TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2001 (10) TMI 1137
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....ersonal bonafide requirement. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that as the proceedings initiated by the respondent-landlord were not maintainable under first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Uttar Pradesh urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), the Prescribed Authority, First Appellate court and the High Court committed mistake of law by directing the appellant's eviction. it is contended that as no notice in terms of the aforesaid proviso was served upon the appellant-tenant, no cause of action accrued to the respondent-landlord for seeking his eviction under the provisions of the Act. 3. Undisputed facts of the ca....
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.... or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists namely-- (a) that the building is bonafide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the trusts; (b) xx xx xx Provided that where the building was in occupation of a tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such purchase being made after the commencement of this Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds,....
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.... six months notice just after purchase does not arise directly in the present case but since it has been raised art the bar on behalf of the respondent therefore decided - though only incidently." 7. General and sweeping observations regarding the non applicability of the proviso with respect to the building purchased prior to the commencement of the Act were uncalled for and not in consonance with the object of the Act. However, the High Court rightly observed that "considering the language used in the 'First Proviso' and keeping in mind and object for providing the said proviso' one fails to find any good reason for attaching the condition of six month notice even after three years period after purchase, as suggeste....
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....ivine revelation. "Words are certainly not crystals, transparent and unchanged" as Mr. Justice Holmes was wisely and properly warned (Towne v. Eisner 245 US 418, 425 (1918)] learned (sic)and, J., was equally emphatic when he said" : "Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purpose which lie behind them." (Lenigh Valley Coal co. V. Yensavage 218 FR 547, 533]." 9. With respect to interpretation of a Welfare Statute, like the Rent Control Act being a piece of legislation, this Court in Mangat Raj & Anr. v. Kidar Nath & Ors. held: "Like all other Rent Control Acts in the other States in the country, the Rent Act is a piece of social legislation which seeks to....
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....further provides that no application under the said clause shall be entertained unless the landlord had given a notice to the tenant not less than six months before the filing of such application and such notice may be given even before the expiration of a period of three years. The object of the service of the notice is to furnish information to the tenant about the requirement of the landlord in order to enable him to search for an alternative accommodation or to find out as to whether the scale made by his erstwhile owner was a genuine and bonafide or not. The proviso and the notice contemplated under it was never intended to be permanent clog on the rights of the purchaser. The period contemplated for not initiating the eviction against....