TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2001 (1) TMI 935
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....d at the earlier stages of the litigation centred round a question as to whether this item should be exempted from tax or not. The principal reason for this is because in section 2 of the Act which contains the definition the term "agricultural produce or horticultural produce" has been defined as follows: "Agricultural produce or horticultural produce shall not include tea, coffee, rubber, cashew, cardamom, pepper and cotton; and such produce as has been subjected to any physical, chemical or other process for being made fit for consumption, save mere cleaning, grading, sorting or drying." The defining section very clearly excludes rubber from one of the several items, which would otherwise clearly come under the definition of agricultur....
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.... contends that while reading item No. 2 in the Second Schedule to the Act, there is absolutely no scope to include the item "rubber" which has been specifically excluded in the defining section. His submission therefore was that irrespective of the invalid reason that is contained in the Tribunal's order that the conclusion is incorrect and unwarranted and that the order is liable to be set aside. Dealing with the line of reasoning adopted by the Tribunal, the learned Government Advocate submitted that the basis of the error emerges from the fact that the Tribunal appears to have been influenced by some of the earlier judicial decisions which relate to the definition of "agricultural produce" under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957. The lea....
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....ld be permissible for the court to go back to the definitions and such other aspects of the main legislation on which the subsequent legislation may be silent or in the event of ambiguity. This formula will not hold good in those of the cases where the Legislature consciously incorporates a definition in the new Act which definition is at variance from the original one. It will have to be presumed that there was a certain reason for this variation and in this background, it would not be permissible for a court to either ignore or override the definition and go back to the definition in the parent Act. As far as the present case is concerned, it will have to be totally and completely circumscribed by the provisions of the present Act. Where....
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.... that the expression used in the Second Schedule, namely, the expression "agricultural produce" is identical and it is his submission that since the entry in the Second Schedule does not specifically exempt rubber that this Court must be guided for the purposes of interpretation of the expression by the earlier decisions. We would have readily accepted this argument without any difficulty under normal circumstances except for the fact that in the case of the present Act as indicated by us earlier, the defining section wherein the term "agricultural produce" has been defined by the Legislature specifically excludes rubber as an item. Under the law governing the principles of interpretation this Court is necessarily restricted while construin....
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....e petitioners would still not qualify for any reliefs. It is true that the respondents' learned counsel submitted that in keeping with the theory of harmonious interpretation if there are certain inconsistencies, the court will have to adopt the ironing out process, in order to ultimately construe the different provisions in the manner that does not pose conflict. The learned counsel submitted that effectively the court must strictly construe the item No. 2 in Second Schedule wherein 2 or 3 of the items have been specifically included in the term "agricultural produce " without specifically again excluding the item which the petitioners are dealing with namely rubber. The inference according to the respondents' learned counsel would be that....