TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1994 (12) TMI 314
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....ry No. 137 and deserved to be taxed at 12 per cent. The revising authority therefore issued a notice dated September 25, 1981, to the assessee asking them as to why revision proceedings should not be initiated. The assessee however, made a request on November 4, 1981, not to proceed with the proposed revisions as certain tax appeals regarding the earlier assessment years in respect of same issue were pending before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (S.T.A.T.). Accordingly, the revising authority by order dated November 7, 1981, deferred the proceedings of the revisions till the disposal of the appeal. Later on the revising authority proceeded to decide the question after issuing fresh notices to the assessees on December 20, 1984. In the said revisions it was held that the article fell under entry No. 137 and deserved to be taxed at 12 per cent. The order in the revisions was passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes on April 15, 1985 and served upon the parties subsequent thereto. Appeals were filed before the S.T.A.T. against the said decision by the assessee. The S.T.A.T. held that though on the merits the assessees had no case, the exercise of powers of revision by ....
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....cluded in computing the period of four years specified in sub-section (3) for the purpose of making a fresh revision, if any, under this section. (6) Where any proceeding under this section has been deferred on account of any stay order granted by the High Court in any case, or by reason of the fact that an appeal or other proceeding is pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court involving a question of law having a direct bearing on the order or proceeding in question, the period during which the stay order was in force or such appeal or proceeding was pending shall be excluded in computing the period of four years specified in this section for the purposes of exercising the power under this section." From the perusal of the various relevant dates pointed out already it will be noticed that the assessing authority passed assessment orders some time in the month of May, 1980. In September, 1981, notice was issued for the first time for initiating revision proceeding under section 20. Final orders were passed in all the revisions some time in or, after January, 1986. Thus the orders were manifestly passed much beyond the period of four years from the date of assessment orde....
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....which are not the subject-matter of the appeal. According to Sri Jaiswal, the assessees had filed appeals before the S.T.A.T. only to urge the point that the exercise of powers by the Deputy Commissioner in the revision was bad as it was hit by limitation. The Tribunal need not have discussed the merits of the case when that was not the point open for discussion before the Tribunal. It is not necessary to deal with this point in these revisions which are preferred by Revenue for agitating a different point. The contention of the learned Government Pleader is that the revision proceedings having been initiated by issue of a show cause notice in the month of September, 1981, the question of limitation does not arise. The powers have thus been exercised by the revisional authority within four years as required by section 20(3) of the APGST Act. In support of his contention the learned Government Pleader makes reference to certain cases. Firstly he relies on the decisions in Ghanshyamdas v. Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax [1963] 14 STC 976 and Sales Tax Officer v. Sudarsanam Iyengar & Sons [1970] 25 STC 252. Both of these cases are Supreme Court decisions. In these cases ....
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....f the provisions of the Mysore Sales Tax Act or the Karnataka Sales Tax Act as the case may be. No doubt, the decisions in these cases support the view sought to be pressed by the learned Government Pleader. In all these cases the interpretation of expression "shall be exercisable" has been made on the lines which, the Government Pleader wants this Court to interpret the question of limitation in these cases. However, we are not inclined to accept the said interpretation. According to our view the exercise of powers of revision must come to an end within a period of four years from the date of passing of the order by the subordinate authority. The effect of section 20(3) of the APGST Act in our opinion, is that the revising authority is powerless beyond the period of four years to deal with the revision. The exercise of powers as a whole cannot extend beyond the period of four years from the date on which the order of subordinate authority was served on the dealer. The learned Government Pleader was unable to bring to our notice any decision of this Court taking a view on the lines of the Karnataka High Court. The Government Pleader, however, brought to our notice the decision in ....
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....eriod of four years was over. Lastly in State of Andhra Pradesh v. M. Ramakishtaiah & Co. [1994] 93 STC 406 the apex Court affirmed the decisions of this Court in Khetmal Parekh's case [1976] 38 STC 531 and Ramakrishnaiah's case [1976] 38 STC 537 and held further that if the order of the revisional authority purporting to have been passed within four years is served upon the assessee after substantial delay, then the presumption would be that the order was not made within a period of four years as required and was therefore barred by limitation. From all these cases relied on by the learned Advocate for the assessees, Sri Jaiswal it will be found that a consistent view has been taken by this Court which has been affirmed by the apex Court that the period of limitation of four years prescribed by section 20(3) of the APGST Act covers the whole proceedings of the revision including passing of the final order and of communicating the same promptly to the party concerned. We think, apart from the view taken by us, we are also bound by the consistent view taken by this Court which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court. It is true that in all these cases it was never urged by any one t....
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....e real position, it was futile for the Legislature to add by this sub-section that the intervening period from the date on which deferment takes place till the operation of the stay order, is to be excluded. It is well-known canon of interpretation of statutes that the Legislature does not enact futile provisions in an enactment. The purpose of bringing sub-section (6) on the statute book must therefore be to save the period of actual stay from the computation of total period of four years in deciding the revision which is in addition to order of assessment. It is however to be made clear at this juncture that section 20(3) which prescribes the outer limit of four years concerns only of the revisions "in relation to order of assessment passed under the Act". On the other hand, under section 20(1) the Commissioner has power to initiate revisions not only in relation to orders of assessment but also in relation to "any order passed or any proceeding recorded by authorities subordinate to it ". Therefore, the reading of section 20(1) and section 20(3) will show that the period of limitation is prescribed only to such orders which are in relation to assessment passed under the Act. Th....