AI OCR 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2006 (10) TMI 385
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....ysons (India) and M/s. P.J. Sales Corporation, Ludhiana. It was allegedly found that non-alloy steel, bars, rods, etc. of value ranging from Rs. 15/- to Rs. 17/- per kg. were exported in the guise of alloy steel forgings, bars, rods, etc. by declaring their value thereof from Rs. 110/- to Rs. 150/- per kg. and the export proceeds over and above the actual price were being routed through Hawala Channel. The officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) searched the factory as well as the residential premises of Appellant and that of Prabhjot Singh. Various incriminating documents were recovered. Appellant and the said Prabhjot Singh made statements under Section 108 of the Customs Act. Prabhjot Singh allegedly admitted to have supplied fake bills to units owned and controlled by Appellant on commission basis without actual supply of the goods. It was also found that Appellant had declared goods exported as "alloy steel" whereas after the tests conducted by Central Revenue Control Laboratory, they were found to be "other than alloy steel", i.e., non-alloy. The Consul (Economic), Consulate General of India at Dubai allegedly confirmed the existence of a parallel set of exp....
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....ons had to be recorded. The final order of detention was preceded not only on the basis of raids conducted in various premises, recording of statements of a large number of witnesses, carrying on intensive inquiries both within India and outside India, obtaining test reports from three different laboratories but also the fact that despite notices Appellant and his associates did not cooperate with the investigating authorities. They initiated various civil proceedings from time to time, obtained various interim orders and, thus, delay in passing the order of detention cannot be said to have not been explained. Learned counsel would contend that keeping in view the nature and magnitude of an offence under COFEPOSA, a distinction must be made between an order of detention passed under COFEPOSA vis-a-vis other Acts as per the law laid down by this Court in Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat and Others [(1988) 3 SCC 153] and in that view of the matter the High Court must be held to have arrived at a correct decision. Indisputably, delay to some extent stands explained. But, we fail to understand as to why despite the fact that the proposal for detention was made on 2.12.....
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....he order of detention. The question as regard delay in issuing the order of detention has been held to be a valid ground for quashing an order of detention by this Court in T.D. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala and others [AIR 1990 SC 225] stating: "The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised thus: The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay a....
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.... authorities of DRI themselves categorically stated that the activities of Appellant after 11.10.2003 were not in question and in fact all the bank accounts were defreezed. Although learned Additional Solicitor General may be correct in his submissions that ordinarily we should not exercise our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India by allowing Appellant to raise new grounds but, in our opinion, we may have to do so as an order of detention may have to be considered from a different angle. It may be true that the period of detention is over. It may further be true that Appellant had remained in detention for the entire period but it is one thing to say that the writ of Habeas Corpus in this circumstances cannot issue but it is another thing to say that an order of detention is required to be quashed so as to enable the detainee to avoid his civil liabilities under SAFEMA as also protect his own reputation. In a case of this nature, we do not think, in view of the admitted facts, that we would not permit Appellant to raise the said questions. So far as the question of non-placement of material documents before the detaining authority is concerne....
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..... and Others [(2001) 10 SCC 212], it was stated: "When we went through the grounds of detention enumerated by the detaining authority we noticed that there is no escape from the conclusion that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority was the cumulative result of all the grounds mentioned therein. It is difficult for us to say that the detaining authority would have come to the subjective satisfaction solely on the strength of the confession attributed to the petitioner dated 7-11-1999, particularly because it was retracted by him. It is possible to presume that the confession made by the co-accused Sowkath Ali would also have contributed to the final opinion that the confession made by the petitioner on 7-11-1999 can safely be relied on. What would have been the position if the detaining authority was apprised of the fact that Sowkath Ali had retracted his confession, is not for us to make a retrospective judgment at this distance of time." In Ahamed Nassar v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others [(1999) 8 SCC 473], this Court opined: "The question is....
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....ies in future, I am satisfied that there is a need to prevent you from indulging in such prejudicial activities in future by detention under COFEPOSA Act, 1974 with a view to preventing you from smuggling goods in future." We have been taken through the order of detention. The statements of Appellant and the said Prabhjot Singh were recorded therein in extenso. Recording of such statement must have been made from the xeroxed copies of such documents which were available with the detaining authority. The self-inculpatory statements of Appellant as also Prabhjot Singh purported to have been made in terms of Section 108 of the Customs Act were required to be considered before the order of detention could be passed. The same was not done. The original of such documents might not been available with the detaining authority but admittedly the xeroxed copies were. It has not been denied or disputed that even the xeroxed copies of the said documents had not been supplied to the detenue. It may be true that Appellant in his representation dated 14.06.2005 requested for showing him the original documents referred to or mentioned in the grounds of detention but then at least the xeroxed copi....