired. Baroda Baroda Undera 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 249 250 251 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266/1 266/2 267 275+ 276 + 0 - 59 - 69 0 - 31 - 36 0 - 29 - ....
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....amount of compensation awarded and all other charges indicated in the acquisition of the property shall be paid by the Commissioner; "thereupon the said property shall vest in the Corporation". In other words, on payment of compensation by the Corporation to the Land Acquisition Officer, statutorily the Corporation gets transfer of possession from the State and the acquired property vests in the Corporation free from all encumbrances. Thereby the Corporation becomes the absolute owner of the land free from all encumbrances including tenancy rights, if any, alleged to be held by the respondents." 30. As demonstrated earlier, it is established from the record that entire expenses of acquisition and payment of compensation under the consent award had been paid by the GIDC and the GIDC having taken possession directly from the farmers/land owners, the GIDC became the absolute owner of the land in dispute free from all encumbrances under Section 30 of the GID Act. 31. We may now consider the argument made on behalf of the State Government by the learned Additional Advocate General that since the land has been acquired by the State, it has vested in the State free from all encumbra....
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....f actual possession of the land. How such possession may be taken would depend on the nature of the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the nature of the land admits of. There can be no hard and fast rule laying down what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. We should not, therefore, be taken as laying down an absolute and inviolable rule that merely going on the spot and making a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land in every case. But here, in our opinion, since the land was lying fallow and there was no crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tehsildar in going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of determining what part was waste and arable and should, therefore, be taken possession of and determining its extent, was sufficient to constitute taking of possession. It appears that the appellant was not present when this was done by the Tehsildar, but the presence of the owner or the occupant of the land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession. It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement that notice should be gi....
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....cent judgment in Brij Pal Bhargava v. State of UP 2011(2) SCALE 692. 19. The same issue was recently considered in C.A. No. 3604 of 2011 - Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal Agarwal decided on 26.4.2011. After making reference to the judgments in Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat (supra), Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab (supra), P.K. Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka (supra), NTPC v. Mahesh Dutta (supra), Sita Ram Bhandar Society v. Govt. of NCT, Delhi (supra), Omprakash Verma v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra) and Nahar Singh v. State of U.P. (1996) 1 SCC 434, this Court laid down the following principles : "(i) No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what act would constitute taking of possession of the acquired land. (ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the concerned State authority to go to the spot and prepare a panchnama will ordinarily be treated as sufficient to constitute taking of possession. (iii) If crop is standing on the acquired land or building/structure exists, mere going on the spot by the concerned authority will, by itself, be not sufficient for taking possession. Ordinarily, in such ....
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....; 26. Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) 1990 at page 1563: "Vested: Fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete; Having the character or given the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent, not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. Rights are "vested" when right to enjoyment present or prospective has become property of some particular persons or persons as present interest; mere expectancy or future or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws does not continue "vested right" Vaughan v. Nadel; 228 Kan. 469, 618 p. 2d 778, 783. See also Accrue Vest and specific typed of vested interest infra." 27. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, of the English Language unabridged, Volume III S to Z at page 2547 defines the word "vest" as follow: "vest" vest ...... To place or give into the possession or discretion of some person or authority (the regulation of the waterways .... to give to a person a legally fixed immediate right of present or future enjoyment of (as an estate) (a deed that vests a title estate in the grantee and a remainder in his children), (b) to grant endow, or clothe with a particular author....
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....t is vested is de jure possession not de facto, for more reasons than one because we are testing the expression on a statutory hypothesis and such an hypothesis can be carried only to the extent necessary to achieve the legislative intent. Voluntary Surrender 31. The 'vesting' in sub-section (3) of Section 10, in our view, means vesting of title absolutely and not possession though nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily surrendering or delivering possession. The court in Maharaj Singh v. State of UP and Others (1977) 1 SCC 155, while interpreting Section 117(1) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reform Act, 1950 held that 'vesting' is a word of slippery import and has many meaning and the context controls the text and the purpose and scheme project the particular semantic shade or nuance of meaning. The court in Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan (dead) by Lrs. (2000) 8 SCC 99 held as follows: "We do find some contentious substance in the contextual facts, since vesting shall have to be a "vesting" certain. "To vest, generally means to give a property in." (Per Brett, L.J. Coverdale v. Charlton. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th edn. Vol. VI.) Vesting in favour of the u....
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.... Rajasthan Housing Board & Ors. v. Shri Kishan & Ors., (1993) 2 SCC 84 and Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India v. Subodh Singh & Ors., (2011) 11 SCC 100). 27. The meaning of the word 'vesting', has been considered by this Court time and again. In Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344, this Court held that the meaning of word 'vesting' varies as per the context of the Statute, under which the property vests. So far as the vesting under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act is concerned, the Court held as under :- "In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17, the property acquired becomes the property of Government without any condition or ; limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration." 28. In Gulam Mustafa & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 448, in a similar situation, this Court held as under :- "Once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for inval....
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....State. He has a right to only receive compensation for the same, unless the acquisition proceeding is itself challenged. The State neither has the requisite power to reconvey the land to the person- interested, nor can such person claim any right of restitution on any ground, whatsoever, unless there is some statutory amendment to this effect. 32. The general rule of law is undoubted, that no one can transfer a better title than he himself possesses; Nemo dat quod non habet. However, this Rule has certain exceptions and one of them is, that the transfer must be in good faith for value, and there must be no misrepresentation or fraud, which would render the transactions as void and also that the property is purchased after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferee has the requisite power to transfer the said land, and finally that, the parties have acted in good faith, as is required under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. (Vide: Asa Ram & Anr. v. Mst. Ram Kali & Anr., AIR 1958 SC 183; State Bank of India v. Rajendra Kumar Singh & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 401, Controller of Estate Duty, Lucknow v. Aloke Mitra, AIR 1981 SC 102; Hanumant Kumar Talesara v. ....
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....on 17A. Use of land for any public purpose permitted :- When any lands vests in the State Government or in a corporation owned by the State Government under the provisions of this Act, it shall be lawful, with the previous sanction of the State Government to use such land also for any public purpose other than that for which its possession was taken." 37. In the earlier part of the judgment, we have already held that the land in dispute acquired by the State Government for GIDC never vested in the State Government under Section 16 of the LA Act nor possession was taken by the State Government of the acquired land nor any amount towards cost of expenses for acquisition or compensation by consent award under Section 11 (2) of the LA Act was paid by the State Government. Further, the possession of the acquired land was taken by the GIDC directly from the farmers/land owners. Therefore, the entire acquired land vested in GIDC free from all encumbrances under Section 30 (2) of the GID Act. It is also relevant to point out over here that there was no necessity for the GIDC to enter into agreement with the State Government under Section 32 of the GID Act as GIDC was the absolute owner ....