TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1999 (2) TMI 647
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....IIL were served on the firm on February 9, 1991. Against such assessment the firm preferred on April 8, 1991, before the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Central Section (Assessment Wing), two appeals-one against the assessment of tax and penalty and the other against the imposition of interest. But during the pendency of these appeals the assessing authority, in purported exercise of power under section 20(3) of the 1941 Act suo motu revised on December 16, 1991 the assessment as well as the order as to interest and thereby raised the demand further. The assessing authority then issued modified notices of demand in forms Nos. VII and VIIL in lieu of earlier demand notices. The firm again preferred two appeals on March 10, 1992 against such suo motu modification of assessment order and also the order relating to interest. In disposing of these two appeals, bearing Nos. A-1113/AW/91-92 and A-1114/AW/91-92, the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes annulled the two suo motu revisions of the tax assessment and levy of interest, on grounds, inter alia, that while appeals against the original assessment of tax and interest were still pending before the superior authority....
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....ch an order is not limited by the pendency of any appeal or by the provisions of rule 80(5) of the 1941 Rules. It is their further case that mere service of a show cause notice communicating the gist of a proposed order cannot lead to an inference that despite any logical objection against such proposed order, the final order of the respondent No. 3 would be the same as proposed. 3.. The question that calls for decision here is whether the respondent No. 3 has acted illegally or he was within his jurisdiction in issuing the impugned notice dated November 19, 1997. 4.. Mr. L.K. Gupta, learned Advocate for the applicant, at the first instance questions the validity of the notices issued by the Additional Commissioner on the ground that these notices do not disclose any reason for which the said authority considered it necessary to reopen the original assessment. But, if the Additional Commissioner gives the assessee an opportunity of being heard on all the grounds on which he (the Additional Commissioner) considered it necessary to reopen the assessment, there can be no denial of justice. The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sales Tax Officer, Ganjam v. Ut....
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....is rule lays down, inter alia, that the authority competent to exercise power of revision shall not, on his own motion revise any assessment or an order passed under the 1941 Act, if the period within which an appeal may be made has not expired. We fully cater to the view of Mr. Gupta that the legislative intent in framing this rule is not only to prohibit such suo motu revision during the period but has also greater implication. He adds that it would be wrong to say that after expiry of the period the Commissioner or his delegated authority would be competent to exercise the power despite the pendency of an appeal against the order which is intended to be suo motu revised. We fully agree with Mr. Gupta that this rule has been framed to ensure that an appeal filed against an order is not interfered with by any suo motu revision during the pendency of the appeal. This rule not only prohibits exercise of revisional power during the period available for filing of appeal but also by necessary implication prohibits exercise of the revisional power, even after the period of limitation, during the course of pendency of the appeal. Unless this be the position the clause (i) to the main sub....
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...... It has been argued by Shri K.K. Saha, learned Advocate for the respondents, that the Additional Commissioner has the unrestricted jurisdiction to revise under section 20 of the 1941 Act any order of his subordinate, and that the order of the Assistant Commissioner setting aside the order of the Commercial Tax Officer (modifying his own assessment) being also an order within the meaning of section 20, there can be no legal prohibition for him (the Additional Commissioner) to revise the said order of the Commercial Tax Officer. In support of his contention he refers to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in [1997] 107 STC 579 (Commissioner of Sales Tax, Orissa v. Halari Store). The said decision is in the context of section 23(4)(a) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947. In the said case the Supreme Court has held that under the said section the Commissioner has power to revise any order, including an appellate order made under the Act or the Rules by a person other than the Tribunal or the Additional Tribunal. He further adds that when the Additional Commissioner has the competence to exercise power under clauses (a) and (b) of section 20(3) to revise any such order, the notic....