TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2014 (1) TMI 462
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....otice issued under section 143(2) of the Act and the consequent assessment order for the Assessment Year 2010-11 dtd. 26/3/2013 are mainly challenged on the ground that notice issued under section 143(2) of the Act dtd. 26/9/2012 has been issued beyond the period mentioned in the first proviso to section 143(2) of the Act. No other submissions have been made. 3. It is the case on behalf of the petitioner that return of income for A.Y. 2010-11 claiming exemption of Rs.5,09,70,716/- was filed on on 29/4/2011. That the said return was processed under section 143(1) of the Act on 30/8/2011. That notice under section 143(2) of the Act came to be issued by the respondent on 26/9/2012 which actually came to be served upon the petitioner - assessee on 1/10/2012. It is the case on behalf of the petitioner that considering the first proviso to section 143(2) of the Act, notice under section 143(2) of the Act was required to be served within a period of six months from the end of accounting year only in which returns were filed and therefore, notice was required to be served by the petitioner - assessee on or before 30/9/2012. However, the said notice was served on the petitioner on 1/10/201....
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.... the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner shall not be applicable. It is submitted that as such notice under section 143(2) of the Act was in fact, issued on 26/9/2012 which was sent to assessee by Speed Post as one of the mode as mentioned in section 282 of the Act and 30/9/2012 (last date of service of the notice) was Sunday and the postal department was closed and therefore, on the very next available day i.e. on 1/10/2012 (Monday), notice under section 143(2) of the Act has been served. Therefore, relying upon section 10 of the General Clauses Act and applying the analogy / logic of section 10 of the General Clauses Act, it can be said that the notice has been served within prescribed period mentioned under proviso to section 143(2) of the Act and therefore, the said provision has been strictly complied with. In support of his above submissions, Mr.Bhatt, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the revenue has heavily relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Huda and another Versus Dr.Babeswar Kanhar and another, reported in (2005) 1 SCC 191 and in the case of Mohd. Ayub Versus State of Uttar Pradesh throu....
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....section 143(2) of the Act was required to be served upon the assessee on or before 30/9/2012. However, 30/9/2012 was the holiday and postal department was closed and therefore, notice under section 143(2) of the Act was served upon the assessee on the first subsequent opportunity i.e. on the next working day on 1/10/2012 i.e. on Monday. It is not in dispute that 30/9/3012 being Sunday was holiday. It also cannot be disputed that when the notice was issued by the department on 26/9/2012 by Speed Post and the same was dispatched on 27/9/2012 under normal circumstances and if 30/9/2012 would not have been holiday - Sunday, notice as such would have been served upon the assessee on or before 30/9/2012. However, as 30/9/2012 being Sunday was holiday, notice upon the assessee could not be served on that day and in fact the same could be served upon the assessee on the very next working day i.e. 1/10/2012 - Monday. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the revenue has heavily relied upon section 10 of the General Clauses Act, which reads as under :- "10. Computation of time.- (1) Where, by any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of this A....
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....ions in various other Acts, there is a general principle that a party prevented from doing an act by some circumstances beyond his control, can do so at the first subsequent opportunity [see Sambasiva Chari v. Ramasami Reddi, (1898) 8 MLJ 265 : ILR 22 Mad 179]. The underlying object of the principle is to enable a person to do what he could not done on a holiday, on the next working day. Where, therefore, a period is prescribed for the performance of an act in a court or office, and that period expires on a holiday, then the act should be considered to have been done within that period if it is done on the next day on which the court or office is open. The reason is that law does not compel the performance of an impossibility [See Hossein Ally v. Donzelle, ILR (1880 5 Cal 906 : 6 CLR 239]. Every consideration of justice and expediency would require that the accepted principle which underlies Section 10 of the General Clauses Act should be applied in cases where it does not otherwise in terms apply. The principles underlying are lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does not compel a man to do the impossible) and actus curiae neminem gravabit (the act of court shall prejudice no ma....