TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2013 (1) TMI 616
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....rics. It was granted the status of EOU by the Government of India, Ministry of Industry, Department of Industrial Development by way of a Letter of Permission (for short "the LOP") dated 31.08.1992 as amended by letter dated 4.5.1993. The appellant applied for a license for private bonded warehouse, which was granted to it under C. No. V (Ch.51) 13- 01/92/100%EOU dated 30.09.1992 by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise Division- Raipur for storing inputs, raw materials, etc. either imported duty-free by availing concessions available for 100% EOU or procured locally without payment of duty for use in manufacture of all wool, poly-wool and other fabrics. 3. For interaction with the appellant, its sister unit, Uniworth Ltd., another EOU, engaged in the generation of power from a captive power plant, obtained another LOP dated 1.11.1994. The said LOP, dated 1.11.1994, permitted usage of electricity generated by the captive power plant by both, Uniworth Ltd. and the appellant Uniworth Textiles Ltd. The appellant purchased electricity from Uniworth Ltd. under an agreement which continued till 1999. 4. Prior to January-February, 2000, the sister unit i.e. Uniwor....
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....e Central Excises and Salt Act/ 1944 (1 of 1944), read with sub- section (3) of section 3 of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (58 of 1957), the Central Government being satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do, hereby exempts excisable goods, specified in Annexure I to this notification (hereinafter referred to as the said goods), when brought in connection with - a) the manufacture and packaging of articles, or for production or packaging or job work for export of goods or services out of India into hundred percent export oriented undertaking (hereinafter referred to as the user industry); or; XXX XXX XXX from the whole of, (i) the duty of excise leviable thereon under section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944), and (ii) the additional duty of excise leviable thereon under sub- section (1) of section 3 of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (58 of 1957), XXX XXX XXX ANNEXURE I 3. Captive power plants including captive generating sets and transformer....
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....EPZ concerned would be informed in writing for such supply and proper account of consumption of raw material would be maintained by the supplying unit for calculation of NFEP." 8. Yet, the appellant received a show cause notice from the Commissioner of Customs, Raipur, demanding duty for the period during which the appellant imported furnace oil on behalf of Uniworth Ltd. It gave the following reason for the same: - "1.1. M/s. Uniworth Ltd. (Power Division), Raipur, is engaged in the generation of power. M/s. Uniworth Textiles Ltd. and M/s. Uniworth Ltd. both are distinct companies having different LOP Central Excise Registration No. and different board of directors. They are different companies as per Companies Act and they prepare separate balance sheet... 4.2. Therefore it appears that the noticees had not received 742.5 KL of furnace oil ... from M/s. Coastal Wartsila Petroleum Ltd... in their factory at all as neither they had storing facility to store the furnace oil so procured nor they had any power plant to utilize the said furnace oil to generate electricity. They also did not have LOP from Government of India... to procure and us....
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....assessee in case of duties not levied, short-levied or erroneously refunded. It allows the said limitation period to be read as five years only in some specific circumstances, viz. collusion, willful misstatement or suppression of facts. Since the said show-cause notice was issued after the elapse of six months, the revenue, for its action to be legal in the eyes of law, can only take refuge under the proviso to the section. 11. Both the appellate authorities, viz. the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise (Appeals) and the Tribunal, rejected the claims of the appellant and affirmed payment of duty and penalty. They reasoned that since the appellant procured the furnace oil not for its own captive power plant, but for that of another, it could not claim exemption from payment of duty; entitlement of duty free import of fuel for its captive power plant lies with the owner of the captive power plant, and not the consumer of electricity generated from that power plant. Little or no attention was paid to the issue of limitation, which in our opinion, is the primary question for consideration in this case. The Tribunal only made the following observations in this regard: ....
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....from the relevant date in the circumstances mentioned in the proviso, one of it being suppression of facts. The meaning of the word both in law and even otherwise is well known. In normal understanding it is not different that what is explained in various dictionaries unless of course the context in which it has been used indicates otherwise. A perusal of the proviso indicates that it has been used in company of such strong words as fraud, collusion or wilful default. In fact it is the mildest expression used in the proviso. Yet the surroundings in which it has been used it has to be construed strictly. It does not mean any omission. The act must be deliberate. In taxation, it can have only one meaning that the correct information was not disclosed deliberately to escape from payment of duty. Where facts are known to both the parties the omission by one to do what he might have done and not that he must have done, does not render it suppression." [Emphasis supplied] 14. In Sarabhai M. Chemicals Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Vadodara[(2005) 2 SCC 168], a three- judge bench of this Court, while referring to the observations extracted above, echoed the follow....
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....[(2005) 7 SCC 749], while again referring to the observations made in Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Company (supra), this Court clarified the requirements of the proviso to Section 11- A, as follows:- "26...This Court in the case of Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Company v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay (supra), while dealing with the meaning of the expression "suppression of facts" in proviso to Section 11A of the Act held that the term must be construed strictly, it does not mean any omission and the act must be deliberate and willful to evade payment of duty. The Court, further, held :- 'In taxation, it ("suppression of facts") can have only one meaning that the correct information was not disclosed deliberately to escape payment of duty. Where facts are known to both the parties the omission by one to do what he might have done and not that he must have done, does not render it suppression.' 27. Relying on the aforesaid observations of this Court in the case of Pushpam Pharmaceutical Co. v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay [1995 Suppl. (3) SCC 462], we find that "suppression of facts" can have only one meaning that the correct informa....
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....ort levied or short paid or erroneously refunded because of either fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts or contravention of any provision or rules. This Court has held that these ingredients postulate a positive act and, therefore, mere failure to pay duty and/or take out a licence which is not due to any fraud, collusion or willful misstatement or suppression of fact or contravention of any provision is not sufficient to attract the extended period of limitation." [Emphasis supplied] 18. We are in complete agreement with the principle enunciated in the above decisions, in light of the proviso to Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. However, before extending it to the Act, we would like to point out the niceties that separate the analogous provisions of the two, an issue which received the indulgence of this Court in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Customs[(2001) 4 SCC 593, at page 619] in the following words:- "53...Our attention was drawn to the cases of CCE v. Chemphar Drugs and Liniments (1989) 2 SCC 127, Cosmic Dye Chemical v. CCE (1995) 6 SCC 117, Padmini Products v. CCE (1989) 4 SCC 275, ....
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.... intent to evade payment of duty" occurring in proviso to Section 11-A of the Excise Act which are missing in Section 28(1) of the Customs Act and the proviso in particular... 56. The proviso to Section 28 can inter alia be invoked when any duty has not been levied or has been short-levied by reason of collusion or any wilful misstatement or suppression of facts by the importer or the exporter, his agent or employee. Even if both the expressions "misstatement" and "suppression of facts" are to be qualified by the word "wilful", as was done in the Cosmic Dye Chemical case while construing the proviso to Section 11-A, the making of such a wilful misstatement or suppression of facts would attract the provisions of Section 28 of the Customs Act. In each of these appeals it will have to be seen as a fact whether there has been a non-levy or short-levy and whether that has been by reason of collusion or any wilful misstatement or suppression of facts by the importer or his agent or employee." [Emphasis supplied] 19. Thus, Section 28 of the Act clearly contemplates two situations, viz. inadvertent non-payment and deliberate default. The former is canvas....
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.... inference of bona fide conduct in favour of the appellant. The appellant laboured under the very doubt which forms the basis of the issue before us and hence, decided to address it to the concerned authority, the Development Commissioner, thus, in a sense offering its activities to assessment. The Development Commissioner answered in favour of the appellant and in its reply, even quoted a letter by the Ministry of Commerce in favour of an exemption the appellant was seeking, which anybody would have found satisfactory. Only on receiving this satisfactory reply did the appellant decide to claim exemption. Even if one were to accept the argument that the Development Commissioner was perhaps not the most suitable repository of the answers to the queries that the appellant laboured under, it does not take away from the bona fide conduct of the appellant. It still reflects the fact that the appellant made efforts in pursuit of adherence to the law rather than its breach. 24. Further, we are not convinced with the finding of the Tribunal which placed the onus of providing evidence in support of bona fide conduct, by observing that "the appellants had not brought anyth....